Introduction<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The ongoing military confrontation between Iran and the United States and Israel provided the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with an opening to reshape the political landscape in line with its own outlook. This influence was not confined to its central role in the selection of the new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei as successor to his father; it also extended to the broader array of positions left vacant during the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, former IRGC Commander Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr was recently elevated from his post as secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council to become secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, succeeding veteran politician Ali Larijani. The latter had long been regarded as a key pillar in preserving the political system\u2019s multilayered power structure in the post-Khamenei phase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These developments suggest that the war may have accelerated a trajectory toward greater dominance by the IRGC over Iran\u2019s political system, potentially ushering in structural shifts in its balance of power and institutional configuration. Against this backdrop, key questions emerge: what role did Larijani play within the establishment, what factors lay behind his sidelining and what does Zolqadr\u2019s appointment signal for the establishment\u2019s future direction?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Larijani and the Art of Walking Tightropes<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The assassination of Larijani constituted not merely the targeting of a prominent political figure, but a structural blow to the establishment. He was more than a senior official within Iran\u2019s political system; he represented a complex synthesis of the post-revolutionary order, combining three interlocking dimensions: familial-religious legitimacy, bureaucratic and security expertise and the capacity to mediate between competing factions within the establishment. His academic and philosophical background further enabled him to navigate the corridors of power and manage shifting tensions between \u201cconservatives\u201d and \u201creformists.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Over the course of his career, Larijani occupied a range of positions that, while diverse in appearance, were deeply interconnected in function. These included a command role in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War, a ministerial post in culture, leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, speaker of Parliament (Majlis) from 2008 to 2020, and, ultimately, a return to the core of security and strategic decision-making in his final position. This breadth of experience underscored not only his unconventional profile, but also his adaptability across different political phases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Larijani was not solely a product of bureaucratic ascent; he also emerged from a religious-political lineage that carries significant weight within Iran\u2019s power structure. Born into an influential clerical family, he was shaped by an environment that bridged seminary training and academic study, including his engagement with Western philosophy at Tehran University \u2014 an intellectual trajectory that set him apart within the Iranian elite. He combined the profile of a security figure fluent in theoretical discourse with that of a \u201cconservative\u201d politician possessing rhetorical and intellectual range beyond conventional political norms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For this reason, some Western analyses have characterized him as a \u201cbalancing force\u201d within Iran: neither a liberal \u201creformist\u201d nor a populist \u201chardliner,\u201d but rather an institutional \u201cconservative\u201d capable of safeguarding the establishment from internal fragmentation while maintaining engagement with external actors, without relinquishing the ideological framework of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist or the foundational principles of the revolution. It is within this capacity that his significance becomes most apparent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Iranian republic does not operate as a conventional state structured around uniform institutions, but as a layered system composed of multiple centers of authority: the supreme leader, the IRGC, the Supreme National Security Council, the presidency, Parliament, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Guardian Council, clerical networks and a range of economic and security bodies. In such a configuration, influence does not necessarily correlate with formal rank; it lies instead with those able to bridge these institutional layers. Larijani\u2019s importance stemmed precisely from this role \u2014 his ability to engage each component of the establishment in its own language.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Larijani\u2019s significance may help explain why the supreme leader moved to restore him to the forefront following the 12-Day War with the United States and Israel in June 2025. This step came within the context of a broader reassessment of Iran\u2019s post-war policy, as the establishment sought to recalibrate the hardline decisions and orientations associated with the Supreme National Security Council. The body\u2019s influence has expanded since 2020, and arguably even earlier, when it pushed Iran\u2019s nuclear policy toward escalation, contributing to a miscalculated confrontation with the United States that ultimately led to the targeting of Iranian nuclear facilities. In this setting, Larijani\u2019s return signaled an effort to restore balance and adapt to shifting conditions, requiring a blend of deterrence and flexibility. His subsequent actions \u2014 including engagement with Iran\u2019s regional axis and oversight of nuclear negotiations conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs \u2014 reflected this calibrated approach, aimed at navigating Iran out of the acute pressures imposed by Trump and Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
His importance appeared to deepen further following the assassination of Ali Khamenei in late February 2026. According to international reporting, Larijani emerged in the turbulent vacuum that followed the supreme leader\u2019s death as one of the central figures in managing the affairs of the state, if not the most influential. Some accounts went so far as to describe him, during that brief and fluid period, as the \u201cde facto leader\u201d or the most powerful figure in Iran. This characterization does not suggest that he formally replaced the supreme leader, but rather that he functioned as the establishment\u2019s executive center of decision-making at a critical juncture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From this perspective, Larijani\u2019s importance lay not only in the extent of his influence, but in its nature. Within Iran, he came to embody a form of what may be described as \u201cflexible conservative thinking\u201d \u2014 an approach that does not challenge the framework of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih), yet recognizes that the system\u2019s durability depends as much on governance, role distribution, and the careful management of internal balances as it does on ideological commitment. This entails navigating the tension between coercion and compromise, ideology and expediency, and the imperatives of revolution and statehood. It is precisely this capacity that distinguished him from a purely military profile: while military institutions may excel at enforcing control, they are not always equipped to translate that control into sustained political stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Assassination Within the Framework of Change<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is little doubt that the assassination of Larijani formed part of Israel\u2019s broader campaign aimed at reshaping \u2014 or at minimum weakening \u2014 the Iranian political system. This development can be interpreted along several key lines:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First: The Logic of Decapitation<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Israel, alongside the United States, appears to have shifted toward a strategy that targets not only nuclear and military infrastructure, but also the establishment\u2019s capacity to reproduce its leadership after successive blows. Within this framework, Larijani\u2019s assassination is particularly consequential. He was not simply a senior official, but one of the few figures capable of reconstructing the political hierarchy in the aftermath of the loss of the supreme leader and other high-ranking commanders. In this sense, his removal does not temporarily diminish the establishment\u2019s strength; it strikes at its ability to reconstitute itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second: A Message of Deterrence<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Targeting a figure with such deeply embedded ties across the religious establishment, security institutions and political sphere carries implications that extend beyond the military domain. It signals that no individual within Iran\u2019s decision-making core is beyond reach, and that the architecture of sovereignty itself is vulnerable. Reports emphasizing the level of intelligence penetration required to carry out such an operation underscore the capacity to access sensitive circles at the heart of Tehran. In this respect, the act transcends assassination, amounting to a direct challenge to state sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Third: The Removal of a Pivotal Actor<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In many conflicts, the strident \u201chardliner\u201d is less strategically consequential than the pragmatic \u201chardliner.\u201d The former is more easily isolated and discredited, while the latter is harder to contain and affords the establishment greater diplomatic flexibility. Larijani, despite his firm alignment with the establishment, was not a mere mobilizing figure; he functioned as a negotiator, an institutional actor and a practitioner of calibrated compromise within the framework of the revolution. His assassination can therefore be read as an effort to tilt Iran further toward militarization \u2014 marginalizing figures capable of mediation and enabling a more rigid security apparatus to assume direct control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fourth: Preempting Separate US-Iran Understandings<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From this perspective, the presence of a figure such as Larijani may have posed a strategic concern for Israel, given his combination of pragmatism and influence, which could facilitate engagement with Washington. Such a development might complicate Israeli objectives or even impose constraints on the continuation of the conflict. Accordingly, his assassination can be interpreted as an attempt to silence a rational and influential voice within the establishment \u2014 one capable of redirecting the trajectory from confrontation toward negotiation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Will Zolqadr Fill the Void?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The appointment of Zolqadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, succeeding Larijani, reflects the rapid shifts in Iran\u2019s power centers and internal balance following Khamenei\u2019s death. The choice appears to bear the imprint of the IRGC, with loyalty \u2014 rather than administrative or political breadth \u2014 emerging as the decisive criterion for assuming such a sensitive post. The move suggests an effort to align the council\u2019s orientation more closely with the IRGC\u2019s strategic and defense priorities during a critical phase, while also tightening control over political decisions related to potential negotiations with the United States, given the council\u2019s central role in this domain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Zolqadr\u2019s career trajectory aligns closely with the IRGC\u2019s institutional outlook and the current phase of confrontation, which it views in existential terms for both the IRGC and its regional axis. He first rose to prominence as commander of the strategic Ramadan Headquarters at the outset of the Iran-Iraq War \u2014 an early platform for cross-border operations from which the Quds Force later evolved. In the post-war period, he advanced through senior ranks, serving as chief of the Joint Staff and later as deputy commander-in-chief. This military background shaped his profile as a \u201chardliner\u201d figure upon transitioning into civilian roles, at a time when the IRGC was expanding its political reach during the early years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad\u2019s presidency. He subsequently held positions as deputy interior minister for security affairs, deputy chief of staff for Basij affairs, and later moved into the judiciary. In 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Within this framework, Zolqadr is best understood as part of a network of figures bound by ideological alignment and institutional loyalty to the IRGC \u2014 networks that operate within the state\u2019s bureaucratic architecture and are often relied upon as instruments of continuity and control. This profile likely informed his selection at a moment the regime perceives as existentially sensitive. Unlike Larijani, however, he lacks a comparable political presence, does not maintain a strong connection to public opinion, and does not possess the same degree of influence, personal authority, or cross-institutional reach within Iran\u2019s political system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Accordingly, Zolqadr does not represent a continuation of Larijani\u2019s role, nor is he positioned to significantly shape the broader balance of power or strategic direction. His function is more likely to be executive than pivotal \u2014 an implementer rather than a source of alternative policy thinking in a complex security environment. His appointment may also reflect a widening gap between formal power centers and broader social currents, as well as between official and informal institutions and the regime\u2019s competing political tendencies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Taken together, his selection \u2014 alongside the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei as military adviser to Mojtaba Khamenei \u2014 points to the consolidation of hardline influence, particularly among figures affiliated with the IRGC, across key decision-making bodies. The implications of this shift include reduced flexibility, heightened external confrontation, tighter control over national security structures, and the prospect of steering the country toward an open-ended and potentially destabilizing conflict trajectory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Establishment and the Post-Larijani Era<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The assassination of Larijani appears to have created a distinct kind of void \u2014 less the absence of a charismatic leader than that of a critical intermediary. In revolutionary-security systems, there is rarely a shortage of figures capable of issuing orders, but far fewer who can interpret the regime to itself \u2014 translating ideology into policy and policy into a coherent institutional framework. Larijani largely fulfilled this role, one that now seems absent in the current configuration. In this sense, his elimination may reflect the broader transformation imposed on Iran\u2019s political system in the context of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This process of change suggests neither continuity nor adaptive dynamism, but rather a degree of ambiguity over where effective authority resides. It coincides with growing assessments that the IRGC has, in practice, become the dominant force in governing the country, or at least the most influential actor within the ruling structure. Such a shift carries significant implications, pointing to a transition from a religious theocracy toward a more rigid model \u2014 one that can be understood as a theocratic system underpinned by direct militarization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At its core, this raises a deeper philosophical and political question. Since 1979, the Iranian republic has rested on the premise that ultimate legitimacy is religious, yet exercised through relatively modern state institutions \u2014 an attempt to reconcile the religious and the political. Figures like Larijani were central to maintaining this balance, enabling the regime to present itself as both ideological and pragmatic, revolutionary and institutional, religious and strategic. With the removal of such figures and the rise of others more closely aligned with IRGC, the balance appears to tilt \u2014 either toward a more pronounced military dominance, or toward intensified competition among power centers, or potentially toward the emergence of alternative actors with comparable influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From a theoretical standpoint, the post-Larijani moment poses a sensitive challenge to Iran\u2019s model of governance. The doctrine of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) does not rely solely on jurisprudential foundations or revolutionary narratives, but also on its capacity to sustain a functioning state that forms part of a broader religious vision, with the supreme leader acting as the representative of the Absent Imam. However, when senior leadership is repeatedly targeted, and the state appears unable to shield its own officials, the issue extends beyond security concerns to touch on the establishment\u2019s underlying legitimacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, it would be an overstatement to conclude that Iran is inevitably moving toward imminent collapse in the aftermath of Larijani\u2019s assassination. Available international assessments emphasize the regime\u2019s layered and resilient structure, supported by institutional depth and security capacity sufficient to withstand such shocks. In this sense, while his assassination constitutes a significant weakening of the regime, it does not, in itself, precipitate its collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Accordingly, four potential scenarios can be outlined for Iran\u2019s trajectory in the aftermath of Larijani\u2019s removal:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First Scenario: The Rise of the IRGC as the Decisive Center of Power<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This appears the most plausible in the short term \u2014 not in the sense of a conventional military takeover, but as a consequence of the vacuum created by the successive assassinations of Khamenei and then Larijani, which amplifies the role of the most cohesive, organized, and operationally capable institution. The appointment of Zolqadr as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, alongside the earlier designation of Rezaei as military adviser to the supreme leader, points to the IRGC\u2019s expanding presence within key decision-making structures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second Scenario: The Reconstruction of a Civil-security Nexus<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Under this scenario, the regime would seek to cultivate either an individual figure or a collective mechanism capable of assuming some of Larijani\u2019s former functions \u2014 namely, managing the interface between the IRGC, the presidency, the religious establishment and external channels. While theoretically conceivable, this path faces a structural constraint: Larijani did not merely occupy a position that can be replaced, but embodied a form of accumulated institutional capital developed over decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Third Scenario: Institutional Continuity Accompanied by Declining Legitimacy<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this case, the state persists in formal and structural terms, but its capacity to command consent erodes, leading to an increasing reliance on coercive instruments. Over time, such a trajectory risks transforming the state from a governing framework with a coherent vision into a mechanism primarily concerned with its own survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fourth Scenario: State Collapse<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although not the most immediate outcome, this possibility cannot be excluded, particularly under the pressures of sustained military confrontation and its potential prolongation. External actors, including Washington, could pursue a strategy reminiscent of Iraq\u2019s trajectory after 1990, exerting pressure that incrementally pushes the regime toward breakdown. Such a dynamic may be reinforced if the current environment sidelines political actors capable of flexible engagement, leaving decision-making concentrated in military hands. In that event, the establishment would lose the pragmatic adaptability that has historically underpinned its resilience in the face of successive crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The assassination of Larijani is not merely a security incident, but a revealing moment in the broader struggle over the nature of the Iranian state itself: whether the Iranian republic will be allowed to recalibrate and reorganize from within, or whether it will be driven into a more chaotic and militarized phase that undermines its capacity to reconcile state structures with ideological foundations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Within the regime, Larijani embodied a delicate connective thread between religious legitimacy and strategic rationality. His removal therefore represents, in effect, the erosion of an effort to preserve a degree of political reason within a system defined by the constant tension between revolution and statecraft. It can thus be read as an attempt to reshape and reengineer the Iranian political landscape against the internal logic of its own actors \u2014 an intervention that may ultimately push the regime toward greater instability and, in the most severe interpretation, toward a precipice.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Introduction The ongoing military confrontation between Iran and the United States and Israel provided the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with an opening to reshape the political landscape in line with its own outlook. This influence was not confined to its central role in the selection of the new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei as successor […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":14275,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1402],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14274","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-position-estimate"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14274","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14274"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14274\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14277,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14274\/revisions\/14277"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14275"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14274"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14274"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14274"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}