{"id":14362,"date":"2026-05-17T12:13:12","date_gmt":"2026-05-17T09:13:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=14362"},"modified":"2026-05-17T12:13:14","modified_gmt":"2026-05-17T09:13:14","slug":"the-uaes-divergent-path-in-the-conflict-with-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/the-uaes-divergent-path-in-the-conflict-with-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"The UAE\u2019s Divergent Path in the Conflict with Iran\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Since February 28, Iran <a href=\"https:\/\/gulfnews.com\/uae\/government\/uae-intercepts-2-ballistic-missiles-and-3-drones-from-iran-today-1.500533745\">attacked<\/a> the UAE with 2,843 projectiles, predominantly using drones, but also ballistic and cruise missiles were used. Though the interception was extremely high, the hits or the falling debris led to 13 fatalities including three victims described as \u201cmilitary-related personnel,\u201d while the 230 injured belonged to 27 nationalities. The UAE\u2019s corporate, tourism, real estate and energy sector almost ground to a halt. Saudi Arabia\u2019s Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin and Salman called his Emirati counterpart thrice to express solidarity and extend cooperation against the shared Iranian threat. Abu Dhabi took a different path in countering Tehran\u2019s aggression and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. While Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, which were also attacked by Iranian projectiles, support the mediation process, the UAE is more inclined toward forcibly opening the strait besides using the right to retaliate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Though the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states earned global solidarity for enduring Iran\u2019s relentless barrages of drones and missiles, the UAE remained far from impressed.&nbsp;As much as Tehran promoted the narrative of the Gulf state\u2019s nexus with Washington and Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi perpetuated the alliance further.&nbsp;It was far from impressed with&nbsp;the mediatory efforts of Islamabad, Riyadh, Cairo and Ankara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On March 17, Adviser to the UAE President Anwar Gargash <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2026-03-17\/uae-official-says-iran-war-tightens-gulf-ties-to-us-israel\">said<\/a> Iranian attacks on its Arab neighbors would serve to strengthen relations between Israel and states that have diplomatic ties with Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israeli media reported that Mossad and Shin Bet chiefs visited the Gulf partner twice during the war but also the director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense held delegation-level talks. More startlingly, Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu also&nbsp;flew to Abu Dhabi&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/IsraeliPM\/status\/2054613742424355266?s=20\">during the war<\/a>, which reportedly&nbsp;led to \u201ca historic breakthrough in bilateral relations.\u201d It is anybody\u2019s guess if the breakthrough is similar to the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan joint defense pact or the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.axios.com\/2026\/04\/26\/israel-iron-dome-uae\">deployment<\/a>&nbsp;of Iron&nbsp;Dome batteries along with dozens of military personnel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cIsrael just sent (the UAE) Iron Dome batteries and personnel to help them operate them. How come? Because there\u2019s an extraordinary relationship between the UAE and Israel based on the Abraham Accords,\u201d US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee <a href=\"https:\/\/www.timesofisrael.com\/in-first-official-confirmation-us-envoy-says-israel-sent-iron-dome-to-uae\/\">said<\/a> at an event in Tel Aviv on May 12.&nbsp;Alongside the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco also recognized Israel six years ago by signing the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2025\/10\/17\/trump-expects-expansion-of-abraham-accords-soon-hopes-s-arabia-will-join\">Abraham Accords<\/a>&nbsp;in the White House.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While strengthening its strategic alliance with Israel, the UAE&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/1e39d1ce-87d3-4bd6-9716-b45d78fc27ba\">withdrew<\/a>&nbsp;from OPEC and OPEC +. UAE Energy Minister Suhail Al Mazrouei <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/why-uaes-opec-exit-is-a-blow-to-saudi-arabia\/a-76975354\">justified<\/a> the move, saying, \u201c[the] UAE wanted to be unconstrained by any groups,\u201d adding that the quota system limits their ability to increase revenues. However,&nbsp; the timing of the decision to exit from the organization raised eyebrows and speculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While other Gulf states reserved their right to respond to Iranian aggression, the UAE chose to exercise it. In early March,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/the-u-a-e-has-been-secretly-carrying-out-attacks-on-iran-f1745a0d\">Emirati fighter jets<\/a>&nbsp;struck a water desalination facility in Iran\u2019s Qeshm Island. However, Ali al-Nuaimi, a senior UAE official, rejected the Israeli media report, \u201cWhen we do something, we have the courage to announce it.\u201d After Iran\u2019s attack on the Fujairah oil terminal on May 4, IRGC Telegram channels and media outlets circulated images purporting to show a UAE Air Force (UAEAF) Mirage 2000-9 over southern Iran. Emirati air force jets not only wear distinct livery but also prominently display manifest markings and serial numbers; the Mirage jet was unmarked. The fact that UAEAF F-16s <a href=\"https:\/\/english.alarabiya.net\/webtv\/media\/2026\/04\/23\/alsharaa-receives-fighter-jet-escort-in-uae-airspace\">escorting<\/a> Syria\u2019s President Ahmed al-Sharaa were devoid of national markings and tail numbers further fueled speculation of UAE involvement in retaliatory attacks against Iran. Interestingly,&nbsp;Iranian officials have not claimed that the UAE successfully carried out retaliatory attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If the herculean task of reaching a compromise between the United States&nbsp; and Iran is reached anytime soon, the UAE will no longer be a haven for the IRGC-linked Iranian elite, which typically used the banking and import system to evade financial and technological sanctions. Israel\u2019s forceful intervention during the war has left a solid impression on the petro state.&nbsp;The over half a century-old dispute with Iran over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa \u2013 courtesy the UK \u2013 is separate from smoothing commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. Israel and the UAE have dug in their heels for the ouster of the clerical regime in Iran. Will the Gulf state regain control over the islands? The chances are slim. As of today, the Iranian revolutionary government&nbsp;is holding on to power, hence&nbsp;tensions between Tehran and Abu Dhabi are set to continue, even if a deal is reached between the United States and Iran,&nbsp; which also appears wishful. For Saudi Arabia, its allies and other Gulf states, a defiant UAE hand-in-glove with Israel, poses a different set of undertakings. The foresight of Saudi Arabia\u2019s pragmatic restraint during the war is revealed in Prince Turki Al Faisal\u2019s latest <a href=\"https:\/\/www.arabnews.com\/node\/2642938\">remarks<\/a>:&nbsp; \u201cHad the Israeli plan to ignite war between us and Iran succeeded, the region would have been plunged into ruin and destruction.\u201d And last but not least, Washington would probably lose the luxury of dealing with the GCC member states as a bloc. After all, the United States cannot disentangle itself from the Middle East, even though its military might be asked to.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Since February 28, Iran attacked the UAE with 2,843 projectiles, predominantly using drones, but also ballistic and cruise missiles were used. Though the interception was extremely high, the hits or the falling debris led to 13 fatalities including three victims described as \u201cmilitary-related personnel,\u201d while the 230 injured belonged to 27 nationalities. The UAE\u2019s corporate, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":14363,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14362","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14362","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14362"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14362\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14364,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14362\/revisions\/14364"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14363"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14362"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14362"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14362"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}