The assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a US-Israeli airstrike on February 28, 2026, marked the end of a long era defined by widespread debate and disagreement over his domestic and foreign policies. His sudden absence represents a pivotal moment, signaling a turning point not only for Iran\u2019s internal political structure but also for the network of regional proxies and international alliances. Contemporary Iran cannot be examined without considering Khamenei\u2019s era and legacy, given his central role, influence and status as one of the Iranian establishment\u2019s most powerful pillars over four and a half decades, a period fraught with internal and external conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The killing of the establishment\u2019s undisputed central figure raises critical questions: what is the impact of his absence on Iran\u2019s future? Does his death signal the collapse of the establishment, or do remaining centers of influence and ideological structures ensure its continuity? Who will succeed him as supreme leader, and how will the political system evolve? What consequences will his absence have for Iran\u2019s regional alliances and network of proxies? Could armed militias become more actively involved in ongoing conflicts? And what options does Iran have in responding to Khamenei\u2019s assassination?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How Consequential and Impactful Is Khamenei\u2019s Assassination for the Future of the Iranian Establishment?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond the extensive supra-constitutional powers and authorities that the Constitution grants the supreme leader \u2014 which could, in theory, be extended to any appointed successor to safeguard the establishment from collapse \u2014 no future leader is likely to wield the same influence over the establishment\u2019s stability, strength and continuity that Khamenei exercised for over more than 45 years of political leadership. This is due to multiple factors and considerations, the most significant of which include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Strategic Core: Khamenei as the Establishment\u2019s Heart and Mind<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Iranian establishment revolves around key centers of power, chief among them was Khamenei, who served as the central axis linking all others. He was not only the state\u2019s most powerful figure but the architect of its institutions, Constitution, military and revolutionary apparatus, embedding an ideological and doctrinal framework that prioritized the establishment over citizens\u2019 welfare. His authority shaped both domestic and foreign policy through an ideological lens. Through his consolidation of power, close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and weakening of rival institutions, he became both a symbol and operator of Iran\u2019s political engine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Khamenei was not an ordinary political leader or a traditional cleric; he was a symbol around whom all the threads of the Iranian game converged \u2014 from revolution to state-building, from war to opposition, from the nuclear program to ballistic missiles to foreign adventures and more. His personality came to inspire both admiration and anger at once. His path through Iran\u2019s system of religious rule began in the city of Mashhad and rose to the highest leadership position in the country, turning his life into a window into the history of contemporary Iran with all its transformations, conflicts and crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In practical and constitutional terms, Khamenei became the backbone, mastermind and beating heart of the system. He possessed the unique ability to gather the establishment\u2019s centers of gravity in his own hands \u2014 what some describe as the \u201csurreal code\u201d that allowed him to hold the system together. It is often said that if Ruhollah Khomeini ignited the revolution, it was Khamenei who preserved it and ensured its continuation and export. From his youth, he was one of its pillars, symbols and key influencers in shaping its trajectory and sustaining its principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n His departure will therefore deprive the system of much of its solidity, strength and continuity, and may even lead to the unraveling of the remaining centers of power that follow him in influence and importance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Religious Authority and Historical Leadership Experience<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to his religious authority, Khamenei possessed extensive experience in managing Iran\u2019s system of religious governance \u2014 one unmatched by his potential his successors. He had a charismatic presence and wielded considerable influence among believers in the doctrine of Wilayat al\u2011Faqih and religious rule in Iran, both inside the country and beyond. His unparalleled experience shaped his ability to navigate and negotiate the complex regional and international issues surrounding Iran. Viewed as a pragmatic political figure, Khamenei was capable of balancing flexibility \u2014 softening positions when the establishment\u2019s future stability was threatened \u2014 with rigidity in upholding revolutionary principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Khamenei was renowned for his high-level strategic planning on major issues related to the state\u2019s future and its political system, his calm decision-making style and his capacity to withstand crises. As Iran\u2019s ultimate decision-maker with the final word on all decisions, he emerged as the guardian of Iran\u2019s revolutionary project. His absence therefore represents a deep blow to the country\u2019s leadership which benefited not only from his accumulated experience in war and negotiations but also from his galvanizing power which aligned the state\u2019s various institutions and competing power centers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Engine of Iran\u2019s Geopolitical Project<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Compared with the figures who might potentially assume the position should the regime survive the current intense pressures, Iran\u2019s expansionist geopolitical project is directly tied to the supreme leader. The survival and continuity of Iran\u2019s regional project depended to a large extent on Khamenei himself. The relationship between the Iranian system \u2014 of which Khamenei was the primary center of gravity \u2014 and its regional proxies is one of existential interdependence. Khamenei also adopted a consistent posture of resistance toward the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Supporters remember him as a symbol of steadfastness and the guardian of Iran\u2019s geopolitical project stretching from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Palestine. Critics, by contrast, denounce him as a leader who was excessively centralized in his rule, concentrating power in his own hands, deepening internal and regional polarization and transforming Iran into a highly centralized state under his military and security grip. Despite the debates surrounding his personality, there is broad agreement that he was the ultimate decision-maker, and that the state\u2019s institutions and its social, military and religious networks operated fully under his authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For this reason, the discussion surrounding him extends beyond the man himself to the future of the system after his absence \u2014 whether Iran will continue the model of governance he entrenched or undergo fundamental political transformations in the post\u2011assassination phase. His departure will undoubtedly have a profound impact on what is known as the \u201cAxis of Resistance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Glue of Internal Cohesion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Khamenei had long acted as the figure who led, protected and maintained cohesion among all wings of the system \u2014 its official, unofficial and parallel institutions. His absence may therefore trigger an escalation of internal conflicts and an intensification of power struggles among the establishment\u2019s factions, including the IRGC and the \u201cconservative\u201d and \u201creformist\u201d currents. Each faction is expected to seek control over authority and resources, especially in light of the complex domestic crises caused by ongoing economic sanctions and the establishment\u2019s internal weakening after sustaining both external and internal blows that have fragmented its geopolitical project and damaged its capabilities. This risk is compounded if joint US\u2011Israeli strikes continue. For these reasons, Khamenei\u2019s departure could ignite a far more violent struggle among the remaining power centers \u2014 assuming they survive further US and Israeli attacks \u2014 potentially even leading to mutual physical elimination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In short, although some strategic analysts and Iran specialists argue that Khamenei\u2019s absence will not immediately bring down the establishment, his departure will create a vacuum that cannot be filled. It may therefore mark the beginning of the unraveling of the remaining nodes of power, influence and continuity that he held together. This makes the defining feature of Iran after Khamenei a phase of uncertainty and profound instability, one that threatens the survival of the entire system \u2014 especially amid mounting crises, pressures, external strikes and the Iranian public\u2019s loss of confidence in state institutions and their ability to stop the ongoing deterioration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran\u2019s Governance After Khamenei\u2019s Demise<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Post-Khamenei Iran: Governance and Potential Scenarios<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The following outlines the most prominent potential forms of post-Khamenei governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n System Continuity Through a Successor<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This scenario assumes the political system continues under a new supreme leader, potentially resembling Khamenei\u2019s own appointment and allowing \u201chardliners\u201d to consolidate control. Succession represents a foundational moment: it transfers not only political office but also the constitutional, security and ideological center of gravity that transcends all three branches of government, commands the army and the IRGC and steers the state and bureaucracy. The successor\u2019s name matters, but more critical is the alliance he brings: seminaries and religious institutions, the supreme leader\u2019s office, IRGC networks and economic-security arms, the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council and the Expediency Discernment Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Constitutional Framework: Selection and Qualifications<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Selecting body (Assembly of Experts): Constitutionally, the Assembly of Experts, formally elected, appoints the supreme leader by reviewing qualified jurists and choosing one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Qualifications: Charisma is not required; instead, candidates must possess ijtihad <\/em>(jurisprudential competence), justice, piety, sociopolitical insight, administrative competence and courage. Many candidates have strong institutional experience but lack the jurisprudential standing or popular support of Khamenei or Khomeini.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Transitional arrangements (Article 111): If the position is vacant, a temporary council \u2014 consisting of the president, chief justice and a Guardian Council jurist chosen by the Expediency Discernment Council \u2014 assumes leadership. This elevates the judiciary, Guardian Council and Expediency Discernment Council as pivotal institutions during transition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Succession in Practice: Text Versus Reality<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Although the assembly formally appoints the supreme leader, elections for its members are influenced by \u201chardliner\u201d-dominated institutions. Succession is usually an elitist compromise announced by vote rather than open competition. The IRGC operates as a multidimensional power network \u2014 economic, security, regional and domestic mobilization \u2014 so any successor must secure its practical acceptance or adopt collective\/institutional leadership approaches to manage risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Potential Paths<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Three outcomes are possible: managed continuity, gradual military expansion\/conquest or erosion and collapse. The transition may begin as controlled but shift unpredictably. Prior to recent US-Israeli attacks, leaked intelligence suggested succession might favor IRGC-linked elements rather than radical change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mapping Potential Successors: Patterns More Than Personalities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Iran, no formal announcement typically precedes succession, and candidate lists remain speculative. Assessments rely on indicators such as proximity to the Office of the Supreme Leader, acceptance within the religious seminaries, jurisprudential qualifications, positions in sensitive institutions, security clearance and fulfillment of Article 109 of the Constitution. The latter does not require the highest scholarly rank, but rather sufficient jurisprudential competence to issue fatwas across various fields.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Among the Prominent Figures Discussed:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Ayatollah Ali Reza Arafi<\/strong> is frequently mentioned due to his leadership role in the seminaries and membership in key institutions. He is viewed as combining seminary legitimacy with administrative experience. However, his limited public appeal and his capacity to manage the significantly expanded IRGC network pose challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ayatollah Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei<\/strong>, currently head of the judiciary, derives strength from his institutional authority and security-political presence. Yet questions persist regarding whether he possesses, in the view of the religious establishment, sufficient ijtihad and seminary acceptance to combine the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist with the influence of the IRGC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other circulating names <\/strong>\u2014 such as Mohsen Qomi, Mohsen Araki and Hashem Hosseini Bushehri \u2014 represent what may be termed a \u201cfunctional-institutional\u201d pattern. The emphasis here is not personal superiority, but the capacity of this model to avoid sharp divisions within the loyalist Shiite establishment, domestically and beyond. These figures embody institutional continuity: religious-administrative actors rooted in the regime\u2019s core, closely tied to official religious structures and state institutions, often presented as the least costly option for stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mojtaba Khamenei<\/strong> remains central to succession discussions. His potential appointment, however, carries sensitivity due to concerns about inheritance and his relatively limited official administrative experience. His leadership would likely be interpreted as both dynastic succession and a strategic alignment with security power centers, particularly the IRGC. While this could ensure policy continuity, it risks division within the religious elite over legitimacy, potentially encouraging alternatives such as a weak formal leader alongside a powerful deep state or a collective leadership council. The Mojtaba Khamenei model represents combined political and religious succession \u2014 traditionally improbable within Iran\u2019s seminary culture \u2014 yet practically plausible given his networks, IRGC ties and continuity of his father\u2019s trajectory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In June 2025, The New York Times and several other newspapers reported that Khamenei had identified three potential successors from whom the Assembly of Experts would select one, amid concerns that he might be targeted by the United States and Israel. According to the source cited by the newspaper, Mojtaba Khamenei was not among those candidates<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, this account was later cast into doubt. In January 2025, The Washington Post<\/a> published a report discussing Khamenei\u2019s illness and alleged preparations for Mojtaba Khamenei to replace him, claiming he had been secretly chosen by members of the clergy. Iranian officials rejected that report, describing it as based on \u201crumors and allegations.\u201d They emphasized that the supreme leader is not appointed by clerics, but by the Assembly of Experts, whose members are elected by the Iranian people every eight <\/a>years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iranian statements further stressed that Khamenei\u2019s public positions and conduct reflected his opposition to his sons entering politics, let alone succeeding him. Reinforcing this position, Ayatollah Mahmoud Mohammadi Araghchi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, stated that Khamenei had declined a request from certain assembly members to consider one of his sons for future leadership. An Iranian newspaper subsequently reported that its sources confirmed Khamenei\u2019s firm rejection of any succession by his sons, adding that the Assembly of Experts respected this stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, in March 2023, debate surfaced within the seminaries regarding Mojtaba Khamenei\u2019s eligibility. Some clerical figures argued that he had the right to seek the position like any other qualified Iranian citizen and religious scholar, without guardianship restrictions. They maintained that being the son of the supreme leader did not disqualify him, provided he met the required political and religious qualifications. This discussion intensified after cleric Sadegh Mohammadi and Assembly of Experts member Mousavi Jazayeri suggested the possibility of Mojtaba Khamenei succeeding his father. Taken together, these developments indicate that Mojtaba Khamenei could not be entirely ruled out and may, at that critical juncture, have been regarded as the most likely candidate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An Outsider<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The transfer of authority in the position of supreme leader in Iran constitutes a complex dilemma that extends far beyond selecting a particular religious or political figure. The regime\u2019s structure is built upon a delicate equilibrium between religious legitimacy and institutional and security power. For that reason, restricting the discussion to media-circulated names \u2014 such as Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Reza Arafi or even Hassan Khomeini, despite his \u201creformist\u201d inclinations \u2014 risks oversimplifying a far more intricate internal equation. Under the Constitution, the Assembly of Experts holds the authority to appoint any jurist who satisfies the required religious and political qualifications. This provision opens both theoretical and practical space for the selection of a less prominent figure, provided that he is acceptable to the establishment\u2019s principal centers of power, particularly the IRGC, the Office of the Supreme Leader and official religious institutions. In moments of institutional transition, political systems often gravitate toward what may be described as a \u201cquiet consensus:\u201d the elevation of a figure who does not trigger factional sensitivities and who is capable of managing the fragile balance between competing forces \u2014 assuming a rational calculus among the IRGC and key actors in Tehran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n