The Middle East endures a fragile truce. Over $25 billion and 13 dead soldiers later, the United States is far from clear about the obliteration of Iran\u2019s nuclear capability and the erosion of its destabilizing power. The dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as Iran\u2019s nuclear option before it acquires and unveils the actual deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Washington\u2019s suspicion that the 12-Day War attacks on the Natanz and other facilities in Iran may not have completely destroyed its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile partly led to its ongoing joint campaign alongside Israel. Tehran preserved the ambiguity by denying<\/a> access to IAEA inspectors. Over two months after his second war against Iran, President Trump still awaits the \u201cnuclear dust.\u201d On April 16, he claimed Iran had offered to hand over the \u201cnuclear dust<\/a>\u201d but Tehran denied making any overtures of the sort. Iran\u2019s 60% HEU (uranium hexafluoride, UF6) is in gaseous form rather than solid, as reported in June 2025. The stockpile is stored in cylinders, packed into enormous blue containers called \u201coverpacks.\u201d They are believed to have been deposited<\/a> in tunnels deep under the Isfahan nuclear facility. If so, the containers may be intact deep underground despite the bombing of the site. If the containers were stored deeper than the US bunker-buster GBU-57 bomb\u2019s impact radius, they could have survived intact. With Iran\u2019s cooperation, their recovery by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be relatively straightforward though labor-intensive. If the United States and Iran decide to recover the material with the use of force, the operation may involve unprecedented effort, incalculable losses and an indefinite timeframe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Though there is minimal risk of radiation from UF6, the compressed leaking gas reacting with humidity in the air and sweat creates hydrofluoric acid, which is injurious to humans. Local radioactive contamination can cause an accident if UF6 is leaked in larger quantity, leading to what is called a criticality accident<\/a>. In such an event, the cleanup operations will not only need more time but also specialists. Hence, a clandestine operation by US special services (Green Berets, SEALs, Delta Force) is fraught with uncertainty and unknown risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the worst-case scenario of total collapse of diplomatic channels and successful deception and transfer by Iran of its HEU weighing 408.6kg of its 9,247.6kg net uranium stock (including all levels of enrichment and all chemical forms), it can be converted to weapons-grade uranium (WGU), i.e., 90% enrichment in another subterranean complex that lies 150 meters or so beneath the Pickaxe Mountain (Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La). Tehran had informed the IAEA of its existence but did not share any design details in its last meeting and correspondence prior to the 12-Day War. The extent of the damage to Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities, including Pickaxe Mountain, remains unclear. Even if the facility is too deep for the most lethal US bombs, operations at the site may have been halted to avert leaving tell-tale signs of chemical traces and human footprints. The ambiguity is further compounded by questions over Russia\u2019s role in facilitating plutonium production at the Bushehr reactor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n