{"id":13799,"date":"2025-09-08T13:12:45","date_gmt":"2025-09-08T10:12:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=13799"},"modified":"2025-09-10T10:15:53","modified_gmt":"2025-09-10T07:15:53","slug":"rationale-behind-ali-larijanis-appointment-as-snsc-secretary-amid-irans-security-challenges","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/articles\/rationale-behind-ali-larijanis-appointment-as-snsc-secretary-amid-irans-security-challenges\/","title":{"rendered":"Rationale Behind Ali Larijani\u2019s Appointment as SNSC Secretary Amid Iran\u2019s Security Challenges"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Recently, Ali Larijani was appointed<\/a> as the secretary of Iran\u2019s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Confronted with mounting internal political pressures, escalating geopolitical challenges and economic vulnerabilities, Tehran\u2019s decision signals efforts to address the imminent challenges it faces now. The recently proposed changes encompassing new appointments and the establishment of new defense infrastructure also come amid internal debates between \u201chardliners\u201d and \u201cmoderates\u201d in Iran regarding the consequences of Iran\u2019s war with Israel and its future strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In August, the SNSC established a Defense Council under the president\u2019s authority, comprising heads of the three branches of government, ministers and senior military officials. The SNSC serves as Iran\u2019s highest authority on security policy, functioning under the direct oversight of the supreme leader, who appoints both its secretary and key members, thereby ensuring control over the council\u2019s decisions. Its role includes setting defense and security policy, ensuring coordination among the country\u2019s intelligence, political and economic domains and mobilizing resources against internal and external threats. Larijani\u2019s appointment is viewed by \u201cmoderates\u201d and \u201creformists\u201d as a sign of potential flexibility, coming at a time when Tehran confronts dilemmas and challenges regarding its regional and foreign policy approaches. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Larijani\u2019s political career spans four decades and has reflected adaptability during critical times while enduring loyalty to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Born in Najaf in 1958 to a prominent clerical family, Larijani\u2019s trajectory has been deeply shaped by familial and ideological networks. His marriage to the daughter of Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, a key ideologue of the Iranian republic and prominent leader, further enabled him to be close to the politico-religious elites in Iran, providing him access to the corridors of power. Larijani\u2019s siblings have also held influential positions across Iran\u2019s judiciary, legislative and diplomatic institutions, highlighting the family\u2019s entrenched influence within the establishment. One of Larijani\u2019s most important early appointments was as Iran\u2019s minister of culture and head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Between 2005 and 2007, Larijani was appointed for the first time as the secretary of the SNSC during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. During this period, he oversaw sensitive nuclear negotiations and defense planning, navigating the balance between asserting Iran\u2019s nuclear ambitions and managing relations with the European Union and Russia. He resigned in 2007 due to major disagreements with Ahmadinejad. During the 2015 nuclear negotiations, he supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Parliament amid opposition from certain sections of \u201cconservatives\u201d and  \u201chardliners.\u201d Despite being close to the supreme leader, Larijani was sidelined in recent presidential elections, and he was disqualified by the Guardian Council for legal reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Having worked closely with both \u201chardliners\u201d and \u201creformists,\u201d Larijani\u2019s career reflects pragmatism, marked by his ability to balance realpolitik considerations with Khamenei\u2019s overarching ideology and strategic vision. Larijani brings decades of experience navigating the intersection of domestic politics, regional power dynamics and international diplomacy. His return signals the Iranian establishment\u2019s priorities to stabilize decision-making and navigate the way ahead with respect to nuclear negotiations, as well as to revitalizing Iran\u2019s regional influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The recent changes hold major domestic and regional implications. Domestically, they aim to consolidate consensus, align security priorities with broader policies and prepare for challenges like E3-triggered UN snapback sanctions<\/a>. Larijani faces the delicate task of framing any prospective negotiations, particularly with the European Troika or other international actors, without undermining the ideological position of Khamenei, who has consistently rejected the scope for substantive engagement with the United States in the current context. In a recent interview, Larijani criticized<\/a> the IAEA\u2019s leadership and questioned its credibility as it failed to condemn attacks on Iran\u2019s nuclear sites, effectively siding with the United States and Israel. He emphasized that while Iran remains committed to the NPT and negotiations, its approach must be guided by power and prudence, ensuring it does not surrender in talks. Larijani will likely focus on balancing the establishment\u2019s rhetorical posture against practical necessities, which is to advance talks that may reduce the threat of sanctions or military escalation, while maintaining the semblance of ideological consistency and national unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regionally, Larijani\u2019s recent engagements in Lebanon and Iraq illustrate Tehran\u2019s intent to secure and sustain its influence in critical arenas. Iran and Iraq recently signed<\/a> a border security memorandum aimed at preventing third-party destabilization. The Iraqi government has downplayed it as a routine agreement, while the United States has opposed the deal, citing it as a threat to Iraqi sovereignty. In Lebanon, Larijani\u2019s visit occurred amid mounting pressure on Hezbollah from the Lebanese government to disarm, a process deemed central to Beirut\u2019s domestic stability and its prospects for regional and Western support. By engaging directly with the Lebanese leadership, Larijani seeks to ensure Iranian influence remains resilient. Similarly, his outreach in Iraq underscores Iran\u2019s interest in sustaining strategic alignments with Baghdad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now more than ever, Iran needs to coordinate closely with Russia and China, and Larijani\u2019s international engagements underscore the importance of leveraging these ties. His meeting<\/a> with Russian President Vladimir Putin highlights the significance of Russian and Chinese support for Iran in the current circumstances, despite the fact that Iran realizes that neither will defend Tehran militarily in the wake of regional wars or conflicts. Consequently, Iran must navigate its isolation carefully, using diplomatic networks to secure political leeway without relying on external intervention. The Iranian establishment seek to utilize Larijani\u2019s extensive experience, longstanding relationships and credibility with both Moscow and Beijing to maximize the channels of influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The recent changes initiated by the Iranian establishment have acquired salience, particularly after the war with Israel exposed gaps in Iran\u2019s forward defense and intelligence capabilities. The Iran-Israel conflict highlighted significant vulnerabilities in Iran\u2019s defense and intelligence structures. Espionage activities enabled Israel to target military commanders and nuclear scientists, prompting Iran to arrest hundreds of suspected operatives. Larijani\u2019s role will therefore extend to reinforcing internal security, restoring confidence in the country\u2019s intelligence and counterintelligence apparatus and ensuring that lessons from the recent conflict translate into actionable improvements in defense planning, as reiterated in his recent statements. It is imperative for the Iranian establishment, now at one of its weakest points, to reestablish credible deterrence. Yet how this can be achieved remains uncertain, especially given the absence of consequences for Israeli and US strikes on Iran\u2019s nuclear sites and Israel\u2019s targeted killings of senior Iranian commanders and scientists, which have set a dangerous precedent that undermines deterrence and poses a serious threat to Iran\u2019s national security and the establishment\u2019s stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Larijani\u2019s return underscores Tehran\u2019s search for stability and strategic coherence, yet the establishment\u2019s deep vulnerabilities remain unresolved. While his experience and pragmatism may provide avenues for recalibration in security policy and diplomacy, entrenched structural weaknesses, international isolation and challenges to establish deterrence continue to constrain Iran\u2019s options. The creation of new councils and centralization of authority may streamline decision-making, but cannot offset the strategic costs of military, intelligence and diplomatic setbacks. Ultimately, it remains uncertain whether Larijani\u2019s reappointment can meaningfully alter Iran\u2019s trajectory or merely manage its crises in the short term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u00a0Opinions in this article reflect the writer\u2019s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah<\/em>
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Recently, Ali Larijani was appointed as the secretary of Iran\u2019s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Confronted with mounting internal political pressures, escalating geopolitical challenges and economic vulnerabilities, Tehran\u2019s decision signals efforts to address the imminent challenges it faces now. The recently proposed changes encompassing new appointments and the establishment of new defense infrastructure also come […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":267,"featured_media":13802,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[1269,7113],"class_list":["post-13799","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","tag-ali-larijani","tag-snsc-secretary"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13799","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/267"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13799"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13799\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13803,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13799\/revisions\/13803"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13802"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13799"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13799"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13799"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}