{"id":14676,"date":"2026-10-07T12:35:23","date_gmt":"2026-10-07T09:35:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=14676"},"modified":"2026-10-07T12:36:43","modified_gmt":"2026-10-07T09:36:43","slug":"the-rationale-and-implications-of-irans-janfada-campaign","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/the-rationale-and-implications-of-irans-janfada-campaign\/","title":{"rendered":"The Rationale and Implications of Iran\u2019s Janfada Campaign"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Iran\u2019s mobilization campaign Janfada<\/a> has been projected as a massive success by the Iranian establishment, demonstrating not only a show of force and solidarity but also the mobilization of Iranian society amid escalating tensions. What began in March 2026 as a campaign encouraging citizens to project readiness to support the country has increasingly developed organized military and security dimensions. Despite efforts to build legitimacy and credibility through such campaigns, the Iranian establishment continues to face mounting challenges. The recent campaign can be understood as an effort to reinforce state legitimacy and project national unity amid domestic discontent and challenges due to the ongoing conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)  Brigadier General Hassan Hassanzadeh said<\/a> that hundreds of thousands had registered for the active mobilization campaign. As per statements from Iranian officials, Iran intends to establish 1,000 resistance battalions, and participants can contribute not only through military and security activities but also through social services, media involvement and financial support. As per the Iranian authorities, 313,000 people participated<\/a> and registered in the campaign, however, this number remains unverified. The campaign involved Basij and other organized forces, and civilians, including women and children. President Masoud Pezeshkian attended the mobilization event, further asserting its significance. Basij Commander Hossein Taeb highlighted<\/a> the mobilization as a sign of national resistance and readiness for comprehensive defense. The campaign involved weapons training, while videos on social media showcased military exercises on the streets. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Organizations associated with Iran\u2019s security apparatus have repeatedly been deployed to suppress political opposition. The attempt to frame mobilization in terms of religious duty and national responsibility reflects a longstanding strategy through which the Iranian establishment has sought to reinforce its legitimacy and political credibility, particularly amid growing domestic dissent and disagreement. The mobilization is also extending beyond formal military institutions, with spaces like mosques being used as sites for military training. Sasan Zare, the campaign\u2019s spokesperson, said<\/a> that several mosques have been designated and that the longer-term objective will be to establish active sites across Tehran. Such attempts blur the boundaries between civilian and security infrastructures. This pattern is also evident beyond Tehran, particularly in regions where the campaign happens amid existing social and political tensions. In Sistan and Balochistan, Janfada programs combine military training and mass mobilization with an emphasis<\/a> on social unity. This again can be seen as a measure to counter public pressure in a region that faces persistent socioeconomic deprivation and growing local dissent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The inclusion of children in the campaign is also particularly concerning. Amnesty International<\/a> has documented the recruitment of children as young as 12, including minors carrying rifles and deployed at checkpoints and patrols. This highlights the deepening militarization and the danger to children in a clear violation of international law. Iranian officials said boys over 15 were permitted to register and that there were plans concerning younger participants, framing this as an effort to familiarize younger generations with sacrifice and resistance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iranian authorities also launched Elaj<\/a> (cure), a security program encouraging citizens to provide information about Iranian dissidents and critics living abroad. Taken together, these developments suggest an effort to extend the state\u2019s capacity for surveillance deeper into society and beyond Iran\u2019s territorial borders. Elaj seeks to identify perceived opponents. State media promoted Elaj as a mechanism for identifying and punishing Iranians abroad whom it characterizes as \u201ctraitors.\u201d As per reports<\/a>, the platform has published personal information of Iranians living abroad and encouraged citizens to submit additional information through its website and messaging channels. The operators claim to have identified approximately 1,600 people, with around 600 allegedly identified through public reports. Elaj is significant because it extends a domestic surveillance model beyond Iran\u2019s territorial boundaries. Iran has previously developed mechanisms through which citizens could report protesters, alleged violations of mandatory hijab regulations and other activities considered as threats by the Iranian establishment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The more immediate implication of these programs lies in domestic security and state control. The creation of diverse networks connected to the Basij and IRGC could provide the state with additional personnel and organizational capacity during periods of unrest or emergency. The Iranian establishment appears to be expanding Basij mobilization beyond established formations to construct a broader population-based defense and security reserve. Janfada and Elaj therefore point toward a broader process of securitization. Military and security practices are increasingly being embedded within civilian institutions and contexts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such efforts by the state reflect the securitization of everyday social life, enabling the establishment to manipulate political loyalty and expand its ability to monitor dissent. The emerging security ecosystem therefore represents not merely mobilization for external defense, but the institutionalization of societal control and espionage under the pretext of national security. The establishment construes its narratives around sacrifice, resistance and national defense to legitimize extraordinary measures. Such mass securitization is also happening amid intensified coercive responses to dissent. As per reports<\/a> by rights groups, between March and August 2026, Iranian authorities executed at least 59 people on national-security charges, including 29 linked to the 2025\u201326 protests. Those executed included several teenagers as well as many young people in their early 20s, with many more reportedly remaining at imminent risk of execution. Thousands of people protested<\/a> outside the UN in New York, calling for an end to such executions and democratic change in Iran.  In this context, Janfada and Elaj essentially reflect a continuing process of securitization in which the Iranian establishment presents the threats it faces as imminent challenges to the survival of the nation, thereby conflating its security and stability to a national security issue. This invariably changes the nature of state-society relations and expands the Iranian establishment\u2019s capacity to monitor and suppress dissent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Janfada campaign can also be seen as a form of deterrence signaling amid threats from the United States. By projecting mass participation and societal solidarity, Iran signals that military confrontation could generate resistance beyond the battlefield. Such campaigns also are envisioned as elements that could complement Iran\u2019s conventional and asymmetric deterrence capabilities. However, integrating civilians more closely into security structures paves the way for unprecedented dangers. As the boundaries between civilian and security spaces become intertwined, civilians may face greater exposure during future escalation. This could increase the potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties if security-linked civilian infrastructure becomes part of the conflict. The inclusion of children is particularly significant in this context from the perspective of human rights and international humanitarian law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, the Iranian establishment\u2019s recent programs and campaigns illustrate the securitization of society as a strategy exploiting the narratives surrounding external threat and war. Janfada\u2019s progression from symbolic mobilization to weapons training and mass military exercises indicates the nature of societal militarization in Iran. Such initiatives also essentially cater to expanding the establishment\u2019s capacity to monitor and assert greater control over society.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Iran\u2019s mobilization campaign Janfada has been projected as a massive success by the Iranian establishment, demonstrating not only a show of force and solidarity but also the mobilization of Iranian society amid escalating tensions. What began in March 2026 as a campaign encouraging citizens to project readiness to support the country has increasingly developed organized […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":14677,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[7149],"class_list":["post-14676","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-janfada"],"yoast_head":"\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\n