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IRANIAN FEMINISM MODERNIZATION AND ISLAMIZATION

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After decades since the 1979 revolution, Iran still does not have a good reputation in women's rights. Iranian women continue to face strict laws and political restrictions, as well as, suffer from discrimination in education and employment. In the light of these circumstances, women are exploring different avenues to develop tools that allow them to resist the regime and its policies against them.

The women's tools of resistance in Iran include "hard power" such as organizing and participating actively in "feminist" or "political" protests, as in the 2009 "Green Revolution", as well as "soft power" which does not resist the regime directly, such as women's organizations, and newspapers, as well as, lobbying campaigns to change laws and to reinterpret religious texts. The aforementioned are non-traditional tools of resistance but have proven to be potent because of their impact at multiple-levels.

Iranian feminists disprove the claim that the regime is the only representative of Islamic law and is the only authority capable of interpreting religious texts. They refute the accusation that they have adopted Western feminist thought and argue that their legitimacy is drawn from Islamic law. Iranian feminists present Islam as a religion which liberates and does not oppress women.

Western feminism is grounded on the idea of separating feminism and religion, as it is regarded as developing a system of 'feminist oppression'. However Islamic feminists, on the contrary, include religious discourse and it is for this reason that Muslim women have been inspired by feminism, as they want to pursue their rights without forsaking their religion for the sake of feminism.

This study deals with the development of feminist activity in Iran at the beginning of the last century and the most important stages that it has gone through with a focus on the post-revolutionary period. It presents the regime's attitude towards women, their role in the public sphere, and the impact of state policy on them. And it discusses the rise of Islamic feminism and the reaction of the religious class in this regard.

The study is based on a basic principle that the role of women in Iran was and is at the heart of major national discussions evolving around state building-unlike in most of the neighboring Islamic countries where feminism has remained on the sidelines. In the Pahlavi era, the Shah's modernization project was based on forcing women to remove the headscarf and compelling them to exist in the public sphere. In contrast, under the revolutionary regime, the Islamization project was based on making the headscarf compulsory and compelling women to leave the public sphere. In both cases women were part of the state's self-definition and its declared ideology. However, feminist resistance undermined state policies and forced it into making concessions. Accordingly, this study raises the following questions- how does Iran frame its feminist policies and its strategies for women? how does the religious class deal with the feminist issue? And what is their position regarding active feminism?

First: Modernization and the rise of Islamism

The controversial issue of women and their social position has concerned Iranian thinkers since the late 19th century. However, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were progressive when it came to women issues, whereas Iran was linguistically isolated as it was separated from the Arab states, and it was not part of Ottoman territory. Iran's link to the West and its modernist ideas were relatively weak because it was not under direct imperial control.⁽¹⁾ Also, the position of women in Iran was not as progressive as in other regions because of a lack of social reformists who championed the feminist movement with the pen such as Qasim Amin, one of the Arab world's "first feminists" or Tahar Haddad. Secondly, women's entry into the public sphere was by politics not charitable work which is a preliminary and necessary step to give women the skills for organized activity.

The first involvement of women in the public sphere was seen at the constitutional revolution at the beginning of the last century, when some elite women, who had ties

with politicians and prominent clerics, sought to limit the absolute power of the Shah and establish parliamentary rule. When feminism started, it was not that convincing, women were deprived of their right to vote, worst of all, gender issues were not discussed during the drafting of the constitution, and no explanation was given for this isolation. Hassan Madras⁽²⁾ explained, in the House of Representatives, when he said, "Allah did not give women the energy and the ability to make them able to vote, so the minds of this vulnerable kind are not ready."⁽³⁾

Women's disappointment with politics led them to participate in social and educational activities. In 1910, "Danesh" or "Knowledge" was the first female newspaper which was titled repetitively with, "We only publish matters concerning domestic affairs and we do not discuss politics." Some semi-secret women's associations came into existence and several girls' schools were founded because of the state's delay in taking this step until 1918.⁽⁴⁾ Despite the cautious nature of female activists to avoid a clash with the religious class, they were still opposed. For example, the opening of girls' schools was challenged by protests led by Ayatollah Shushtari,⁽⁵⁾ and by women from the lower classes. Leaflets were distributed and a fatwa asserting the illegality of these schools was issued⁽⁶⁾ by Ayatollah Abdullah Nuri.⁽⁷⁾

The opposition of the clergy to women's education requires some clarification as Islam encourages the education of both genders equally. So why did the clergy deny the right of education for women? The clergy's opposition to women's education cannot be justified by religious texts but they were insistent on religiously legitimizing their "isolation" of women. With the arrival of the Pahlavi family to power, Iran entered what is known as "state feminism" as the state adopted a policy of supporting and empowering women in all fields starting from Reza Shah (1925-1941). He adopted a model of westernization and secularization, like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, who was admired by him. Women were a cornerstone in this project and the intellectual elite, like the West, believed the inferior standing of women and the hijab were symbols of Islamic regression, and there was no way to overcome this and reach enlightenment except by improving the position of women and removing the veil.

The state's pro feminist policies advanced rapidly as it constructed many female schools free of charge. When the University of Tehran opened in the mid-1930s, women could register. The state encouraged women to enter the labor market and it employed many. However, these steps were overshadowed by the headscarf being banned by an official decree in 1936. Accordingly, women were no longer allowed to wear the traditional "*chador*" or the headscarf. To overcome this hurdle they were encouraged to wear European hats. Although the law included men as well, especially public servants, who had to wear European suits, the degree of implementation was not at the same level as for women. For example, policemen had strict orders to remove the chador, hijab and immediately tear them up. In contrast, the attire of men was ignored.⁽⁸⁾

The reformist laws and the anti-Islamic laws, simultaneously, represented a serious strategic mistake by Iran's modernist elite. Few of the women from the elite benefited from gains, such as education whereas most of the women did not benefit. In rural and remote areas where the state was almost non-existent, women continued to wear traditional clothing and their lives were unchanged. However, women from the middle and lower classes in urban areas were far from liberated as many of them felt because of the hijab ban they had to stay at home and give up their public activities, such as shopping, general economic chores and going to public baths. The law kept these women indoors and contributed to their subordination because they were forced to give up their

public role and rely on men more than before.⁽⁹⁾

There were no significant changes in the position of women between 1936 and 1963 when the state granted women their political rights. Three women became members of the house of representatives and female ministers were appointed in 1968.⁽¹⁰⁾ In conjunction with these developments, the family protection law was passed in 1967 granting women the right to divorce and husbands could no longer divorce their wives unilaterally or be granted the custody of children automatically post-divorce. The first wife or the court's approval was a key condition for marrying another, and the age of marriage for girls was raised from 13 to 18 years.⁽¹¹⁾

These changes were met with sharp opposition from the religious class. They criticized women in parliamentary and municipal sessions. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini expressed his opinion in a letter that "the entry of women to the house of representatives and to municipal councils was contrary to the laws of Islam."⁽¹²⁾ The family protection law was challenged when Ayatollah Khomeini issued a *fatwa* which stated that any woman who was divorced by a civil court would be committing adultery if she remarried.⁽¹³⁾

The policy of "state feminism" in Iran led to different aftermaths. It contributed to erasing some of the social hindrances that had prevented women from being visible in the public sphere. After Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1978) relaxed the restrictions on the hijab, women could study and work while wearing a modern hijab. On the other hand, it led to the following negativities;

First: This policy weakened the feminist movement because it relied on government donations resulting in dependency. This hindered its development, particularly its organizational and communication skills. Also, its independence was completely eroded when the state nationalized women's organizations by merging them into one state organization headed by Ashraf Pahlavi, the daughter of Reza Pahlavi.

Second: Most social groups were under the influence of the religious class. In education, the low rate of female participation at all stages showed the extent to which parents had been influenced by the religious class.

Second: The Islamic Republic and feminism

There were several factors that led Iranians to revolt against the Shah's regime. The most prominent of these was the exclusion of most social classes from oil revenues, the Shah's social policies alienating the grassroots and his compulsory modernization project. When massive demonstrations broke out in Iranian cities, women participated in large numbers. It was interesting that women insisted in wearing the chador or hijab and did not raise any gender demand.

According to the Iranian academic Homa Hodfar, wearing the headscarf was a "temporary act" by middle-class women to show their disapproval of feminist ideology and to deny that communists and foreigners were leading the demonstrations. Wearing the hijab encouraged women from the lower classes to join the demonstrations. In her opinion, the demonstrators did not have gender demands because of the Shah's close relationship with women's rights and raising gender demands seemed to contradict with the goals of the revolutionary movement.⁽¹⁴⁾

As the revolution attained its goal, clerics hurried in implementing their Islamization policies. After two weeks of the revolution, the family protection act was abolished, the ban on temporary marriage was lifted, and the legal age of marriage and legal accountability was lowered to 9 years for girls and 14 years for boys. Ayatollah Khomeini

declared after a month of his return from exile that women cannot work as judges,⁽¹⁵⁾ and in a speech at the Rafah school three days later, he showed his displeasure about unveiled women working in state ministries and institutions, and he ordered women to wear the hijab.⁽¹⁶⁾

On the following day of the International Women's Day, protests broke out against attempts to impose the headscarf. A women's demonstration led by some leftists was organized at the University of Tehran and a few thousand protesters participated in it and women lawyers organized several protests at the Ministry of Justice.

As the protests expanded into the street, the religious class made a tactical retreat and the government announced that Ayatollah Khomeini's message had been misinterpreted, and there was no intention of imposing the headscarf. The government mentioned the family protection law would remain active until another law was passed, but the protests did not stop, and the clergy took over the country announcing in June 1980 that women should wear the headscarf at work. As a result, protesters were immediately dismissed, and the following year women from religious minorities and foreign visitors were forced to wear the hijab.⁽¹⁷⁾

In the next few years of the revolution, the "governing principles" defining the state's plan towards women became clearer:

1- The priority of the public sphere: The clergy agreed that the role of women in the private sphere was more important than their role in the public sphere. This matter was frequently repeated in their speeches, as Ayatollah Khomeini stated that whatever the scientific degree or the professional level of women "she must be a perfect housewife."⁽¹⁸⁾ Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Leader stressed this issue saying, "**The role of women in the family- according to me- outweighs all the roles that she can perform.**" He proclaimed that women should not sacrifice their role at home as a mother and wife in favor of any action that can be played outside, "it is not a kind of heroism that women imitate men in their work because the job of women is more important than all the business of men."⁽¹⁹⁾

2-Encouraging childbearing: The state gave childbearing great attention - at least in the early years - to oppose the Shah's policy of birth control. Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized this importance, considering that "motherhood is a sacred duty for women."⁽²⁰⁾ He also warned that "women who control their birth because of their activity outside the home contradicts the human nature of women". He considered this behavior similar to the Western model, thus he emphasized that "the great sin of Western civilization lies in weakening this role."⁽²¹⁾

3- Disapproving the principle of equality: They considered it as a Western principle contrary to the nature of the two sexes. The Tehran Institute for Studies and Research highlighted that this view prevailed at the governmental level as the "equality between women and men in education and work is no longer a goal of social progress in Iran."⁽²²⁾ This opinion was popular among women who were close to the government such as Ms. Shahla Habibi, the Presidential Advisor of Women's Affairs during the late President Akbar Hashmi Rafsanjani's reign. She said, "The Islamic view assumes that men and women complement each other, whether in the same family or the community."⁽²³⁾

We can touch on the impact of these principles on policy and law. For example, as part of the plan to return women to the private sphere, the government day care centers for children were closed. A law was proposed to encourage women to retire early after 15 years of work, and to lower the number of working hours into half for mothers. However, it

was not a good idea because of its economic infeasibility.⁽²⁴⁾ To encourage childbearing, birth control centers were shut down and the punishment for abortion was increased to death. The parliament submitted a proposal on maternity for some flexibility at work. In violation of the principle of equality, the state adopted a discriminatory policy against women, preventing them from participating in the judiciary, studying in some colleges - such as the Faculty of Law and the College of Agricultural Sciences or even continuing their studies abroad. This was under the pretext that the state was a "custodian of our honor" and that women should not be sent to stay in a "corrupt environment."⁽²⁵⁾

The implementation of this policy had far-reaching results on women and their position in society. At the political level, women retained some political rights; for example, four women were elected to parliament in 1980. Later, women were elected as local council members, but they were excluded from executive and decision-making positions. It took Iranian women one decade to have the first woman appointed as a deputy minister, 17 years as a vice president, and 30 years as a female minister.⁽²⁶⁾

The constitution and labor laws did not distinguish between men and women, yet women were slowly hired in traditional fields such as nursing, teaching, and medicine, and they did not benefit from their salaries because they paid higher taxes and insurance than men. Women sometimes had to pay for their children's care in preschools and they had no right to purchase cheap goods from civil service cooperatives.⁽²⁷⁾

In 1981, the Iranian parliament passed a new law on punishments grounded in Islamic law, which meant that certain provisions concerning divorce and *Diya* varied between men and women. On the other hand, the law included punishments ranging from imprisonment to ten - sixty days or a fine for violating the "hijab".⁽²⁸⁾

Third: The new feminist wave and resistance strategies

The feminist movement began to emerge during the early days of the revolution. However, it grew strength evidently by several successful campaigns and strategies. The Western model, as Iranian feminists believe, is not suitable to imitate as its analytical tools and learning experiences primarily stem from the lives of the middle and rich class of women in the West. It failed to achieve the equality needed to integrate women in the labor market. Instead of economic liberation, it made women captives of global capitalism. Finally, it failed to recognize marriage and motherhood as being rewarding.⁽²⁹⁾

In general, the feminist movement is divided into three main currents:

1-The conservative current: It adopts a traditional approach close to that which is provided by the *Hawza* and seeks to diverge from this approach slightly, so it is considered by some observers as a semi-official current. One of the most prominent representatives of this trend is Zahra Mustafa, the daughter of Ayatollah Khomeini, who headed the association of "Women in the Islamic Republic" founded in 1986. It aims to "realize the rights of women and recognize their position in the family and home." It issues the feminist edition "*Nada*", which was first published in 1991.⁽³⁰⁾

2- The renewal current: It is linked to the Islamic *marāji*, but it adopts a radical way in gender issues. It was challenged by the conservative feminist movement and religious institutions. It rejected attempts to impose the headscarf and discrimination against women.

One of the most prominent representatives of this current is Mrs. Azam Taleghani, the third daughter of Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani,⁽³¹⁾ who participated in the revolution. She was a member of the first Islamic Consultative Assembly. She was elected as

Secretary General of the feminist movement. Also, Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of the former reformist Prime Minister Hussein Mousavi. She was the first woman to be appointed as university chancellor. Mrs. Taleghani headed the Islamic Women Association which issued a critical feminist journal known as "Hajar's Message" and was considered as the voice of women inside the Islamic Republic; as it aimed to monitor the suffering of Iranian women. The journal's name is inspired by Hajar, the wife of the Prophet Ibrahim who suffered alone with her baby in the desert. Mrs. Taleghani was suspended for her bold criticism for seven years between (1989-1996), even though she was a member of parliament and one of the revolutionary activists.

Mrs. Taleghani had been trying to run for the presidency in all Iranian elections since 1997. However, the Guardian Council, insisted on rejecting her papers -and other women's' too – grounded on article 115 of the constitution which states that a candidate should be a man and Ayatollah Khomeini's statement that a woman is not suitable for the presidency. Mrs. Taleghani was not convinced of these arguments and she was even criticized by the "Hajar's Message" journal. It sought the views of some prominent clerics and politicians about her. Mrs. Taleghani traveled to Qom to convince the clerics to change their position towards women.⁽³²⁾ The female nomination for the presidency was resolved theoretically in 2004-2005 when the Persian Language Council issued a statement asserting that the word man is equal to the word woman. Therefore, the Spokesman of the Guardian Council was required to say that women could stand for the presidency.

3-Hermeneutics current: It is a juridical current that combines the feminist and Islamic institutions. It arose as an independent current associated with the publication of "Zanan" magazine in 1992. It was founded by Shahla Sherkat, who worked throughout the 1980s in the journal "Zen Rose" or Women Today, part of the famous Keyhan Group, which was run by a group of Islamic activist's post-revolution addressing the attacks against women in its early years. She left the journal "Zen Rose" after editorial disagreements by adopting a more radical reformist approach for women's issues.

Zanan" magazine differed from other women's publications in two ways"

First: It was closely linked with feminism from day one and it translated several feminist articles into English for Western readers, as well as translating the texts of feminist theorists such as Simon Bolivar, Virginia Woolf and Charlotte Gillman into Persian. This feminist trend was bizarre according to Iranians who viewed feminism as a "female perversion" and a "Western threat" which instigated women to rebel against men.

Second: "Zanan" magazine depended on a radical interpretive approach towards religious texts. This was different from the traditional approach known in the Islamic world since the nineteenth century. "Zanan's" project rejected this traditional approach as it was male dominated and championed a new interpretation of religious text grounded in modern knowledge. This approach led to different results from what was found in classical Islamic texts.⁽³³⁾

This approach was taken as an excuse by traditional clerics, such as Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, to disapprove of the magazine's articles as he considered them as undermining religious knowledge. The College of Religious Studies in Qom decided to counter feminist ideas and it issued a journal, "Biyam Zan", translated as "the letter of the woman" supervised by the clergy. Despite these criticisms, "Zanan" magazine continued to publish for 16 consecutive years (1992-2008) until the reign of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

(2005-2013). It reappeared in 2014 renamed as "Zanan Imroz." It was banned again after publishing ten editions only, as it covered a controversial story that investigated the living arrangements of couples who were not married in Iran.⁽³⁴⁾

The feminist movement, with its various leanings, has managed to cooperate with each other and to develop successful strategies, as well as, campaigns to restore some of the lost rights of women in the early years of the revolution. The new family law of 1992 was better than the previous law as it provided many opportunities for women. For example, the new law allowed women to set conditions in the marriage contract and it placed them in a better legal position, since men had to negotiate the amendment of these conditions in their favor.⁽³⁵⁾

The "law of equal hire", issued in 1991, was championed by female activists in the press as it approved equal pay for men and women, as well as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in determining wages. Under legislation passed in 1995, maternity leave for breastfeeding mothers in the public and private sector was increased by 4 months. This law required employers to provide enough breaks and appropriate locations for women to breastfeed. Such laws had significant symbolic and ideological implications because they opened the door for Islamic countries to approve new laws for women grounded in non-traditional interpretations of religious texts.⁽³⁶⁾

Another success for female activists was when Ayatollah Khomeini granted women the custody of *the children of martyrs* instead of to wealthy men in recognition of their sacrifices for the revolution. Also, they succeeded in raising the reproductive role issue, which Mrs. Taleghani and other female activists had repeatedly criticized. This issue was resolved after the end of the Iran-Iraq war under the late President Rafsanjani (1989-1997), by beginning a national program for family planning which succeeded in lowering birth rates. Also, exclusion from the judiciary was resolved when women could work as consultants for judges in the family court, and later women were given rights to issue judicial decisions. The parliament raised the age of marriage for girls from 9 to 13 years in 2002 because of pressure from female reformists and currently there is a discussion about the possibility of raising the age further, as well as a lifting the ban on women traveling abroad.

Women have succeeded in pushing the clergy to step back from their anti-feminist policies and to adopt a feminist policy but still there are pending issues such as the compulsory veil and the ban of women running for the presidency. The success of women under a religious regime is particularly significant because it represents a feminist victory over interpretation and hard-liner readings, not Islamic law itself which speaks of women rights. It demonstrates that the strict religious positions, which were adopted by the state, were only ideological and could be revoked later.

Endnotes

- (1) Homa Hoodfar, *Women's Movement in Iran: Women at the Crossroads of Secularization and Islamization*, (Grabels Cédex: Women Living under Muslim Laws, 1999).
- *Qasem Mohammed Amin (1863-1908): He was an Egyptian thinker, a pioneer, and a leader of Women's Liberation Movement. Tahar Haddad (1899-1935): a Tunisian author, trade unionist and theoretician. He campaigned for the development of Tunisian society at the beginning of the 20th century. He worked for the rights of Tunisian union workers, the emancipation of Tunisian women and the prevention of polygamy in the Muslim world.
- (2) Hassan Modarres (1870-1937) was an Iranian political cleric and a notable supporter of Iranian Constitutional Revolution. He was elected for the second term of the Majlis.
- (3) Mahdi Mehrizi, "Religious Trends in Contemporary Iran: The Position of Women" *Contemporary Texts* 6, (2006):71.
- (4) Ellen Fleischman, "Other Renaissance: The Rise of Women's Movements," in *the Modern Middle East: Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East*, ed. Judith Tucker and Margaret Mrother (Cairo: The Supreme Council of Culture, 2003), 148.
- (5) Muhammad Taqi Shushtari (1902-1996) was a Shia scholar and the grandson of Jafar Hussein Ali Shushtari, the author of *Al Khasaes Al Hosseinya*.
- (6) Hoodfar 1999.
- (7) Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri (1843-1909) was a prominent Shia cleric and played an integral role in the tobacco protest movement by issuing a fatwa prohibiting tobacco. He supported the Constitutional Movement and suggested establishing a committee of senior Shia scholars to revise the laws issued by the *Majlis* [parliament]. Later he turned against the Constitutional Movement and established "the Islamic Majlis." In 1909, he was executed over his opposition to the government.
- (8) *Ibid.*, 13-14.
- (9) *Ibid.*, 15.
- (10) Azadeh Kian, "Islamic Feminism in Iran: A New Form of Subjugation or the Emergence of Agency", *Critique Internationale* 46, no. 1 (2010): 50.
- (11) Haleh Esfandiari, "Iran Primer: The Women's Movement," PBS, October 27, 2010, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://goo.gl/akQrnp>.
- (12) Mehrizi, 72.
- (13) Ziba Mir-Hosseini, "Women and Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran: Divorce, Veiling, and Emerging Feminist Voices," in *Women and Politics in the Third World*, ed. Haleh Afshar (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 142.
- (14) Hoodfar, 22-23.
- (15) *Ibid.*, 27-28.
- (16) Bara al Joma'a, "Iranian Women and the Compulsive Hijab Syndrome," *Geroun*, March 9, 2018, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://goo.gl/oT64fx>.
- (17) Hoodfar, 27-28.
- (18) Hala Afshar et al., "Women and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Iran," in *Women and Politics in the Third World*, ed. Haleh Afshar (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 135.
- (19) Talal Atris et al., *Women in Imam Khamenei's Mentality* (Beirut: Dar Al-Ma'aref Al-Hakamiya, 2013), 4-5.
- (20) Afshar, 131.
- (21) Atris et al. 58.
- (22) Cateon Amirepour, "Chador and Equality are not at odds," *Qantara*, April 3, 2003, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://goo.gl/bDVRba>.
- (23) Bassem Bakor, "Iranian President's Advisor Speaks to the Center," *Alhayat*, November 25, 1996, accessed 25 October 2018, <http://cutt.us/I5wYy>
- (24) Afshar, 135.
- (25) *Ibid*; 137.
- (26) Haleh Esfandiari, "The Women's Movement," *The Iran Primer*, August 2015, accessed 25 October 2018, <http://bit.ly/2R80Ut6>.
- (27) Afshar, 133-134.
- (28) "The Dilemma of Iranian Women's Movement: Will It Be Solved?," *Rasanah IIIS* April 4, 2018, accessed October 1, 2018, <https://goo.gl/9U7MGL>.
- (29) Afshar, 125-127.
- (30) Dalal Abbas et al., *Women and the Family in the Constitution and Iranian Laws* (Beirut: Center of Civilization for the Development of Islamic Thought, 2009) 70.

(31) Mahmoud Taleghani (1919-1979), a Shia cleric, who played a political role in Iran pre-1979 revolution. He supported Mohammad Mosaddegh's nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. He spent 15 years in Jail during Shah's reign. After the 1979 revolution, he became a member in the Assembly of Experts for Constitution. Few months after the 1979 revolution, he died.

(32) Amirepour.

(33) Afsana, Najmabadi, "Feminism in an Islamic Republic: Years of Hardship, Years of Growth," in *Islam, Gender and Social Change* ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad and John L. Esposito (Oxford, 1998), 64-67.

(34) Guardian Media Group, "Iran bans magazine after 'white marriage' special," *the Guardian*, April 27, 2015, accessed, October 1, 2018 <https://goo.gl/iKuCbG>.

(35) Hoodfar, 34-35.

(36) *Ibid.*, 35.