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THE CRISIS IN IRAN: BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE AND AUTHORITARIAN RESISTANCE

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If compared to contemporary states, Iran represents a unique model. Its political system has characteristics and features that cannot be found in other systems. This leads to a methodological problem when attempting to understand the nature of this system and trying to classify it among the other political systems, which can be considered as having a normal structure. For example, when looking at the Iranian constitution's articles, we get the impression that there is separation among the three branches of power and a mechanism for accountability and oversight, let alone regular electoral contests. But a deep look at the political system reveals that this impression is totally untrue and that the Iranian political system is subject to the authority of a single person, the guardian jurist. Moreover, the legislation approved by Iran's parliament, which is an elected body, is reviewed by the 12 member appointed Guardian Council as I will further explain.

The Iranian regime is not only authoritarian and theocratic, but it possesses characteristics of authoritarianism, despotism, theocracy, and the rule of clergymen all intertwined together. On the other hand, it carries some traits of democratic systems such as a rotation of power and elections. The Iranian state is regarded as a nation-state but it has imperial ambitions beyond its border.⁽¹⁾

This study argues that the Iranian state and its political system in the post-1979 laid the foundation for what can be called the institutional doctrine of the state. This refers to a host of political practices connected with the establishment of the state and represents the framework that regulates the ideology that is embraced by the political elites across its wide-ranging spectrum. These political practices are the main common denominators that guide, legitimize and justify the political behavior of institutions and individuals. They also affect the constitutional principles and the structure of Iran's system, as well as, the relationship among its institutions, state and society.

The ideological nature of the state: it is a state with a religious and ideological message. In the preamble of Iran's constitution, it states that it does not only seek to protect its borders, but it shoulders the burden of the heavenly message to render God's system of governance victorious worldwide. In the concluding part, the Iranian constitution stipulates that the Iranian government hopes this century will be the time when the Islamic government is established worldwide and all the oppressors are defeated across the globe. The Iranian constitution also cites Quranic verses and prophetic Hadiths to indicate the purposes and aims of the Islamic state, as well as, its activities and its ideological missions. This has impacted the relationship between the state and society, raising two pertinent questions - Does the state represent society and its interests? Or does it have an ideological mission?

The authority of the Supreme Leader: The Jurist Leadership's objective is to emerge all authorities under his control. This was the motive for the religious bloc to cleanse Iran's political scene of potential threats, particularly the political blocs and movements that partook in the revolution against the Shah, as well as, a host of political parties and forces of different backgrounds that were co-opted by the religious elite.⁽²⁾

The conflict pattern: In general, the conflict between the people and their rulers is instrumental in renewing the revolution and protecting it from its foes at home and abroad. This was apparent in the way the Shah's regime was toppled. This happened through taking to the streets, staging protests, strikes and sit-ins, as well as, other methods of collective action. Also, the Shah was toppled by violence as a means to achieve certain ends.⁽³⁾

First: The relationship between state and society, domination not representation

The state is not only a legal entity or a legal person. Nor is it a host of institutions and organizational structures. It does not live and assume its duties in a vacuum. Rather, it is a medium for multiple and frequent interactions among social and economic forces in society. Also, it is a place where the interests and strategies of international actors converge. This increases interchangeable influence among nations.

Three political schools have emerged in the political analysis on the relationship between state and society:

The first school, it was based on the state playing a central role, and was named as "Statism." The state is the representative of public interests, and it seeks a balance between different social forces and classes. It is the just ruler who strikes a balance among different groupings, and he protects society, its identity and independence. The state is custodian in nature and it is relatively independent from society. The state has a clear will and goal expressed by coherent political elite and is capable of changing and developing society according to the ideologies and ideas of the ruling elites. This 'Statism' was the basis from which stemmed development and modernization

theories in the 1960s and 1970s, and influenced the concept of the state in Marxist and Fascist theories.⁽⁴⁾

As to **the second school**, it was based on society playing a central role. Society is the origin. It precedes the state. And the state represents society and is not independent of it. The state is an extension of cultures and interests prevalent in society. When the state is separated from society, it turns into an apparatus for repression and coercion that has neither approval nor legitimacy from the masses. Some of the supporters of this school went too far in their vision, coining terms like advancing societies and retreating states in reference to the increasing role of society at the expense of the state. But they quickly paid attention to the state and admitted its role in developing a relationship with society based on integrating the two, which paved the way for the next school to emerge.⁽⁵⁾

The third school, that the professor of international studies Joel S. Migdal called "State-in-Society,"⁽⁶⁾ He argues that it is very wrong to view the state as an entity imposed on society or that it lives in isolation, although it is true that some countries aim to reshape their societies through a general policy, as well as, being true that at the same time society is reshaped as a result of its interaction with societal forces and interests.⁽⁷⁾

In this regards, the concept of "mutual empowerment", emphasizing a complementary and mutually reinforcing relationship between the institutions of the state and the society, emerged. Increasing the power of civil society organizations does not necessarily weaken the institutions of the state. In the same sense, increasing the institutional capacity of the state does not necessarily suffocate society. Thus, the concept of a guardian or dominant state has been subjected to fundamental criticism, and other concepts have emerged that focus on multiple centers of social, economic and political power.⁽⁸⁾

Iran offers a ideological, or rather sectarian model, that is based on the principles of the Islamic revolution that are enshrined and expressed in many articles of the constitution,⁽⁹⁾ such as Article 2: "continuous leadership (imamah) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam;" Article 3: "The creation of a favourable environment for the growth of moral virtues based on faith and piety and the struggle against all forms of vice and corruption;" Article 4: "This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter;" Article 8: "In the Islamic Republic of Iran, al-'amr bilma'ruf wa al-nahy 'al al-munkar is a universal and reciprocal duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the government with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the government. The conditions, limits, and nature of this duty will be specified by law. (This is in accordance with the Qur'anic verse: "The believers, men and women, are guardians of one another, they enjoin the good and forbid the evil."⁽¹⁰⁾

The ideological nature of the conditions for holding senior positions in the state is evident. For example, the President should be a person with a "religious personality of integrity and piety," and he must believe in the principles of the Islamic republic and Twelver Shiism.⁽¹¹⁾ Likewise, Iran's Constitution defines the goals of official institutions, stating that the goal of the Supreme Council for National Security is to protect the Islamic Revolution and its national interests (Article 176), and the goal of the judiciary is to "safeguard the rights of the people in accordance with the line followed by the Islamic movement, and the prevention of deviations within the Islamic nation."

The Constitution focuses on the military establishment, particularly its doctrine, that makes faith and belief a basic need for inclusion in the armed forces. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has a distinct role in this regard. The Constitution states that its mission is to defend the Islamic Revolution and to raise the youth accordingly. The Guard maintains ideological purity, revolutionary enthusiasm and direct association with the ideas of the *Velayat-e Faqih*.⁽¹²⁾ The IRGC has many responsibilities at times of war and peace. It participated in the Iran-Iraq War, as well, as

the wars in Syria and Iraq, resulting in thousands of Iranian casualties

The IRGC has evolved since 1979 to become a well-disciplined military organization, as well as, a political and economic power. It has been assigned to maintain internal security and repress protests.⁽¹³⁾ Also it has acted as an Islamic vice squad. The IRGC was used by the religious elite to pressure reformists such as the former presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani. The IRGC has continued as an independent organization and it has not been integrated into the regular army unlike other revolutionary organizations across the world such as the Red Army in Russia, and the Popular Liberation Army in China. After the revolutionary successes in Russia and China, the revolutionary organizations that led the uprisings were integrated into standing armies.⁽¹⁴⁾

The sublime aim of the Islamic republic's regime is to establish a regime that paves the way for the reappearance of Imam Mahdi who will lead the Islamic global government.⁽¹⁵⁾ According to Article 152 of Iran's constitution, Iran's foreign policy is based on defending the rights of all Muslims and according to Article 154, "While scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the *mustad'afin* against the *mustakbirin* in every corner of the globe." The Iranian political system by this article seeks to exonerate itself from accusations of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries.⁽¹⁶⁾

Iran has aspirations beyond its borders. The ruling elite has used Persian nationalism to reinforce this aspiration to protect Iran's strategic interests, and its strategic position, as well as, to present Iran as a strong regional actor capable of leading the Muslim world, or at least a large part of it under the principles of the Iranian revolution.⁽¹⁷⁾

The image presented by the Iranian constitution is that the state is dominated by religious and sectarian principles, along with having global aspirations. The institutions of the state are not interested in public affairs but rather they focus on imposing revolutionary principles on all social forces as well as promoting the Supreme Leader and his opinions, as well as, viewing opposing views as treason. Thus, Iran proves it has adopted 'Statism' as a model of governance. Its aim is no longer to represent society, but it seeks to reshape society and ensure its doctrinal and ideological perspectives prevail among social forces. For this, Iran has a political system that enables it to dominate and indoctrinate society.

Second: merging branches of power: the guardian jurist and his role⁽¹⁸⁾

Despite the diversity, and multiplicity of Iran's institutions, as well as, a popular electoral system and its constitution stipulating (Article 6),⁽¹⁹⁾ that public opinion needs to be considered by the state, the truth of the matter is that the guardian jurist dominates constitutional and institutional power. He is the head of the regime and occupies the sublime religious position.⁽²⁰⁾ The preamble of the constitution recognizes the spiritual and political standing of Imam Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, and states that in line with the mandate of the Imam and the Imamate, the constitution provides conditions for the leadership of the jurist, who has the due requirements, and who the people recognize as their leader. According to Article 107, "The eminent *marji' al-taqlid* and great leader of the universal Islamic revolution, and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran."⁽²¹⁾

The clout of the guardian jurist extends over the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power. The constitution, amended in 1989, according to Article 57 stipulates the three branches of power assume their role "under the supervision of the absolute *wilayat al-'amr* and the Leadership of the Ummah."⁽²²⁾

According to Article 113, leadership of the nation, is practiced by the guardian jurist or the leader, who assumes the top position in the state. He has a sublime political and religious position. In the religious respect, the Article 5 stipulates, "During the Occultation of the *Waliul-'Asr* (may God hasten his reappearance), the *wilayah* and leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just [*'adil*] and pious [*muttaqi*] *faqih*, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age." Iranian law

has consolidated his position. The constitution prohibits insulting the founder of the Islamic republic or criticizing the performance of the Supreme Leader. The 88-member Council of Experts, is composed of clerics and jurists, chooses the Supreme Leader of Iran. According to Article 111, they are elected by the people for eight years after the Guardian Council ensures they fulfill the required criteria as mentioned in the constitution. The Council can dismiss the Supreme Leader if he is incapable of fulfilling his duties. The role of the supreme leader can be highlighted by reviewing his purviews according to the constitution.⁽²³⁾

The powers of the Supreme Leader extend through the Guardian Council,⁽²⁴⁾ that is composed of twelve members. The Supreme Leader selects half of them. And he has the power to dismiss them or accept their resignation. The other half, made up of legal and constitutional experts, are nominated by the judiciary, which is appointed by the Supreme Leader. However, they require approving by the consultative Islamic council, elected by the people, as stipulated in Article 91.

The importance of this role for the Supreme Leader in having a say over who is a member of the Guardian Council, can be seen in light of its powers: Reviewing legislation approved by the Shura Council and ratifying it after ascertaining it is compatible with Islamic standards and the principles of the Constitution. The objection to legislation that contradicts Islamic principles is the original and exclusive jurisdiction of half of the members of the Guardian Council. However, legislative differences with the principles of the Constitution are the jurisdiction of the legal jurists on the Council. Voting on a bill is decided by the majority of the membership of the Shura Council. According to Article 112, upon the order of the Supreme Leader, the Nation's Expediency Discernment Council shall meet at any time the Guardian Council judges a proposed bill of the Islamic Consultative Assembly to be against the principles of Sharia or the Constitution, and the Assembly is unable to meet the expectations of the Guardian Council. Also, the Council shall meet for consideration on any issue forwarded to it by the Supreme Leader.

In any case, according to Article 93, "The Islamic Consultative Assembly does not hold any legal status if there is no Guardian Council in existence, except for the purpose of approving the credentials of its members and the election of the six jurists on the Guardian Council."⁽²⁵⁾

The Guardian Council is assigned to interpreting the constitution and deciding whether laws and administrative measures are constitutional. It passes resolutions in case three-quarters of its membership votes in favor of them, according to Article 98. This is legal and judicial, similar to the Supreme Court in the US, the Consultative Council in France, and the Supreme Constitutional Court in Egypt. Also, the Council supervises general elections, and general referendums (article 99). The Guardian Council enjoys legislative, judicial and political powers. It also has the political jurisdiction to review candidate names, and disqualify candidates that do not meet the stipulated requirements. The Council has used these powers to disqualify figures with independent views that contradict the views of the guardian jurist or anyone believed to present a threat to the state.

To resolve the differences that arouse between the Islamic consultative assembly and the Guardian Council leading to the suspension of some legislative bills, in February 1988, Khomeini issued a decree to establish the "Expediency Discernment Council". Its mission was to arbitrate the issues considered to be points of contention between the two bodies. It has the right to advise the guardian jurist on issues concerning the general policies adopted by the state. The Council is composed of a number of permanent and temporary members chosen by the guardian jurist, according to Article 112. According to article 177, *Velayat-e Faqih* has the right to propose amendments to the constitution or add new articles for the interest of the country after consultation with the Council.⁽²⁶⁾

The Iranian constitution assigned the guardian jurist powers to outline the general policies of the state in consultation with the Expediency Discernment Council, a, regulate the relationship among the three branches of power and intervene in case disagreements arise among them. The guardian jurist is the commander in chief of the armed forces. He issues decisions related to war

or peace, as well as, decisions concerning general mobilization. He has the power to appoint, to dismiss and to accept the resignation of senior officials, including the chief of staff of the armed forces, the commander in chief of the IRGC, senior commanders of the armed forces, and commanders of the internal security forces, as well as, the head of Iran's radio and television organization. He picks representatives of the Supreme National Security Council. He also appoints a representative for himself in the Supreme Council of the IRGC. The mission of this representative is to make sure that the decision of the council complies, politically, religiously and ideologically with the Supreme Leaders dictates. He can object to the Council's decisions in case they defy these dictates. The Supreme Leader endorses the president of the republic after the latter wins the presidential elections, as well as, dismissing him if needed (Article 110) after the vote of the Islamic consultative assembly or after a court verdict is issued (Article 89).

The president exercises his constitutional powers within the framework of the general directions determined by the *Velayat-e Faqih*. He is concerned with chairing the executive authority except in areas directly related to the guardian jurist (Article 60). He is accountable to the people, to the Supreme Leader and to the Islamic consultative assembly, according to the amendments made in 1989 (Article 122). He was accountable only to the people in the original Constitution of 1979.⁽²⁷⁾

In addition to his constitutional responsibilities, Khomeini extended his powers through networks that were loyal to him, in all government departments to follow up the implementation of these directives and adherence to the principles of the Iranian revolution. These powers continued under Khamenei, although he lacks the charismatic character of Khomeini's leadership.

At the level of the judicial authority, the constitution gives the jurist the power to appoint, dismiss or accept the resignation of the head of the judicial authority (Article 157), and the president of the judiciary must be a fair judge. His appointment shall be for a period of five years. The Chief Justice shall appoint and dismiss judges (Article 158). He proposes a number of names to the president of the republic for him to pick the minister of justice. The Supreme Leader also outlines the guidelines of the Supreme Court in the country and appoints its chief as well as the attorney general who should be picked from among fair scholars (Article 161).⁽²⁸⁾ He has the right to pick names of prisoners who will be included in a general or partial amnesty. All the foregoing leads to the conclusion that the Supreme Leader is an authority that supersedes the three branches of power. He directs them and follows up their work without being subject to accountability or oversight. This has conferred him religious immunity and sacredness.⁽²⁹⁾

Third: crises of the state and regime

We have already referred to the unique features of the Iranian political system, which is difficult to place in traditional political classifications done by political science scholars. It combines religious authoritarianism with a veil of republicanism. It also has duplicity when it comes to the sovereignty of God and that of the people. The Constitution expresses this duplicity and indicates that the administration of the affairs of the country is based on the principle of returning to the general will of the people. Article 6, "In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections." Article 56 states, "Absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and it is He Who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this divine right, nor subordinate it to the vested interests of a particular individual or group. The people are to exercise this divine right in the manner specified in the following articles."⁽³⁰⁾

This duplicity has led researchers to consider this regime as a *hybrid*. This term is used to describe authoritarian regimes that have some traits of democratic systems or that are transitioning towards democracy. They have been given other names such as competitive

authoritarianism or electoral authoritarianism.⁽³¹⁾

The Iranian regime, despite being a hybrid regime, in the end, the ultimate power to make decisions and policies is in the hands of the Supreme Leaders and his network of cronies. This gives the regime a big deal of authoritarian resilience. Using this resilience, the regime has managed to put down all uprisings and protests. The regime is based on two sets of institutions. The first which are elected, and the second which are appointed. The latter has the upper hand, which restrains electoral competition. The regime dominates the country through a set of repressive tools, which include direct violence, moral coercion, intelligence surveillance, censorship, and domestic intimidation.⁽³²⁾ Furthermore, the absolute power depends on religious pretexts. The one who is assuming this power is the representative of the absent imam who gets heavenly succor.⁽³³⁾ Ali Meshkini, the late former Chief of the Assembly of Experts mentioned during the controversial arguments in 2006 that all Iranian institutions are working under the supervision of the Supreme Leader appointed by God. Another member of the Assembly of Experts said the government derives its policies from God.⁽³⁴⁾ Thus, clerics of the conservative movement placed themselves as intermediaries between Muslims and God. Moreover, they also projected views of the imam in areas other than politics, governance and rotation of power. The previous explanation points to two kinds of crises: structural and architectural. Those crises are connected to the ideological foundations and principles on which the regime is based and the rules regulating the relationships between its institutions on the other hand. This can be seen as follows:

The first crisis happened due to the tension arising from running society through an ideological vision that is based on religion. The ruling elite seeks to impose its ideology across society control minds and souls. This ideological vision is consistently reiterated in curricula, government programs and policies, as well as, in the state-run media. At the cognitive level, this crisis springs from the relationship between the static ideology and dynamic realities. Every ideology, especially if it has a totalitarian nature, claims it encompasses all affairs concerning society and the universe. And it has answers to all questions and issues. But it collides with dynamism found in a society where new issues arise that the advocates of this ideology cannot find answers to.

When this happens, one of the two tracks emerge: Either the dominant ideology is reformed and developed in response to changing realities by dropping some elements, reinterpreting new ideas or the ideological penetration of the state declines. And the gap between formal discourse and prevailing ideas among the people widens. This result is supported by the experiences of Muslim and Christian communities, whether the ruling ideology is based on a religious or civil basis.

In Iran, the crisis happens due to the conservative wing's control of the *Velayat-e Faqih* position, who has massive powers. This has put limits on the reformist trend, and this was clear during the presidency of Mohammed Khatami, from 1997 to 2005, who won by an overwhelming majority. This win was supported by the reformists' winning the majority of the seats in the municipal councils in the first local elections in 1999, and the majority of the seats in the Islamic consultative assembly in the 2000 elections. However, because of the dominance of the conservative elements in appointed councils, Khatami was unable to implement all his reform program except for some matters related to freedom of expression. The conservative wing reorganized its ranks and managed to win a majority of the seats in municipal councils in the 2003 elections and the majority of the Shura Council seats in the 2004 elections, under Khatami's presidency, after the Guardian Council excluded nearly 2,000 reformist candidates. This was a prelude to the defeat of the reformist candidate the late Hashemi Rafsanjani, who represented realism and political moderation, in the presidential election to the hardline candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.⁽³⁵⁾ Ahmadinejad put an end to some of Khatami's reforms, restoring censorship. *Velayat-e Faqih* did not hesitate to announce his support for Ahmadinejad in the elections for his second presidential term.⁽³⁶⁾ The role of the Guardian Council helped strengthen the conservative movement by

screening and disqualifying candidates who held opposing views to the Supreme Leader. The council performed this role actively and vigorously. In the elections of the Shura Council in 2016, 6229 candidates fielded themselves. Many of them were disqualified by the council. When protests broke out in the aftermath, the Council reversed its decision, allowing 1,500 candidates from the reformist movement to run. In the elections of the Assembly of Experts, held in the same year, 800 people fielded themselves, only 161 among them were endorsed as candidates by the council.⁽³⁷⁾ The list of excluded candidates in this election included Ahmad Khomeini, the grandson of the Imam Khomeini, and Mohammad Khatami.⁽³⁸⁾

In the 2017 presidential election, 1636 candidates fielded themselves. Only six among them were accepted as candidates. The prominent among those excluded was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former president who nominated himself in violation of the Supreme Leader's directives. Two of the candidates then withdrew and the elections were held between four candidates.⁽³⁹⁾ These tactics paid no heed to the profound changes within Iranian society due to the spread of education and the emergence of a new generation intune with progression in communication and information technology. This new generation is skilled in social media, which has impaired the state's ability to ideologically control society.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Students and women have spearheaded the call for change in Iran. Students were the most active actors in the political movement that led to the overthrow of the Shah.⁽⁴¹⁾ This movement continued in many ways. We can say that students in general were the mainstay of the demonstrations and protest movements in Iran. Such as the 1999 demonstrations that called for freedom and for the powers of the Supreme Leader to be curtailed. They also had a role in the 2005 Green Movement demonstrations, which broke out in protest at the irregularities in the 2005 presidential elections won by Ahmadinejad. Yet they partook in the 2009 demonstrations where 3 million people took to the street.⁽⁴²⁾ And the 2011 protests that broke out following the developments in the Arab region. The government harshly repressed these protests, arresting major reformist leaders such as Rafsanjani, Khatami, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi Karroubi.⁽⁴³⁾ In 2017-2018, a new wave of economic-motivated demonstrations took place in the city of Mashhad and raised political slogans that attacked the Supreme Leader and called on the government to pay attention to Iran's internal situation instead of indulging in the affairs of other countries.⁽⁴⁴⁾

The second crisis is related to the relationship between the state and the revolution. The state is defined as a legal and political entity that is a member of the international community and is committed to the rules of international law. A revolution is a movement of change that seeks to destroy the status quo and establish a new system that expresses its ideas and orientations. Therefore, the first years of any revolution are usually full of unrest and unexpected events, clashes between it and the existing regional or international order. As the time passes, the "revolution" becomes a "state" and moves from revolutionary legitimacy to legal and constitutional legitimacy at home and abroad. There is usually a debate among the leaders of the revolution concerning transformation and its timing, as seen in the conflict between Lenin and Trotsky, who defended the concept of an perpetual revolution.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Despite four decades since the revolution, Iran, the state, behaves according to the mindset of the revolution, interfering in the internal affairs of other states politically and militarily, as well as, supporting proxies to export the revolution.⁽⁴⁶⁾ A strategy to achieve this goal is adopted by the development of Iran's military capabilities, the establishment of centers of influence and regional expansion beyond its borders, and the use of the Revolutionary Guard to develop military and political relations with certain groups and organizations. This strategy is pursued by Iran using its ideological commitment to expand regionally and convey its revolutionary vision.⁽⁴⁷⁾

In the end, the continuation of this duality between institutions, power and authority, as well as, the state and revolution will continue to cause crises for the Iranian political system.

Endnotes

- (1) Gwydion M. Williams, "Nation States Existed Long before the Peace of Westphalia," *Gwydion Williams*, 13 June 2015, accessed 1 July 2018, <http://bit.ly/2ST1s74>.
- (2) This coalition included religious and liberal, leftist, and religious. One of these currents was The Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI), the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, The Tudeh Party of Iran, Fedayeen Islam Group, and the National Front. This had an impact on the destiny of the first Iranian President Abolhassan Banisadr, who fled the country. The second Iranian President, Mohammad-Ali Raja, was assassinated by Mojahedin-e Khalq. The first president after the transitional government, Mehdi Bazargan, was detained and executed. Source: Gerhard Konzelmann, *Iranian Revolution 1979-1989*, Trans. Mohammed Abu Rahmah (Cairo: Madbouly Books, 1992), 183-188.
- (3) There are many examples on this such as the protests that erupted in Iran against the Shah in 1962, 1963, 1976, 1971, and 1977. Those protests dramatically increased in January, September, October and November in 1978 and continued to 1979. Millions of Iranians across the country participated in them. After almost 25 years protested emerged again in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2017.
- Jahangir Amueger, "The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution," State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991, accessed June 28, 2018, doi:10.3897/bdj.4.e7720.figure2f.
- (4) Elia Zureik, "Theoretical Considerations for a Sociological Study of the Arab State", *Arab Studies Quarterly* 3, no.3, (Summer 1981); 229-257.
- (5) Metin Heber, *The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 46.
- (6) Joel S. Migdal, a professor of International Relations at Washington University, established International Relations Program. He was an associate professor at Harvard University and a lecturer at Tel Aviv University. He published many research articles such as, "Villagers, Politics, and Revolution," (1947), "Palestinian Community and Politics," (1980), "Strong Communities and Weak States," (1988), "State and Society," (2001), "Palestinian People," (2003), "Borders and Affiliations," (2004)
- (7) Neera Chandhoke, *State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory*, (California: Sage Publications Inc, 1995), 14.
- (8) Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-6.
- (9) Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Tatshairi, "Features of Balance in the Islamic Constitutional Experience of Iran", *A Nation of Islam Journal*, (March 2012); 83.
- (10) Iranian Constitution, *Constitution Project*, 30 July 2018, accessed 17 December 2018, 9-10, <http://bit.ly/2LkGKuu>.
- (11) The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school [in usul al-Din and fiqh], and this principle will remain eternally immutable, according to Article 12.
- (12) Iranian Constitution, art. 176.
- (13) Hesam Forozan and Afshin Shahi, "The Military and the State in Iran: The Economic Rise of the Revolutionary Guards," *The Middle East Journal* 71, no. 1 (Winter 2017) 67-86.
- (14) Kenneth Katzman, *The Revolutionary Guard: Establishment, Evolvement, and Role* (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 1996), <http://bit.ly/2R5e1zf>.
- (15) Dr. Mohammad Saeed Mu'min, "Iran and Attempts to Restore the Imperial Dream," *Journal of International Politics*, no. 201 (July 2015) 92.
- (16) Iranian Constitution, art. 152 and art. 154.
- (17) Amal Hamadeh, "What Does It Mean to be an Iranian in the 21st Century," *Journal of Democracy*, no. 66, (April 2017) 105.
- (18) The jurist leader, the supreme leader, the leader, deputy of Imam Mahdi refer to the same position.
- (19) Iranian Constitution, art. 6.
- (20) See a number of sympathetic and critical assessments of constitutional structure in Iran in: Tawfeeq Shoman, "Constitutional Powers in Iran: Powers and Roles", *Ash'al Al Awsat Magazine*, no. 114, (Spring 2004); 45-54. As well as Mohammad Sadiq al-Husseini, "Decision Making in Iran: The Structure of the Islamic System", *Ash'al Al-Awsat Magazine*, no. 54, (August 1996); 7-18. Abdulrazak Alta'ei, "The Political System in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Islamic Republic of Iran: Comparative Study," *Journal of Regional Studies* 9, no. 30 (2013); 275-299.
- (21) Iranian Constitution, art. 107.
- (22) *Ibid.*, art. 57.
- (23) *Ibid.*, art. 5, art. 111, art. 113.
- (24) Wadad Jaber Ghazi, "The Guardian Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Realities of the Role in Political Life and its Future Prospects: A Political Historical Reading", *Al Mustansiriya Journal of Arab and International Studies*, no. 47 (2014); 214-240.
- (25) Iranian Constitution, art. 91, art. 112, art. 93.
- (26) *Ibid.*, art. 112, art. 117.

- (27) *Ibid.*, art. 122.
- (28) *Ibid.*, art. 157, art. 158, art. 161.
- (29) David E. Thaler et al, *Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics* (Los Angeles: RAND Corporation, 2010), 39-42.
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