{"id":13733,"date":"2025-08-06T15:34:46","date_gmt":"2025-08-06T12:34:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=13733"},"modified":"2025-08-06T15:34:47","modified_gmt":"2025-08-06T12:34:47","slug":"eu-policies-in-the-mena-region-internal-divisions-external-challenges-geopolitical-competition-and-future-prospects","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/eu-policies-in-the-mena-region-internal-divisions-external-challenges-geopolitical-competition-and-future-prospects\/","title":{"rendered":"EU Policies in the MENA Region: Internal Divisions, External Challenges, Geopolitical Competition, and Future Prospects"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The European Union (EU) has long considered the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region a strategic priority. This attention is primarily due to geographical proximity, energy inter-dependence, migration flows, and intertwined security concerns. Events in MENA \u2013 conflict, political instability, migration surges, and economic crises \u2013 have historically had direct repercussions on European societies, influencing political debates, shaping public opinion, and even determining electoral outcomes. This inter-connection has created both challenges and opportunities for the EU, making the development of a coherent and effective policy toward MENA essential for European prosperity and stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For decades, the EU presented itself<\/a> as a normative power, seeking to export values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, alongside economic integration and development support. Initiatives such as the 1995 Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) were built on the assumption that encouraging inclusive governance and shared prosperity would create a stable, peaceful neighborhood to the south. The EU sought to shape MENA societies through \u201csoft power\u201d rather than military force, positioning itself as an alternative to the more militarized approach associated with the United States. For a time, this vision appeared to gain some traction, with Europe regarded as a benign partner willing to support transitions to more open, market-oriented societies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, this normative approach has gradually given way to more transactional, short-term engagement, a shift that accelerated after Russia\u2019s military intervention in Ukraine in 2022. The war exposed Europe\u2019s structural vulnerabilities, particularly its reliance on Russian energy supplies. Faced with an urgent need to diversify energy imports, EU member states turned increasingly to North African and Eastern Mediterranean suppliers. Simultaneously, migration flows across the Mediterranean increased, driven by conflict, poverty, and climate change. These developments elevated migration control and energy security to top policy priorities, often at the expense of governance reform. What had previously been a balance between values and interests tilted heavily toward interests, with normative goals relegated to secondary objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This shift coincides with intensifying geopolitical competition in MENA. China and Russia, two non-Western international powers seeking to challenge Western influence globally, have seized opportunities created by EU weaknesses and internal divisions. China has significantly expanded its economic presence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI<\/a>), investing in infrastructure, telecommunications, and energy projects. Its development model \u2013 focused on rapid delivery and devoid of political conditionality \u2013 has resonated with many MENA governments, particularly those wary of Western pressure related to  governance and human rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia  reasserted itself militarily and diplomatically, most visibly in Syria, where its intervention preserved the Assad regime. Since the fall of the  Assad regime in December 2024, Moscow has managed to establish relations with the new Syrian authorities while consolidating its military presence in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia currently operates three key military bases in Syria:<\/p>\n\n\n\n