{"id":13840,"date":"2025-09-24T15:23:43","date_gmt":"2025-09-24T12:23:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=13840"},"modified":"2025-09-24T15:28:56","modified_gmt":"2025-09-24T12:28:56","slug":"irans-imperative-for-genuine-reform-building-trust-with-neighbors-post-12-day-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/articles\/irans-imperative-for-genuine-reform-building-trust-with-neighbors-post-12-day-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Imperative for Genuine Reform: Building Trust With Neighbors Post-12 Day War"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Although some analyses frame the conflict as an Iranian \u201cvictory\u201d born of resilience and asymmetric responses, it in fact laid bare the vulnerabilities of Tehran\u2019s regional strategy. Ballistic missile exchanges, cyberattacks and proxy engagements strained Iran\u2019s alliances and further eroded trust among its neighbors. These defensive circles have become Iran\u2019s point of vulnerability, as their airspace was exploited by Israel to launch airstrikes against Iran. In the aftermath of the war, Iran faces a stark choice: cling to ideological rigidity or embrace systemic reform to cultivate genuine good-faith relations with its neighborhood. Superficial diplomatic gestures will not suffice; what is required is a profound evolution of Iran\u2019s political system \u2013 the nezam<\/em> \u2013 if it is to survive and achieve meaningful regional integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The war\u2019s fallout has amplified calls for Iran to rebuild trust with Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, as well as neighbors like Iraq and Yemen. Prior to the conflict, Iran\u2019s support for non-state actors \u2013 such as the Houthis in Yemen and Shiite militias in Iraq \u2013  fueled perceptions of interference, undermining diplomatic efforts like the 2023 China-brokered Iran-Saudi rapprochement. The war intensified these dynamics: Iran-backed groups launched attacks on Israeli interests, but Iran\u2019s inability to deter Israel\u2019s strikes highlighted the costs of this proxy doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Post-war inconsistencies in Iranian policy have further eroded credibility. For instance, during the June war, Iran targeted the US military base in Qatar with missiles; yet, after an Israeli strike in Doha during the conflict, Tehran swiftly condemned the attack. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such opportunistic shifts underscore a pragmatic but short-term approach that fails to address underlying distrust. Neighbors view these as tactical maneuvers rather than strategic pivots, perpetuating a cycle of suspicion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To transcend this, Iran must adopt a good faith policy rooted in transparency and mutual respect. This requires moving beyond rhetoric to tangible actions that demonstrate a commitment to non-interference and regional stability. However, such a shift cannot emanate solely from elected institutions like the presidency or Parliament, which operate within the constraints of the nezam<\/em>. The supreme leader and unelected bodies, such as the Guardian Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), hold ultimate sway over foreign policy. Flexibility from figures like President Pezeshkian \u2013 elected in July 2024 amid \u201creformist\u201d hopes \u2013 may offer cosmetic changes, but without systemic overhaul, these will remain superficial. The establishment\u2019s history shows that pragmatic adjustments, like accepting the 1988 UN ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War, can prioritize survival over ideology. The 12-day war presents a similar inflection point: domestic pressures from economic sanctions, public unrest and military setbacks demand an evolution to avert collapse and build trust with Iran\u2019s neighbors.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the heart of any meaningful evolution lies the Iranian Constitution, which codifies an expansive and interventionist foreign policy doctrine. Article 3(16) commits the state to providing \u201cunsparing support to the mustaz\u2018afin<\/em> [oppressed] of the world,\u201d while Article 154 proclaims solidarity with the \u201cjust struggles of the mustaz\u2018afin<\/em> against the mustakbirun<\/em> [oppressors],\u201d even as it formally disclaims interference in other states\u2019 internal affairs. These provisions have long been interpreted to justify proxy engagement across the region. Similarly, Article 11 obliges the government to promote unity among Muslim peoples, a clause often invoked to legitimize support for Shiite movements abroad. Article 152 emphasizes defense of the rights of all Muslims and adherence to non-alignment, yet in practice it has served as a foundation for hegemonic ambitions. Together, these constitutional mandates provide a veneer of legitimacy for interventions ranging from arming the Houthis in Yemen to shaping Iraqi politics. Revisiting such provisions through a careful constitutional review \u2013 not a revolution, but a measured evolution \u2013 could help redefine Iran\u2019s role from regional disruptor to credible partner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Precedents exist: the 1989 amendments expanded executive powers; a similar process could excise or amend clauses enabling proxy warfare, signaling a doctrinal reset. Practical steps form a roadmap for this change. First, Iran must publicly declare its disengagement from armed proxies and completely cease supporting them. At the same time, it should channel its influence toward fostering political integration. In Yemen, Tehran should pressure the Houthis to engage in UN-led dialogues transforming them into a legitimate political entity under a national government rather than a militant force intensively targeting local people threatening the neighborhood and the flow of international trade in international waters. In Iraq, Iran-backed militias like Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah should be urged to disarm and integrate into state security forces, reducing sectarian divisions. Voices within Iran already echo this sentiment, arguing fiscal and strategic burdens make continued support untenable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, constitutional reforms should be pursued via the Assembly of Experts or a dedicated council, focusing on Articles 3, 11, 152 and 154 to emphasize non-interference and cooperative diplomacy. This could include clauses promoting economic interdependence, such as joint Gulf security frameworks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, to build trust, Iran must align actions with words. Ending dual discourses \u2013 condemning attacks on neighbors while covertly undermining them \u2013 is crucial. Transparent confidence-building measures, like joint naval patrols with Saudi Arabia or economic pacts with the UAE, could follow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the 12-day war is not merely a setback but an opportunity for Iran to repackage its foreign policy. By building a new nezam<\/em> through constitutional revisions and concrete steps on proxies, Tehran can forge a new chapter of regional cooperation. Without such profound changes, diplomatic gestures will ring hollow, leaving Iran marginalized in the region. Neighbors stand ready for engagement, but only if Iran demonstrates credible transformation. This path demands courage, but it is the surest route to enduring stability and prosperity in a post-war Middle East.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Although some analyses frame the conflict as an Iranian \u201cvictory\u201d born of resilience and asymmetric responses, it in fact laid bare the vulnerabilities of Tehran\u2019s regional strategy. Ballistic missile exchanges, cyberattacks and proxy engagements strained Iran\u2019s alliances and further eroded trust among its neighbors. These defensive circles have become Iran\u2019s point of vulnerability, as their […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":13846,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13840","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13840","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13840"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13840\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13845,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13840\/revisions\/13845"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13846"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13840"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13840"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13840"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}