Israeli Determination to Escalate and Involve Washington<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nIsrael seeks to intensify strikes targeting Iran\u2019s nuclear program \u2014 aiming to disable it entirely or at least prolong its incapacitation. However, it appears unable to achieve this alone without US intervention. Currently, the United States seems reluctant to engage directly in the conflict, possibly to avoid provoking Iranian attacks on US interests. This US hesitation is partly due to the ability of Iraqi armed groups to attack US interests and bases in the region if Washington attacks Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran\u2019s Strategy to Balance Escalation and De-escalation<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nAs Israel escalates its military operations, Iran has managed to regain its ability to respond and partially restore its image \u2014 both of which had suffered during the initial phase of the war, when Israeli casualties were significant. By the third day of the conflict, new options emerged and the ability to influence the trajectory of conflict has become more evident, as the two parties endured substantial human and material losses. However, Iran appears more resilient in absorbing these costs, in part because Israeli society has not faced such sustained pressure or casualties in recent history. Despite this, Iran has left the door open to diplomacy and has signaled a willingness to engage in mediation or dialogue aimed at ending the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cLeverage in Play\u201d \u2014 Axis Factions Ready to Engage<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThere is no question that the intense strikes launched on June 16, 2025, targeting Tel Aviv and Haifa are the most severe and destructive since the onset of the conflict. Most notably, these attacks involved missiles directed at Tel Aviv and Haifa for the first time, challenging Israel\u2019s air defense systems and exposing technical vulnerabilities that emerged due to sustained operations. Despite the severe setbacks suffered by the Iran-backed \u201cAxis of Resistance,\u201d it will probably engage in the conflict at any moment. Consequently, Israel has redeployed divisions from Gaza to its northern borders, driven by concerns over Hezbollah\u2019s potential involvement from the Syrian front. Such a redeployment would not have occurred without intelligence or clear indications of possible activity on the northern front in support of Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Complex Calculations Facing Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nStrategically, Iran may soon deplete its reserves of ballistic and hypersonic missiles as it continues high-tempo launches in the near term. Israel, by contrast, could face growing challenges in sustaining the interception of these large-scale missile barrages should they persist over time. Airspace control will likely prove decisive in the evolving conflict, given Iran\u2019s limited air defense capabilities and Israel\u2019s technological and military superiority. Nevertheless, Iran has demonstrated a capacity to recalibrate the strategic equation by executing effective strikes on Israeli territory, inflicting both material damage and casualties. Despite these successes, Israel retains a significant advantage, having largely secured air superiority and successfully intercepted a substantial portion of Iran\u2019s missile assaults.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Expanding Attacks on Infrastructure<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nIn recent days, both sides have escalated strikes on infrastructure \u2014 Israel focusing on military and economic targets to sway domestic opinion and potentially reshape Iran\u2019s political future. This aligns with what some view as Israel\u2019s strategic endgame: regime change in Tehran. While the prospect of Iran undergoing political transformation as a direct consequence of this conflict remains remote, the Iranian leadership is actively leveraging the war to reinforce its legitimacy following years of internal crises, notably the 2009 Green Movement and the widespread protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ruling establishment seeks to reframe the conflict in nationalistic and civilizational terms, presenting itself as a bulwark against \u201cglobal imperialism\u201d and portraying Israel as an existential adversary. By doing so, it aims to strengthen its position within the Iranian public consciousness, asserting that the confrontation is less about its nuclear ambitions or government policy and more about defending Persian identity and sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Concurrently, Iran has launched targeted strikes on Israeli infrastructure, aiming to influence Israeli public opinion and potentially incite internal dissent. However, Iran\u2019s military limitations \u2014 particularly in airpower and missile precision \u2014 suggest that it lacks a definitive strategic objective in this conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Exploiting the War to Bolster Legitimacy and Rehabilitate the Image of the Ruling System<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe defense of the \u201cIranian state,\u201d including its rhetoric, is likely to intensify among cultural elites \u2014 even those aligned with or sympathetic to the opposition \u2014 as Israeli attacks escalate or expand. Rising nationalist sentiment tends to unify religious \u201chardliners\u201d and extreme nationalists. It can also be argued that expectations of a popular uprising or an internal challenge from Iran\u2019s cultural and revolutionary elite \u2014 often cited by Israeli and Western officials as a possible pathway to regime change \u2014 are unrealistic under current conditions. The likelihood of overthrowing the ruling religious establishment through a \u201crevolution\u201d or \u201ccoup\u201d remains low, based on available data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
No Prospects for Mediation and Diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nIran appears to be the weaker party in this conflict, yet it shows little willingness to accept external conditions or to use the war as leverage to return to diplomatic negotiations. Israel, on the other hand, seems to view this as a long-awaited opportunity to neutralize the perceived threat from Iran, capitalizing on its military superiority and extensive regional alliances. However, despite inflicting significant casualties, Israel has not achieved this objective. The international community and great powers also appear unable to halt the conflict in Gaza, which has persisted for nearly two years. As a result, neither side seems likely to alter the trajectory of the current war unless one manages to fulfill a key strategic objective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion: Continuing Escalation and Limited Diplomatic Horizon<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Iran-Israel confrontation has reached an unprecedented level of escalation, reflecting significant geopolitical shifts in the region. Based on recent events (June 15- June 16), it appears that the near-term outlook is dominated by mutual strikes, targeting strategic and civilian sites, with no clear path toward peace or ceasefire. The conflict risks spiraling further, potentially destabilizing the region, risking nuclear proliferation or expanding into multiple fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While there remains a chance for a diplomatic breakthrough \u2014 likely to emerge through regional or international initiatives driven by growing concerns over the war\u2019s potential domino effect \u2014 two critical questions remain: What price will be paid to reach such a settlement? And who will bear its costs?<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"For the third consecutive day, the military confrontation between Iran and Israel has intensified. Israel continues its targeted strikes against Iran\u2019s nuclear infrastructure, military facilities and scientists, while Iran endeavors to restore strategic balance through retaliatory attacks aimed at Israeli infrastructure and military sites. Both sides appear to be engaged in a strategic effort to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":13595,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13593","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13593","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13593"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13593\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13598,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13593\/revisions\/13598"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13595"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13593"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13593"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13593"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}