In the midst of a 12 day cycle of intense hostilities between Israel and Iran \u2014marked by a dangerous escalation in strikes and reprisals that brought the region to the brink of a potentially devastating war \u2014 the United States, wielding the world\u2019s most formidable military, aligned itself firmly with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), one of the most capable armies in the Middle East. Alongside Washington, several European capitals voiced unequivocal support for Israel\u2019s stated objectives: neutralizing both Iran\u2019s nuclear program and its growing ballistic missile capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In stark contrast, Iran faced the confrontation in relative isolation and under significant strategic strain. Nations it typically regards as allies \u2014 most notably China and Russia \u2014 refrained from offering any tangible support or issuing deterrent threats that might have constrained Israel\u2019s military campaign. Meanwhile, the United States actively supported its closest ally Israel through direct airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities using advanced stealth bombers. Despite their deep economic and geopolitical ties with Tehran, both Beijing and Moscow opted for a stance of neutrality, limiting their responses to public condemnations of Israel\u2019s escalation. Even when Russia went a step further, its actions remained within the bounds of pragmatic neutrality, as President Vladimir Putin merely extended an offer of mediation without altering the strategic balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A pressing question has been gaining traction in both Iranian and international media and academic circles \u2014 one that appears both rational and urgent, yet still lacks comprehensive, evidence-based exploration. It centers on the strategic calculus of major powers and how they define, evaluate and prioritize their relations with so-called middle powers like Iran. Why did China and Russia refrain from supporting Iran in its confrontation with Israel? What explains their conspicuous absence amid a crisis involving a state often described as a close ally? Iran is frequently grouped within what commentators term the Eastern Bloc \u2014 a coalition of states perceived as challenging US dominance in global affairs and led by China. Yet the recent silence from Beijing and Moscow raises fundamental questions about the depth and limits of these alliances and how far strategic partnerships extend when real conflict erupts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran\u2019s relations with both China and Russia seemed to have reached a level of strategic depth that would suggest stronger solidarity in times of crisis. Tehran has signed 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreements with both powers, signaling long-term cooperation across economic, military and geopolitical dimensions. Iran has also played a pivotal role in supporting Russia\u2019s war effort in Ukraine, supplying drones and ballistic missiles that have proven critical on multiple fronts. Meanwhile, China has officially labeled Iran a \u201ctrusted partner,\u201d placing it among its most valued allies in regional diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Deconstructing the ongoing debate surrounding Chinese and Russian neutrality during the Israeli-Iranian military clashes \u2014 and the Iranian sense of abandonment \u2014 requires a closer examination of how Beijing and Moscow perceive their ties with Tehran. A common analytical misstep lies in interpreting Iran-China-Russia relations through Tehran\u2019s lens, which often frames these ties as alliances in the conventional sense. This assumption leads many observers to expect allied behavior \u2014 such as political backing or military support \u2014 during crises, and thus to misread or overestimate the depth of these partnerships. The result is a wave of speculative and often unrealistic commentary. To move beyond such distortions, one must interrogate a range of key indicators that reveal how China and Russia actually define and prioritize their cooperation with Iran \u2014 as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Real Dynamics and Parameters of Partnership<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The recent Israeli-Iranian military confrontations have laid bare the true nature and limits of Iran\u2019s relations with China and Russia. While Tehran often frames its ties with both powers as alliances \u2014 implying a high level of strategic integration and solidarity \u2014 there is no reciprocal use of the term \u201cally\u201d by either Beijing or Moscow, whether in rhetoric or practice. In fact, one of Russia\u2019s earliest public responses during the height of the hostilities was to clarify that the bilateral agreement with Iran contains no mutual defense clause. Some analysts interpreted this statement as a clear signal that Moscow would not back Tehran in an open conflict with Israel. President Putin later remarked that Iran had not requested assistance, further underscoring Russia\u2019s cautious, non-committal stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Gaps in the Effectiveness of Iran\u2019s Air Defense Network<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The conflict also exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran\u2019s air defense systems. The Israeli air force was able to operate with near-impunity in Iranian airspace, achieving a level of air dominance that highlighted Tehran\u2019s technological inferiority in this domain. A key factor behind this shortfall was Iran\u2019s failure to procure advanced Russian defense platforms such as the S-400 missile defense system and the SU-35 fighter jet \u2014 aircraft capable of competing with US models like the F-35 and designed to penetrate and dominate hostile airspace. Despite Iran\u2019s repeated and urgent efforts to bolster its aerial capabilities following previous confrontations \u2014 most notably during operations True Promise 1 and True Promise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China has also played a behind-the-scenes role in discouraging Iran from following through on its repeated threats to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. While such a move is often cast in official Iranian rhetoric as a potential lever against the United States or European powers, in practice, it would disproportionately harm Iran\u2019s own partners \u2014 chief among them, China. Roughly one-third of all global maritime trade through the strait involves Chinese cargo. A closure would thus disrupt critical energy supplies and commercial flows essential to the Chinese economy. This strategic interdependence explains why Tehran, despite its fiery discourse, has refrained from militarizing the strait.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Divergent Strategic lenses<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Recent developments underscore divergent Chinese and Russian calculations regarding relations with Iran which are influenced by the following foreign policy considerations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Iranian Leadership\u2019s International Standing<\/p>\n\n\n\n This may be a limiting factor in advancing Chinese and Russian relations with Iran to the level of an alliance. Both countries recognize that an alliance with Iran would entail the burden of supporting an isolated and sanctioned partner, given Iran\u2019s nuclear and geopolitical approaches that have placed it in continuous conflict with regional and global powers. These same orientations have also prevented Iran from offering the necessary infrastructure for China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative and Russia\u2019s North-South Initiative. As a result, Iran\u2019s priority has diminished in Chinese and Russian strategic plans concerning global trade routes and logistical corridors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China and Russia may also assess the performance of the Iranian political system based on the deep level of intelligence penetration it has suffered and Israel\u2019s ability to eliminate senior Iranian leaders within hours. This naturally does not enhance Iran\u2019s standing as a potential ally in their view.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Relations With the Gulf States<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia and China maintain strong relations with the Gulf states, which reject Iran\u2019s geopolitical orientations. Even after the resumption of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic ties under Chinese mediation, the Gulf remains one of the most influential factors shaping the nature and limits of Russian-Chinese cooperation with Iran in the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Relations With Tel Aviv and Washington<\/p>\n\n\n\n The nature of China and Russia\u2019s ties with the West, and their need to balance relations with Israel, play a central role in shaping their policies toward Iran. Both countries may consider their strategic, economic and technological interests with the West \u2014 particularly with Israel and the United States \u2014 to outweigh any potential benefit from closer alignment with Iran, which remains diplomatically and economically isolated due to its nuclear, ballistic and regional policies. China, in particular, maintains strong technological and economic ties with Israel and fears that support for Iran could worsen its already strained relations with the United States, tensions that intensified following the US tariff measures under the Trump administration. Russia, for its part, is concerned that military support for Iran would provoke a Western response \u2014 particularly increased supplies of advanced strategic weapons to Ukraine \u2014 which could disrupt the military balance and increase the already high economic and military costs Moscow bears in the ongoing war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In conclusion, <\/strong>armed conflicts remain the most definitive measure of the depth and credibility of international partnerships. The Israeli-Iranian confrontation has served as a revealing test case, laying bare what can only be described as Iran\u2019s \u201cally dilemma.\u201d Despite nearly five decades of rule, the Iranian republic has been unable to elevate its international partnerships to the level of formal alliances. This stands in stark contrast to other states with fewer geopolitical, economic or demographic advantages, many of which have successfully forged alliance-based relations with major global powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The recent visit by Iran\u2019s defense minister to Beijing raises a pertinent question: is Tehran seeking to revive or deepen military cooperation with China, particularly in the hope of acquiring advanced air defense systems? Even so, any Iranian initiative is likely to encounter cautious Chinese deliberations rooted in its broader strategic calculations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What further underscores Iran\u2019s strategic shortfall is the comparative trajectory of its neighbors in the Gulf. These states \u2014 geographically proximate to Iran and similarly endowed with energy resources \u2014 have opted for a fundamentally different path. Prioritizing national development, institutional modernization, and integration into the global economy, the Gulf states have succeeded in establishing wide-ranging strategic alliances with major powers. Their influence has grown to the point where they now shape global trade and logistics corridors and act as central players in determining the Middle East strategies of global actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran, by contrast, has remained mired in costly geopolitical projects that have yielded few tangible gains but significant losses \u2014 both material and human. These choices have subjected it to repeated and targeted military strikes from the United States and Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, Iran\u2019s isolation is not irreversible. Should its leadership choose to pivot away from expansionist, ballistic and nuclear projects and instead embrace constructive diplomacy aimed at mutual security and economic cooperation, the possibility of real alliances and regional integration remains. In doing so, Iran could transition from a pariah state to a \u201cnormal\u201d and stabilizing actor in the regional order \u2014 an outcome that would benefit not only Iran but also the broader Middle East.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In the midst of a 12 day cycle of intense hostilities between Israel and Iran \u2014marked by a dangerous escalation in strikes and reprisals that brought the region to the brink of a potentially devastating war \u2014 the United States, wielding the world\u2019s most formidable military, aligned itself firmly with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":67,"featured_media":13653,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13652","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13652","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/67"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13652"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13652\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13654,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13652\/revisions\/13654"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13653"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13652"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13652"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13652"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}