As the world watched the US presidential election cycle with great suspense, the implications of a new Trump administration are being intensely scrutinized in Tehran. A reinstated \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d policy will likely see a re-emergence of tough sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and heightened military deterrence aimed at curtailing Iran\u2019s regional influence and nuclear program. The first consequences for the Iranian economy of the US elections were the depreciation of the national currency, the rise of the price of gold, and the stock market experienced a relapse. The Iranian rial dropped sharply, with the US dollar reaching an unprecedented high of approximately 720,000 rials on November 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Several moderate Iranian commentators advocate the need for \u201cde-escalation and normalization of Iran’s relations with Europe\u201d after the election of Donald Trump, while fearing his behavior could be \u201cunpredictable.\u201d In an interview with Arman<\/em>, international affairs expert Alireza Bigdeli stated that Trump will act as a \u201cbusinessman and pragmatist, not seeking war\u201d with Iran. Moderate newspapers outline the need for engagement and dialogue even under a new Trump Administration whereas conservative newspapers attempt to downplay the impact of the US elections on the future of Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new Iran policy of the next Trump Administration will be implemented in the context of the recent tensions, including a direct threat reportedly issued by the Islamic Republic against President-elect Trump in July 2024. Despite Iranian official denials, on November 8, 2024, the Department of Justice unsealed criminal charges against a man allegedly tasked by Iran with \u201csurveilling and plotting to assassinate\u201d Trump before the presidential elections. Against this tense backdrop, Brian Hook, a prominent architect of the original \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d policy as Trump\u2019s former special envoy for Iran, may also take up a senior post in the new Trump administration, evoking Iranian memories of the former policy and intensifying domestic reactions in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the next Trump administration reintroduces the \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d policy, Iran\u2019s leadership is likely to revert to its hardened posture, characterized by rhetoric of resistance and self-reliance. During the first Trump administration, Iran\u2019s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei framed the US stance against Iran as a manifestation of imperialist aggression, urging the Iranian people to resist US pressures. This narrative remains strong inside Iran, and Iranian leaders will likely re-adopt it as a tool to reinforce solidarity, portray the US as an external antagonist, and justify any measures taken to counter the economic negativities of reimposed sanctions and a stricter implementation of existing sanctions especially regarding Iranian oil sales to China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, Iran\u2019s military and security apparatuses will likely escalate their rhetoric and posture. The threat made by the Islamic Republic against Trump himself in July 2024 suggests that Iranian hardliners view his potential return as extremely unsettling and an existential threat for them at a personal and ideological level. The Revolutionary Guard could exploit these tensions to further assert its influence over domestic politics, sidelining more moderate voices within the Iranian government who favor dialogue over conflict. There is also a risk of a global war according to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abbas Araghchi. On November 9, 2024, he explained that the \u201cworld should know that in case of the expansion of war, its harmful effects will not be limited only to the West Asia region; insecurity and instability can spread to other regions, even far away.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The resurgence of figures such as Hook will further stoke distrust and resentment among Iran\u2019s political elite. Hook\u2019s approach was widely perceived by Iranian authorities as a strategic, multifaceted assault, not only targeting Iran\u2019s economy but also seeking to undermine the country\u2019s political system and regional influence. Currently, Trump has selected Hook to head the transition team in the State Department. His involvement will likely be cited by Iranian media outlets and officials as evidence of a continued \u201chostile\u201d US posture, serving to rally nationalist sentiment and bolster the narrative of an existential threat posed by the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The anticipated return of \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d will likely intensify the economic hardships already faced by the Iranian population. The sanctions that were re-imposed during the first Trump administration significantly impacted Iran\u2019s economy, with effects that still resonate today. High inflation, a depreciated currency, and limited access to essential goods have been sources of discontent and frustration for average Iranians, who often view the economic consequences of US policies through humanitarian lens. A reinstated \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d policy could exacerbate these economic hardships, likely increasing public dissatisfaction and potentially sparking protests as seen during previous periods of economic difficulties. Iran\u2019s young and tech-savvy population, eager for international integration, might be especially vocal in its criticism of any renewed isolation. Although public opinion within Iran varies, many Iranians have grown weary of feeling caught between geopolitical tensions, seeking instead an improvement in quality of life, freedom, and economic opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran\u2019s leadership may choose to strengthen its \u201cResistance Economy\u201d program in response, furthering domestic production and reducing dependence on foreign goods to withstand and mitigate the impact of US sanctions. Additionally, Tehran might look to deepen partnerships with non-Western allies like China and Russia as alternative economic and military partners. A return to \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d will likely halt the prospect of new Western diplomatic openings, intensifying Iran\u2019s international isolation and potentially sparking a race for countermeasures. As tensions rise, the question of whether confrontation or compromise will ultimately prevail remains pivotal, shaping the future of US-Iran relations and the lives of millions in Iran and in the region. Finally, to prevent any future military escalation between the United States and Iran, the moderate Iranian government led by Masoud Pezeshkian could leverage its renewed ties with key US regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, to engage with the incoming Trump administration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Source: <\/strong>Asharq Al-Awsat<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00a0Opinions in this article reflect the writer\u2019s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" As the world watched the US presidential election cycle with great suspense, the implications of a new Trump administration are being intensely scrutinized in Tehran. A reinstated \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d policy will likely see a re-emergence of tough sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and heightened military deterrence aimed at curtailing Iran\u2019s regional influence and nuclear program. The first […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":13094,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13093","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13093","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13093"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13093\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13096,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13093\/revisions\/13096"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13094"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13093"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13093"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13093"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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