{"id":13248,"date":"2025-02-03T15:04:45","date_gmt":"2025-02-03T12:04:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=13248"},"modified":"2025-02-03T15:07:05","modified_gmt":"2025-02-03T12:07:05","slug":"lebanese-developments-and-the-implications-forhezbollah-iran-and-the-syrian-equation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/lebanese-developments-and-the-implications-forhezbollah-iran-and-the-syrian-equation\/","title":{"rendered":"Lebanese Developments and the Implications forHezbollah, Iran and the Syrian Equation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

On January 9, 2025, the Lebanese Parliament\u2019s selection of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Joseph Aoun, a critic of Hezbollah, as the new president marks a pivotal moment for the country and improves the prospects for a lasting ceasefire<\/a> between Israel and Lebanon. In his victory speech, Aoun declared that only the Lebanese state would hold a \u201cmonopoly\u201d on weapons<\/a> \u2014 a statement widely interpreted as a commitment to disarm Hezbollah, long regarded as more powerful than the national military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aoun is well-positioned to attract additional LAF members and reconstruction funding from regional states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar<\/a>. He has expressed a commitment to Hezbollah\u2019s disarmament in Southern Lebanon, as required by the ceasefire agreement, and has signaled support for eventually dismantling Hezbollah\u2019s militia<\/a> forces nationwide. However, Aoun is likely to proceed cautiously in addressing Hezbollah to avoid the risk of civil conflict. For their part, Hezbollah leaders have shown no willingness to broadly disarm or relinquish the group\u2019s self-declared role as an authorized \u201cresistance\u201d<\/a> movement against Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, on January 13, 2025, the appointment of Nawaf Salam as Lebanon\u2019s new Prime Minister is widely seen as a positive step toward preserving the country\u2019s stability and even reflecting hope for change<\/a>. A member of a prominent Beirut family with deep political ties, Salam secured the backing of several traditional factions<\/a>, including Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and the three major Christian parties. He also won the support of approximately a dozen \u201cchange\u201d MPs who gained seats in 2022 by campaigning to break away from Lebanon\u2019s entrenched political class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, neither Hezbollah nor its ally Amal<\/a> \u2014 the two main parties representing Shiites in Parliament \u2014 endorsed Salam, although they refrained from putting forward an alternative candidate. Meanwhile, the outgoing Prime Minister Najib Mikati, previously considered a strong contender for reappointment, was nominated by only nine MPs. A small number of MPs chose not to nominate any candidate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These internal developments are likely to have regional repercussions. Lebanon\u2019s political landscape has long served as a microcosm of regional and international rivalries. The appointment of a new president represents a significant turning point, impacting not only the country\u2019s internal dynamics but also the broader geopolitical landscape, including Hezbollah, Iranian influence and the volatile Syrian theater.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lebanon\u2019s presidency, traditionally reserved for a Maronite Christian under the country\u2019s confessional system, is a powerful symbol of compromise among Lebanon\u2019s diverse sectarian groups. The election of the new president was the result of extensive negotiations among domestic factions, regional players such as Saudi Arabia and Iran and international stakeholders including the United States and France. The identity of the new president will heavily influence Lebanon\u2019s political alignment. Aoun is close to the West and the Gulf states. Therefore, he might challenge Hezbollah\u2019s dominance, albeit at the risk of exacerbating internal divisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Firstly, this election signals the end of a power vacuum. After more than two years without a functioning government, Aoun\u2019s election and Salam\u2019s appointment signal an end to a period of political paralysis, potentially stabilizing the government\u2019s structure. This could lead<\/a> to more decisive governance and policy implementation. Salam\u2019s background in international law and diplomacy at the International Court of Justice might encourage a push toward adopting anti-corruption measures and enacting broader institutional reforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new leadership could help in the unlocking of international aid and financial support, which has been contingent on political stability and reform. With Aoun\u2019s military background and international support, there is an expectation that foreign donors might be more willing to invest or provide loans for reconstruction and recovery. The economic challenges are vast, including a collapsed currency and banking sector.<\/a> The new administration will need to implement policies to address inflation, poverty and service failure, which could be complicated by Lebanon\u2019s sectarian governance system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite Aoun potentially attempting to reduce Hezbollah\u2019s influence, the political system will still require cooperation among different religious sects, which could lead to tensions with Shiite representatives in Parliament. Another option could be for Aoun and Salam to challenge Hezbollah\u2019s military power, particularly through implementing the ceasefire agreement and disarming the group in Southern Lebanon as per UN Resolution 1701. This might lead to friction with Hezbollah or, conversely, could push the group toward more political compromises or concessions if it sees a strategic advantage in doing so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The election of Aoun, might also enhance the influence of Gulf states within Lebanese politics. This could lead to a realignment of Lebanon\u2019s foreign policy, with an emphasis on economic and security cooperation with these states.  Iran, a key supporter of Hezbollah, might view this realignment as a strategic setback<\/a>, potentially affecting its regional policies or leading to diplomatic maneuvers to maintain its influence in Lebanon. Also, with Salam\u2019s diplomatic experience and international connections, Lebanon might see an improvement in its relations with international bodies, potentially leading to more support for its recovery and stability<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The appointment of a new Lebanese president is more than a domestic political event; it is a litmus test for the Middle East’s shifting alliances and power dynamics. For Hezbollah, Iranian influence and the Syrian equation<\/a>, the Aoun presidency will probably signal a pivot toward a new order. Overall, Lebanon\u2019s political future remains deeply intertwined with the region\u2019s unresolved conflicts and rivalries. The incoming Trump administration must recognize that permanently reversing Iran\u2019s influence requires a comprehensive and multifaceted regional strategy. A strong focus on Lebanon should be a key component, aimed<\/a> at further reducing Iran\u2019s ability to exploit Lebanese vulnerabilities to project its power and interests in the Levant. Trump should also consider regional perspectives on the necessity of stabilizing both Syria<\/a> and Lebanon<\/a> in 2025. However, while external support and goodwill are essential, they are not enough. The Lebanese people themselves must make the difficult decisions<\/a> necessary to rebuild a functional and resilient state.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On January 9, 2025, the Lebanese Parliament\u2019s selection of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Joseph Aoun, a critic of Hezbollah, as the new president marks a pivotal moment for the country and improves the prospects for a lasting ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. In his victory speech, Aoun declared that only the Lebanese state would […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":13249,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13248","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13248","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13248"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13248\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13250,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13248\/revisions\/13250"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13249"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13248"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13248"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13248"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}