As new alliances and political shifts reshape the balance of power in the Middle East, Iraq\u2019s position becomes increasingly critical, both in terms of its regional strategy and its prospects for stability and growth. Amid the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iraq witnessed political debates and divisions over whether to deploy military support for Assad. Domestically, Iraqi politics remains a battleground for Iranian influence, consequently reshaping power-sharing arrangements and deepening internal divisions. Over the past two decades, Iran has entrenched itself within Iraq\u2019s political and security structures, exerting significant control over various armed groups that largely operate in alignment with Tehran\u2019s interests. The weakened state of Iran\u2019s \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d has pushed Baghdad to reconsider its approach, especially as regional countries are now coordinating to address shared security concerns, economic integration and shifting alliances that could redefine the regional order. In the current context, Iraq faces the challenge of demonstrating to the United States and regional countries that it is working toward reducing Iranian influence while avoiding direct confrontation with Tehran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The upcoming elections in Iraq will be a decisive factor in shaping how Baghdad balances its interests and some of the recent developments reflect the ongoing struggle for influence among political factions, particularly over the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). After the 2022 political crisis and Sadrist Movement leader Muqtada al-Sadr\u2019s withdrawal, an umbrella bloc of predominantly Shiite parties formed the Coordination Framework with which the PMF is closely aligned. The PMF has evolved into a significant security and political force in Iraq as illustrated by its steadily increasing budget allocation, highlighting its growing institutional power in Iraq. A major point of contention that has dominated<\/a> the political scene in Iraq and split the Coordination Framework relates to the PMF retirement law, which if enforced would force its leader Faleh al-Fayyadh to step down. Nouri al-Maliki\u2019s State of Law Coalition and Qais al-Khazali\u2019s Asa\u2019ib Ahl al-Haq are leading efforts to enforce the law. Amid these developments, Fayyad recently visited<\/a> Tehran and met Iran\u2019s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dispute over Fayyadh\u2019s leadership reflects deeper divisions within the Coordination Framework over multiple interconnected issues including a quest for more power, and the nature of relations with Iran. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia\u2019 al-Sudani in the recently held Baghdad International Dialogue Conference urged dialogue for regional stability and promised Iraq\u2019s neutrality<\/a>. Meanwhile, Sadrist Movement leader Sadr is signaling<\/a> a political return, urging supporters to update voter records. His potential candidacy, emphasizing nationalism and alliances with Sunnis and Kurds, could challenge the Coordination Framework. Maliki recently proposed an alliance with the Sadrists though it was quickly rejected by some leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iraq\u2019s Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein recently said<\/a> that armed groups operating outside government authority are unacceptable \u2014 an attempt to reassure Washington given its growing concerns over Baghdad\u2019s ability to rein them in. The PMF has in recent years intensified its attacks targeting US assets and personnel in Iraq and the Trump administration has urged Baghdad to dismantle the PMF or integrate it into the Iraqi security forces. However, Sudani had earlier rejected this demand, and in a recent interview Maliki reiterated<\/a> that the PMF cannot be dismantled citing its importance in maintaining security. The Trump administration has warned Iraq and failure to address Washington\u2019s concerns could lead to sanctions and other punitive measures that could exacerbate the country\u2019s economic challenges. Regional security and political developments as well as domestic constraints leave limited room for the Iraqi government to take decisive action against the PMF without risking political instability and backlash from influential Shiite factions. Iraq\u2019s responses to regional conflicts remain a dividing issue within the Iraqi government as evident from leaders like Maliki\u2019s call for intervention<\/a> in Syria that drew criticism for sectarian rhetoric. The developments in Syria have had a significant impact on Iraq, highlighting the need for Baghdad to choose its side as well as act swiftly to deter another protracted domestic political crisis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, T\u00fcrkiye is increasing pressure on Iraq regarding the PKK, with Erdogan seeking greater cooperation from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s influence in Syria and its attempts to increase influence in the region have raised concerns among Iraqi officials, particularly regarding Ankara\u2019s military operations and its long-term strategic ambitions. Iraq also faces the challenge of balancing its ties with T\u00fcrkiye while addressing lingering security challenges in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The return of the Trump administration has exacerbated the risks for Iraq as the United States has intensified efforts to curb Iran\u2019s influence by revoking Iraq\u2019s waiver to import Iranian gas and electricity. The executive order<\/a> was passed to take immediate steps to \u201censure that the Iraqi financial system is not utilized by Iran for sanctions evasion or circumvention.\u201d Iraq has been dependent on Iran for electricity and the power crisis in Iraq may worsen. Washington is also pressuring<\/a> Iraq to resume Kurdish oil exports and has urged Iraq to counter Iran\u2019s oil smuggling. Kurdish exports have been halted since 2023 after an ICC ruling led T\u00fcrkiye to shut the pipeline. While Iraq has transferred control to its state-run State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), disputes with the KRG over payments and pricing persist and T\u00fcrkiye has yet to confirm its willingness to reopen the pipeline. Meanwhile, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has warned against a complete US withdrawal \u2014 a position that is contrary to the PMF as well as several factions within the Coordination Framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are actively leveraging their diplomatic and economic influence in the evolving regional order. Despite engaging closely with Gulf states in the last couple of years, there have been persisting concerns over Iranian influence in Iraq. Recognizing the risks of sanctions from the United States as well as regional isolation, Iraq is prioritizing deeper engagement with regional actors while simultaneously enhancing cooperation with the West. Sudani\u2019s recent visit to London and the strengthening of ties<\/a> with the UK through trade, investment and security collaboration reflect Baghdad\u2019s attempts to engage constructively with Europe. However, persistent investor concerns, domestic political tensions and security risks constrain Baghdad\u2019s efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iraq\u2019s political trajectory will be determined by its ability to navigate regional pressures while maintaining internal stability. The upcoming elections and the future of the PMF will be key indicators of Baghdad\u2019s strategic direction and the regional power realignments will test Iraq\u2019s ability to assert its autonomy. As geopolitical tensions rise, Baghdad\u2019s decisions in the coming months will have long-term implications for its future and role in the Middle East.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" As new alliances and political shifts reshape the balance of power in the Middle East, Iraq\u2019s position becomes increasingly critical, both in terms of its regional strategy and its prospects for stability and growth. Amid the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iraq witnessed political debates and divisions over whether to deploy military support […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":13347,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13346","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13346","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13346"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13346\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13348,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13346\/revisions\/13348"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13347"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13346"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13346"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13346"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}