Decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period when Russian influence on the international political arena and on the balance of global powers dwindled, Moscow is resurgent, and returning to play a key dominant role in shaping geopolitical conflict.
\nSince the end of the 1980s, the United States stood alone as a unipolar global power. This has now changed, with Russia shaking off its torpor and becoming a key player in the new multipolar global order, driven by President Vladimir Putin\u2019s vast ambition. Putin is intent on building a modern superpower that no longer lives on the margins or plays a spectator\u2019s role, with this changing role shaping and reshaping the world on both the political and economic levels.
\nIf we look at Russia\u2019s alliances in the Middle East, we find that the regime in Iran is one of its closest regional allies, with the two states sharing a common vision, at least for the time being, regarding Syria, and cooperating closely in their support for the Assad regime and targeting of the Syrian people in their efforts to crush the revolution.
\nWith the rosy glow fast fading from this geopolitical honeymoon stage for Moscow and Tehran, an important question is coming to the fore: Does Tehran trust Moscow?
\nIt is rare to find any report or analysis touching on this issue, particularly in the context of the two states\u2019 stance on Syria. My own modest knowledge about the Iranian regime\u2019s mindset allows me to assert with confidence that the regime\u2019s ideological, political and intellectual leadership have no trust in Moscow, but are pragmatic in allying with Russia in order to benefit in various ways as it has done during a number of critical periods, with the interests of the two intersecting to their mutual advantage.
\nHistory is always a consideration in any Iranian narrative, on both the official and the popular levels. Historically, Russia\u2019s presence and reputation in Iran has been overwhelmingly negative, with Russia defeating Iran in two major wars during the first half of the nineteenth century, as well as annexing areas of Iranian territory and playing a hegemonic role over Iran\u2019s economy in the early twentieth century. During the latter period, Russia also shared influence with the then-British Empire in Iran throughout Iran\u2019s era of constitutional revolution from 1905 to 1911. Although Iran and Russia now enjoy positive and mutually beneficial political and economic relations, this does not eradicate Iran\u2019s collective memory of these historical wounds and change its general mistrust towards Russia.
\nMost importantly, Russia is aware of the risk for itself of Western economic openness to Iran, especially with American, German and French companies keen to target the lucrative Iranian market opened up by the 2015 nuclear deal. The resumption of relations between Tehran and Western capitals means that Iran will become a strong competitor for Russia in the field of gas exports to Europe. Iran\u2019s geographic location and massive levels of natural gas production at competitive prices also make it a potentially favorable supplier over Russia for European nations, a factor that Moscow has so far apparently not considered in its own calculations. Another crucial issue for Europe in any such equation is that replacing the natural gas currently supplied to Europe by Russia with Iranian gas would prevent Russia from using this political and economic card against the European nations in any emerging European-Russian conflict. Given these factors, it is natural to wonder: will Russia accept being a party to any agreement that might act against its own interests and policies, whether in Eastern Europe or the Middle East?
\nWhile Moscow does not wish to spoil any negotiations between Iran and other parties or to be the cause of any failure of the nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 nations, it is highly unlikely to accept any agreement that might harm its own interests regionally or globally.
\nIt is known that the game of geopolitical chess played by governments is based primarily on the principle of balancing one\u2019s political interests and potential expenses with all the possible strategic, political, economic and military costs. Given this consideration, any future Russian or Iranian move will be preceded by a detailed study of the potential profits and losses involved. The Iranian regime is likely to be in a more sensitive position among its followers and admirers, as well as needing to consider the possible consequences of any move on its standing among the allies and backers from its recent past. While Iran\u2019s increasing economic openness to foreign investors has seen Iranian politicians competing to woo overseas businesses, this may alienate the leadership in Moscow, who know \u2013 perhaps better than the Iranians themselves \u2013 the secrets of Iran\u2019s nuclear plants and military power, and who are regarded as untrustworthy friends from the Iranian perspective. Striking a balance between these factors will play a key role in Tehran\u2019s decision-making process for some years to come.
\nWe should also bear in mind the other political equations involving both parties outside their domestic and bilateral spheres, such as their roles in Syria. When we look at Russo-Iranian coordination in Syria and the unlimited support of both for the regime of Bashar al-Assad, we can see that this is tactical rather than strategic coordination. Tensions have already emerged between Russia and Iran over the control of Aleppo and Iran has exerted efforts to block any consensus between Ankara and Moscow, with Tehran-backed militias attempting to prevent the evacuation of civilians from the stricken city, leading Russia to threaten to bomb any side which tried to scuttle its deal on Aleppo.
\nAll of these factors lead us to predict an increasingly troubled future for Russo-Iranian coordination on Syria, especially concerning other external players\u2019 involvement in negotiations, with Russia\u2019s strategic objectives in Syria being markedly different to those of their counterparts in Tehran. It is certain that the main reason behind the current alliance between Russia and Iran has been the combative relationship between Moscow and Washington. With many believing that there\u2019s likely to be a US-Russian d\u00e9tente once Trump becomes president, however, Iran is likely to be pushed out of the geopolitical Great Game, becoming at best a marginal player.
\nThere are certainly many indicators suggesting that US-Russian relations are set to undergo major changes with Trump coming to power; perhaps the most recent of these is Trump\u2019s choice of Rex Tillerson, a figure with close ties to President Putin, as his Secretary of State. Trump has frequently made comments about the future closeness between the two countries once he comes to power. Relations between Moscow and Arab nations are currently tense, with this situation unlikely to have any negative repercussions on the alliance between Moscow and Tehran. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see any signs of change in the near future, with the Arab countries, regrettably, likely to remain only marginal players in the Great Game being played out in the region. We can only hope that this unhappy situation is temporary and short-lived.<\/p>\n
Opinions in this article reflect the writer\u2019s point of view, not necessarily the view of The Arabain GCIS<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period when Russian influence on the international political arena and on the balance of global powers dwindled, Moscow is resurgent, and returning to play a key dominant role in shaping geopolitical conflict. Since the end of the 1980s, the United States stood alone as a unipolar […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":17,"featured_media":2356,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[42,244,1296,1356,1359,162,342,1154,449,12,386,361,722,115,1361,391,1362,194,73,84,1360,44,1355,1357,83,28,1358,1031,69],"class_list":["post-2349","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","tag-agcis","tag-aleppo","tag-arabian-gulf-center-for-iranian-studies","tag-british-empire","tag-business","tag-economic","tag-french","tag-geopolitical","tag-german","tag-iran","tag-khamenei","tag-media","tag-middle-east","tag-military","tag-mohammad-alsulami","tag-moscow","tag-p51","tag-political","tag-press","tag-revolutionary","tag-rex-tillerson","tag-russia","tag-soviet-union","tag-strategic","tag-syria","tag-tehran","tag-the-iranian-regime","tag-trump","tag-united-states"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2349","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/17"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2349"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2349\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2355,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2349\/revisions\/2355"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2356"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2349"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2349"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2349"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}