{"id":11361,"date":"2023-05-25T10:29:14","date_gmt":"2023-05-25T07:29:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=11361"},"modified":"2023-05-25T10:29:15","modified_gmt":"2023-05-25T07:29:15","slug":"irans-supreme-national-security-council-after-shamkhanis-resignation-context-and-repercussions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/position-estimate\/irans-supreme-national-security-council-after-shamkhanis-resignation-context-and-repercussions\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Supreme National Security Council After Shamkhani\u2019s Resignation: Context and Repercussions"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi issued a decree on May 22, 2023, whereby<\/a> he appointed Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the new Secretary of Iran\u2019s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to succeed Ali Shamkhani. The latter resigned after spending 10 years in office. As has always been the case with former secretaries of the council, Shamkhani has not totally left the Iranian political landscape. Shortly after announcing Shamkhani\u2019s resignation, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him as a member of the Expediency Discernment Council and adviser. The role of the council is considered important in the process of decision-making internally and externally, especially in the context of Iranian national security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This position paper will look at the factors leading to the resignation, its significations and potential repercussions, both internally and externally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Significance and Context<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The resignation of the Iranian SNSC\u2019s secretary surprised everyone. Shamkhani was considered to be a veteran pillar of Iran\u2019s decision-making circles and played a major role in outlining Iran\u2019s foreign policy, including involvement in the nuclear talks. He was extremely prominent in recent months as he played a key role in signing the rapprochement agreement with Saudi Arabia, resulting in ties being restored between the two sides. This deal offered Iran an opportunity to end its regional isolation and recalibrate it ties with its neighbors. Shamkhani\u2019s involvement was indicative of his prominence and influential role in Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 SNSC\u2019s Significance in Formulating Iranian Foreign Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This resignation is of significance given the prominent role<\/a> the SNSC plays in crafting Iran\u2019s foreign policy. Since its establishment, the council has been among the primary bodies where Iranian foreign policy is discussed. The council\u2019s most important mission in 2003 was running Iran\u2019s nuclear program. It is worth noting that Khamenei has ultimate authority over the council which is in charge of outlining Iran\u2019s security and defense policies and responding to internal and external threats. Despite the fact that the Iranian president is the council\u2019s chair, the secretary, who is also the supreme leader\u2019s personal representative in the council, is actually responsible for steering its discussions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rise of \u201cHardliners\u201d and Their Impact on the SNSC\u2019s Role<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The SNSC has become more prominent, specifically since the \u201chardliners\u201d established control over the country\u2019s branches of power, starting from the parliamentary elections in February 2020 and Raisi\u2019s presidential election win. The council has recalibrated Iran\u2019s foreign policy to cope with the more radical orientations of the \u201chardliners.\u201d The council had its wings clipped by Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, particularly in relation to talks with the West and the signing of the nuclear deal in 2015. The council contributed to placing legislative limitations on the prospects of reviving the nuclear deal after Trump left the White House. Moreover, the council and its Secretary Ali Shamkhani played a role in outlining Iran\u2019s foreign policy based on defiance and confrontation \u2014 one of its characteristics was to adopt a hardline posture on the nuclear talks in Vienna, and move away from the West to mitigate the impact of sanctions and bypass pressures. This growing and prominent role of the council was at the expense of Iran\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the results<\/a> of this Iranian foreign policy was the deadlock in the nuclear talks in Vienna, resulting in the reimposition and expansion of sanctions and pressures on Iran by the Biden administration. This pushed Iran to adopt a more bellicose policy, reflected in its involvement alongside Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war and the emphasis on looking eastwards. These postures and policies did not save the political system at home as it faced a new wave of popular protests that erupted because of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and human rights abuses, particularly after the killing of Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini at a detention facility of Iran\u2019s morality police.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The political system has realized that reversing its regional behavior and approach \u2014 through reconciliation and normalization of ties with Saudi Arabia \u2014 offers it an opportunity to end its regional isolation and thwart the formation of a US and Israel-led regional security body against it. The Shamkhani-led council played a prominent role in reaching the Saudi-Iran deal and its subsequent diplomatic efforts at the regional level indicated that it had strayed into the Foreign Ministry\u2019s territory. Shamkhani bypassed Iran\u2019s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in these efforts. Iran continues to review its policies toward the region\u2019s countries as well as to the rest of its spheres of influence accordingly. The region\u2019s countries continue to watch Iran\u2019s positions and monitor the limits of change and continuation of its foreign policy. There are forecasts that Iran will be more serious about cooperating in order to achieve stability, and will manage competition for logical and rational reasons given the circumstances besetting the country internally and externally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Motives for Removing Shamkhani<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are several factors contributing to the Iranian government\u2019s decision to end Shamkhani\u2019s tenure or push him to submit his resignation, the main ones are the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shamkhani\u2019s Affiliations and Positions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Given that Shamkhani was close to the \u201creformists\u2019\u201d orientations, he always faced criticism from the \u201chardliners,\u201d especially as he had criticized the political system, including the current Raisi government. During the protests that followed the death of Amini in September 2022, Shamkhani criticized the government\u2019s crackdown on the protestors. This position led to a lot of pressure on Khamenei, especially to dismiss Shamkhani, as the SNSC had failed to quell the protests. Furthermore, accusations of corruption were leveled against him and his family, although the allegations have not been probed or proven yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Differences Over Iran\u2019s Regional Trajectory<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 According to reports<\/a>, the cause for Shamkhani’s dismissal was his disagreements with Raisi; he believed that the SNSC should be in charge of Iran\u2019s ties with Arab states. Raisi desired to reestablish his and his ministries\u2019 authority over regional matters, which Shamkhani had presided over recently. This disagreement was another example of Shamkhani\u2019s brave stances and defiance of Iranian decision-making circles, including the IRGC and the presidency. He called for a change of policies, reflecting a difference of viewpoints on foreign policy issues among key stakeholders. Disagreements appeared clearly in two divergent positions: Shamkhani\u2019s tacit call<\/a> \u2014 at the conclusion of the international forum hosted by Tehran\u2019s Supreme National Defense University earlier in May 2023 \u2014 on the Iranian leadership to acknowledge the developments on the global stage. He said, \u201cWe should make the appropriate changes,\u201d warning at the same time that a lack of preparedness and strength would render the country vulnerable in the face of unanticipated difficulties. On the other hand, Ali Bagheri, Tehran\u2019s chief negotiator and deputy foreign minister in an article<\/a> titled \u201cThe Foreign Policy Perspective in Light of the New Global Order,\u2019 pointed to the shifts in the global order while reiterating Tehran\u2019s commitment to its well-established positions on several issues at the regional and global levels. This article was published on the official website of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, which Bagheri wrote one day before Shamkhani\u2019s resignation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Akbari\u2019s Case and the Post-Khamenei Era Arrangements<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There had been calls in the past to fire Shamkhani. The condemnation of Shamkhani\u2019s ally, Alireza Akbari, increased the likelihood of his expulsion and provided his opponents with a massive opportunity to attack him, including newspapers and websites linked to the IRGC. Furthermore, other sources suggest that the Akbari case was a planned plot to discredit Shamkhani, whose prominent and rising profile was of concern to \u201cconservative\u201d circles. Some blogs relate that Shamkhani planned to run in the next presidential election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the political system prepares for Khamenei\u2019s imminent succession, which could occur at any time, the supreme leader dislikes conflict among the country\u2019s institutions and elites. This orientation has been in place since the supreme leader launched the so-called \u201csecond stage of the revolution,\u201d which relies on supplying the various state institutions with young cadres to reinforce the revolutionary line and keep the government in power for as long as possible. It is worth mentioning that Rouhani appointed Shamkhani to his post, a position of supreme state authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Concern About Shamkhani\u2019s Ambitions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Perhaps the Iranian deep state was concerned about Shamkhani\u2019s rise to prominence, which increased the prospect of \u201cmoderates\u201d and \u201creformists\u201d nominating<\/a> him in the next presidential race, so disrupting the imminent post-Khamenei transition process. Another theory is that the political establishment perceived Shamkhani as being overly zealous about reestablishing relationships with neighboring states. This was reflected in the \u201cconservatives\u2019\u201d outrage over Shamkhani\u2019s role in ending the diplomatic rupture with Saudi Arabia and facilitating Iran-Arab relations, which put further pressure on Raisi to fire him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Ali Akbar Ahmadian\u2019s Strengths<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The new SNSC secretary has credentials and a record that make him more favorable to the \u201chardliners\u201d over Shamkhani. According to Fars News Agency<\/a>, Ahmadian was born in 1961 in the city of Kerman. He is from the revolution\u2019s second generation. His appointment is compatible with the plan of the supreme leader and the president to achieve the so-called \u201csecond stage of the revolution.\u201d He is considered among the commanders who is obedient to the political system\u2019s line since he was among the commanders who was close to former Quds Force Chief Qassem Soleimani. They served together in the 41st Tharallah Division. In addition, Ahmadian possesses extensive experience of working in decision-making institutions and holds significant qualifications and has made notable contributions in this field. He left his studies at the Faculty of Dentistry at the University of Tehran once the Iran-Iraq War started and joined the battle lines. In the final years of the war, Ahmadian became one of the architects of transforming the IRGC Navy and established himself as an asymmetric defense theorist. Furthermore, during Ahmadian\u2019s stint as deputy and commander of the IRGC Navy, the concept of asymmetric defense was fully operationalized. His 15-year tenure in the IRGC Navy established him as a specialist in navigation and missiles. After leaving the IRGC Navy in 2000, Ahmadian was appointed as the IRGC Chief of Joint Staff. During his seven-year term, he initiated significant transformations in the administrative structure and organizational capabilities of the IRGC. He rose to prominence as one of the most eminent Iranian experts on national security issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He graduated from the Faculty of Dentistry at the University of Tehran after the Iran-Iraq War. He also graduated from the Supreme National Defense University with a Ph.D. in Strategic Management. He was also the chief of the IRGC Strategic Center for 16 years, beginning in 2007. In September 2022, he was one of five new members appointed to the Expediency Discernment Council by Khamenei. Thus, Ahmadian has a track record of serving the political system and has earned the trust of the supreme leader and Iran\u2019s de facto governing institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Internal and External Repercussions of Removing Shamkhani<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the nature of the council\u2019s tasks and the roles assigned to Shamkhani throughout his political career, including internal and external missions, his resignation and replacement will have internal and external repercussions, such as the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Internal Repercussions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The replacement of Shamkhani is more of a dismissal than a resignation and his appointment to the Expediency Discernment Council and as an adviser to the supreme leader is nothing but an appeasement gesture. This is evidenced by the Iranian poet Mohtasham Kashani\u2019s verse that was posted by Shamkhani on his Twitter account. The verse reads, \u201cThe words that were being uttered in secret, were overtly uttered\u2026at the end, insinuations were allowed, so leave.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His dismissal reflects the \u201chardliners\u2019\u201d desire to control all decision-making institutions and the appointment of more ideologically-driven officials to key decision-making posts. Ahmadian is close to the \u201cconservative\u201d camp unlike Shamkhani, who is considered by some as one of Rouhani\u2019s stalwarts. The dismissal also indicates the pattern of the dispute at this stage between the different parties of the Iranian political process. The \u201cconservatives\u201d are waging a battle and they believe that there should be no room for the opposition to have any share in power. This is indicative of their efforts to undermine any opportunities for the \u201creformists\u2019\u201d to advance in the next parliamentary or presidential elections as was the case in the 2020 parliamentary election and the 2021 presidential election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shamkhani\u2019s dismissal indicates that the Foreign Ministry could now play a bigger role in making and implementing foreign policy decisions after a period of domination by the SNSC and its secretary. Shamkhani played major roles, subsequently appropriating the role of the Foreign Ministry. The incoming SNSC chief lacks diplomatic expertise, hence he will have to cooperate with the Foreign Ministry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for Shamkhani, his future career and role will depend on the political steps that he will take. If he prefers being appointed to state positions, he will remain behind closed doors within state apparatuses that are run by Khamenei in a way that serves the interests of the political system in line with internal and external developments. But if he prefers being elected to Parliament or presidential office, according to some analysts, this step will take the level of competition to another stage, with Shamkhani expected to side with the \u201creformists\u201d as previously mentioned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

External Repercussions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the face of the official silence and ambiguity surrounding Shamkhani\u2019s resignation, analysts have mentioned various motivations related to domestic and external considerations. Regardless of which motivations are more accurate, there will certainly be some repercussions on Iran\u2019s foreign policy given the significance of the SNSC secretary\u2019s role in the country\u2019s political and security decision-making. It is also worth noting that the removal of Shamkhani after his success in concluding the Saudi-Iran deal to restore diplomatic ties has raised many questions about the extent to which the two events (the Saudi-Iran deal and Shamkhani\u2019s dismissal) are correlated. However, Shamkhani\u2019s removal was a discussion point even before the signing of the rapprochement deal with Saudi Arabia, when his name became synonymous with the case of Akbari in 2019. The latter was accused of obtaining top-secret intelligence from Shamkhani and divulging it to Britain; he was executed on this charge. Moreover, the ruling establishment was not happy with Shamkhani\u2019s criticism of the Iranian government. It is likely that Shamkhani\u2019s marginalization will continue until he is totally removed from the scene; i.e., he will not be assigned to a major diplomatic mission then pushed toward resignation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the context of Shamkhani\u2019s departure, his replacement indicates that the most hardline elements within the political system in relation to Iran\u2019s regional policy have a strong hand and have succeeded in imposing their view and removing Shamkhani from his post. This development could impede Iran\u2019s trajectory toward normalizing its ties with the region\u2019s countries, particularly with Saudi Arabia and contribute to the government reconsidering its regional policy. There is a camp that still believes that Iran has paid a huge price for its regional project and clout and that the process of openness and normalization of relations pose a threat to the country\u2019s regional standing. On the other hand, another camp believes that Shamkhani\u2019s success in thawing relations with Arab states has intensified internal pressures on the political system to pursue a foreign policy that is also open to the West and the United States. Replacing Shamkhani reflects a desire to prevent the latter camp from advancing, and a need to suppress this alternative view since it goes against the well-established principles of Iran\u2019s foreign policy. This is indicated in Bagheri\u2019s article which was posted on the Foreign Ministry\u2019s website.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 In regard to the most important foreign policy issue, the nuclear talks, while both Iran and the United States cling to the talks as a means to revive the nuclear deal, removing Shamkhani \u2014 who was placed on the US sanctions list in 2020 during Trump\u2019s tenure \u2014 from office could pave the way for changing Iran\u2019s approach toward the nuclear talks, however, this approach is unlikely to contradict the government\u2019s normalization of relations with the region\u2019s countries as normalization, will strengthen Iran\u2019s regional standing and curb the international pressures on it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, there is an alternative view which holds that Iran may not abandon its new regional orientations of normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia and cooperating to advance regional peace and stability. According to this view, the removal of Shamkhani, who spearheaded the signing of the rapprochement deal with Saudi Arabia and the normalization of ties, will not significantly impact Iran\u2019s position, given that this new Iranian orientation is blessed by the supreme leader rather than the president. This newly implemented orientation is vital for Iran, which it must not reverse. Given these divergent analyses, it could be said that there is a possibility of striking a balance between the path of normalizing ties and preserving regional clout and the links that Iran has worked hard to develop and maintain over four decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong> Perhaps the political establishment is embarking on a path of building domestic consensus on foreign policy after the structural dichotomies displayed by the dispute among the apparatuses of power, particularly among the ones connected to the supreme leader and those overseen by the president. This consensus could delay the implementation of the Saudi-Iran deal\u2019s terms on normalizing relations and advancing regional stability. In general, Iran\u2019s foreign policy developments in the coming period and the extent of their compliance with the Saudi-Iran deal will be a litmus test for the Iranian ruling system and its institutions. The continuation of de-escalation and the settling of differences will indicate whether or not the institutional frameworks (state institutions) have the upper hand over the decision-making process in Iran. There could then be greater efforts to further enhance building ties and normalization. Conversely, in case of the resumption of past practices, this will provide clear proof that the Iranian political establishment will continue to remain adherent to the revolutionary ideological vision that prevents the strengthening of amicable relations with its immediate neighbors as well as with global powers.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi issued a decree on May 22, 2023, whereby he appointed Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the new Secretary of Iran\u2019s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to succeed Ali Shamkhani. The latter resigned after spending 10 years in office. As has always been the case with former secretaries of the council, Shamkhani has […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":11362,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1402],"tags":[6992,1852,502,6993],"class_list":["post-11361","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-position-estimate","tag-irans-supreme","tag-national-security-council","tag-shamkhani","tag-shamkhanis-resignation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11361","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11361"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11361\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11364,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11361\/revisions\/11364"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11362"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11361"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11361"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11361"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}