{"id":12942,"date":"2024-09-18T14:10:02","date_gmt":"2024-09-18T11:10:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=12942"},"modified":"2024-09-19T10:59:09","modified_gmt":"2024-09-19T07:59:09","slug":"from-hostility-to-cooperation-sisis-recent-visit-to-ankara","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/from-hostility-to-cooperation-sisis-recent-visit-to-ankara\/","title":{"rendered":"From Hostility to Cooperation: Sisi\u2019s Recent Visit to Ankara"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi recently <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/egypts-sisi-heads-turkey-first-presidential-visit-12-years-2024-09-04\/\">visited<\/a> Ankara and met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The meeting comes after over a decade of hostility during which both leaders remained on opposite sides of several regional conflicts that exacerbated tensions and limited the prospects for any active cooperation.&nbsp; The visit follows Erdogan\u2019s trip to Cairo earlier this year in February which officially ended the decade-long hostility between Ankara and Cairo. During the recent visit, both leaders called for deeper bilateral ties and indicated their intention for coordinated responses against Israel as well as to facilitate humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. The volatile regional security situation amid the war in Gaza has accentuated rapprochement efforts between both countries despite disagreements concerning Hamas. In the current context, both countries are compelled to look beyond lingering ideological differences and focus on economic interests and pragmatic strategic considerations as they are in urgent need to improve their economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Bilateral relations between Egypt and T\u00fcrkiye deteriorated significantly following the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi following the\u00a0 June 30 revolution in 2013. Morsi, who had come to power after\u00a0the so-called &#8220;Arab Spring&#8221;\u00a0protests, was a close ally of T\u00fcrkiye, which had supported the Muslim Brotherhood. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s media continued to criticize Sisi, while Erdogan repeatedly invoked Sisi\u2019s name in political rhetoric, drawing parallels between Sisi and certain opposition figures in T\u00fcrkiye to rally support. Relations between both countries began improving after T\u00fcrkiye took measures to ease tensions with regional countries including Egypt and as per reports, there have been backdoor diplomatic efforts in recent years to improve relations that eventually led to both countries reappointing ambassadors. During the recent visit, both countries signed several cooperation agreements including in the domains of energy, agriculture, education, tourism and trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The recent developments are driven by various economic and strategic interests, influenced by the evolving regional geopolitical landscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Firstly, it is important to note that even after cutting off ties, the two countries continued to engage in bilateral trade as Egypt remained T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s foremost trading partner in Africa and T\u00fcrkiye remained one among the top five trading partners of Egypt. This indicates that, despite political tensions, both countries have been cautious about the lingering disputes negatively impacting their bilateral trade relations. During the press conference after the meeting between both presidents, Erdogan <a href=\"https:\/\/english.news.cn\/20240905\/fe641108ec3d4709bdc7c4691495d118\/c.html\">said<\/a> that both countries intend to boost their bilateral annual trade from $7 billion to $ 15 billion in the next five years. The agenda to improve bilateral economic cooperation and diversify investments indicates that both countries are keen on overcoming political differences and divergences primarily because of their domestic economic situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Secondly, Cairo and Ankara are motivated by the need to recalibrate their foreign policies and align with the evolving regional geopolitical environment. Egypt and T\u00fcrkiye have supported rival factions in Libya which exacerbated tensions between both countries. While Ankara supported the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli primarily because of the ideological convergence with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo supported General Khalifa Haftar\u2019s Libyan National Army (LNA) to prevent Islamist forces from gaining influence in the region that could pose challenges for Egyptian border security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Thirdly, T\u00fcrkiye currently seeks to enhance its energy security, improve its LNG import infrastructure, and explore options for new suppliers. Ankara aims to become a gas hub and supplier to the European Union, and the recent moves, including navigating opportunities for importing LNG from Egypt, are primarily focused on complementing this aspiration. In February, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) and Egypt\u2019s Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/energy\/natural-gas\/turkish-egyptian-energy-firms-agree-to-cooperate-for-regional-security\/40682\">agreed<\/a> to strengthen their cooperation on natural gas and LNG trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Fourthly, in recent years, T\u00fcrkiye has actively sought to expand its defense exports globally and has especially focused on penetrating North African markets. This strategic focus aims to position defense exports as a significant contributor to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s economy. Earlier in February, T\u00fcrkiye agreed to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/turkey-agrees-provide-drones-egypt-2024-02-04\/\">export<\/a> combat UAVs and other military equipment to Egypt which signaled a shift in the bilateral relations between both countries. The potential for exploring defense cooperation stems from opportunities that would mutually benefit both countries especially as Egypt has expressed interest in Turkish defense products, particularly drones. Moreover, such a partnership would further strengthen ties between both countries as defense ties would invariably cement the prospects for engagement based on long-term considerations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Fifthly, T\u00fcrkiye aims to avoid escalating regional tensions and secure its maritime interests, particularly since it was excluded from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum established in 2020. By engaging with Egypt, T\u00fcrkiye seeks to mitigate its regional isolation, which stems from conflicting maritime interests with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sixthly, both Egypt and T\u00fcrkiye have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, and a mutual understanding between them could help preserve their respective interests amid rising regional tensions. In January, Ethiopia <a href=\"https:\/\/www.al-monitor.com\/originals\/2024\/01\/ethiopia-somaliland-deal-receives-wide-condemnations-including-egypt-turkey\">signed<\/a> a landmark agreement with Somaliland, which despite lacking international recognition, granted Ethiopia access to the Red Sea in exchange for recognizing Somaliland\u2019s sovereignty. This deal aims to help Ethiopia overcome its geographical limitation of being landlocked by diversifying its Red Sea access. Recently, T\u00fcrkiye has intensified its efforts to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.africanews.com\/2024\/07\/02\/turkey-mediates-between-somalia-and-ethiopia\/\">mediate<\/a> talks between Somalia and Ethiopia, seeking to enhance its diplomatic influence in the region. On the other hand, Egypt and Ethiopia have been at loggerheads over Ethiopia\u2019s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) which Egypt fears will severely endanger its water security situation. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c3vxqk9g43no\">warned<\/a> that Ethiopia will humiliate any nation that threatens its sovereignty in response to Egypt\u2019s growing involvement in the Horn of Africa. This intensified rhetoric also comes after Egypt signed a military deal with Somalia which Ethiopia sees as a challenge to its maritime deal with Somaliland. If the lingering tensions escalate, this situation could potentially lead to a proxy conflict which would have dire consequences as the region holds immense strategic importance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Cairo and Ankara recognize the need for rapprochement and engagement in the current geopolitical landscape. This is also particularly evident in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s participation in the Arab League summit in Cairo which complements Ankara\u2019s ongoing efforts in repairing ties with regional neighbors.&nbsp; Amid the Gaza war, effective coordination is essential, and Egypt\u2019s geographical proximity makes it a pivotal player in humanitarian efforts. Ankara recognizes this, viewing the situation as an opportunity for strengthening bilateral ties.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi recently visited Ankara and met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The meeting comes after over a decade of hostility during which both leaders remained on opposite sides of several regional conflicts that exacerbated tensions and limited the prospects for any active cooperation.&nbsp; The visit follows Erdogan\u2019s trip to Cairo earlier [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":12943,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[387,7087,5881],"class_list":["post-12942","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-ankara","tag-sisi","tag-visit"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12942","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12942"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12942\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12948,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12942\/revisions\/12948"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12943"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12942"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12942"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12942"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}