{"id":12537,"date":"2024-04-17T12:39:00","date_gmt":"2024-04-17T09:39:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=12537"},"modified":"2024-05-05T14:02:56","modified_gmt":"2024-05-05T11:02:56","slug":"rifts-within-iraqi-shiite-parties-will-malikis-attempts-to-seek-overtures-with-sadr-be-fruitful","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/position-estimate\/rifts-within-iraqi-shiite-parties-will-malikis-attempts-to-seek-overtures-with-sadr-be-fruitful\/","title":{"rendered":"Rifts Within\u00a0 Iraqi Shiite Parties: Will Maliki\u2019s Attempts to Seek Overtures With Sadr Be Fruitful?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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In the midst of escalating crises both internally and externally, particularly with the involvement of Iran-backed militias in the conflict in Gaza, Iraq finds itself grappling with intensified challenges. Against this backdrop, Shiite circles in Iraq have disclosed efforts by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, to initiate reconciliation<\/a> with his Shiite rival Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist Movement. This move seeks to address one of the longstanding Shiite conflicts within the Iraqi arena. Over the years, the two major Shiite alliances have engaged in intense power struggles, competing for leadership, religious authority (marjaya), power and clout in Iraqi politics. These tensions have heightened since the onset of the November protests five years ago, occasionally escalating to armed clashes between the two influential Shiite factions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The recent efforts by Maliki, aligned with the Coordination Framework which includes factions supported by Iran, to reconcile with Sadr, raise significant and multifaceted questions. If successful, these efforts could profoundly impact the Shiite political landscape in Iraq, restructuring power dynamics and potentially reshaping the stances of Shiite factions on key issues. Several questions emerge:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What are the underlying motives driving Maliki\u2019s attempts to reconcile with Sadr, particularly considering his alignment with the  Coordination Framework? Does this signal a rift within the coalition, potentially leading to its dissolution?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Is Iran playing a role in Maliki\u2019s overtures to Sadr, aiming to resolve the intra-Shiite conflict that poses a challenge to Iranian influence in Iraq?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What are the potential opportunities and challenges associated with the rapprochement between Maliki and Sadr? How might this impact the broader political landscape in Iraq?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the significant differences between the two parties and the evolving internal and external dynamics in Iraq, what is the likelihood of success for Maliki\u2019s efforts to reconcile with Sadr?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Motives and Drivers Behind  Maliki Seeking Reconciliation With  Sadr<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Coordination Framework, led prominently by the State of Law Coalition under Maliki\u2019s leadership, navigated a significant conflict with the Sadrist Movement regarding government formation. This tussle culminated in the installment of Mohammad Shia\u2019  al-Sudani as the prime minister in 2022. However, this victory, albeit substantial, was overshadowed by the circumstances surrounding it. Unlike a triumph secured through electoral dominance, this victory stemmed from a need to offset a resounding electoral defeat. Following the withdrawal of Sadrist  lawmakers from the Iraqi Parliament and Sadr\u2019s own retirement from politics, the  Coordination Framework found itself compelled to regain its political footing. This turn of events left an indelible mark not only on Maliki\u2019s psyche but also on the collective consciousness of the Coordination Framework\u2019s figures and leaders. It underscored the limitations of their movement\u2019s influence and the extent of its leverage within the Iraqi political landscape. The government formed by the  Coordination Framework, albeit designed to strike a semblance of balance, is plagued by apprehensions. It has always harbored a concern that supporters of the Sadrist Movement may reinitiate demonstrations at any given moment.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amidst the dominance of the  Coordination Framework, Iraq\u2019s political landscape adhered to a delicate balance characterized by internal and external policy equilibrium, alongside a lingering apprehension of Sadr\u2019s potential resurgence that could upend the established equation. However, this equilibrium was disrupted with the onset of the Israeli conflict in Gaza and Iran\u2019s decision to engage its loyalist armed militias in military support of Palestinian resistance factions in October 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ramifications were far-reaching, not solely confined to military maneuvers among the militias with allegiance to the Qom marjaya but extending to political realignments within the  Coordination Framework itself. Consequently, the established equation governing Iraqi politics underwent a seismic shift as erstwhile allies found themselves at odds. The following highlights the several catalysts standing out in elucidating Maliki\u2019s pivot toward reconciliation with Sadr:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Divergent Viewpoints of the Factions Aligned With the Coordination Framework <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Coordination Framework\u2019s stance on military involvement in Gaza revealed a stark division among Shiite groups, particularly regarding the extent to which engagement should be escalated. On one side were coalitions advocating for a conservative approach, eschewing expanded military involvement against US targets. This faction included the State of Law Coalition led by Maliki, the Fatah Alliance under the leadership of Hadi al-Amiri of the Badr Organization, the State Forces Alliance led by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, and Ammar al-Hakim of the National Wisdom Movement. Their reluctance to broaden military action was not a gesture of support for the US presence in Iraq but rather a pragmatic response to Iraq\u2019s intricate crises. They aimed to prevent potential repercussions for Iraq and avoid embarrassing the  Coordination Framework-formed Iraqi government before the US administration. Contrastingly, there were alliances and factions advocating for an aggressive stance, calling for expanded and sustained military engagement against US targets. This faction included Harakat al-Huquq (Rights Movement) led by Hussein Mu\u2019nis, the Iraqi Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah headed by Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi, and Harakat al-Nujaba led by Akram al-Kaabi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, Maliki stands firm among those who oppose the notion of exceeding the rules of engagement with the United States in Iraq, citing the delicate balance that governs the Iraqi equation and its potential repercussions on the government formed by the coalitions within the  Coordination Framework. This includes the State of Law Coalition led by Maliki himself. Additionally, Maliki\u2019s stance aligns with that of Iran, further cementing his position. He resists the urge to deviate from the traditional rules of engagement out of concern for receiving stern deterrence messages from the United States, which could disrupt the functioning of the Iraqi government and potentially pave the way for Sadr\u2019s resurgence on the Iraqi street. Therefore, Iran, via the Commander of the Quds Force, Ismail Qaani, urged the leaders of Iran\u2019s aligned militias in Iraq to curtail their attacks<\/a> against US targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It appears that Maliki has realized that the departure of his most formidable opponent and arch-nemesis from political life did not diminish his role in leading the Shiite faction or shaping the Iraqi landscape. Sadr\u2019s retirement failed to restore equilibrium for Maliki, particularly as he recognized the unreliability of certain allies who seemed more inclined toward bolstering their own influence and power within the Iraqi landscape.  This concern is heightened by Maliki\u2019s apprehension regarding the burgeoning rapport between Qais al Khazali, leader of the Asa\u2019ib Ahl al-Haq militia, and Iraqi Prime Minister  Mohammad Shia\u2019 al-Sudani. He fears that this growing relationship could lead to the formation of a potent Shiite alliance that might undermine his influence and potentially diminish his sway on the Iraqi stage. Thus, Maliki saw in encouraging Sadr to re-enter political life and establishing a robust bilateral relationship \u2014 a coalition between Maliki and Sadr \u2014 an effective strategy to thwart the emergence of such a formidable alliance. This approach has become a central concern for Maliki, who increasingly subscribes to the Iranian viewpoint that isolating Sadr could exacerbate divisions within the Shiite community, potentially paving the way for catastrophic intra-Shiite infighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Maliki\u2019s Assessments on Sadr\u2019s Intention to Return to Politics <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conversely, Maliki might have interpreted several signals suggesting Sadr\u2019s inclination to gradually re-engage in political life. One such indication was Sadr\u2019s call<\/a> for mass demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinian people against the Israeli war in Gaza. This call underscored Sadr\u2019s enduring ability to mobilize public support and his continued influence over \u201cstreet protests.\u201d The swift response from broad swathes of the population to  Sadr\u2019s summons demonstrated his street mobilization power and the continuance of his ground support.  Moreover, Sadr\u2019s outreach extended beyond domestic borders. His message<\/a> to the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, seeking permission for his Sadrist followers to peacefully approach the borders of Palestine, and his call for Arab nations to stage open sit-ins at the Palestinian borders until the Gaza siege is lifted, further indicated his reemerging political activism on a regional scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, Maliki might have interpreted Sadr\u2019s private and enigmatic visit to the residence of the highest Shiite authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, alongside discussions among Shiite figures regarding the amendment of the election law in preparation for early parliamentary elections, as pivotal to Iraq\u2019s political future. This visit hinted at the strong rapport between Sadr and Sistani, a relationship that  remains closed off to many politicians, including to leaders within the  Coordination Framework. Furthermore, Sadr\u2019s directive<\/a> to movement leaders to reconnect with the grassroots  on multiple occasions was perceived as a precursor to his potential return to the political arena.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Speculation Suggests That Iran Is Behind Maliki\u2019s Attempts to Seek Overtures With Sadr <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some observers speculate that Iran may have played a role in influencing Maliki\u2019s shift toward Sadr, potentially aiming to mend the Shiite-Shiite divide that significantly impeded Iranian efforts to extend their influence in Iraq. Iran perceived the rift between key Shiite figures as a hindrance to its expansionist agenda in Iraq, particularly considering the Shiite community\u2019s pivotal role in advancing its interests. The division between Maliki and Sadr posed a significant challenge to Iran\u2019s ability to safeguard its gains and advance its broader plans in Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is also growing Iranian concern regarding the expanding individual interests of certain armed militias within the current Iraqi landscape. This development poses a risk of provoking a retaliatory response from the United States, potentially upsetting the delicate balance engineered by the Iranian-backed  Coordination Framework in Iraq. Such a scenario could even escalate into open conflict between Iran and the United States, with far-reaching implications for Iran and its regional influence. In light of these concerns, media reports surfaced regarding a visit by the  Iranian Quds Force Commander Ismail Qaani to Iraq on January 29, 2024. During this visit, Qaani reportedly met with leaders of various armed groups at Baghdad International Airport. Notably, this visit occurred just one day after Washington accused Iran and its militias of responsibility for the killing of US soldiers at the Tower 22 base. The purpose of Qaani\u2019s visit was purportedly to exert pressure on militia leaders to either curtail or mitigate<\/a> attacks against US targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Major Chances For Rapprochement Between Maliki And Sadr <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both Maliki and Sadr have ample opportunities for reconciliation, making it the most straightforward path to circumvent various potential challenges and risks that could impact both of them. Some of the most notable opportunities include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Possibility of the Sadr-Maliki Dispute Reaching the  Maturation Phase<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As any internal or external conflict evolves, it often reaches a stage of maturity where the involved parties find common ground and are more inclined to consider a settlement. This occurs when one or more parties to the conflict perceive that they have exhausted their options for maximizing gains through continued conflict. This dynamic might partially apply to the positions of the major Shiite alliances, as they have all come to realize that none possess all the decisive cards to claim sole leadership of the Shiite camp. In the case of Maliki and Sadr, their positions reflect this evolving understanding:<\/p>\n\n\n\n