{"id":14188,"date":"2026-02-17T14:09:34","date_gmt":"2026-02-17T11:09:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=14188"},"modified":"2026-02-17T15:24:18","modified_gmt":"2026-02-17T12:24:18","slug":"yemens-new-government-and-prospects-for-stability-and-reform","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/yemens-new-government-and-prospects-for-stability-and-reform\/","title":{"rendered":"Yemen\u2019s New Government and Prospects for Stability and Reform"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Since the military escalation in December 2025, the situation in Yemen has changed rapidly, marked by internal fragmentation and regional interventions. Saudi-led initiatives, alongside efforts by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), sought to create constructive avenues for negotiations for broader political dialogue. Amid the shifting internal political dynamics, the formation<\/a> of a new government represents a pivotal step in determining Yemen\u2019s path toward stability, which remains critical to address the protracted humanitarian crisis in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yemen\u2019s recently formed cabinet represents a significant moment in the country\u2019s fractured governance landscape, especially considering the context and timing in which the government has been formed. This government is essentially tasked to transform Yemen by promoting inclusive political representation and catalyzing stabilization with strong diplomatic support.  The cabinet under Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shaya al-Zindani was the culmination of weeks of Saudi-facilitated consultations among Yemen\u2019s key political forces after weeks of intensified attacks. Negotiations primarily focused on ensuring competence and inclusiveness, striving to balance pragmatic internal political considerations and regional geopolitical realities with effective and accountable governance. The immediate priority for this government is to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated, particularly in a context where entrenched power politics has consistently undermined state authority and institutional cohesion. Zindani has announced<\/a> that the new government will soon relocate to Aden and will focus on restoring effective governance within the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To address the structural challenges and protracted constraints that Yemen faces, it is essential to have expert policymakers who can constructively gauge the domestic situation. In this context, the formation of the new cabinet underscores a clear and deliberate focus on experience and professional expertise, signaling a technocratic orientation. Zindani is a career diplomat who has served in the UK, Italy, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and was appointed minister of foreign affairs and expatriates in 2024. Minister of Defense Major General Taher Ali Ayda al-Aqili is a career military officer and former chief of the General Staff who has also served as a senior military adviser. Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Ali Ahmed Haidan has been serving as Yemen\u2019s interior minister since December 2020, overseeing internal security under the internationally recognized government. Marwan Faraj Saeed bin Ghanem who has now been appointed as minister of finance is an economist and an experienced investment and finance specialist. He has held<\/a> senior roles at the Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation in Kuwait and served as director general of the General Investment Authority of Yemen. Afrah Abdulaziz al-Zuba, a Yemeni development and peacebuilding expert, has been appointed minister of planning and international cooperation, who previously served as the managing director of the Executive Bureau for Aid Absorption and Policy Reforms and deputy secretary-general of Yemen\u2019s National Dialogue Conference. By placing experienced diplomats, military officers and policymakers in key portfolios, the leadership exhibits intent on restoring administrative coherence and rebuilding both domestic and international confidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is also significant that the new cabinet marks the highest level of female representation compared to previous governments in  Yemen. This development is not merely symbolic; greater participation of women in policymaking and the workforce has consistently been linked to more inclusive, accountable and sustainable development outcomes. For Yemen, this is particularly critical. The country faces one of the world\u2019s gravest humanitarian crises, with over 76% of the population in need of assistance, while women and girls bear a disproportionate share of the conflict\u2019s social and economic costs. Ranked last<\/a> in the 2017 Gender Gap Index, Yemen\u2019s structural gender inequalities are deeply entrenched. Expanding women\u2019s representation at the decision-making level, therefore, strengthens not only social justice but also the effectiveness and legitimacy of state-building and recovery efforts. The appointment of Afrah al-Zuba (minister of planning and international cooperation), Judge Ishraq Fadl al-Maqtari (minister of legal affairs) and Ahd Mohammed Salem Jaasous (state minister for women\u2019s affairs) signals a conscious departure from past exclusions. Such representation has garnered positive responses from both the international community and local civil society, who view women\u2019s inclusion as a tangible indicator of a forward-looking, inclusive governance model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Table 1: Yemen\u2019s New Cabinet (2026)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Name<\/strong><\/strong><\/td>Designation<\/strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr>
Shaya al-Zindani<\/td>Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and Expatriate Affairs<\/td><\/tr>
Tawfiq Abdulwahed Ali al-Sharjabi<\/td>Minister of Water and Environment<\/td><\/tr>
Major General Ibrahim Ali Ahmed Haidan<\/td>Minister of Interior<\/td><\/tr>
Mohammed Mohammed Hizam al-Ashwal<\/td>Minister of Industry and Trade<\/td><\/tr>
 Qasim Muhammad Qasim Bahibah<\/td>Minister of Public Health and Population<\/td><\/tr>
Badr Abdo Ahmed al-Aradha<\/td>Minister of Justice<\/td><\/tr>
Major General Taher Ali Ayda al-Aqili<\/td>Minister of Defense<\/td><\/tr>
Badr Mohammed Mubarak Basalma<\/td>Minister of Local Administration<\/td><\/tr>
Muti\u2019a Ahmad Qasim Damaj<\/td>Minister of Culture and Tourism<\/td><\/tr>
 Anwar Mohammed Ali Kalashat al-Mahri<\/td>Minister of Technical Education and Vocational Training<\/td><\/tr>
Adnan Mohammed Omar al-Kaf<\/td>Minister of Electricity and Energy<\/td><\/tr>
Marwan Faraj Saeed bin Ghanem<\/td>Minister of Finance<\/td><\/tr>
 Afrah Abdulaziz Al-Zuba<\/td>Minister of Planning and International Cooperation<\/td><\/tr>
Salem Abubakr Mohammed Thabit al-Awlaqi<\/td>Minister of Civil Service and Insurance<\/td><\/tr>
Ishraq Fadl al-Muqatri<\/td>Minister of Legal Affairs<\/td><\/tr>
Adel Abdulmajid Alawi al-Abadi<\/td>Minister of Education<\/td><\/tr>
 Amin Numan Muhammad al-Qudsi<\/td>Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research<\/td><\/tr>
Shadi Saleh Basurah<\/td>Minister of Communications and Information Technology<\/td><\/tr>
Mohammed Abdullah Ali Bamqa\u2019a<\/td>Minister of Oil and Minerals<\/td><\/tr>
Mohsen Ali Haidera Qasim al-Amri<\/td>Minister of Transport<\/td><\/tr>
Hussein Awad Saeed al-Aqrabi<\/td>Minister of Public Works and Roads<\/td><\/tr>
Mukhtar Omar Saleh al-Yafei<\/td>Minister of Social Affairs and Labor<\/td><\/tr>
Mashdal Mohammed Omar Ahmed<\/td>Minister of Human Rights<\/td><\/tr>
Turki Abdullah Ali al-Wadaei<\/td>Minister of Endowments and Guidance<\/td><\/tr>
Abdullah Ali Hussein Abu Huria<\/td>Minister of State for Parliament and Shura Council Affairs<\/td><\/tr>
Akram Naseeb Ahmed Al-Ameri<\/td>Minister of State<\/td><\/tr>
Abdulghani Hafiz Allah Jameel<\/td>Minister of State, Mayor of Sanaa<\/td><\/tr>
Abdulrahman Sheikh al-Yafei<\/td>Minister of State, Governor of Aden<\/td><\/tr>
Ahmed Saleh Ahmed al-Awlaqi<\/td>Minister of State<\/td><\/tr>
Ahed Mohammed Salem Jaasous<\/td>Minister of State for Women\u2019s Affairs<\/td><\/tr>
Walid Mohammed Mohammed al-Qudaimi<\/td>Minister of State<\/td><\/tr>
Walid Ali Ismail<\/td>Minister of State<\/td><\/tr>
Moammar Mutahar Mohammed al-Eryani<\/td>Minister of Information<\/td><\/tr>
Nayef Saleh Abdulqader al-Bakri<\/td>Minister of Youth and Sports<\/td><\/tr>
Salem Abdullah Issa al-Saqtari<\/td>Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Fisheries<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

It is important to take into consideration the situation within Yemen and the need to plan policies accordingly. A weak and fragile government would inevitably expand the Houthis\u2019 strategic space, strengthening their capacity and incentives to obstruct peacemaking and undermine stabilization efforts. While the cabinet reflects political recalibration, security remains Yemen\u2019s central and most immediate challenge, as without focusing on internal security, all the other objectives and aspirations will be impossible to pursue. Moreover, Yemen\u2019s port facilities and oil infrastructure are key pillars of the country\u2019s economy and must be prioritized in any recovery strategy. For this, ensuring security is essential to attract foreign investment and rebuild investor confidence. Hence, the new government must be supported to build institutional resilience and build trust and credibility while enhancing its military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, Saudi Arabia\u2019s support functions as a structural stabilizer rather than mere financial backing. Riyadh\u2019s role in facilitating the integration of armed factions under a unified command enhances the state\u2019s ability to consolidate authority and preempt security vacuums that non-state actors could exploit. Saudi Arabia\u2019s proactive engagement in Yemen also reflects Riyadh\u2019s recognition that Yemen\u2019s stability is inseparable from its own national security. Over the years, Saudi Arabia has consistently invested in Yemen. Saudi Arabia\u2019s Development and Reconstruction Program includes<\/a> 268 initiatives across sectors, including transport, education, health, energy, water, agriculture, development and government capacity building, intended to improve Yemen\u2019s economy, infrastructure and connectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The newly formed government has been welcomed by the European U<\/a>nion, which described it as a step toward stability. Such diplomatic endorsement bolsters the government\u2019s legitimacy and enhances the prospects for reconstruction and humanitarian cooperation. Ultimately, Yemen\u2019s recovery trajectory will depend not only on internal cohesion but also on sustained international confidence in the government\u2019s credibility and its institutional resilience.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Since the military escalation in December 2025, the situation in Yemen has changed rapidly, marked by internal fragmentation and regional interventions. Saudi-led initiatives, alongside efforts by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), sought to create constructive avenues for negotiations for broader political dialogue. Amid the shifting internal political dynamics, the formation of a new government represents […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":14189,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14188","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14188","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14188"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14188\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14194,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14188\/revisions\/14194"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14189"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14188"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14188"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14188"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}