{"id":12972,"date":"2024-09-26T14:36:19","date_gmt":"2024-09-26T11:36:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=12972"},"modified":"2024-09-26T14:36:21","modified_gmt":"2024-09-26T11:36:21","slug":"the-irgc-bans-communication-devices-following-pager-explosions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/iran-in-a-week\/the-irgc-bans-communication-devices-following-pager-explosions\/","title":{"rendered":"The IRGC Bans Communication Devices Following Pager Explosions"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Imbalances in the Mining Sector Cause Tragic Explosions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Hammihan Online editorial highlighted recent discussions from Dr. Masoud Nili and Dr. Reza Ardakanian concerning Iran\u2019s economy and the dangerous imbalances affecting various sectors. It noted that their remarks came amidst the tragic news of over 50 coal miners losing their lives, signaling the severity of systemic issues. The editorial emphasized that while accidents in mining, traffic, and other sectors are unavoidable, Iran\u2019s high accident rates reflect the widespread decay in national infrastructure and the lack of capacity to restore and rejuvenate critical sectors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial discussed global trends in mining safety, noting that developed countries have reduced mining fatalities by 75% over the past two decades. In contrast, Iran continues to face major challenges, particularly due to a lack of safety infrastructure, oversight, and training in its mines. The editorial added that Iran\u2019s fatality rate per million tons of extracted materials is significantly higher than the global average. This is attributed to inadequate safety training, the use of outdated equipment, the failure to follow safety protocols, and insufficient risk management practices in Iran\u2019s mining industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, the editorial argued that the economic challenges facing Iran exacerbate safety issues in the mining sector. As companies struggle financially, they are forced to cut costs by reducing worker training, limiting safety equipment, and replacing advanced technology with cheaper labor. Over time, these cost-saving measures lead to deteriorating safety standards, exposing workers to increased risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial added that corrupt and unmotivated regulatory bodies further weaken safety enforcement, while the government lowers safety standards to prevent mine closures. This approach, the editorial noted, may not have immediate consequences, but it increases the likelihood of future disasters. The same patterns are evident in Iran\u2019s road safety, where increased travel, poor vehicle quality, declining road conditions, and inadequate oversight have contributed to rising traffic fatalities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, the editorial argued that all these issues stem from broader economic imbalances and deteriorating infrastructure. Dr. Nili\u2019s expert report, as reflected in the editorial, called for greater unity within the government to address these challenges. He emphasized the need for consensus among key stakeholders on resolving three critical issues: economic and environmental imbalances, social and cultural divides, and the crises in Iran\u2019s foreign relations. The editorial concluded that without addressing these issues, the country\u2019s infrastructure will continue to erode, leading to more tragedies like the coal mine disaster.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hammihan Online<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Missiles Are Gathering Dust<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Hamdeli Daily editorial by Dr. Saif al-Reza Shahabi discussed recent escalations in Lebanon involving Hezbollah and Israel. On Tuesday and Wednesday, September 17 and September 18, 2024, explosions involving electronic devices in Beirut and several Lebanese cities led to injuries and fatalities among Hezbollah members and civilians. Following these events, an Israeli attack on Hezbollah\u2019s Radwan Unit in Beirut\u2019s southern suburb on Friday, September 20, 2024, resulted in the deaths of senior military commanders, including Ibrahim Aqil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial noted that Hezbollah had significantly strengthened its military arsenal since the 2006 war with Israel, reportedly amassing 150,000 missiles and numerous drones. It raised a critical question: when would Hezbollah decide to use this stockpile? If Hezbollah did not respond militarily following Israel\u2019s deadly attacks, which amounted to an effective declaration of war, what circumstances would compel the group to do so?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial further indicated that Hezbollah seemed to be weighing national, regional, and international considerations in its decision-making. If the group opted not to utilize its missile arsenal, then it questioned the rationale behind the enormous expenditure on building this capability. It also highlighted that the stockpiled missiles, if left unused, could lose their effectiveness over time due to neglect and obsolescence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, the editorial argued that the deterrent effect of Hezbollah\u2019s missile arsenal appeared ineffective, as Israel continued to carry out strikes at will. It cited Hezbollah\u2019s leader Hassan Nasrallah, who in his speech on Thursday, September 19, 2024, warned Israel that Hezbollah would target its military sites and settlements in retaliation for any aggression. However, it wondered whether Israel\u2019s recent attacks, including the killing of several Hezbollah commanders, did not already constitute acts of aggression that warranted a response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial drew parallels between Israel\u2019s current approach and its tactics during the 1967 war, where it first neutralized Egypt\u2019s air force before occupying the Sinai Peninsula. It suggested that if Hezbollah chose not to escalate the conflict at this critical juncture by launching a full-scale military response with its missile arsenal, it should at least refrain from making hollow threats of \u201csevere revenge\u201d after each Israeli strike. The editorial concluded by contrasting Hezbollah\u2019s rhetoric of promising retaliation with Israel\u2019s consistent and aggressive military actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hamdeli Daily<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Threat Coming From Zangezur Is Serious<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an editorial published in Arman Daily, Abdolreza Farajirad discussed the initial agreements made regarding Zangezur with Iran. He noted that, despite significant noise and controversy within Iran, there had been no reactions from Azerbaijan, Turkey, or even Russia. The only response came from the spokesperson for the Russian government, who stated that they had presented their plan to the Iranian side, which neither accepted nor opposed it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial suggested that the proposed plan might involve creating an underpass from the Zangezur corridor, currently under Russian control, to facilitate communication between Iran and Armenia. Alternatively, it was speculated that it had been agreed that Iranian trucks could enter the Siunik province of Armenia via Nakhchivan. However, this second option presented its own set of fundamental challenges. In the first scenario, permission lay with Russia, while in the second, Azerbaijan would control access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Farajirad emphasized that Iran\u2019s initial entry into Armenia would require explicit permission, and during periods of tension with either Russia or Baku, complications could arise. He argued that the Russians appeared keen to finalize this strategic contract or partnership with Iran simultaneously. The writer believes that by signing this contract, the Russians intended to offer Iran a concession while simultaneously resolving the Zangezur issue. He anticipated that the strategic agreement with Russia would soon be signed, potentially including the purchase of Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft and S-400 air defense systems, which had created optimism within the Iranian military. However, he expressed skepticism, asserting that despite the signing, Russia would not deliver advanced weaponry to Iran until it received approval from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If forced to deliver, it would likely avoid providing essential components.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial asserted that discussions had likely taken place with Gulf Arab states, with Russia assuring them that it would not engage in cooperation with Iran that would alter the regional balance of power in Iran\u2019s favor. Farajirad highlighted that Russia\u2019s relationships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, akin to its ties with Turkey, were so crucial that it would never prioritize Iran over these countries during wartime. He pointed out that three nations \u2014 China, Turkey, and the UAE \u2014currently managed much of the Russian economy. Furthermore, he noted that Saudi Arabia\u2019s cooperation with Russia in OPEC+ had been instrumental in keeping oil prices elevated, a critical factor for the Russian economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alongside this context, the editorial highlighted Azerbaijan, under Aliyev\u2019s leadership, which Russia has recently brought into its sphere of influence to utilize as a tool for transporting Russian energy to Turkey. This strategy would allow Turkey to broker deals and secure its share of the European energy market. The editorial argued that any agreements in this regard had originated in the previous administration, with the Russians themselves indicating that this contract had been slated for signature under the prior government but would now be delayed due to the helicopter incident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Farajirad concluded by stressing that officials in the new government\u2019s foreign policy department needed to study this contract meticulously and discuss its implications with the president. He suggested that it might be necessary to delay the signing even further, as entering into such an agreement at this time could negatively impact Iran\u2019s discussions with Western powers, given previous sensitivities raised by similar agreements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arman Daily<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why Are the Sanctions Not Being Lifted?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an editorial for Arman Meli, Fereydoon Majlesi discussed Iran\u2019s approach to improving international relations. He noted that during his first press conference, the president emphasized Iran\u2019s desire to enhance its relationships with the world. Majlesi highlighted Tehran\u2019s interest in leveraging the current opportunity to negotiate the lifting of sanctions through dialogue and interaction with other countries. However, he argued that the extent to which this goal was accepted hinged on Iran\u2019s foreign policy outlook. Tehran needed to demonstrate its ambition to evolve into a progressive nation, which, in turn, could encourage other countries to collaborate with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Majlesi recalled the period when Iran faced diplomatic isolation from Saudi Arabia due to radical attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Despite significant differences, efforts were eventually made to restore relations, culminating in an agreement announced by the foreign ministers of both countries to reestablish diplomatic ties. Nonetheless, he suggested that this relationship remained largely superficial, as there were no substantial developments in economic cooperation. The editorial pointed out that Saudi officials seemed to prefer staying in hotels in Tehran rather than frequenting their embassy, indicating a lingering distrust stemming from the past. This sentiment needed to be addressed to foster mutual trust between Iran and Saudi Arabia, allowing for normal economic interactions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, Majlesi argued that the situation with Western countries was more complex. He asserted that Western nations, particularly the United States, aligned themselves strategically with Israel, as evidenced by their unwavering support for Tel Aviv during recent events. Iran\u2019s support for the Palestinians became a fundamental point of contention between Iran and the West. While Western countries expressed a willingness to engage in economic dealings with Tehran, their concerns about Iran\u2019s regional alliances led them to view the nation with skepticism. Majlesi suggested that, despite Iran\u2019s insistence on supporting the Palestinian cause for religious and humanitarian reasons, Western powers were unlikely to reduce their pressure on Iran, even if Tehran sought to improve relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial concluded that for Iran to enhance its global standing and foster genuine cooperation, it needed to navigate these intricate diplomatic landscapes carefully. Building trust with neighboring countries and addressing underlying tensions would be crucial for Iran to emerge as a credible and collaborative partner on the international stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arman Meli<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Over 45 Women Prisoners at Evin Launch Hunger Strike Amid Pezeshkian\u2019s Visit to New York<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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During the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, over 45 political prisoners, primarily women, at Evin prison initiated a hunger strike on Tuesday, September 24. According to the Narges Mohammadi Foundation, named after a prominent political prisoner and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, four female inmates had begun a sit-in and hunger strike a day earlier in the women\u2019s wing of the prison. The protesting women demanded an end to the execution of political prisoners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For nearly seven months, weekly sit-ins and hunger strikes have been organized by a group of women inmates across Evin and several other Iranian prisons under the campaign titled \u201cNo to Executions.\u201d Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who traveled to New York on Sunday, September 22, claimed that Iran is \u201cfar safer and freer\u201d than international media reports suggest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, human rights organizations reported that over 400 executions occurred in Iran during the first eight months of this year, including at least 100 post-presidential elections within just one month. Concurrently, the Bah\u00e1’\u00ed community expressed concerns about intensified persecution against Bah\u00e1’\u00eds in recent weeks, highlighting a disconnect between the Iranian government\u2019s promises of respect for minority rights and its actual practices. Simin Fahandzh, the Bah\u00e1’\u00ed representative at the UN, noted that regardless of who holds power, Bah\u00e1’\u00eds consistently face ongoing persecution. Pezeshkian is scheduled to address the General Assembly for the first time on the same day as the protests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Radio Farda Persian<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

16 Million Students Are Back to School; 790,000 Are Absent<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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As the new academic year approaches, approximately 16 million students in Iran are set to return to school starting on Sunday, September 22. According to the latest reports from the Ministry of Education, 790,000 students have yet to enroll in schools.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The breakdown of the student population reveals around 9.2 million in elementary education, approximately 3.8 million in middle school, and about 2.9 million in high school. This year, 1.5 million new students are entering the first grade of elementary school. Additionally, 2.5 million students are enrolled in 18,000 non-governmental schools across the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As part of the preparations, 154 million textbooks have been printed for students. Those who ordered their textbooks through the online system (https:\/\/irtextbook.ir) will receive them from their schools on the first day of the new term. However, according to Mohammad Alavi Tabr, the deputy head of the Educational Research and Planning Organization, 890,000 students have not ordered their textbooks. Among these, 100,000 have registered but failed to order their books, while 790,000 have not enrolled in any school.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compounding the issue, the challenges faced during the summer, such as some public schools refusing to enroll students with low grades or claiming a lack of space, have led to confusion and uncertainty for families, leaving many students without a school placement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tasnim<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

New Controversy Involving Damad: Majidi Appointed as Executive Assistant to the President\u2019s Office<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Hassan Majidi, who was appointed as the deputy director of the Iran Tour and Tourism Company, a subsidiary of the Retirement Fund, in 2018, is also the son-in-law of Masoud Pezeshkian. Recently, Majidi attracted media attention due to his presence on a trip to Iraq, leading to questions about his role in the visit. His appointment as the executive assistant to the president\u2019s office may serve as a response to these inquiries or as an effort to end the controversy surrounding his presence. Regardless, this appointment indicates that Pezeshkian\u2019s government officially desires his involvement. The assessment of Majidi\u2019s qualifications will be made later based on his performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rouydad24<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pager Explosions; The IRGC Bans the Use of Communication Devices<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Two senior Iranian intelligence officials revealed to Reuters that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has ordered its high-ranking members to temporarily refrain from using communication devices. This directive comes in the wake of a tragic incident in Lebanon last week, where explosions involving pagers and walkie-talkies belonging to Hezbollah resulted in 39 fatalities and injuries to over 3,000 individuals. Lebanese authorities and Hezbollah have attributed the attacks to Israel, although Israel has neither confirmed nor denied its involvement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to a report published by Reuters on September 23, an intelligence source indicated that the IRGC is undertaking a major operation to investigate not only communication equipment but also financial transactions both within Iran and abroad, as well as the travel activities of its senior personnel and their families. The source noted that most of the communication devices utilized by the IRGC are domestically manufactured or imported from China and Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, concerns have escalated regarding Israeli infiltration into sensitive military and security institutions, prompting investigations into personnel in these sectors and Iranian individuals who may have received compensation for providing information to Israel. Despite attempts to contact the Iranian ministries of defense, foreign affairs and interior for comment, no responses were received.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report also highlighted that, following the pager explosions in Lebanon, security regulations surrounding Iran\u2019s nuclear and missile facilities have been tightened to unprecedented levels. Iranian military officials are currently using encrypted communication devices, including walkie-talkies, with a diverse range of models that are either locally manufactured or composed of imported components.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the IRGC remains the largest military and economic power in Iran, with its Quds Force providing financial, military and technical support to allied groups throughout the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shiite militias in Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

DW Persian<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Imbalances in the Mining Sector Cause Tragic Explosions A Hammihan Online editorial highlighted recent discussions from Dr. Masoud Nili and Dr. Reza Ardakanian concerning Iran\u2019s economy and the dangerous imbalances affecting various sectors. It noted that their remarks came amidst the tragic news of over 50 coal miners losing their lives, signaling the severity of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":12977,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[355],"class_list":["post-12972","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-iran-in-a-week","tag-irgc"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12972","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12972"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12972\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12978,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12972\/revisions\/12978"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12977"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12972"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12972"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12972"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}