



# **JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES**

## **Specialized Studies**

A Peer-Reviewed Quarterly Periodical Journal

---

Year 2, Issue 7, June 2018

---

ISSUED BY



**RASANA**  
المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية  
International Institute for Iranian Studies

# ISRAEL AND ITS STRATEGY OF FACING IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Jihad Abu Sa'dah

---

Regional Affairs Specialist

**I**srael's security and military doctrine rests on a strategy of deterrence, and preventive war, as well as, maintaining the qualitative superiority of its strategic weapons, mainly, its nuclear superiority in the region. Israel gives priority to hard power in responding to threats in the region. It looks at Iran's nuclear program as a strategic threat in case it develops nuclear weapons. In addition, Tel Aviv believes Iran aims to threaten Israel by implementing its regional project, as well as, supporting proxies in Lebanon and Palestine. This threat posed by Iran, resulted in Israel opposing the nuclear deal signed by Iran and the P5+1<sup>(1)</sup> group in Vienna on July 14, 2015.<sup>(2)</sup>

## **Iran's nuclear ambitions**

Iran has significantly progressed in its nuclear capability and it has developed its own military capability relying on its internal expertise. Its nuclear ambitions started during the Shah's era from 1957-1979 and they expanded after the 1979 revolution.<sup>(3)</sup>

At the beginning of the 1990s, Iran's nuclear program was active on all levels because of advanced nuclear research. At this time, it only had a few strategic nuclear plants and they were shrouded with total secrecy to avoid any military strikes similar to the Israeli strikes on Iraq's nuclear program in the 1980s.

Iran has justified developing nuclear capability for several reasons<sup>(4)</sup> 1- nuclear energy for civilian purposes, so more of its oil can be exported in exchange for foreign currencies 2- support its industrial sector with nuclear technology 3- develop specialized personnel in this important field, 4- its right - in agreement with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to enrich uranium locally for self-sufficiency and shed dependency on external providers.<sup>(5)</sup> Nevertheless, Iran's secrecy surrounding some parts of its nuclear program such as the Fordow nuclear plant northeast of Qum, revealed by Iranian dissidents abroad, has raised doubts concerning Iran's motives and whether parts of its nuclear program were geared towards military purposes.<sup>(6)</sup>

There are other declared and undeclared motives behind Iran's nuclear program which can be summarized as follows:

**1. Economic motives:** Iran has proclaimed that its nuclear program was developed for civilian purposes and it would supply approximately 20% of its energy needs. This is important as its population continues to grow and its economic development plans project an increase in energy consumption in the country. Energy from nuclear plants would mean more oil and gas can be exported rather than employed for energy needs.<sup>(7)</sup>

**2. Military motives:** Iran's security policy relies on two basic principles 1- possessing defensive capabilities to avert Israeli and US threats on the one hand and 2- strengthening its strategic role in the Gulf and the Middle East, preventing regime change, and protecting its vital interests under the current world order on the other.<sup>(8)</sup> As a result of these principles, Iran believes in the importance of having a nuclear program to securitize itself from threats.

**3. Strategic motives:** The development of Iran's nuclear capabilities is part of its holistic foreign policy to play a strategic role, improve its armed forces, and possess strategic weapons to guarantee qualitative superiority and prevent threats,<sup>(9)</sup> knowing that it adopts a radical ideology which it seeks to export beyond its borders. Accordingly, Iran will be able to improve its influence, position and protect its strategic gains from any expected hostilities.

**4. Improve its international political standing:** A nuclear program gives Iran a pressuring card and a bargaining chip when interacting with major powers, particularly the United States and other regional countries.<sup>(10)</sup>

**5. Attain a balance of power with Israel:** Undoubtedly, one of the important motives behind Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program is its desire to attain a strategic balance with regional powers, especially Israel that has prioritized Iran as its number one strategic enemy. Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is an expression of its opposition to the West as it disregards the demands of Middle Eastern countries for Israeli nuclear plants to be inspected or at least for Israel to be pressured into signing the NPT.<sup>(11)</sup>

**6. Protect its borders and the regime from external hostilities:** Iran's high- uranium

enrichment proportion might speed up its ambition to possess nuclear weapons that will securitize its territory and deter external threats. In addition, Iran will be able to deny the United States any possibility to invade it and threaten its regime like the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.<sup>(12)</sup>

**7. Expand its influence in the Arab region:** One of Iran's strategic goals is to expand its influence in the Arab region. The geopolitical reality indicates that Iran cannot expand north or east as there are military and nuclear powers- India, Pakistan, and China in the east and Russia in the north- meaning that Iran can only expand westward.<sup>(13)</sup> As a result, Iran's possession of nuclear weapons improves its ability to impose its hegemony on its neighboring countries and threaten their security and stability.

All in all, Iran has sought to possess nuclear technology for civilian purposes away from the provisions of the NPT, which confirms its intention to acquire nuclear weapons or at least the necessary technology to develop them to avert regime change threats, and improve its strategic role, as well as, having the capability to resist its enemies, mainly, Israel.

### **The Israeli assessment of Iran's nuclear program and ways of confrontation**

Israel views Iran as a strategic enemy and believes its nuclear program is a threat to its existence. Israel fears an Iranian nuclear attack and it believes such weapons will extend its hostile behavior, as well as, its relations with its proxy militias and factions in countries such as Lebanon and Syria. In addition, Iran could transfer its nuclear technology to any of its regional allies such as the Syrian regime which has commenced a nuclear program by building a nuclear plant in Kibr area in Deir ez-Zor and it was targeted by Israel in September 2007.<sup>(14)</sup>

Israel believes Iran to be a state sponsor of terrorism and it will pose a bigger threat in case it possesses nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran provides Israel with the pretext to promote this by its practices, policies, and hostility from its officials. Accordingly, Israel argues that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons is extremely critical, not only for Israel but also for the international community in general and fears that the Iranian nuclear program could develop and grow beyond international control.<sup>(15)</sup>

The prospective Iranian nuclear threat was raised for the first time in the late 1990s in the United States when some observers noted that Iran could possess nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Accordingly, Israel and the United States have placed the Iranian threat among the priorities of the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).<sup>(16)</sup>

The Israeli political discourse has focused on Iran as a reckless ideological state that can potentially use nuclear weapons against Israel or against any other country. Also, that it plays a major role in promoting religious radicalism, as well as, using violence and terrorism to attain its strategic goals.<sup>(17)</sup> In addition, Israel marketed the idea that Iran could possibly provide such weapons to terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad to attack Israel;<sup>(18)</sup> therefore, according to Tel Aviv, Iran's possession of nuclear weapons is a means to it supporting Islamic movements which threaten Israel,<sup>(19)</sup> as well as, supporting its regional project and serving its proxies.<sup>(20)</sup>

Israel has always provoked Washington, secretly and openly, against Iran's nuclear program accompanied by its threat to strike Iran's nuclear plants and has set preventive military plans in this concern, mainly, the Iranian Bushehr nuclear plant.<sup>(21)</sup> The Israeli government lobbied the former US President George W. Bush to persuade him to

prioritize Iran and its threat.<sup>(22)</sup>

Israel exerted pressure on the US administration and Russia. It informed them that it would not wait until the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant and it was determined to put an end to Iran's nuclear program, even if this involved the use of military force.<sup>(23)</sup> Some observers expected an American-Israeli strike against Iran. However, the United States did not intend to go to war with Iran and jeopardize its relations with the Arab and Islamic states. This pushed the Bush administration to exert pressure on Russia and other countries to thwart Iran's nuclear program.<sup>(24)</sup>

In addition, Israel exerted pressure on the European Union and the IAEA. On September 13, 2003, it gave Iran until the end of October 2003 to prove it was not seeking the development of nuclear weapons and to sign the additional protocol to the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement. While the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed Elbaradei threatened to bring the matter to the Security Council if Iran failed to fully cooperate with the IAEA.<sup>(25)</sup>

Strategic estimates were made by the most prominent Israeli military strategists; Meir Dagan, the former Chief of Mossad from 2002- 2011 and Gabi Ashkenazi, the former Israeli Chief of Staff from January 2007-February 2011. They said that Iran would not possess nuclear weapons before 2015 and that there was no need to rush and strike Iran. This strategic estimate contradicted the previous years' strategic estimates when the intelligence provided by Israel to Western countries stated that Iran would have nuclear weapons before mid-2011.<sup>(26)</sup>

Despite a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the European Union to stop uranium enrichment, Israel questioned Iran's intentions and the ineffectiveness of inspections carried out by the IAEA. According to the Israeli assessment of the situation, Iran has the necessary scientific expertise and nuclear technology to carry out uranium enrichment away from censorship and inspection, implying that agreements do not prevent Iran from uranium enrichment in secret plants leading to the development of nuclear weapons.<sup>(27)</sup>

All Israeli parties are unanimous on the fact that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons poses a strategic threat to Israel. In 2010 the Israeli army officially announced, for the first time in history, that Iran was Israel's number one strategic enemy and that the removal of Iran's nuclear threat was its top priority and the biggest challenge facing it since its existence.<sup>(28)</sup> All in all, Israel has relied on the following strategies in the face of Iran's nuclear program:

1. Combining the principle of preemptive strikes to guarantee that Israel is the only nuclear power in the region and the Ben-Gurion principle of building close relations with the countries surrounding Iran to encircle it without ignoring US presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf. Indeed, because of Iran's vast geographic size, this policy will be fruitful as Iran is surrounded by the Israeli and American presence on all sides.<sup>(29)</sup>
2. Constant pressure on the United States to challenge Iran's nuclear program, by diplomatic or preventive military methods, despite, the fact that Israel does not traditionally rely on others in issues related to its security.<sup>(30)</sup>
3. The creation of the Ministry of Strategic Affairs in 2006, active intelligence services to collect information, fabricating information like the Iraqi case, and deploying Mossad to carry out external operations to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear technology.<sup>(31)</sup>
4. Israel set two conditions for accepting any peaceful initiative or proposal to remove

weapons of mass destruction from the region 1- reaching a peace agreement with the Arab countries and Iran with complete constraints on all armament operations on the one hand 2- and the removal of weapons of mass destruction but with the implicit acceptance of Israeli nuclear weapons on the other.<sup>(32)</sup>

The Israeli officials have shown three different positions in dealing with Iran's nuclear issue as follows:

1. This position was expressed by the Israeli political and military leaders Ehud Barak, Gabi Ashkenazi, Ehud Olmert, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Avigdor Lieberman, saying that Israel must be prepared for the military option and set up a ground attack on Iran's nuclear plants at the appropriate time. This strategy was adopted by Netanyahu who called it, "Iran First", which meant prioritizing a confrontation with Iran over any other Palestinian, Lebanese, or Syrian threat. Lieberman believes Iran is the main problem in the Middle East.<sup>(33)</sup>
2. Expressed by the former Director of the Israeli intelligence, Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash who said that Israel was unable to confront Iran's nuclear threat by relying on its own forces and that it was in dire need for help from the United States, adding that if the United States took any military action against Iran, Israel had to be part of the operation.<sup>(34)</sup>
3. This position can be noticed by the statements of the former late President, Shimon Peres who said that Israel had no intention to attack Iran and that there had to be a broad international agreement to tackle Iran.<sup>(35)</sup>

In fact, these positions are no more than a difference in evaluating the Iranian threat to Israel and the priorities in dealing with this threat between those who wanted to postpone the military option, and those who supported an immediate military strike, as well as, those who favored provoking other parties such as the United States to strike Iran. In parallel with the above positions, the Israeli army continued conducting military exercises, armament, buying state-of-the-art warplanes and surveillance aircraft in the world, and testing the Hetz [Arrow] interceptor missile systems and others. Indeed, these preparations were praised by Netanyahu who expressed his satisfaction with Israeli preparations for any military option against Iran.<sup>(36)</sup> To face the Iranian nuclear threat and thwart its nuclear program, Israel has one of two options: a militarily strike to remove or hinder Iran's nuclear ambitions or to improve non-military pressure to force Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions on its own.

Israel has faced several problems in facing Iran's nuclear program such as its credibility as it is not a signatory to the NPT, and the relaxed approach of the Arab's to Iran's nuclear issue. Accordingly, Israel favored hiding behind the American position while provoking the US administration against Iran. An Israeli military strike on Iran's nuclear plants is extremely difficult and faces many technical, tactical and political challenges. The Israeli warplanes must fly long distances to get to their targets deep in Iran and need the approval of Israel's neighboring countries to enter their airspace, in addition to the legitimacy of such a strike. In fact, it has become clear that Israeli threats to strike Iran's nuclear plants were only part of a distribution of roles with the United States to provoke the European Union and the Russian's to exert pressure on Iran to stop its uranium enrichment and comply with the requirements of the IAEA.<sup>(37)</sup>

### **The nuclear deal and mounting Israeli concerns**

After two years of negotiations, the P5 + 1 group and Iran signed the nuclear deal in April 2015, which raised Israel's concerns about Iran's ability to become a regional nuclear

power with the approval of the major powers and the European Union. Israel was concerned that the agreement would restart Iran's oil exports, unfreeze its assets, and legitimize it regionally. This would pose a threat to its borders and security considering Iran's growing role in Syria. In addition, Israel believed the nuclear deal would give Iran some breathing space after which it could resume its nuclear program and that the agreement could collapse at any moment, allowing Iran to resume its uranium enrichment.<sup>(38)</sup>

As a result of these fears, Israel opposed the Iran nuclear deal and resumed threatening military action against Tehran. Netanyahu launched a campaign against it, claiming that the agreement was a historic mistake and that major powers were risking "Our future." Netanyahu said, "The world has become more dangerous than before and the nuclear deal allowed Iran to possess the capability to produce a large arsenal of nuclear weapons." Netanyahu assured that Israel was not part of the agreement and would continue to defend itself.<sup>(39)</sup> He believed the agreement did not take Israeli long-term interests into account and only focused on achieving the short-term interests of superpowers.<sup>(40)</sup>

Netanyahu restored the policy of threats and said that his government did not vow not to sign the nuclear deal, but to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Israeli Minister of Security, Moshe Ya'alon criticized the nuclear deal sharply and talked to Israeli radio saying, "Today is a victory for Iran that went to negotiations claiming weakness but has become the strongest party by lying and cheating." Like Netanyahu, Ya'alon repeated his threats and asserted that Israel would defend the security of its citizens by its own capabilities as needed.<sup>(41)</sup>

Netanyahu did not accept the assurances of the former US President Barack Obama in a telephone conversation between them, particularly that the terms of the agreement completely removed any possibility for Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Netanyahu called for an urgent meeting of the Political-Security Ministerial Council that unanimously rejected the nuclear deal, saying that Israel was not committed to this agreement.

The Council decided to begin a media campaign, targeting public opinion, and political elites in the United States and Europe, focusing on the dangers of the nuclear deal on Israel, the region, and the world. The campaign emphasized that this agreement not only turned Iran into a nuclear power, but improved its standing in all economic, political, and military aspects as well as providing it with the means to produce advanced conventional weapons.<sup>(42)</sup> The Council asserted that the nuclear deal would allow Iran to conduct research and production operations related to advanced centrifuges, acquire nuclear-related equipment and technologies, and develop ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In addition, according to Israeli officials, the agreement would remove monitoring operations on Iran's nuclear activities and exclude undeclared inspection visits to Iran's sites since the terms of the nuclear deal stated that Iran should be given a notice of at least 24 days ahead of such visits. Also that the IAEA should inform it in advance of the purpose of the inspection, which would permit Tehran time to cover up most of its nuclear activities.<sup>(43)</sup>

During that period, after the US Congress's failure to reject the Iran nuclear deal, the Israeli strategy concentrated on three directions 1- the US interior, 2- the moderate Arab countries, 3- handling its internal discourse over its military and security strategy.

The first phase of the Israeli strategy focused on speaking against the nuclear deal to blackmail the United States at a later stage in terms of qualitative and unique military

assistance after improving Iran's regional standing by the nuclear deal.<sup>(44)</sup> In the second phase, Israel tended to polarize the moderate Arab countries in parallel with its endeavors directed towards the American interior. It sought to reap the fruits of the concerns of these countries about the nuclear deal and use a strategy of common concern about Iran's threat, hoping to change the entire regional conditions.<sup>(45)</sup> The third phase of the Israeli strategy was related to military and security issues. In an inconsistent position with Israel's political institutions, an Israeli military source stated that Iran's nuclear deal eased the direct non-conventional threat on Israel, but at the same time, it would allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons in a year.<sup>(46)</sup>

After signing the Iran nuclear deal, Israel experienced a state of confusion and uncertainty and found itself in trouble after the Iranian nuclear program, according to Israeli officials, obtained international legitimacy. Israel started looking for other options and alternatives to deal with the new situation. On the one hand, it tried to obtain American financial and military assistance and to improve relations with Arab countries having similar concerns about Iran, its nuclear program and its growing threat in the region. In addition, Israel began an international diplomatic campaign to question the Iranian nuclear deal and its intentions in the region, considering its hostile practices, interference in Arab internal affairs after the Arab Spring and the development of its ballistic missile program. This campaign paved the way for Israeli propaganda on Iran and the resumption of US-Israeli coordination on this issue, especially after President Donald Trump's inauguration that gave fresh impetus to reconsidering the nuclear deal and even re-evaluating Iran's role in the region.

### **Israel and post-US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal**

Israel relied on President Trump to adopt a hardline position on Iran, unlike former President Obama who espoused a policy of negotiations and understanding with this country. President Trump vowed to cancel the Iran nuclear deal and described it as the worst in US history as it permitted Tehran to threaten regional security and it had not thwarted Iran's future nuclear ambitions. After a year and a half of difficult policy discussions, threats of sanction on Iran and rebuilding an alliance to confront Iran's regional threat, President Trump kept his promise and announced the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 8, 2018, the resumption of sanctions, and He set new conditions to negotiate a new treaty with Iran,<sup>(47)</sup> which represented an important victory for Israel and a step towards facing Iran's threat.

Earlier on April 30, 2018, Netanyahu revealed documents he called "The secret archives of the Iranian nuclear program" which Iran was trying to conceal, and this political move was considered to provoke the US to withdraw from the nuclear deal.<sup>(48)</sup> Israel welcomed President Trump's decision and described it as a historic one. Netanyahu said that President Trump had made a brave and correct decision<sup>(49)</sup> that would give grounds for a new phase of security and stability in the Middle East. He added that a united front against the Iranian regime would derail its aggressive practices that threaten the Middle East and the international community. Netanyahu openly declared his army's readiness to begin military operations against any source of threat to Tel Aviv, in a strong reference to Iran and its proxies.<sup>(50)</sup>

Israel has praised President Trump's policy on Iran since his inauguration as he threatened to impose the highest level of economic sanctions on Iran after they were removed under the provisions of the nuclear deal. On its part, the US Department of Treasury announced that all nuclear-related sanctions would be resumed on Iran after



the six-month deadline set by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in December 2016, including hindering Iranian oil from getting into world markets.<sup>(51)</sup> The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo announced a set of terms and conditions for negotiating a new agreement with Iran. Pompeo's terms would thwart the Iranian nuclear program, diminish its regional role, and remove the threat of its ballistic missiles- the points that correspond with Israeli interests.<sup>(52)</sup>

On its part, Israel worked to undermine the Iran nuclear deal. It used President Trump's announcement and began several military strikes on Iranian sites in Syria and tried to thwart Iran's presence in this country or at least near its areas of influence. At the same time, Israel tried to convince the European parties to exert more pressure on Iran to reach a new agreement while taking Israeli interests into considerations when Netanyahu visited Germany, Britain, and France on June 4, 2018, to discuss the nuclear deal and Iran's regional role.<sup>(53)</sup>

All in all, Israel is satisfied with the current US policy on Iran, especially on the nuclear issue as it focuses on the following points:<sup>(54)</sup>

- » Iran's ballistic missile program as President Trump has always said that the nuclear agreement was a failure because it did not address Iran's ballistic missiles, knowing that Iran refused to include this in the nuclear deal.
- » The United States wants to develop a new inspection system and to include American experts in the inspection team who should have access to Iran's nuclear plants and gain the necessary information about its nuclear program.
- » The United States wants to guarantee that Iran shall not resume its nuclear activities after the expiry of the nuclear deal and that this agreement shall be eternal, meaning that Iran shall not be able to resume the 20% uranium enrichment as stated in the nuclear deal.

No doubt, undermining Iran's nuclear deal leads to two possibilities 1- a better agreement that does not provide time for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and prevents it from developing ballistic missiles 2- or military action against Iran and its nuclear plants, making Israel the only regional nuclear power and removing all threats to its security. Indeed, Israel favors the first option as the second has critical consequences.

## **Conclusion**

The Israeli position on Iran's nuclear program has been determined by its concerns about Iran having nuclear weapons which would change the fact that Israel is the only nuclear power in the region. Therefore, Israel welcomed and supported the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal when Israeli officials expressed satisfaction with America's pressuring policy on Iran, as well as, the imposition of more restrictions on this country such as the resumption of nuclear-related international isolation and sanctions. The Israelis benefited from US pressure on Iran and began several military strikes on its forces and proxy militias in Syria. They agreed with the Russians to keep these forces away from the Israeli areas of influence near the Syrian borders, especially in the occupied Golan Heights. In addition, Russia and Israel agreed to limit Iran's role in Syria, intending to weaken Iran in general.

Nevertheless, there are still several risks related to Iran's nuclear program. For example, the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal could give Iran a pretext to resume uranium enrichment at the same rates prior to the agreement as many of the Iranian officials have threatened. On the other hand, the United States is facing international opposition concerning withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Despite threatening all parties

to sanctions in the event of cooperating with Iran, the resumption of sanctions needs a long time to go back to how they were prior to the nuclear deal. This could possibly benefit Iran more than the other parties, especially regarding its nuclear ambitions. Indeed, these ambitions are in Iran's strategic goals given that it already possesses the suitable infrastructure and qualified personnel to resume uranium enrichment.

As a result of the above, Israel could restore its traditional options in dealing with Iran's nuclear program by provoking the United States against Iran with the possibility of beginning a military operation targeting its nuclear plants, acting individually against targets, or continuing its diplomatic endeavors to provoke the international community to adopt a policy of isolation and pressure to thwart Iran's nuclear program. It seems that Israel will give priority to the latter option considering the US hardline position on Iran and the possibility that the European parties could change their positions on this country as they are convinced of Iran's threat and its destabilizing regional behavior. In addition, the European parties consider the American position and are aware of their loss if they violate the US policy and adopt a different one, knowing that all regional powers favor this option and strive to implement it.

The military option to confront Iran's nuclear program by either Israel or the United States is possible but will have serious consequences on Israel's and regional security. However, the policy of pressure and isolation could invite more productive results considering the critical internal conditions facing the Iranian regime and its involvement in crises abroad in a way beyond its capability to proceed on for a long time. Thus, the policy of depleting and weakening the Iranian regime is more fruitful than targeting it in a direct way.

## Endnotes

- (1) *P5+1 Group*: it is the five permanent members in the Security Council- the United States, France, Britain, Russia, and China and Germany.
- (2) Barhoom Jariesi, "Israel Objects the Nuclear Deal, Considering it a Threat," *Alghad*, 4 April 2015, accessed 22 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/hK22L>.
- (3) Ata Zahra, *The Iranian Nuclear Program* (Beirut: Olive Center for Studies and Consultations, 2015), 17.
- (4) Durriyah Basyouni, "Israel and the Gulf Cycle, Obligations of Ideologies and Pragmatism of Interests," *Gulf Affairs*, no. 60 (winter 2010): 21.
- (5) "Ali Larijani, Goals of the Iranian nuclear program are absolutely civilian," *Mehr News Agency*, 10 April 2006, accessed 24 February 2018, <http://cutt.us/fEAjs>.
- (6) "Exposure of an Iranian secret site for uranium enrichment," *Mujahidin Khalq Website*, 24 February 2015, accessed 10 September 2018, <http://cutt.us/8Hm7>.
- (7) Zahra, *The Iranian Nuclear Program*, 10.
- (8) Sa'ad Mijbil Hubaidah, "The Iranian Nuclear Program and its Impact on the Kuwaiti Foreign Policies for the Years 2003-2012" (Master's thesis, the Middle East University, 2013), 41-42.
- (9) Zahra, 2015, 15.
- (10) "Larijani, "Goals of the Iranian nuclear program are absolutely civilian," *Mehr News Agency*, 10 April 2006, accessed 24 February 2018, <http://cutt.us/iOfwO>.
- (11) Hubaidah, "The Iranian Nuclear Program and its Impact on the Kuwaiti Foreign," 42.
- (12) Basyouni, "Israel and the Gulf Cycle."
- (13) Hubaidah, "The Iranian Nuclear Program," 44.
- (14) "Israel officially admits destruction of proposed nuclear plant in Deir ez-Zor in Syria in 2017," *France 24*, 31 March 2018, accessed 22 October 2018 <http://cutt.us/xLIG5>,
- (15) Hibah Jamaloddin, "Israel and Iran's Role after the Nuclear Deal," *Journal of International Policy*, no. 202 (December 2015): 12.
- (16) Abdulmunim Nour, *The Iranian Nuclear Activities from the Beginning until Imposition of Sanctions* (Cairo: the Egyptian Angelo Library, 2009), 25.
- (17) Jamaloddin, *Israel and Iran's Role after the Nuclear Deal*, 21.
- (18) Yahya Sadaqah, "The Israeli Nuclear Weapons," *Journal of Diplomatic Studies*, no 10 (1993): 2.
- (19) Ahmad Mahmoud, *The Iranian Nuclear Program: The Crisis between Difficult Settlement and Risks of Escalation* (Cairo: Strategic Political Studies in Al-Ahram, September 2005), 20-21.
- (20) Jamaloddin, "Israel and Iran's Role after the Nuclear Deal," 21.
- (21) Mohammed Alahmar, Saber Balool, and Qasem Abu Dest, "The Israeli Political Positions on the Iranian Nuclear Program," *Tishreen University Journal for Scientific Research and Studies* 33, no. 6 (2011): 94-96.
- (22) Fraiman Ameer, "Iran's Nuclear Program from an Israeli View," trans. Yahya Debouq, *Journal of Islamic Unity*, no. 17 (November 2005): 44.
- (23) Mohammed Mohammed, "America Cornered Iran, Tehran Concerned About Israeli Threats," *Alwasat News*, 29 September 2003, accessed 23 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/AQX3d>.
- (24) Alahmar et al., "The Israeli Political Positions on the Iranian Nuclear Program," 97.
- (25) Ibrahim Ghali, "Israel and Facing the Iranian Nuclear Threat," *Israeli Selections*, no 110 (February 2004): 126.
- (26) Fadi Nahhas, "Security-Military Scene in 2010," *Madar Strategic Report 2011*, ed. Ghanim, Hunaidah Ramallah: The Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies, 2011, 144.
- (27) Ahmed Mahmoud, *The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Analyzing Strategies and Conflict Administration*, Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies, no. 149, 2005, 45-47.
- (28) Ephraim Kam, "The Iranian Challenge" in *Strategic Survey for Israel 2010*, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, (2010), 141-156.
- (29) Khodr Abbas, "Israel's National Security: Theories and Levels," *Alwaei for Studies and Training*, 2003, accessed 10 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/XOLZV>.
- (30) Ghali, "Israel and Facing the Iranian Nuclear Threat," 127-128.
- (31) Yousif Rezqa, "Minister of Strategic Threats and the Dark Situation," *Donia Alwatan*, 4 November 2006, accessed 21 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/Sulaq>.
- (32) *Ibid.*, 128.
- (33) Talal Atreesi, "The Israeli Strike on the Iran's Nuclear Program: Possibilities and Consequences," *Strategic Report*, no.13, Olive Center for Studies and Consultations,(June 2009), p50.
- (34) Israa Alkoud, "Regional Stance on Iran's Nuclear Program," *Economics and Political Sciences College Journal* 16 , no. 4, (2015): 96.

- (35) Ibid., 96.
- (36) Nahhas, "Security-Military Scene," 144-146.
- (37) Mahmoud, *The Iranian Nuclear Crisis*, 45-47.
- (38) Nahhas, 145.
- (39) Barak Rafeed, "Netanyahu to Obama: the nuclear deal threatens Israel's security, Obama: the US Secretary of Defense arrives in Israel next week," *Haaretz*, 14 July 2015, accessed 10 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/8U8j>.
- (40) Nahhas, 110.
- (41) Israeli unanimity on facing the Iran nuclear deal, *Al Jazeera*, July 14, 2015. <http://cutt.us/Ieo4E>, Date of Access: December 10, 2018
- (42) Rafeed, "Netanyahu: Israel is not committed to the nuclear deal,"
- (43) Nahhas, 145-146.
- (44) Hassan Ibrahim, "Israel's Strategy after the Nuclear Deal: Cry to Blackmail Washington," *Alahd News*, 14 July 2018, accessed 21 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/FD3lk>.
- (45) Ibid.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) "The US Withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal might severe its stance on Iran," *Reuters*, 9 May 2018, accessed 10 October 2018 <http://cutt.us/LKnr>.
- (48) "Netanyahu tries to convince America to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal," *Alwatan Newspaper*, 1 May 2018, accessed 10 October 2018. <http://cutt.us/f1WDD>.
- (49) "After Trump's withdrawal these are the US and Israeli nuclear goals in Iran," 1 April 2015. *AlKhaleej Online* <http://cutt.us/rT9dC>, Date of Access: December 10, 2018
- (50) "The most prominent reactions to the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal," *Alhadaf Gate News*, 8 May 2018, accessed 10 October 2018 <http://cutt.us/wMcVL>.
- (51) Abdurrahman Assiraj, "What does Trump's individual withdrawal from the nuclear deal mean?" *Noon Post*, 9 May 2018, accessed 10 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/sPTWa>.
- (52) "Pompeo: these are our terms to lift sanctions on Iran," *Alhurra Channel*, 21 May 2018, accessed 10 September 2018, <http://cutt.us/zxsXj>.
- (53) Ali Haidar, "Netanyahu in Europe: let all fronts unify against Iran, Alakhbar," 4 June 2018, accessed 10 September 2018, <http://cutt.us/Aepf9>.
- (54) Mohammed Gharouri, "This is Iran's response to the possibility of the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal," *Sputnik*, 3 May 2018, 10 October 2018 <http://cutt.us/AjqO9>.