{"id":13813,"date":"2025-09-15T14:40:24","date_gmt":"2025-09-15T11:40:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=13813"},"modified":"2025-09-15T14:40:24","modified_gmt":"2025-09-15T11:40:24","slug":"the-cairo-agreement-and-prospects-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/the-cairo-agreement-and-prospects-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"The Cairo Agreement and Prospects for Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

On September 9, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded an agreement<\/a> in Cairo, brokered by Egypt, to resolve their escalating disputes. Tensions had peaked in June 2025, when Israel and the United States launched large-scale military strikes on Iran and its nuclear facilities. The attacks brought nuclear diplomacy to a standstill, suspended the work of international inspectors and deepened uncertainty over the future of Iran\u2019s nuclear program, including its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. This report examines the circumstances leading to the agreement, outlines its main provisions and assesses its implications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Context of Escalation and Threats<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Cairo agreement was reached two months after the US-Israeli military escalation against Iran in June 2025, during which Iranian nuclear facilities were targeted and heavily damaged, according to US and Israeli assessments. In response, Iran suspended its cooperation with the IAEA. President Masoud Pezeshkian signed<\/a> into law a bill passed by the Parliament halting all forms of cooperation with the agency, accusing it of having effectively facilitated Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites during the 12-day war in June.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since then, international inspectors have been unable to carry out monitoring or inspection activities in Iran, leaving the status of Iran\u2019s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity \u2014 a level just short of weapons-grade \u2014 uncertain. International stakeholders have voiced serious concerns, questioning whether the stockpile was destroyed in the attacks or secretly relocated by Iran beforehand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the ceasefire, Iran adopted a policy of brinkmanship, refusing to return to negotiations and taking further escalatory steps. European powers sought to establish a channel for dialogue with Tehran to defuse the crisis, but their efforts failed. Several rounds of talks held in European capitals and T\u00fcrkiye collapsed, as Iran refused to meet key conditions: providing clarification about its 440 kilograms<\/a> of uranium enriched to 60%, resuming cooperation with the IAEA, and re-engaging in talks with the United States. As a result of this impasse, the E3 \u2014 Germany, the UK and France \u2014 triggered<\/a> the snapback mechanism to reimpose sanctions on Iran on August 28.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the snapback process, Iran was given until October 1 to reach a settlement with the IAEA that would permit the resumption of inspections, monitoring and dispute resolution \u2014 or face the automatic reimposition of UN sanctions. Tehran rejected this move as illegal and warned it might withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Washington maintained<\/a> its maximum pressure sanctions on Iran, particularly targeting its oil exports and financial sector, seeking to deepen Tehran\u2019s isolation and increase pressure on the ruling establishment. The situation became more precarious as the United States and Israel continued to threaten renewed military action. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently stated that any future Israeli operations against Iran would depend entirely on Tehran\u2019s conduct, especially regarding its nuclear and ballistic missile programs \u2014 a threat that adds significant leverage over Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this tense environment, several regional powers, including Egypt and T\u00fcrkiye, have sought to mediate<\/a> and de-escalate tensions. They have played an active role alongside Russia and China, which are supporting a six month extension of the deadline before sanctions are reimposed. The plan is designed to give diplomacy a chance to bridge outstanding differences and buy time to address the technical and political complexities of Iran\u2019s nuclear program \u2014 while keeping the process under European control, rather than letting it lapse on October 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Details of the Agreement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed an agreement in Cairo under the auspices of Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. While not all of the agreement\u2019s provisions were disclosed, Grossi stated<\/a> at a joint press conference after the signing that the deal was technical in nature and underscored the \u201cessential\u201d inspections that must resume in Iran under the NPT. Under the Safeguards Agreement previously concluded between Iran and the IAEA, Tehran is obligated to prepare a \u201cspecial report\u201d detailing the location and condition of its nuclear material \u2014 including its stockpile of highly enriched uranium \u2014 in the aftermath of incidents such as attacks or earthquakes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Upon returning to Vienna on September 10, Grossi stressed the importance of granting inspectors access to the sites that had been attacked, stating<\/a>, \u201cThis includes all facilities and installations in Iran, and it also contemplates the required reporting on all the attacked facilities, including the nuclear material present at those.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Tehran\u2019s side, Araghchi said<\/a> the agreement was consistent with the law passed by Parliament and had been negotiated with the approval and authorization of the Supreme National Security Council. He emphasized that the deal addresses Iran\u2019s security concerns and challenges while setting out the technical requirements for cooperation with the IAEA. However, he warned<\/a> that any \u201chostile action\u201d against Iran \u2014 including the reimposition of UN sanctions \u2014 would lead Tehran to consider the agreement with the IAEA null and void.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A preliminary analysis of the agreement suggests that it sets the stage for:<\/p>\n\n\n\n