{"id":3174,"date":"2017-06-17T15:14:55","date_gmt":"2017-06-17T12:14:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arabiangcis.org\/english\/?p=3174"},"modified":"2017-06-17T15:14:55","modified_gmt":"2017-06-17T12:14:55","slug":"why-did-khamenei-turn-to-banisadr","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/articles\/why-did-khamenei-turn-to-banisadr\/","title":{"rendered":"Why did Khamenei turn to Banisadr?"},"content":{"rendered":"

In Iranian politics, names signify events. When we talk of Saeed Emami, we are talking about chain killings; when we mention Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, we are reminded of 2009 election fraud; \u201cMir-Hossein Mousavi\u201d brings the house arrest to our minds; \u201cHossein-Ali Montazeri\u201d revives the memory of 1988 massacre, and mentioning Abolhassan Banisadr implies political dismissal. Just like last night when Ayatollah Khamenei, in a public meeting and in the presence of Hassan Rouhani, pointed out to Rouhani\u2019s remarks about national cohesion, saying: \u201cPeople should not be divided into two groups, just as in 1980 when the then president [Abolhassan Banisadr] divided the people into two opposing groups. That is dangerous.\u201d<\/strong>
\nSo far, in Iranian politics, we have had a lot of predictions or wishes for [this or that president] to \u201cbecome like Banisadr\u201d, but none of them has exactly become like Banisadr. They might have been marginalized or become the opposition. But, Khamenei, in his era, has not had the charisma or decision-making power to make any president act like Banisadr.
\nNevertheless, Khamenei\u2019s mentioning of Banisadr\u2019s situation\u2013 which is tantamount to threatening to dismiss or predicting a certain political future for a politician \u2013 is meaningful, because a few days before this reference, Khamenei had asked the officers of soft war, who are considered as his loyal supporters, to \u201cfire at will\u201d when they witness any disruption in the central system of culture and politics. Comparing the current condition with 1980 makes Rouhani\u2019s government an easier and more accessible target. This basis somehow shows the political future of Hassan Rouhani \u2013 the future which Khamenei wants to create for him: in the margin, a suspect, or perhaps a criminal. In fact, the leader, rather than threatening, is preparing the proper foundation for the long run. This foundation overlaps very well with the idea of \u201cbeing revolutionary\u201d as well.
\nThe idea of \u201cbeing revolutionary\u201d is an extensive umbrella which can bring together many principlist groups, as well as help with preserving the \u201cdomestic political hostility\u201d. Keeping the revolutionary, emotional atmosphere is a proper antidote for compensating defeats in elections, and preventing more collapse and losing forces within the principlists. The revolutionary and emotional atmosphere also helps in following up the mechanism of solving the problem not within the structure or political high levels, but in the public sphere and with pressure from the media and radical bodies supporting Khamenei. Also, the other side won\u2019t be allowed to think that political power comes from the \u201cballot box\u201d, but will remember that the political power is in the Leader\u2019s hands.
\n\u201cFire-at-will\u201d and \u201cacting like Banisadr\u201d are useful components for such an atmosphere. In the past decade, Ayatollah Khamenei, more than being the Leader of Islamic Republic, has been the true leader of a certain group in the Islamic Republic. So, he and his followers mutually need such games. His supporters severely failed in 2017 election, and Khamenei\u2019s records in crisis management show that whenever he fails, he makes the disputes public. Therefore, they [Khamenei and his supporters] are currently encouraging each other and strengthening their own morale. More labels and slogans are on the way.
\nIn the short run, this approach is extensive, but not deep. Khamenei\u2019s most important approach during the first term of Rouhani\u2019s government was also based on controlling and managing the president. In the beginning of the first term of Rouhani\u2019s government, the tone was soft and attacks were limited. With the advance in negotiation and especially after success in JCPOA and improvement in Rouhani\u2019s social and political standing, the president\u2019s language became stronger and there were more confrontations on Khamenei\u2019s behalf. Naturally, 24 million votes in 2017 election will make \u2013and has made \u2013 Rouhani\u2019s position and language stronger, and there is obviously a kind of political disobedience and willingness to confrontation in Rouhani\u2019s behavior. And now Khamenei is trying to control this condition. In 2009, Hashemi Rafsanjani\u2019s advice to Khamenei about Ahmadinejad was: \u201cA stitch in time saves nine,\u201d but he is using it about Rouhani.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In Iranian politics, names signify events. When we talk of Saeed Emami, we are talking about chain killings; when we mention Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, we are reminded of 2009 election fraud; \u201cMir-Hossein Mousavi\u201d brings the house arrest to our minds; \u201cHossein-Ali Montazeri\u201d revives the memory of 1988 massacre, and mentioning Abolhassan Banisadr implies political dismissal. Just […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":114,"featured_media":3175,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[1901,1904,52,42,154,1296,1903,1898,1899,12,1902,386,361,1900,314,73,159,84,38,28],"class_list":["post-3174","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","tag-1988-massacre","tag-1904","tag-52","tag-agcis","tag-ahmadinejad","tag-arabian-gulf-center-for-iranian-studies","tag-ballot-box","tag-banisadr","tag-emami","tag-iran","tag-iranian-politics","tag-khamenei","tag-media","tag-mir-hossein-mousavi","tag-montazeri","tag-press","tag-rafsanjani","tag-revolutionary","tag-rouhani","tag-tehran"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3174","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/114"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3174"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3174\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3176,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3174\/revisions\/3176"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3175"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3174"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3174"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3174"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}