{"id":12814,"date":"2024-08-05T14:49:32","date_gmt":"2024-08-05T11:49:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=12814"},"modified":"2024-09-10T09:31:00","modified_gmt":"2024-09-10T06:31:00","slug":"navigating-shifts-change-and-continuity-in-iranian-foreign-policy-under-pezeshkian","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/centre-for-researches-and-studies\/navigating-shifts-change-and-continuity-in-iranian-foreign-policy-under-pezeshkian\/","title":{"rendered":"Navigating Shifts: Change and Continuity in Iranian Foreign Policy Under Pezeshkian"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full is-resized\"><a href=\"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2024\/08\/Navigating-Shifts-Change-and-Continuity-in-Iranian-Foreign-Policy-Under-Pezeshkian-August-2024.pdf\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"366\" height=\"81\" src=\"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2020\/04\/Download-and-read.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-7815\" style=\"width:342px;height:auto\"\/><\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Iran has witnessed a significant political change with the election of the new \u201creformist\u201d President Masoud Pezeshkian, following the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in western Iran. Therefore, examining the contours of change in Iran\u2019s foreign policy under the new president is crucial. Iran\u2019s foreign policy holds greater salience as the country is an influential player in both regional and international affairs, possessing significant geopolitical weight and influence due to its geographical location, economic capabilities, and human resources. Furthermore, it is involved in numerous complex regional and international issues that impact its foreign relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The victory of the \u201creformist\u201d president, following years of \u201cconservative\u201d dominance in the presidency, raises several questions: what is the extent of the president\u2019s influence on various aspects of foreign policy including its substance, formulation, implementation and outcomes? What are the anticipated features, challenges, and opportunities for the new president\u2019s foreign policy? Additionally, what new achievements can President Pezeshkian bring to the realm of foreign relations, particularly concerning the three main contentious issues: nuclear negotiations, the ballistic missile program, and support for loyalist groups? Finally, developments in Iran\u2019s relations with the Gulf states and neighboring countries will be closely observed during this new period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Iran\u2019s Foreign Policy Dimensions Under President Pezeshkian<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Following the ascendance of a new political leader, a country\u2019s foreign policy is determined by his proposals, campaign statements, and electoral programs related to the outside world as well as remarks made after winning the presidency. In the case of the new Iranian president, the central feature of his foreign policy emphasizes \u201cdialogue and openness to the outside world,\u201d following a pragmatic approach that seeks to realign ideology with national interests. This shift aims to lift economic sanctions, which would help mitigate the severity of isolation and economic siege, providing a more effective option for addressing anti-regime protests in Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to President Pezeshkian\u2019s vision,<a href=\"#_edn1\" id=\"_ednref1\">[1]<\/a> openness to the outside world contributes to creating a favorable environment for improving deteriorating living and economic conditions, enhancing economic growth, and curbing migration as the nation seeks to rebuild. However, it is important to acknowledge that exceptions arise due to the nature of the presidential role in Iran, where the desires and orientations of the supreme leader significantly influence the president\u2019s decisions and choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Pezeshkian\u2019s speech during his first televised debate in the second round of the presidential elections on July 1, 2024, emphasized the need for compromise and engagement with opponents to resolve outstanding differences. He stated, \u201cWe must sit down and compromise to solve our problems with the world,\u201d further explaining, \u201cMy foreign policy aims for the prosperity of the people and encourages them to survive, build, grow economically, and develop.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn2\" id=\"_ednref2\">[2]<\/a> In his article titled \u201cMy Message to the New World,\u201d published in English on July 12, 2024, on the Tehran Times website, he identifies the principle of interest as a fundamental tenet of his foreign policy, asserting that his government\u2019s approach will be guided by the principles of \u201cdignity, wisdom, and interest.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn3\" id=\"_ednref3\">[3]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The new president\u2019s appointment of former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to head the Strategic Council responsible for nominating officials and ministers for the president, along with the increasing likelihood of each of the following: Abbas Araghchi, the chief Iranian negotiator in the government of former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani; Ali Akbar Salehi, the former Iranian foreign minister, and Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran\u2019s ambassador to the United Nations, assuming the duties of the Foreign Ministry portfolio, provides significant evidence of the new president\u2019s pragmatic approach to international relations, particularly regarding nuclear negotiations. This scenario mirrors the Rouhani-Zarif approach toward the Europeans and Americans. The following are the most prominent features of his anticipated foreign policy agenda:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Prioritizing Regional Relations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The regional sphere is a key priority within the framework of the openness policy that President Pezeshkian has articulated. In his statements, debates and articles, he has identified the regional neighborhood as the first circle essential to improving Iran\u2019s foreign relations. Consequently, it is anticipated that the new administration will continue the regional policies of the late President Raisi regarding the enhancement of relations with neighboring countries. This continuation aligns with the directives of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who, in his message to the people on July 6, 2024, following President Pezeshkian\u2019s election victory, stated, \u201cI recommend that Dr. Pezeshkian, the elected president, look to distant and bright horizons by trusting in God and continuing the path of the late Raisi.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn4\" id=\"_ednref4\">[4]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>President Pezeshkian advocates for the establishment of a \u201cregional framework\u201d aimed at fostering dialogue, building confidence, promoting sustainable development, and ensuring peace through collaborative regional efforts. He envisions the creation of a \u201cstrong region\u201d governed by diplomacy rather than force, drawing on the shared values, peaceful Islamic traditions, and abundant resources present among the countries of the region. According to President Pezeshkian, this framework will enhance peaceful initiatives, restore calm and create a stable regional environment, promote sustainable development, and resolve conflicts that drain resources and squander wealth. Harnessing these resources will bolster regional capabilities and enable collective responses to common challenges and foreign interventions, allowing the region to exert significant influence in the emerging multipolar world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In light of this vision, the following trends are expected:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Continued Strengthening of Arab-Iranian Relations<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is likely that Iranian efforts to bolster relations with Arab and Gulf countries, particularly with the Saudi Arabia, will continue. In his writings, Pezeshkian emphasized his ambition to cooperate with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Iraq, aiming to enhance joint cooperation within regional organizations to deepen economic, trade, and investment relations.<a href=\"#_edn5\" id=\"_ednref5\">[5]<\/a> This vision aligns with the supreme leader\u2019s guidance to the new president to follow in the footsteps of the late Raisi regarding foreign relations. Furthermore, Pezeshkian has received congratulatory messages from leaders and presidents of most Arab and Gulf countries, reflecting their desire to collaborate with the new president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Continuity of Hostile Relations With Israel<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The new Iranian president\u2019s perspective on Israel reflects a continuation of hostile relations, as he believes that the policy of openness will extend to all capitals of the world except Tel Aviv. In his article, he asserts that \u201cIsrael remains an apartheid regime to this day, now adding \u2018genocide\u2019 to a record already marred by occupation, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, settlement-building, nuclear weapons possession, illegal annexation, and aggression against its neighbors.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn6\" id=\"_ednref6\">[6]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In his article, the new president outlines several paths for action against Israel. The first is to collaborate with Arab countries to establish a permanent ceasefire in Gaza to halt the ongoing massacre and prevent the escalation of the conflict. The second is to work toward ending the Israeli occupation, which has devastated the lives of four generations of Palestinians; all countries have a binding duty under the 1948 Genocide Convention to take necessary measures to prevent genocide. The third is to urge countries to sever relations with Israel and avoid rewarding it by normalizing ties with Tel Aviv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The ongoing hostile relations between Tehran and Tel Aviv signify the intractability of the conflict, with Israel persisting in its aggressive policies in the Middle East while Iran continues to support what it terms the \u201caxis of resistance,\u201d using the Palestinian cause to further its expansionist goals. Pezeshkian\u2019s stance on the normalization issue places Iran in a dilemma, as it seeks to balance its desire to strengthen relations with Arab and Gulf states while rejecting normalization with Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Iran\u2019s Regional Project \u2014 an Immutable Red Line<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The new president understands that the Iranian expansionist project and its strategic lever, represented by the axis of resistance, falls within the ruling establishment\u2019s red lines. Therefore, during his conversation with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as well as in his messages to both Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, he declared his commitment to providing unwavering support to the resistance fronts in the Middle East. For instance, his message to Nasrallah included, \u201cIran has always supported the resistance of the peoples of the region against the illegitimate Zionist entity. Support for the resistance is rooted in the established policies of the Iranian regime, the ideals of Khomeini, and the directives of the supreme leader, and it will continue with force.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn7\" id=\"_ednref7\">[7]<\/a> Many observers view Pezeshkian\u2019s stance on the axis of resistance as a realistic reflection of Khamenei\u2019s instructions and an indicator of the seemingly positive relationship between the new president and Khamenei. This is evident not only from Khamenei\u2019s praise for Pezeshkian, along with his recommendation to the Parliament on July 22, 2024, to approve the ministerial cabinet of Pezeshkian\u2019s government, but also from Pezeshkian\u2019s announcements during debates expressing his support for the supreme leader\u2019s directives, describing Khamenei\u2019s leadership as wise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Furthermore, Pezeshkian appears to enjoy a strong rapport with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is illustrated by several key moments. The first was his public display of support for the IRGC following the death of IRGC Commander Qassem Soleimani in a US airstrike near Baghdad International Airport in early 2020, where he donned the IRGC uniform and wore his signature scarf around his neck. The second was his significant praise for Soleimani during his election debates, where he referred to him as a national hero, stating, \u201cOne of the reasons that prevents others from taking any action against Iran is the presence of the IRGC.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn8\" id=\"_ednref8\">[8]<\/a> Thirdly, he visited Soleimani\u2019s family at their home, stating, \u201cSoleimani was a national and popular figure for the Islamic world. He had a transcendent view of sectarianism and did not categorize people into specific groups. We must solve the country\u2019s problems by following the path and example of martyr Soleimani.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn9\" id=\"_ednref9\">[9]<\/a> Lastly, the positive sentiments expressed by IRGC commanders<a href=\"#_edn10\" id=\"_ednref10\">\uf02a<\/a> regarding Pezeshkian\u2019s victory were reflected in the congratulatory meeting held on July 14, 2024, where IRGC Commander Hossein Salami stated, \u201cThe IRGC are ready to cooperate with Pezeshkian to implement Khamenei\u2019s policies.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn11\" id=\"_ednref11\">[10]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Return to Policies of Dialogue and Openness to the West<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to the new president\u2019s proposals, he aims to return to the path of openness toward the West. He believes that the path of isolation has hindered the achievement of the ultimate goal set by the supreme leader: transforming Iran into the leading regional power in all fields by the year 2025.<a href=\"#_edn12\" id=\"_ednref12\">[11]<\/a> Therefore, he argues that the political philosophy of economic resistance, adopted by the late President Raisi to render the sanctions ineffective, will not alleviate the impact of sanctions, improve living conditions, or reduce the popular protests, as it is a long-term strategy. Instead, the current crises in Iran require immediate and rapid solutions, which can only be achieved through the lifting of sanctions and the provision of substantial financial aid that contributes to improving the country\u2019s economic and living standards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To achieve this goal, Pezeshkian is working on resuming talks with the West, as explained below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Reviving Nuclear Talks<\/em><\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The new president believes that reviving nuclear negotiations is an urgent priority aimed at lifting the sanctions that are burdening the Iranian economy. He argues that returning to the nuclear agreement would have a significantly positive impact on Iran, alleviating daily losses caused by the inability to increase oil exports amid growing popular discontent and tension. In Pezeshkian\u2019s view, this situation is what prompted the former US president to withdraw from the agreement in 2018.<a href=\"#_edn13\" id=\"_ednref13\">[12]<\/a> Consequently, some of the most prominent promises made by Pezeshkian during his election campaign include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Reviewing and amending \u201cThe Strategic Initiative to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Rights of the Iranian Nation:\u201d <\/strong>This legislation, which was approved by the Iranian Parliament in December 2020, is considered by Zarif to be the greatest obstacle preventing US President Joe Biden\u2019s administration from returning to the nuclear agreement.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF):<\/strong> Iran\u2019s failure to join the FATF has hindered its integration into the global banking system, and the new president aims to rectify this.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Many observers believe that reviving the nuclear agreement, leading to the lifting of sanctions, has become a significant test for Pezeshkian \u2014 a key measure of his success. This is of particular salience given that his position, which diverges from the \u201cconservative\u201d stance toward the West and the nuclear agreement, played a positive role in his electoral chances. A majority of Iranians expressed relief following his victory as \u201chardliner\u201d policies toward the West have only resulted in sharp economic deterioration. This is compounded by the fears voiced by a large segment of the electorate regarding a \u201cconservative\u201d victory, which would &nbsp;perpetuate the current dire situation \u2014 especially after Pezeshkian\u2019s \u201cconservative\u201d rival Saeed Jalili, stated during the debates with Pezeshkian that he would continue the \u201chardliner\u201d approach of Raisi in international relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Iranian-European Dialogue<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The new Iranian president has expressed a desire to engage in constructive dialogue with European capitals to put relations on the right track, based on principles of mutual respect and equality. He emphasized the importance of European countries acknowledging the mistake of not fulfilling their obligations toward Iran after the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement. These obligations include encouraging investment in Iran, effectively protecting companies from US sanctions, and ensuring smooth banking transactions. There are numerous opportunities to enhance Iranian-European cooperation, particularly in technological collaboration, energy security, transborder logistics projects, asylum issues, counter-terrorism and narcotics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In his article, Pezeshkian addressed the European countries, stating that Iran\u2019s defense strategy does not involve seeking to possess a nuclear bomb. He explained that the reduction of nuclear obligations is a direct response to the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the imposition of sanctions on Iran, and the assassination of Soleimani.<a href=\"#_edn14\" id=\"_ednref14\">[13]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, Iran\u2019s support for Russia during what it terms its \u201cspecial operations\u201d in Ukraine has raised sensitivities and hardened Western attitudes toward Iran. This situation may complicate Pezeshkian\u2019s efforts to bridge the gap with Western countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Strengthening Iranian Relations with Revisionist Powers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>President Pezeshkian advocates for strengthening Iranian relations with revisionist powers that seek to establish a multipolar international system, aimed at diminishing the United States\u2019 sole hegemony. Key players in this global bloc include China and Russia, which represent the most prominent powers of the Eastern bloc. Strengthening ties with these nations would bolster Iran\u2019s power and negotiating position in future nuclear talks. He stated in this piece, \u201cChina and Russia have consistently stood by us during challenging times. We deeply value this friendship. Our 25-year roadmap with China represents a significant milestone towards establishing a mutually beneficial \u2018comprehensive strategic partnership.\u2019\u201d He further noted, \u201cRussia is a valued strategic ally and neighbor to Iran and my administration will remain committed to expanding and enhancing our cooperation. We strive for peace for the people of Russia and Ukraine, and my government will stand prepared to actively support initiatives aimed at achieving this objective. I will continue to prioritize bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia, particularly within frameworks such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasia Economic Union.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn15\" id=\"_ednref15\">[14]<\/a> The influence of \u201chardliners\u201d over the state apparatus in Iran may result in the continued strengthening of military relations with the Eastern bloc, as evidenced by the ongoing supply of drones to Russia for its war against Ukraine, while also consolidating ties with both China and North Korea across various realms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The New President\u2019s Personality and Professional Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Compared to his predecessor, Pezeshkian is widely regarded as a low-profile figure in many aspects of his professional career. He does not belong to the rarified circles of leadership as his predecessor and is widely regarded as a pragmatist, particularly with regard to foreign policy. In contrast, President Raisi was known for his obdurate stance on foreign policy issues and was viewed negatively by the West due to his involvement in an extrajudicial death committee, which was accused of imposing the death penalty on tens of thousands of Iranian dissidents \u2014 most notably in the notorious execution cases of 1988. This history made dialogue between him and the outside world particularly challenging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Overall, this context suggests that President Pezeshkian is more inclined to adopt a new pragmatic approach that seeks to combine pragmatic and \u201cconservative-reformist\u201d models in managing foreign relations. He is pragmatic in the international sphere, following in the footsteps of both Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami, while maintaining a \u201cconservative\u201d stance in the regional context, echoing Raisi\u2019s responses to the supreme leader\u2019s orders. This dual approach aims to improve relations with neighboring countries and uphold the principle of economic diplomacy. Thus, Pezeshkian takes a less confrontational and more realistic position with regard to foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Pezeshkian\u2019s Foreign Policy Options<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>President Pezeshkian may capitalize on the array of opportunities to achieve foreign policy breakthroughs or, at the very least, secure some gains. These opportunities can be summarized as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Khamenei\u2019s Flexibility Resulting from Internal Pressures<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The weak turnout in the first round of the presidential elections highlighted the extent of public despair with a political system dominated by \u201cconservatives,\u201d as well as the widespread belief that the leadership is unable to address their problems. This sentiment was preceded by numerous protests that escalated in both scale and intensity. The Iranian establishment sensed the gravity of the situation, a factor that may have prompted Khamenei to engineer the elections in search of exits from the crisis in multiple directions. It is understood that these problems primarily stem from the crushing economic sanctions.<a href=\"#_edn16\" id=\"_ednref16\">[15]<\/a> Thus, the supreme leader could provide Pezeshkian with an opportunity to reach some settlements in foreign policy, hoping that such moves might lead to the lifting, or at least the easing, of sanctions to mitigate the ongoing deterioration of living conditions and to avoid the eruption of new protests. Additionally, establishing stable conditions for the post-Khamenei era is crucial, and having a figure affiliated with the \u201creformists\u201d at the forefront of the political scene spares the supreme leader from bearing any responsibility for failures resulting from the intransigence of US and Western positions; instead, the president and foreign powers would shoulder that responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Western Desire to Support the \u201cReformists\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>International powers understand the extent of the supreme leader\u2019s dominance over power in Iran and recognize that the role of the president remains limited. However, the new president\u2019s ties to the \u201creformist\u201d current and the impact of this alignment on voter participation may encourage some international powers to cooperate with the new president. This collaboration aims to mix the political cards inside Iran by marketing the \u201creformist\u201d current to the Iranian public as capable of advancing their interests and facilitating their integration into the global system \u2014 unlike the \u201cconservative\u201d current, whose hostile policies toward the West are exacerbating the country\u2019s predicament. From this perspective, some Western circles recommend that the United States should indirectly express its openness to collaborating with the new Iranian president, reassuring him that measures demonstrating his moderation will be met with reciprocal and substantial responses.<a href=\"#_edn17\" id=\"_ednref17\">[16]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>International Efforts to Reduce Tensions in the Middle East<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There is an international and regional consensus on the risks of escalation and the potential transition to a regional war, as it would negatively affect all parties involved. This concern is heightened by the intertwining of economic interests and the region\u2019s role as a significant energy supplier and a critical passage for international trade. The recent election of a \u201creformist\u201d president in Iran serves to advance this trend, one that the supreme leader himself does not oppose. The first direct confrontation between Iran and Israel occurred during the tenure of the supreme leader and a \u201cconservative\u201d president; however, it was characterized by a notable degree of rationality, as Tehran confirmed its unwillingness to escalate at that time. Thus, Pezeshkian, through his \u201creformist\u201d tendencies, alleviates some of the pressures on the supreme leader regarding this issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the other hand, it is in the interest of Western and international powers to maintain the current rules of engagement and avoid a comprehensive war. Some Western circles view the significant change in government in Iran as a much-needed opportunity for Western capitals to revisit diplomacy. The primary goal must be to persuade Iran to halt its nuclear program and subsequently retract its military ambitions to prevent further escalation in the Middle East.<a href=\"#_edn18\" id=\"_ednref18\">[17]<\/a> Consequently, the newly elected president should be given every opportunity to succeed, as the potential gains for the United States and Israel would far outweigh the associated risks.<a href=\"#_edn19\" id=\"_ednref19\">[18]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Strengthening of Saudi-Iranian Relations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Saudi Arabia possesses various tools to influence international policies in the region. In recent years, Saudi foreign policy has shifted toward reducing tensions while enhancing regional stability in line with Vision 2030. The Beijing-brokered rapprochement agreement is one of the most prominent achievements of this new approach. Continuing in this direction, Saudi Arabia is expected to play a supportive role in the efforts of the new Iranian president, not only in terms of bilateral relations but also within the broader regional and international contexts. This is as the Arabian Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, aspire to be among the leading economies of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Against this backdrop, some Iranian experts advocate for a recognition of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states\u2019 genuine concerns about Iran\u2019s behavior. Although these concerns persist, their expression and management have evolved.<a href=\"#_edn20\" id=\"_ednref20\">[19]<\/a> They urge the new government to transform its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the other Gulf countries into stable political alliances. This transformation will require direct meetings between the leaders of these countries and ongoing discussions to create a roadmap for cooperation in the economic, military and security dimensions, which could be a crucial area of focus in the coming months.<a href=\"#_edn21\" id=\"_ednref21\">[20]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Differences in \u201cReformist\u201d and \u201cConservative\u201d Orientations Toward the Eastern Bloc<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>An examination of Iran\u2019s relations with Russia and China reveals that their strategic alliance is not as ideal as the Iranian \u201cconservative\u201d faction often presents. On the contrary, it appears that both Russia and China are leveraging Iran\u2019s crises with the West to serve their interests, often at the expense of Iranian interests. For instance, some opinions in Iran hold that exporting 1 million barrels of oil to China daily at prices lower than global rates cannot be considered a success, especially when it leads to the import of subpar goods rather than receiving capital in exchange for oil. China maintains relations with 15 neighboring countries, yet investment opportunities in Iran remain largely obstructed due to sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Therefore, Iran\u2019s political and trade relations with China are heavily dependent on the lifting of these sanctions. If sanctions were not an issue and China viewed Iran as a viable partner, it would not have issued statements alongside Arab nations regarding the ownership of the three islands. The same holds true for relations with Russia; Tehran has suffered significantly due to its military support for Moscow without reaping any benefits in return. This reality may contribute to Russia\u2019s apprehension that a \u201creformist\u201d president could pivot more toward the West, casting a shadow over the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.<a href=\"#_edn22\" id=\"_ednref22\">[21]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cReformists\u201d highlight these imbalances and argue for the need to recalibrate relations, emphasizing the deficiencies of the current eastward orientation policy. This sentiment was echoed by President Pezeshkian during his election campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Factors Affecting Pezeshkian\u2019s Foreign Policy Outlook<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The realization of President Pezeshkian\u2019s foreign policy goals depends on various internal and external factors as elucidated below:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Shadow of the Late President and the Burdensome Legacy of Crises<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The sudden death of former President Raisi in a helicopter crash casts a sympathetic lens on his presidency. The final judgment on his tenure remains pending due to his inability to complete either his first or potential second term, for which he had significant support. Thus, Raisi\u2019s legacy will always loom behind any steps taken by Pezeshkian, whether at the popular or official level. The supreme leader will be the first to draw comparisons, given the close bond he had with Raisi, who was notably obedient to him and whose stances on domestic and foreign issues aligned closely with his views. Khamenei praised Raisi on various occasions. During a meeting with acting President Mohammad Mokhber and Raisi\u2019s government ministers, the supreme leader highlighted the late president\u2019s most notable qualities, including his commitment to fostering positive interactions and \u201cdignity\u201d in foreign policy, strong belief in domestic capabilities to solve problems, clear religious and revolutionary positions while avoiding ambiguous and placatory statements, and a principled adherence to his expressed views. According to Khamenei, Raisi\u2019s approach of engaging with other countries from a position of strength, prioritizing relations with neighboring nations, led some of the world\u2019s top leaders to describe him in their condolence messages as a prominent figure rather than an ordinary politician.<a href=\"#_edn23\" id=\"_ednref23\">[22]<\/a> These attributes will undoubtedly play a role in the supreme leader\u2019s evaluation of his relationship with the new president, who is expected to continue along Raisi\u2019s path not only in his policy orientations but also in his dealings with the supreme leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Conversely, Iran is still grappling with complex economic issues that have worsened living conditions and exacerbated social problems. Despite Raisi\u2019s efforts, he has left behind a burdensome legacy of economic and social challenges. Economists contend that Iran\u2019s current economic difficulties are more daunting than those experienced during the war, as the country did not face issues such as water shortages, a pension funds crisis, sanctions or inflation exceeding 40% during that time.<a href=\"#_edn24\" id=\"_ednref24\">[23]<\/a> All of these problems require immediate attention and are linked to external issues that Pezeshkian must navigate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Defying \u201cConservative\u201d Views While Addressing \u201cReformist\u201d Demands<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>External and internal goals overlap in determining the positions of conservative forces concerning Pezeshkian\u2019s policy on Iran\u2019s international relations. Consequently, the new president will face two levels of challenges from this perspective. The first level involves the conflict of visions between him and the \u201cconservatives\u201d regarding outstanding issues, particularly the nuclear file and the relationship with the West. The president needs to reach compromises that satisfy the \u201cconservatives\u201d to gain their approval for his decisions. The second level pertains to the repercussions of the president\u2019s successes in the internal political process. Pezeshkian\u2019s achievements will bolster the \u201creformist\u201d narrative at the popular level, thereby enhancing the \u201creformist\u201d faction\u2019s chances in future elections. Therefore, it is likely that the \u201cconservatives\u201d will work to obstruct the president\u2019s external efforts \u2014 not necessarily out of &nbsp;disagreement, although they will publicly argue otherwise \u2014 but to prevent the \u201creformist\u201d current from regaining its popular status and momentum. The contours of this conflict have become evident through the significant criticism leveled by the \u201cconservatives\u201d at Pezeshkian, especially given Zarif\u2019s reprisal of his prominent role in the political landscape. For instance, the fundamentalist Kayhan newspaper queried in its editorial whether Pezeshkian had \u201crented\u201d the presidency to Zarif.<a href=\"#_edn25\" id=\"_ednref25\">[24]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The new president\u2019s lack of experience in foreign policy may lead him to rely more heavily on Zarif and other experienced individuals, subjecting him to significant criticism.<a href=\"#_edn26\" id=\"_ednref26\">[25]<\/a> In contrast, the \u201creformists,\u201d both at elite and popular levels, expect President Pezeshkian to confront the \u201cconservative\u201d current and fulfill his promises related to foreign and domestic policy. During her meeting with the president-elect, Azar Mansouri, head of the Reform Front, insisted that his government should symbolize change and hope rather than perpetuate the status quo. She informed him that the Reform Front would be held increasingly accountable for the performance of his administration.<a href=\"#_edn27\" id=\"_ednref27\">[26]<\/a> This sentiment was echoed by the \u201creformist\u201d politician Alireza Alavi, who linked the success of Pezeshkian\u2019s presidency to its espousal of change and development. He argued that if the government merely sustains the status quo, the \u201creformists\u201d will suffer a significant decline in their electoral prospects in upcoming elections.<a href=\"#_edn28\" id=\"_ednref28\">[27]<\/a> These \u201creformist\u201d demands may sometimes clash with the supreme leader\u2019s orientations, as well as the interests of the \u201cconservative\u201d current and the IRGC, compelling Pezeshkian to make concessions in domestic politics to pass decisions on foreign policy, or vice versa. In either scenario, he will likely face strong blowback from the \u201creformists\u201d who will demand that he adhere to all his promises, creating an additional challenge for a president seeking to maintain both his popularity and his relationship with the \u201creformists\u201d to ensure reelection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Role of the IRGC and Militia Positions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The IRGC and the Quds Force have been instrumental in consolidating Iran\u2019s regional influence, making them central actors in Iranian foreign policy. Their activities have determined foreign policy decisions across various arenas, often serving as an alternative to formal diplomacy. The \u201cconservatives\u201d generally do not oppose the IRGC\u2019s involvement in foreign policy due to their alignment on many issues. Still, debates often arise with the \u201creformists\u201d who seek to exercise their powers within state institutions. In contrast, the IRGC adheres to its revolutionary approach, asserting its constitutional status.<a href=\"#_edn29\" id=\"_ednref29\">[28]<\/a> IRGC activities are largely focused on consolidating relations with militias and other non-state actors, which are often disavowed by governments or create embarrassment for official diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Regional and international decision-makers are cognizant of the Iranian establishment\u2019s structure, including the IRGC\u2019s influence and link to the supreme leader. Therefore, the real Iranian position is dictated by the actions of the IRGC, not the rhetoric of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the new president to gain the trust of regional neighbors and the international community, he must reverse this dynamic. Pro-Iran militias in the Middle East possess some autonomy beyond the directives of the IRGC, as their actions are often intertwined with calculations regarding power struggles and influence within their respective countries. They may also harbor concerns about the potential return of the \u201creformists\u201d and their perspectives on relations with the West, particularly a divergence from Raisi\u2019s approach. Such concerns could motivate these groups to adopt escalatory strategies that challenge the new government\u2019s diplomatic efforts, making it difficult, in some instances, for the IRGC to compel these actors to comply with any possible agreements reached with President Pezeshkian.<a href=\"#_edn30\" id=\"_ednref30\">[29]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Trump\u2019s Possible Return to the White House<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Former President Donald Trump\u2019s chances of winning the presidency are reportedly increasing, particularly following an assassination attempt against him. This contrasts with the crisis facing the Democratic Party due to President Biden\u2019s withdrawal from the electoral contest, prompted by party leaders\u2019 concerns about his performance in the initial election debate and his cognitive decline. As Trump draws closer to the presidency, it will become increasingly challenging for Pezeshkian to negotiate a nuclear agreement or reach satisfactory partial settlements for both parties, given Trump\u2019s hawkish stance toward Iran. During his first term, he not only withdrew from the nuclear agreement but also oversaw the assassination of Soleimani. References to Iran in the discussions surrounding Trump\u2019s assassination attempt underscore the potential for significant shifts in relations between the two countries if he returns to power, especially if he responds to calls for a resumption of his previous maximum pressure strategy before it reaches the nuclear threshold stage. This would likely involve reinstating a credible deterrence force and compelling Iran to make tangible compromises regarding its nuclear program and support for proxy groups.<a href=\"#_edn31\" id=\"_ednref31\">[30]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Rise of the Far Right in Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Iran often tries to balance its relationship with the West (the United States and the European Union (EU)) through Europe, whether collectively or within the framework of bilateral relations, in an attempt to create divisions by exploiting the differences that sometimes emerge between the Americans and Europeans. However, the rise of the far right in the recent EU elections is not in Iran\u2019s interest due to underlying hostility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The European People\u2019s Party, the main component leading the European Commission, calls for abandoning the principle of consensus \u201cin the field of European Union sanctions against totalitarian regimes around the world,\u201d referring to Russia and Iran. The far-right camp advocates for a more assertive policy toward Iran, focusing on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, state sponsorship of terrorism, and hostage diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It urges the European Commission to fully include the IRGC, the Houthis and Hezbollah on the EU terrorism list. Therefore, it is expected that the EU will tighten its policy toward Iran in the future by expanding sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities, as well as on individuals and entities linked to Iran in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.<a href=\"#_edn32\" id=\"_ednref32\">[31]<\/a> Thus, it was not surprising that the EU Council extended its sanctions against Iran due to the country\u2019s military support for Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and for armed groups in the Middle East and the Red Sea region.<a href=\"#_edn33\" id=\"_ednref33\">[32]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Tensions With Israel in the Middle East<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israel holds Iran largely responsible for the situation that has unfolded since Hamas\u2019s attack on October 7, 2023, accusing it of supporting the group with funds, weapons, and training. Israel also alleges that Iran coordinates the activities of Shiite militias in Lebanon and Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen to support Hamas by launching various attacks against Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moreover, Iran has disrupted the deterrence equation by directly confronting Israel. As a result, Tel Aviv will spare no effort to prevent Iran from achieving any gains abroad, particularly concerning the nuclear issue. This will not only result in heightened obstruction of the agreement but will also lead to a shift in US policy in the Middle East, which will likely take into account the security role that Israel increasingly plays in the region.<a href=\"#_edn34\" id=\"_ednref34\">[33]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Limits of Transformation in Iran\u2019s Foreign Policy During Pezeshkian\u2019s Term<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Against the backdrop of the challenges and opportunities available to the new president, the limits of the transformation in Iran\u2019s foreign policy during Pezeshkian\u2019s term can be identified as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Enduring Parameters of Iran\u2019s Foreign Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is difficult for any Iranian president, whether \u201creformist\u201d or \u201cconservative,\u201d to change the broad lines of foreign policy determined by the supreme leader, particularly those related to the Iranian expansionist project, nuclear program, and ballistic missiles. These are considered red lines that cannot be crossed, given the nature of the current leadership and the constitutional provisions that grant the supreme leader the authority to determine the substance of the country\u2019s foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The president\u2019s powers in this context are very limited; he is only responsible for implementing the broad lines set by Khamenei. Even in external implementation, the IRGC play a significant role since its authority is derived directly from the supreme leader. As a result, the IRGC remains wholly subservient to the supreme leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Many individuals affiliated with the IRGC also hold sensitive positions in security, defense, and foreign policy institutions. Since the announcement of the new president\u2019s victory, Khamenei has outlined the guidelines he expects to see in the new government, urging a continuation of the approach of his late predecessor, Raisi, regarding economic diplomacy and strengthening relations with neighboring countries. President Pezeshkian has responded by adhering to and demonstrating loyalty to the supreme leader\u2019s instructions, even fostering a good relationship with the IRGC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Continuity of Regional Projects and Policies<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to Pezeshkian\u2019s statements before and after his electoral victory, no significant changes are expected regarding Iran\u2019s position on Israel and its ongoing assault on Gaza, and its regional project. Similarly, the unwavering support for the axis of resistance and the deployment of the IRGC in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine will remain intact. Pezeshkian is poised to continue Raisi\u2019s efforts to improve relations with the Gulf states, particularly with Saudi Arabia, following Khamenei\u2019s positive statements on this issue. However, Pezeshkian will face the challenge of reconciling his support for field diplomacy, which often conflicts with Arab positions, with his commitment to dialogue and the continuity of relations with neighboring countries and the wider world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Additionally, Iran\u2019s strategic interests in expanding its spheres of &nbsp;influence in the Arab region, along with its efforts to preserve the gains from this expansion, do not indicate major changes in Iranian foreign policy during Pezeshkian\u2019s term. Many observers believe that Pezeshkian\u2019s stance on the axis of resistance suggests a lack of change in Iran\u2019s policies regarding its expansionist ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Some may speculate about the possibility of a return to tensions between the Foreign Ministry and the IRGC, reminiscent of the conflicts that characterized the Rouhani-Zarif era due to the IRGC\u2019s interference in diplomatic affairs. However, the dynamics seem to be different during Pezeshkian\u2019s presidency, thanks to what appears to be a positive relationship among Pezeshkian, Khamenei, and the IRGC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Expected Change Will Be Limited to Tools and Results<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While the avenues for altering foreign policy approaches are limited, the Iranian president can operate within the limited frameworks granted by the establishment concerning international relations. This typically involves the tools and outcomes of policy implementation, as well as the tone employed in dealings with the outside world. It is anticipated that Pezeshkian will adopt a pragmatic approach when engaging with the West, utilizing a moderate tone that contrasts with the \u201cconservatives\u2019\u201d preference for isolationist and ideologically polarizing policies. Consequently, President Pezeshkian\u2019s victory may present an opportunity for Tehran to engage more effectively with the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Pezeshkian\u2019s pragmatic approach aligns with the establishment\u2019s strategy, which has increasingly been seen as the key to engaging with the West even prior to Trump\u2019s accession to power in the United States, given Iran\u2019s negative experiences during his administration. Pezeshkian, with his moderate views, flexible stance and approachable demeanor, may create an environment in which the establishment finds it easier to negotiate with the West. It is important to note that Raisi\u2019s government was already negotiating with the West through Oman and achieved some gains, such as increasing oil exports and recovering frozen funds, particularly during Biden\u2019s presidency. President Pezeshkian may have the ability to forge better channels and conduct direct negotiations with the West that could lead to a diplomatic breakthrough. However, if these negotiations prove prolonged \u2014something that seems likely \u2014 he could clash with Trump\u2019s positions should he be reelected in November.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A potential diplomatic breakthrough regarding the nuclear agreement seems feasible, especially since the chief foreign policy advisor for Pezeshkian\u2019s election campaign was Zarif, a key figure behind the 2015 nuclear agreement. However, his endeavors will be challenged by the fact that ultimate decision-making remains in the hands of the supreme leader and influential institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Expectations Regarding the Revival of Nuclear Negotiations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Although the prospect of a significant diplomatic breakthrough leading to the United States\u2019 return to the nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions remains uncertain \u2014 due to the divergent positions between Iran and the United States, especially in light of the Iranian and upcoming US presidential elections \u2014 Pezeshkian\u2019s government could possibly initiate certain steps in the nuclear realm. These may include agreeing to reduce production rates of highly enriched uranium, facilitating multiple visits by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to nuclear sites, in exchange for Washington easing restrictions on Iranian oil exports and collaborating with the International Monetary Fund to remove Iran from the blacklist that has hindered foreign investment and access to international banking networks. This is in addition to a European pledge against reimposing sanctions set to expire in October 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Nevertheless, significant obstacles still confront the new president, including his limited powers, the ongoing domestic crises, the need to amend laws to reduce nuclear commitments amid \u201cconservative\u201d dominance across state institutions \u2014especially the Parliament \u2014 the tense regional situation in which pro-Iran groups are heavily embroiled, and a mutual trust deficit between &nbsp;the Iranian establishment &nbsp;and Washington. Therefore, we should not anticipate fundamental changes in Iran\u2019s foreign policy, as the president will likely be compelled to operate within the parameters specified by the supreme leader. Consequently, Pezeshkian\u2019s influence over Iranian foreign policy will be restricted to managing the pace of its implementation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Foreign policy issues, specifically the nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions, represent the most significant challenge for the newly elected \u201creformist\u201d president. This challenge arises from his inability to alter the overarching strategies of Iranian policy determined by the supreme leader. As a result, the new president has quickly affirmed his complete alignment with Khamenei regarding the country\u2019s foreign policy orientations, which include Iran\u2019s nuclear rights, its stance on Israel, and regional schemes. However, Pezeshkian the pragmatist will seek to employ the mechanisms necessary to lift the sanctions that continue to blight the country\u2019s economic future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Regardless of who assumes the role of foreign minister, the foreign policy decision-making process may encounter complications due to the presence of other institutions that are subordinate to the supreme leader and influenced by the \u201cconservative\u201d current. Pezeshkian has numerous opportunities, both domestically and internationally, that, if leveraged effectively, could enable him to neutralize the opposition within state institutions and secure concessions from regional and global powers. These concessions could contribute to advancing the \u201creformists\u2019\u201d position domestically while de-escalating tensions abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the challenges that may hinder the new president from realizing the goals he set forth during his election campaign regarding foreign policy must also be acknowledged. This is particularly relevant as the initial months of his presidency coincide with the upcoming US presidential elections. Therefore, it is likely that Pezeshkian will achieve only limited gains and breakthroughs in the medium term concerning critical issues in Iran\u2019s international relations, mainly nuclear negotiations and the ballistic missile program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref1\" id=\"_edn1\">[1]<\/a> \u201cIn the First Debate of the Second Round of the Presidential Election, Masoud Pezeshkian: We Will Not Make Gasoline More Expensive,\u201d <em>Mehr News Agency<\/em>, July 1, 2024, accessed July 12, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3xGA5Y0\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3xGA5Y0<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref2\" id=\"_edn2\">[2]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref3\" id=\"_edn3\">[3]<\/a> Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian, \u201cMy Message to the New World,\u201d <em>Tehran Times<\/em>, July 12, 2024, accessed July 12, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/2u.pw\/FZTODEIZ\">https:\/\/2u.pw\/FZTODEIZ<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref4\" id=\"_edn4\">[4]<\/a> \u201cThe Leader of the Revolution in a Message on the Occasion of the 14th Presidential Election: Competitive Behaviors During Elections Should Become Norms of Camaraderie,\u201d <em>Iranian Students\u2019 News Agency<\/em>, July 6, 2024, accessed July 20, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3RW0B6P\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3RW0B6P<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref5\" id=\"_edn5\">[5]<\/a> Pezeshkian, \u201cMy Message to the New World.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref6\" id=\"_edn6\">[6]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref7\" id=\"_edn7\">[7]<\/a> \u201cMasoud Pezeshkian\u2019s Message to Hassan Nasrallah: Support for Resistance Continues With Strength,\u201d <em>Mehr News Agency<\/em>, July 8, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3xPPwNG\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3xPPwNG<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref8\" id=\"_edn8\">[8]<\/a> \u201cGreetings From Masoud Pezeshkian to Nasrallah; Iran to Continue Its Cooperation With Proxies,\u201d <em>Al-Arabiya Persian<\/em>, July 10, 2024, accessed July 20, 2024,<a href=\"%20https:\/2u.pw\/WRc7eSeB.%20%5bPersian%5d.%20\"> https:\/\/2u.pw\/WRc7eSeB. [Persian].<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref9\" id=\"_edn9\">[9]<\/a> \u201cIn the Sincere Meeting of the President-elect of the Nation With the Family of Martyr Soleimani, Masoud Pezeshkian: We Should Solve the Country\u2019s Problems by Following the Path and Ideals of Martyr Soleimani,\u201d <em>IRNA News<\/em>, July 20, 2024, accessed July 20, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3y6iMzS\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3y6iMzS<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref10\" id=\"_edn10\">&nbsp;<\/a>\uf02a General Commander Brigadier General Hussein Salami, Commander of the Aerospace Forces Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of the Ground Forces Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour, Commander of the Naval Forces Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri, Commander of the Quds Force Major General Ismail Qaani, Head of the Anti-Espionage Organization Brigadier General Majid Khademi, Commander of the Intelligence Agency Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi, Commander of the Basij Forces Brigadier General Gholam Reza Soleimani, Commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Forces Brigadier General Abdolreza Abed, Representative of the Supreme Leader Abdullah Haji Sadeghi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref11\" id=\"_edn11\">[10]<\/a> \u201cThe Senior Commanders of the IRGC Met With the President-elect,\u201d <em>Iranian Students\u2019 News Agency<\/em>, July 14, 2024, accessed July 18, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/4cQtWrg\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/4cQtWrg<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref12\" id=\"_edn12\">[11]<\/a> Mehr News Agency, \u201cIn the First Debate of the Second Round.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref13\" id=\"_edn13\">[12]<\/a> Pezeshkian, \u201cMy Message to the New World.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref14\" id=\"_edn14\">[13]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref15\" id=\"_edn15\">[14]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref16\" id=\"_edn16\">[15]<\/a> \u201cAbdolreza Farji Rad in a Conversation With Fararu News Agency: Masoud Pezeshkian Has Heard the Alarm Bells of Foreign Policy,\u201d <em>Fararu News<\/em>, July 12, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/4f2NydJ\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/4f2NydJ<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref17\" id=\"_edn17\">[16]<\/a> Alon Ben-Meir, \u201cCooperating With Iran\u2019s President-elect Pezeshkian Will Far Outweigh The Risks,\u201d <em>Jerusalem Post<\/em>, July 12, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/opinion\/article-810155\">https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/opinion\/article-810155<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref18\" id=\"_edn18\">[17]<\/a> Ellie Geranmayeh, \u201cManaged Reform: What Iran\u2019s New President Means for European Diplomacy,\u201d <em>European Council on Foreign Relations<\/em>, July 10, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3S3brYM\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3S3brYM<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref19\" id=\"_edn19\">[18]<\/a> Ben-Meir, \u201cCooperating With Iran\u2019s President-elect.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref20\" id=\"_edn20\">[19]<\/a> Saber Gul&#8217;anbari, \u201cLessons From the JCPOA Period and Regional Interactions; Masoud Pezeshkianand Interactive Foreign Policy Challenges,\u201d <em>Irdiplomacy<\/em>, July 10, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/4czkqZH\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/4czkqZH<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref21\" id=\"_edn21\">[20]<\/a> Kamran Karmi, \u201cIran and the Cooperation Council for Continuity and Change,\u201d <em>Donya-e-eqtesad Newspaper<\/em>, July 14, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3zD3Md3\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3zD3Md3<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref22\" id=\"_edn22\">[21]<\/a> Fararu News, \u201cAbdolreza Farji Rad in a Conversation With Fararu News Agency.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref23\" id=\"_edn23\">[22]<\/a> \u201cLeader of the Revolution: The Government of Mr. Raisi Was the Government of Work, Hope and Movement,\u201d <em>Tasnim News Agency<\/em>, July 7, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/4bxdLhp\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/4bxdLhp<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref24\" id=\"_edn24\">[23]<\/a> Maryam Fakhri, \u201cMasoud Pezeshkian\u2019s Administration Faces Major Energy Imbalance Challenge: Economists Warn of Potential \u2018Stagnation\u2019 in Iran\/Tajik Economy Amid $120 Billion in Energy Subsidies,\u201d <em>Khabar Online News Agency<\/em>, July 14, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/4cBZyRC\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/4cBZyRC<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref25\" id=\"_edn25\">[24]<\/a> Ghaith Alao, \u201cIran Headline: A Question for Masoud Pezeshkian: Has Zarif Rented the Presidency From You?\u201d <em>Aljadah Iran Media<\/em>, July 20, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/aljadah.media\/archives\/78490\">https:\/\/aljadah.media\/archives\/78490<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref26\" id=\"_edn26\">[25]<\/a> Jason M. Brodsky, \u201cDon\u2019t Fall for the Spin That Iran\u2019s New President, Masoud Pezeshkian, Is a Reformer,\u201d <em>The Jewish Chronicle<\/em>, July 8, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/45VhFj2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/45VhFj2<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref27\" id=\"_edn27\">[26]<\/a> \u201cAzar Mansouri, Head of the Reform Front, Meets President-Elect: Advocates for Increased Accountability of the 14th Government,\u201d <em>Entekhab Newspaper<\/em>, July 15, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3y8Y1Dw\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3y8Y1Dw<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref28\" id=\"_edn28\">[27]<\/a> \u201cAlireza Alavitabar Critiques Masoud Pezeshkian\u2019s Cabinet: \u2018A Continuation of the Status Quo Means We Have All Lost\u2019,\u201d <em>Rouydad24 News Agency<\/em>, July 14, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3Y0ih4U\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3Y0ih4U<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref29\" id=\"_edn29\">[28]<\/a> The assassination of Qasem Soleimani remains a significant event that highlights the complex relationship between the IRGC, the Iranian presidency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his memoirs, Mohammad Javad Zarif revealed that the IRGC informed the United States through the Iraqi Prime Minister that they would respond to the assassination by symbolically targeting US military bases. This coordination took place while he was deliberately kept in the dark despite serving as the foreign minister. Interestingly, President Hassan Rouhani later confirmed Zarif&#8217;s account. This occurred alongside statements from former US President Donald Trump, who indicated his agreement not to retaliate against Iran\u2019s prior warnings of their actions in response to Soleimani\u2019s killing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref30\" id=\"_edn30\">[29]<\/a> Gul&#8217;anbari, \u201cLessons From the JCPOA Period.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref31\" id=\"_edn31\">[30]<\/a> Eli Diamond, \u201cPrepare for a Nuclear Iran,\u201d <em>National Review<\/em>, July 14, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3zMAl8M\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3zMAl8M<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref32\" id=\"_edn32\">[31]<\/a> Gul&#8217;anbari, \u201cLessons From the JCPOA Period.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref33\" id=\"_edn33\">[32]<\/a> \u201cExtension of Unilateral European Sanctions on Iran,\u201d <em>Tasnim News Agency<\/em>, July 15, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/3zHN64g\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/3zHN64g<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref34\" id=\"_edn34\">[33]<\/a> \u201cPost Far-right Rise \u2013 Prospects for the EU Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East and the Gulf Region,\u201d <em>Emirates Policy Center<\/em>, June 19, 2024, accessed July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/2u.pw\/9shg7bWJ\">https:\/\/2u.pw\/9shg7bWJ<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction Iran has witnessed a significant political change with the election of the new \u201creformist\u201d President Masoud Pezeshkian, following the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in western Iran. Therefore, examining the contours of change in Iran\u2019s foreign policy under the new president is crucial. Iran\u2019s foreign policy holds greater salience [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":347,"featured_media":12815,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12814","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-centre-for-researches-and-studies"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12814","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/347"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12814"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12814\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12923,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12814\/revisions\/12923"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12815"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12814"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12814"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12814"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}