As developments continue to unfold in Venezuela following the United States\u2019 capture of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, and in the absence of a clear US roadmap, US President Donald J. Trump declared himself the acting president of the South American country, while Delcy Rodriguez serves as interim president after taking a fresh oath. With the US naval armada in the Caribbean, Caracas has toned down its rhetoric in favor of pursuing a more pragmatic path.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Maduro\u2019s capture and his subsequent trial are unprecedented anomalies as a court is looking into charges against the deposed leader. Meanwhile, the United States has shifted its position of conducting a law enforcement operation in a sovereign state to de facto take over to manage its resources and economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>Trump\u2019s meeting<\/a> with top executives of US and European energy giants brought a heavy dose of realism to the White House, dampening its ambition of investing $100 billion in Venezuela\u2019s oil industry. Besides heaping praise on the president, the oil producers highlighted the practical risks involved. Exxon Mobil CEO Darren Woods called the country \u201cun-investible,\u201d much to the chagrin of the president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since the Maduro ouster, Operation Southern Spear has been limited to monitoring the blockade of Venezuela while strikes against boats have been halted after claiming at least 105 lives of people aboard 29 dinghies in the Caribbean in four months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a normal world, launching an attack on a sovereign state would not have been so straightforward for the Trump administration. The US Constitution requires<\/a> congressional authorization for a president to launch any offensive military action abroad: \u201c[The Congress shall have Power . . . ] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; . . .\u201d Despite the slim majority of Republicans in Congress, not all members are comfortable with the trigger-happy policy. The House has yet to meaningfully challenge the president for forcibly interfering in a sovereign nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Trump\u2019s words<\/a>, \u201cThey took all of our energy rights. They took all of our oil from not that long ago, and we want it back.\u201d Maduro then termed the claim outrageous while calling it resource colonialism. Trump imposed sanctions on Venezuela while recognizing an opposition politician as the country\u2019s president during his first term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While Washington blacklists Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), Venezuela\u2019s state oil company, Chevron had permission to produce and export its oil in joint ventures. In February 2025, the White House announced its plan to revoke Chevron\u2019s license, approved during the Biden administration, following the improvement of relations with Maduro. However, the Venezuelan leader not only stated that Chinese oil giants would take the company\u2019s stakes but also ended deportation flights from the United States. Washington retreated and renewed the license to Chevron while Maduro freed 10 American prisoners in exchange<\/a> for over 250 Venezuelans that the Trump administration was sending to the Salvadoran prison, CECOT.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No doubt it is unlikely that Congress will sign off on the administration\u2019s plea to declare war. In response, the White House may overstep in the name of defensive action and invoke the Alien Enemies Act, an 18th-century law, to expedite deportations of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans by stripping them of temporary protected status<\/a>. Like a host of other executive decisions ranging from the birthright citizenship ban to the imposition of tariffs, the ensuing judicial process will be slow and cumbersome for petitioners in particular. Stephen Miller, one of Trump\u2019s hawkish aides, is the proponent of invoking dormant laws to rid the US of non-white immigrants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another motive is to make Venezuela an example for other Latin American countries, which have deepened multifaceted relations with China over the decades. Call it Monroe Doctrine 2.0 or, in his own words Donroe Doctrine, which allows the United States to exert its clout and power in Latin America and the Caribbean. The enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823<\/a> did not secure South America from invasions of rival powers but led to more organized violence resulting from repeated military interventions, coups and outright incursions. In November 2025, Trump asserted<\/a> that his administration should intervene in the Americas to prevent mass migration to the United States and ensure a hemisphere \u201cfree of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Venezuela\u2019s cordial relations with Iran also added to the list of factors leading to the United States\u2019 decision to get rid of Maduro. Over the decades, Iran, Hezbollah and now the ousted Syrian regime led by the Assads developed Venezuela into a dependable ally. The wealthy Latin American state has been granting citizenship to its operatives, who were not only used to skirt sanctions and build networks but also to smuggle technology, funds and weapons. Rodriguez has no choice but to distance the country from the weakened leadership in Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Donroe doctrine is an attempt to assert sole US control over the resources and geography of the western hemisphere. As recently as the Cold War, Latin American nations have endured numerous US attempts at illicit influence and control. The continent has been united in contempt for global powers for over five centuries<\/a>. Trump\u2019s bid to dictate policy, if not outrightly seize control of Venezuelan resources, is a test case for Washington, its global competitors and the Venezuelan polity and people alike. Washington demands Caracas to \u201ckick out<\/a>\u201d Chinese and Russian companies, besides severing economic ties to Tehran and Havana, an outlandish dictate made as a hedging ploy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Except for condemning Maduro\u2019s arrest as a violation of international law and norms, China and Russia have not challenged the United States in any substantial manner. Beijing buys 80% of Venezuela\u2019s oil while Moscow is its top arms supplier. Taking the benefit of Trump\u2019s distraction from its Ukraine war, Putin seems content with abandoning its South American ally. Beijing, however, is likely engaged in backdoor diplomacy to preserve Venezuela\u2019s sovereignty and its economic interests. The American leader is likely to soften his stance for two reasons: Rodriguez\u2019s accommodation of US oil companies and Xi\u2019s cautious acceptance of new ground realities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the fact that anti-American sentiments remain high in Venezuela and much of the continent, Rodriguez\u2019s control over the armed forces and nationalists is debatable. If she continues to give in, mass street protests on patriotic grounds are quite likely to challenge her policies. If history can be any guide, the emergence of armed militias in oil-rich regions and some coastal areas can disrupt the uneasy calm between the United States and Venezuela. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" As developments continue to unfold in Venezuela following the United States\u2019 capture of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, and in the absence of a clear US roadmap, US President Donald J. Trump declared himself the acting president of the South American country, while Delcy Rodriguez serves as interim president after taking a fresh oath. With the US […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":14114,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[7131,431],"class_list":["post-14113","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-maduro","tag-venezuela"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14113","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14113"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14113\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14115,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14113\/revisions\/14115"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14114"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14113"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14113"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14113"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}