security alliance<\/a> \u2014 potentially replacing the longstanding Russian-Iranian-Syrian-Iraqi axis.<\/p>\n\n\n\nIran views its setbacks in Syria and its diminishing influence in Lebanon with regret, particularly as T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s role in both countries continues to expand. Since Assad\u2019s departure, Ankara has provided substantial military and political backing to key figures dominating the new Syrian landscape. Meanwhile, several regional actors, alongside T\u00fcrkiye, have actively worked to block Iran\u2019s channels of influence \u2014 whether by preventing it from destabilizing Syria or leveraging Iraqi Kurdish factions to disrupt its ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A key battleground in this struggle has been Syria\u2019s Kurdish regions. T\u00fcrkiye has intensified its pressure on the SDF, to the extent that it has openly threatened a large-scale military operation against the group in Syria, as well as against the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK) in Iraq, which Ankara considers a terrorist organization. In line with this stance, T\u00fcrkiye has already carried out military strikes on PKK positions inside Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran\u2019s frustration with T\u00fcrkiye has deepened as Ankara has effectively shut down a key avenue of Iranian influence by compelling Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria to comply with its demands. In Iraq, the PKK announced its willingness to heed the call of its imprisoned leader Abdullah \u00d6calan to dissolve the party, lay down arms and transition to peaceful political activity \u2014 a landmark decision that brings an end to nearly four decades of conflict with the Turkish government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Meanwhile, in Syria, the SDF reached a historic agreement with interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, resolving longstanding disputes and moving toward national unity. The agreement entails the SDF\u2019s integration into the new Syrian army, as well as the transfer of border crossings and oil and gas fields under SDF control to the authority of the new Syrian administration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Diplomatic Friction Between the Two Countries<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Tensions between Iran and T\u00fcrkiye escalated sharply when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan issued a stark warning to Tehran, cautioning against efforts to destabilize neighboring countries and referencing past miscalculations that had proven costly. His rhetoric became even more pointed when addressing the possibility of Iranian support for the Kurds in Syria, hinting that T\u00fcrkiye, too, had the capacity to leverage groups within Iran \u2014 just as it does elsewhere. These remarks came just days before a significant armed rebellion erupted on Syria\u2019s coast, led by Assad loyalists seeking to seize control of the Alawite-majority region. The rebellion aimed to reshape the political landscape and overthrow the new Syrian government, reportedly in coordination with Kurdish factions and other minority groups. Reports suggested that Iran played a key role in orchestrating the attack, working alongside former Syrian army officers, Kurdish elements and Iraqi militias. Fidan\u2019s statements were widely interpreted as a direct warning to Iran against pursuing this course of action. Once the rebellion unfolded, T\u00fcrkiye responded decisively, backing the Syrian government\u2019s efforts to suppress it. Ankara also launched airstrikes on Kurdish positions to prevent the opening of another front against Syrian security forces and took steps to secure strategic gaps left by the Syrian military\u2019s focus on the coastal region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran has historically leveraged the Kurdish issue in its conflicts with neighboring countries, particularly T\u00fcrkiye and Iraq, a strategy also employed by the Assad regime. This tactic became even more pronounced following the outbreak of Syria\u2019s popular uprising in 2011. Accordingly, Iran\u2019s use of the Kurdish card in Syria was viewed as one of the most viable strategies to regain influence in the country or, at the very least, to exert pressure for certain political gains. However, recent regional and Syrian developments have significantly constrained Iran\u2019s ability to use this card effectively. Key among these changes was the historic decision by \u00d6calan and the Syrian government\u2019s agreement with the SDF, a deal brokered with significant US involvement. With both sides now implementing the agreement through joint committees, Iran\u2019s maneuvering space in Syria has narrowed. Despite these setbacks, Iran remains engaged in the Kurdish file, given the strong Kurdish presence within its own borders. Meanwhile, Israeli actions in Syria \u2014 whether through military strikes or support for certain Druze groups \u2014 could indirectly serve Iranian interests. The more instability Israel generates in Syria, the greater Iran\u2019s opportunities to exploit divisions. By leveraging both the Kurdish and Alawite cards, Tehran may still attempt to obstruct T\u00fcrkiye and Arab states from reintegrating Syria into the region on terms that exclude Iranian influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Future of T\u00fcrkiye-Iran Relations<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ongoing developments in Syria have disrupted the delicate balance that has long shaped T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s relationship with Iran, both within Syria and across the broader region. This shift has been particularly evident in the recent escalation of rhetoric between the two countries. Given these developments, several possible scenarios could emerge for the future of T\u00fcrkiye-Iran relations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The first scenario involves continued escalation, which could unfold in two ways: a limited confrontation confined to diplomatic exchanges and political maneuvering or a broader escalation where both T\u00fcrkiye and Iran actively leverage hard power and strategic pressure points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This scenario becomes more plausible given Iran\u2019s determination to preserve its regional influence, sustain its geopolitical project and recover from recent setbacks. To achieve this, Tehran may seek alliances with actors opposed to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s agenda, including Kurdish factions in Iraq and Syria, particularly the SDF. Alternatively, Iran could attempt to destabilize the new Syrian government by inciting internal strife, rallying Alawite factions and spearheading a counter-revolution against the Ankara-backed administration in Damascus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While Iran\u2019s actions are partly driven by its ideological imperatives and its doctrine of forward defense against Israel and the United States, they are likely to provoke strong reactions from T\u00fcrkiye and threaten its strategic interests. In response, T\u00fcrkiye is expected to adopt a firm counter-strategy aimed at curbing Iran\u2019s influence, particularly in its southern sphere of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ankara will likely capitalize on the ongoing transformations in these countries to further restrict Iran\u2019s regional presence, not only in West Asia but potentially in the Caucasus as well. By accelerating its geopolitical initiatives, T\u00fcrkiye could tighten the pressure on Iran from the north, particularly by mediating a resolution to the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and leveraging its strong ties with Baku. This move could be further reinforced by the United States, which also maintains close relations with Azerbaijan and may support efforts to deepen Iran\u2019s regional isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This trajectory of conflicting interests and escalating contradictions sets the stage for a direct confrontation between Iran and T\u00fcrkiye, especially if both sides begin to perceive each other as hostile actors. In such a scenario, every strategic gain by one party would come at the expense of the other, potentially pushing relations toward a crisis point. Diplomatic tensions could escalate into a deeper crisis, with both countries taking retaliatory measures to undermine each other\u2019s influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
T\u00fcrkiye, for instance, could intensify pressure on Iran by leveraging the Organization of Turkic States to highlight the Azerbaijani issue within Iran or by amplifying minority concerns, including the Kurdish question. Ankara could argue that any Iranian support for the PKK constitutes a direct threat to Turkish national security and sovereignty. Additionally, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s recent launch of a Persian-language news channel has already stirred tensions, signaling a potential media front in the rivalry. Furthermore, Ankara might consider aligning with Western economic sanctions against Iran, adding another layer of pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This scenario is particularly dangerous as it not only jeopardizes the security and sovereignty of both nations but also poses a significant threat to regional stability. An escalation of hostilities between Iran and T\u00fcrkiye could destabilize the broader Middle East, exacerbating existing conflicts and introducing new geopolitical fault lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second scenario envisions Iran and T\u00fcrkiye successfully managing their differences and adapting to the evolving geopolitical landscape. Historically, despite experiencing tensions, their relationship has never deteriorated to the point of direct conflict or rupture. Given their intertwined interests and history of pragmatic cooperation, both nations may find it in their best interest to maintain a working relationship rather than escalate hostilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran, facing a severe regional crisis and unprecedented international pressure, risks losing a key regional partner if tensions with T\u00fcrkiye spiral out of control. Ankara has so far refused to join the Western sanctions regime against Iran, has provided diplomatic backing for Tehran in international forums and serves as a crucial economic conduit for Iran\u2019s foreign trade. T\u00fcrkiye also has significant economic ties with Iran, including trade, investments and energy cooperation. These factors make it costly for Iran to push T\u00fcrkiye toward an openly adversarial stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, Iran is aware that T\u00fcrkiye can implement powerful countermeasures that could complicate Iran\u2019s regional position. If Ankara were to adopt Iran\u2019s own playbook \u2014 supporting separatist movements \u2014it could stir unrest among Iran\u2019s Azerbaijani Turks, the country\u2019s largest ethnic minority. Additionally, T\u00fcrkiye has strategic leverage in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as through trade and energy policies, all of which could influence Iran\u2019s approach to key issues like the Kurdish question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In conclusion, Iran has suffered significant regional setbacks, while recent geopolitical shifts have strengthened T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s position in West Asia, granting it greater leverage in Iran\u2019s traditional spheres of influence. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategic alliances and relative domestic stability place it in a stronger position compared to Iran, which faces mounting internal crises and increasing regional and international pressure. The return of Trump-era maximum pressure policies on Iran further complicates Tehran\u2019s challenges, and the last thing Iran needs is for T\u00fcrkiye to align with these pressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Despite years of conflict over Syria where Tehran\u2019s presence represented a crucial threat to Ankara\u2019s interests, Iran and T\u00fcrkiye have so far avoided direct confrontation or uncontrolled escalation. Even at the height of their disagreements, they have managed their rivalry without it spiraling into open conflict. This suggests that while tensions may persist, the two sides are more likely to engage in strategic maneuvering \u2014 leveraging their respective influence in the region through diplomatic and geopolitical pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nevertheless, the deep contradictions in their regional agendas, the imbalance of power and their opposing alliances cannot be ignored. While they may continue to maintain a delicate balance, the growing divide in their relations, coupled with entrenched mutual distrust, could unexpectedly push their rivalry beyond managed tensions into open escalation. The evolving regional landscape and external pressures \u2014particularly from the United States, which aims to shift the balance of power in favor of Israel \u2014 will play a key role in determining whether their competition remains controlled or escalates into a more serious crisis.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Tensions between Iran and T\u00fcrkiye have intensified since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad\u2019s regime in Syria, with Tehran repeatedly criticizing Ankara for backing opposition factions that contributed to Assad\u2019s downfall. The latest strain in relations emerged after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan cautioned Iran against efforts to destabilize Damascus. Fidan warned that Iran\u2019s foreign policy, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":13400,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1402],"tags":[7104,7103],"class_list":["post-13399","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-position-estimate","tag-ankara-and-tehran","tag-kurdis"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13399","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13399"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13399\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13401,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13399\/revisions\/13401"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13400"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}