{"id":14593,"date":"2026-08-27T14:23:59","date_gmt":"2026-08-27T11:23:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=14593"},"modified":"2026-08-27T14:25:02","modified_gmt":"2026-08-27T11:25:02","slug":"dimensions-of-ghalibafs-visit-to-iraq-and-its-impact-on-weapons-regulation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/position-estimate\/dimensions-of-ghalibafs-visit-to-iraq-and-its-impact-on-weapons-regulation\/","title":{"rendered":"Dimensions of Ghalibaf\u2019s Visit to Iraq and Its Impact on\u00a0 Weapons Regulation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As Iraq\u2019s long-running debate over placing all weapons under state control enters a more critical phase, tensions between the Iraqi government and Iran-aligned militias have intensified.[1]<\/a> Several of the most powerful armed groups continue to resist surrendering their weapons, with the September 30, 2026, deadline for resolving the issue of uncontrolled arms approaching. Against this backdrop, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made a three-day visit to Iraq, as prominent Shiite leaders seek a compromise capable of preventing the dispute from escalating into a potentially catastrophic confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The visit represents an important test of whether Baghdad can turn its commitment to a state monopoly on weapons into concrete measures capable of reshaping the country\u2019s security landscape and redefining the relationship between state institutions and armed groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tensions escalated following a recent wave of militia attacks targeting neighboring Gulf states and intensified further after the visit of the commander of Iran\u2019s IRGC-affiliated Quds Force to Iraq. Reports suggested that his mission was aimed, at least in part, at reinforcing  militia resistance to disarmament, reflecting the importance of militias  in Iran\u2019s regional strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given the foregoing, Ghalibaf\u2019s visit raises several questions: Did it alter the political dynamics surrounding weapons control? How are the key parties responding to the Iraqi government\u2019s insistence on ending the duality of authority and decision-making? And what are the prospects for establishing a genuine state monopoly on weapons as Iraq and the wider Middle East navigate an increasingly uncertain and volatile regional environment?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghalibaf\u2019s Visit and the Unfavorable Environment  Facing Iranian Clout in Iraq<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghalibaf\u2019s visit occurred as Iran\u2019s influence in Iraq faces mounting pressure from both inside and outside the country. Externally, Washington is pressing Baghdad to reduce its dependence on Tehran, viewing Iraq as the next major arena in a broader effort to roll back Iran\u2019s influence after its setbacks in Syria and the weakening of its position in Lebanon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inside Iraq, meanwhile, the Iraqi government has moved beyond merely reaffirming its commitment to its ministerial program. Article 9<\/a> explicitly calls for \u201cending the phenomenon of uncontrolled weapons outside the framework of official state institutions.\u201d Baghdad has increasingly sought to translate this commitment into practical measures aimed at consolidating the state\u2019s authority over both weapons and national decision-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Iraqi government\u2019s position  is established on a clear principle: decisions of war and peace, as well as the possession and use of weapons, must remain exclusively Iraqi and subject to state authority. It has also emphasized preventing Iraqi territory from being used for military or political purposes outside the country\u2019s constitutional framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These developments have created a more challenging environment for Iran-aligned armed groups and raise the stakes surrounding Ghalibaf\u2019s visit, as Baghdad seeks to assert state sovereignty while navigating competing pressures from Iran, the United States and powerful domestic actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Setting a Timeframe to Transfer  Arms to  State Control<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has pledged to press ahead with efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons outside state control, declaring his readiness to pursue the issue at the risk of his own life<\/a>. He has set September 30, 2026 as a final deadline for completing the process, signaling that Baghdad intends to move from political declarations to concrete enforcement measures. Most significantly, Zaidi has warned that armed activities conducted outside official state institutions after the deadline could be classified as terrorist acts and prosecuted under Iraq\u2019s counterterrorism law. He has also ordered the preparation of legislation establishing a legal framework for restricting weapons possession to the state and ensuring that arms remain subject to constitutional authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reshuffling Positions of Iraqi Security Leaders<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zaidi has also undertaken a sweeping reshuffle of senior military and security positions, removing officials associated with Shiite political parties and factions<\/a> and those linked to influential figures within the Coordination Framework. He has replaced them with figures seen as more likely to consolidate security and military decision-making under the authority of the commander-in-chief, thereby strengthening the state\u2019s monopoly over the use of force. Among the most significant moves was the appointment of former Interior Minister Lieutenant General Abdul Amir al-Shammari to head and reactivate the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Zaidi also removed Abu Ali al-Basri as head of the National Security Service, replacing him with Basim al-Badri. Lieutenant General Karim al-Tamimi was dismissed as head of the Counter-Terrorism Service and replaced by Lieutenant General Zaid Hawshi, the former head of Military Intelligence. Lieutenant General Muhammad Qasim al-Fahd was appointed to lead the Federal Police. The reshuffle has generated unease among some Coordination Framework leaders, who fear that Zaidi is positioning the government for a direct confrontation with militias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arrests and Tightening the Noose Around Militias<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two developments offer important indications of the Iraqi government\u2019s determination to test its ability to enforce state decisions while gauging the risks of escalating tensions with militias that have previously targeted state-linked figures and interests when  their influence has been perceived to be under threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first was the arrest by Iraqi security forces of Abbas al-Yaqoubi, a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) commander and intelligence chief for the Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, based on information indicating an alleged plot to assassinate prominent Iraqi figures. Under militia pressure, authorities subsequently transferred him to PMF security forces. Reports then circulated that militias were prepared to revive the earlier scenario of encircling Baghdad\u2019s Green Zone, interpreting the arrest as evidence that the confrontation had moved beyond political rhetoric to actual arrests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Photo 1:  Jurf al-Sakhr \u2014 a Longstanding Militia Stronghold<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The second was the imposition of security cordons around two of the most sensitive militia strongholds: Jurf al-Nadaf, controlled by Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and Jurf al-Sakhr, a stronghold of Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah. Both areas<\/a> have remained largely inaccessible to state officials since ISIS was expelled, reflecting the militias\u2019 enduring control. Jurf al-Sakhr, which was devastated and emptied of its population during the ISIS conflict in the predominantly Sunni provinces about 12 years ago, was subsequently sealed off by militias. Reports<\/a> describe it as a major militia stronghold and an advanced base for Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC), housing weapons depots, military facilities, missile and drone production sites and training centers operated by the Quds Force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dimensions of Ghalibaf\u2019s Visit and the Outstanding Issues in Iraq<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghalibaf\u2019s visit to Iraq carries significant strategic implications amid the growing complexities surrounding Baghdad\u2019s efforts to place all weapons under state control. The visit conveys several important messages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Iraqi Issue as Part of the Arrangements to End the US-Iran War<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghalibaf\u2019s visit to Iraq was intended to convey a broader message: Iraq is a central arena in Tehran\u2019s negotiations with Washington and must be incorporated into any arrangements for ending the war. The mission is consistent with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei\u2019s reported strategy of revitalizing the \u201cAxis of Resistance\u201d and preserving its role in the regional order that may emerge after the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghalibaf traveled to Iraq not only as speaker of Iran\u2019s Parliament but also as head of Tehran\u2019s negotiating team in talks with the United States. Since the beginning of Mojtaba Khamenei\u2019s tenure, he has increasingly been involved in issues where Iran\u2019s political, military and security interests overlap, particularly matters involving the IRGC, its regional allies and negotiations over an eventual end to the war with Washington. His role therefore differs from that of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, whose mandate is primarily focused on formal diplomatic channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Iraq remains one of the most sensitive issues in US-Iran relations, Ghalibaf is viewed as a potentially important figure for managing tensions between Baghdad and Iran-aligned militias, containing escalation and preserving Tehran\u2019s influence in Iraq. His visit is therefore particularly significant because it brings together the interests of the IRGC,  the militias, the Iraqi government and the emerging arrangements for the postwar regional order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An Iranian Plot to  Regulate Rather Than Relinquish Weapons<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before meeting with Iraq\u2019s four presidencies, Ghalibaf opened his visit with a press conference at the site where Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed, declaring<\/a> that \u201cthe resistance in Iraq is one of the pillars of the country\u2019s strength.\u201d The choice of venue and message underscored the importance Tehran continues to attach to Iraq\u2019s armed groups as part of its regional strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against this backdrop, the visit appears designed to shift the debate between Baghdad and the militias from the question of whether they should disarm to how their weapons could be managed. The move followed IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani\u2019s unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Iraqi government to soften its position on the September 30 deadline and may represent a renewed Iranian effort<\/a> to find a way through the crisis without provoking another confrontation in Iraq under the Trump administration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reports suggest that Ghalibaf arrived with Iranian proposals<\/a> aimed at preventing a direct clash between the Iraqi government and the militias, including freezing or concealing heavy weapons or temporarily transferring significant quantities of arms to Iran pending a broader agreement on their future in Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghalibaf\u2019s visit was therefore far more than a routine diplomatic mission. It conveyed a clear message of Iranian support for the militias and their continued alignment with Tehran. His honoring of the families of militia members killed in Saudi Arabia\u2019s response to attacks launched from Iraq was likewise interpreted as an unmistakable expression of support for the militias\u2019 repeated attacks on the Gulf states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keeping Weapons With Militias in Exchange for Letting Iraqi Oil Pass Through the Strait Of Hormuz<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alongside the question of weapons, the talks also addressed Iraq\u2019s oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Iraqi officials pressed for exemptions allowing their oil shipments to continue, arguing that Iraq is among the countries most severely affected by the strait\u2019s closure because of its previous dependence on the waterway. Oil Minister Bassem Khudair said Iraq\u2019s exports, estimated at 3.5 million barrels per day, had fallen by 75% as a result of the closure<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran rejected Baghdad\u2019s request, reportedly arguing that granting Iraq an exemption would open the door to similar demands from other countries. Yet the refusal may also have served a broader political purpose: pressuring Baghdad to ease its campaign against Iran-aligned militias. This interpretation acquired salience after reports emerged, following Ghalibaf\u2019s departure, that Iran had authorized a number of Iraqi oil tankers to pass through the strait<\/a>, amid signs that Iraqi factions were moving toward managing their weapons rather than fully surrendering them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The talks also reportedly addressed roughly $15 billion<\/a> in Iranian funds frozen in Iraq, largely generated through payments for Iranian electricity and gas. Tehran has an urgent need for access to these funds as its economy strains under the combined weight of war and sanctions, while Washington moves toward tightening Iran\u2019s economic isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s Militias and Attempts to Blow Up the Iraqi Arena<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response to the Iraqi government\u2019s efforts to bring weapons under state control and pursue corruption cases against influential figures, Iran-aligned militias have adopted an increasingly confrontational posture toward Baghdad\u2019s decisions. Their actions appear aimed at creating political and security instability, undermining the Iraqi government\u2019s authority and obstructing its efforts to consolidate state control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assassination Plots Against  Influential Judicial Figures<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Intelligence reports have uncovered alleged militia plans to assassinate Faiq Zaidan, head of Iraq\u2019s Supreme Judicial Council and the country\u2019s highest-ranking judicial authority. The reported plot appears linked to Zaidan\u2019s support for the Iraqi government\u2019s efforts to place weapons under state control, combat corruption and pursue cases against individuals and organizations that had remained beyond effective accountability for years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Militia leaders reportedly fear that the expanding anti-corruption campaign could expose senior commanders or threaten their broader networks of influence, including affiliated offices, businesses and commercial interests. Their concerns have intensified over Zaidan\u2019s reported insistence that Article 4 of Iraq\u2019s 2005 Counter-Terrorism Law be applied to anyone who refuses to surrender weapons by the September 30 deadline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such a move would carry particularly serious implications for the militias, as it could, for the first time, formally place armed groups rejecting state authority within the framework of terrorism offenses under Iraqi law. The reported assassination plot therefore appears intended not only to intimidate Zaidan but also to deter other officials involved in the Iraqi government\u2019s campaign to establish a state monopoly on weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The alleged effort is reportedly part of a broader campaign targeting figures seeking to advance weapons control, with Zaidan among its principal targets. It would also follow earlier reported attempts by militias to assassinate former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Targeting Official Headquarters in Kurdistan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said that two Iranian drones<\/a> targeted his private office and the residence of the head of the region\u2019s Parastin intelligence agency, marking a potentially significant escalation in Iran\u2019s approach toward the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Although Araghchi denied responsibility, the reported strikes have been interpreted as a possible preemptive warning to the KRG following its statements supporting efforts to place weapons under state control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The attacks may also reflect Tehran\u2019s concern over the KRG\u2019s expanding relationship with Washington, particularly amid speculation that Barzani could play a mediating role in potential US-Iran negotiations. \u201cHardliner\u201d elements within Iran\u2019s leadership may be seeking to signal that closer cooperation with Washington could expose the KRG to direct Iranian pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This concern is especially significant amid expectations that negotiations could fail and that any subsequent conflict might take a different form from previous rounds of tit-for-tat attacks. Iranian decision-makers may fear that Washington could seek to mobilize Kurdish forces inside and outside the region as part of a broader strategy against Tehran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If confirmed, the strikes would represent a qualitative escalation, suggesting that Iran may increasingly target political decision-making centers and senior officials as part of its strategy. Such a shift could make neutrality increasingly difficult for regional governments, forcing them to reconsider the risks of distancing themselves from the conflict or cooperating with Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Threats to Use Armed Force Against the Iraqi State<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Militia rhetoric has increasingly shifted from political opposition to explicit threats of armed confrontation with the Iraqi state, particularly following Qaani\u2019s visit to Baghdad, where he met with leaders of the PMF and other armed groups. According to reports, Qaani conveyed Tehran\u2019s opposition to the immediate surrender of militia weapons, citing expectations of a possible new round of regional conflict. If accurate, the position would constitute further evidence of Iranian interference in an issue that Baghdad regards as a matter of national sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following Qaani\u2019s visit, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah and Kata\u2019ib Sayyid al-Shuhada intensified their attacks on Iraq\u2019s commander-in-chief, despite the fact that some PMF brigades formally operate under his authority. The most serious escalation came from Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah official Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, who threatened armed action if Zaidi proceeded with his weapons-control plan, warning that relations with the Iraqi government would follow an \u201ceye for an eye\u201d principle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assaf also outlined conditions<\/a> for surrendering weapons, including:<\/p>\n\n\n\n