{"id":3458,"date":"2017-08-20T10:34:57","date_gmt":"2017-08-20T07:34:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arabiangcis.org\/english\/?p=3458"},"modified":"2021-05-31T11:16:14","modified_gmt":"2021-05-31T08:16:14","slug":"mahdism-and-political-manipulation-in-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/centre-for-researches-and-studies\/mahdism-and-political-manipulation-in-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"Mahdism and political manipulation in Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"

In an interview in early May 2017, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Ibn Salman said the Iranian regime has adopted an extremist ideology, adding that Tehran wants to take control of the Muslim world.[1]<\/strong>
\nIbn Salman said the Iranian regime wishes to ‘set the scene’ for the Mahdi to reappear.[2] These words are an extremely accurate way to understand the innermost aspects of Iranian policymaking. It should be stressed that this condemnation of the Iranian regime\u2019s political exploitation of faith is not an attack on any sect of Shiism, which are branches of Islam with the same right to exist and to proselytize as any other sects or indeed faiths; this condemnation is leveled solely at the Tehran regime\u2019s policies which encourage and exploit sectarianism for religious purposes and ideologize politics.
\nThrough this study, we seek to highlight the ways in which the current Iranian regime has exploited and employed the doctrine of Mahdism in Iranian politics and its role in radicalizing members of this sect and using faith as a tool to legitimize Iranian expansionism, sending countless young Iranians into cutthroat sectarian wars beyond the country\u2019s borders as a means of exerting regional control. The study also seeks to explain how Khomeinist Iran turned against the core principles of Shiism, and even Mahdism, forsaking its jurisprudential legacy, and exploiting the sub-sect to attain the regime\u2019s political purposes, under the guise of \u2018laying the groundwork for the
\nMahdi to reappear.\u2019
\n\u00bb<\/span> Shiite approaches to the disappearance of the Mahdi<\/strong><\/span>
\nAccording to the Twelver Shiite doctrine, the governing creed of Iran\u2019s \u2018Islamic Republic\u2019, there are three possible approaches relating to governance in the absence of the Mahdi, the prophesied redeemer of Islam whose return is required in order to bring about the End Times and the Day of Judgement. These are:
\n1-<\/span><\/strong> The traditionalist approach: Traditionally, Shiites are required to refrain from engaging in politics until the appearance of the Mahdi. This approach was adopted by the leading jurists prior to the emergence of Khomeini, whose views are now espoused by Najaf’s school of jurisprudence, as well as most of Mashhad, the Akhbaris and the deconstructionists of Qum. According to this traditional approach, any political engagement prior to the reappearance of the Mahdi is misguided;[3] those who raise any banner before the resurrection of the Imam are essentially perpetrating a form of sacrilege, worshipping a being or figure other than God.[4] According to this traditional approach, therefore, Shiites should wait for the reemergence of the Mahdi before participating in any political activities. This traditionalist doctrine is known as the \u201ctheory of waiting\u201d.
\n2-<\/span> <\/strong>The revolutionary approach: The transformation in Shiite thinking on this issue was pioneered by Khomeini and by those seminaries, jurists and ideologues who subsequently modeled their view on his approach, which revolutionized the traditional approach of Shiism, replacing the passive \u201ctheory of waiting\u201d with a proactive call to \u201clay the groundwork\u201d for the re-emergence of the Mahdi.
\n3-<\/span>\u00a0<\/strong>The constitutionalist approach: This approach was adopted by Muhammad Hossein Naini and the other clerics collectively known as the pioneers of the \u2018constitutional revolution\u2019. These include contemporary theological theoreticians such as Shariati, Moussa al-Sadr, Shariatmadari, and others.[5] This approach, which calls for political participation by both clerics and the public, coupled with respect for the rule of law and the authority of the people until the reappearance of the Mahdi, is one adopted by key \u201creformist\u201d clerics in Iran, including Kadivar and Soroush, and Lebanese jurists such as Shams al-Din, Fadlallah, al-Amin, and some of the movement’s activists in Iraq. This approach is effectively a median point between the traditionalist and revolutionary approaches.
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0A coup against Shiite heritage<\/span><\/strong>
\nAs can be seen from the above examples, there has been a historic and seismic shift in Twelver Shiism since 1979, especially concerning the Mahdi; traditionally Shia are called upon to abandon politics and adopt the \u201cTheory of Waiting\u201d, which obliges them to avoid involvement in politics, including any establishment of theocratic rule, since the establishment of any state, the imposition of Sharia law, and the declaration of Jihad are exclusively the right of the Mahdi, with nobody else having the right to act in his place in matters of politics and governance.
\nAccording to this view, the Mahdi, known as Imam Zaman [Muhammad Ibn Hasan al-Mahdi] will spread justice on earth upon his return after it has been plagued with injustice, since humans are incapable of bringing justice on earth, even if they have attributes of perfection.[6] Prior to Khamenei, all the famed Shiite clerics throughout the history of Shiism followed this path and enjoined their followers to do likewise, urging them to obey all rulers, both the just and unjust, Sunni and Shiite. These leading figures also forbade any disobedience to the state. Imam Moussa al-Kazem [128-183 AH], the eighth Imam according to Shiite Twelver doctrine, ordered Shiites to obey sultans regardless of their conduct. If they are just, he asserted, people should pray for God to consolidate the ruler’s power, while if the leaders are tyrants, believers should pray to God to guide them to the right path.[7] Al-Kazem himself refrained from engaging in politics and affairs relating to governance.[8]
\nJurists following the Twelver Shiite doctrine had many opportunities throughout history to seize power; especially when they occupied senior posts during the periods of the Umayyad and Abbasid empires. One of the best-known such jurists, Al-Shar\u012bf al-Murtz\u0101 of the Buyid Dynasty is a case in point. He did not seize power, however, since he lacked the Mahdi\u2019s insight into divine law or the means to achieve an utterly just state, given the full absence of a portrayal of this utopia mentioned in the literary works of Al-Farabi and Plato. All those who attempted to accomplish this mission ended up \u2013 according to Twelver doctrine – being cursed by the absent Mahdi.[9] On several occasions throughout history, jurists of the Twelver Shiite doctrine received offers, either from sultans or revolutionaries, to have their share of power. Despite this, all those prior to Khamenei adopted the same position, saying: “Every political system established in the absence of the Mahdi is illegitimate and despotic.”[10]
\nThroughout history, therefore, the ‘waiting theory’ was the doctrine taught for millennia to generations of clerics and the public. This continued right up to the arrival of Khomeini, who radically changed the supposedly unchanging doctrine, going from the passivity of \u201cwaiting for the infallible Imam\u201d to \u201csetting the scene for the Imam\u2019s [Mahdi\u2019s] re-emergence.
\nFor the Iranian regime, which adopted Khamenei\u2019s revolutionary approach as its foundational principle, this proactive doctrine necessitates launching regional invasions and wars, and seizing the resources of neighboring countries across the region, at the expense of the Sunni majority and the regional states.
\nThe Iranian revolution represented not only a coup against the national state, but also against the foundational principles, guidelines and basic rules of Shiism itself. It shifted balances within the Shiite ideological hierarchy, especially in the social and political fields. In terms of Shiite theology, the post-Khomeini era is totally different to the pre-Khomeini period.[11]
\nIn the wake of Khamenei\u2019s theocratic shake-up, Twelver Shiism changed dramatically, going from emphasizing the need to yield to all leaders and abandon involvement in politics to actively advocating disobedience to the rulers and demands for revolution, as well as sending fighters to other countries \u201cto set the scene for the reappearance of the Mahdi.\u201d[12]
\nAlong with these fundamental doctrinal changes, Khamenei\u2019s new approach also radically reinterpreted the traditional rules of Shiite jurisprudence, abandoning the \u2018Theory of Waiting\u2019, based on the belief that the Mahdi alone is the only one who has the proper authority to spread justice, and instead advocating a new system whereby setting jurisprudence would embrace a revolutionary theocratic ideology to set the scene for the Mahdi\u2019s reappearance.
\nAccording to Khomeini\u2019s new version of jurisprudence, the oppressed everywhere should be helped in order to encourage the reemergence of the Mahdi. For Khomeini, the waiting period should be occupied in diligent work to pave the way for the Mahdi\u2019s reappearance through establishing a state that would help to bring it about.[13] This wholly revolutionary interpretation had not been suggested at any time previously during the 14 centuries since Shiism\u2019s inception, with Khomeini\u2019s new vision effectively giving life and momentum to the idea of political Shiism.[14]
\nKhamenei\u2019s reinterpretation of Twelver Shiism was a means of serving the sect\u2019s political objectives of Shiism, and of giving it a revolutionary ideological foundation. This interpretation, however, was and still is considered a grave theological and systematic deviation. Some prefer to regard this transformation as a sudden leap \u2013 Iran\u2019s own \u2018Great Leap Forward\u2019 \u2013 a move defined as a rapid series of advances in one area without any effort to create a coherent systematic path, or to link one shift to another, or to authenticate these changes. This leads to confusion, with followers expected to leap from one belief to another, or to move directly from a wholly new theological premise to a conclusion, with no effort to provide any evidence or proof to substantiate the reason for this leap, a major flaw concerning fundamental doctrinal changes which require certainty.[15]
\nThis sort of thinking is widely seen among Twelver Shiite analysts in research concerning the Mahdi, with many refusing to scrutinize the issue from a rational viewpoint instead of depending on theories passed down by clerics, or other leadership figures.
\nAfter arguing that Muslims should be governed by an Imam, a government, or a state, whose Imam, caliph or leader should be infallible and appointed by God, these analysts then move on to the idea of disappearance and waiting, which they argue supports the idea of the absence of the infallible Imam. However, on this issue, there is an important question: why has the Imam remained absent instead of emerging to lead Muslims and to establish a sorely-needed government? According to leading Shiite thinker Ahmed al-Katib, the belief in the Absent\u00a0Imam necessitates a level of an internal contradiction since this Imam, according to Shiite doctrine, is supposed to lead Muslims, so it does not befit him to simply disappear. His presence is an urgent necessity, just like deploying traffic officers at crossroads and squares. His willful absence contradicts the principle that \u201cthere should be a ruler who spreads justice on earth\u201d, with any deliberate decision to remain absent\u00a0and to avoid carrying out the duties divinely assigned to him, more especially in times of chaos, rendering him useless. This glaring flaw notwithstanding, however, Shiites have refused to resort to logical reasoning, despite the fact that they used logic to reach the first premise relating to the necessity of appointing an Imam, and in agreeing that he should be infallible and appointed by God.[16] These doctrinal and systematic gaps and spaces, known as the ‘sudden leap theory’, are considered signs of a systematic flaw through which researchers circumvent facts to deceive the audience into holding beliefs which contradict one another, and throw the basic premise into question.
\nThe Twelver Shiite doctrine also states that the Absent\u00a0Imam should appear to spread justice on earth while it is plagued with rampant injustice, emerging to implement Sharia Law, lead Muslims, issue fatwas for them and resolve legal problems faced by them.[17] This belief ignores the proven historical fact that, according to the exhaustive records, none of the venerated Imams, including the Absent\u00a0Imam, engaged in politics or affairs of governance during their lifetimes, being solely concerned with guiding people to the right path.[18] How can it be, then, that Imams are also the best arbiters of these issues?
\nContemplation of this central question has led to the Najaf School of jurisprudence clinging to the \u2018Theory of Waiting\u2019 to this very day.
\nWhen Khomeini asked Muhsin al-Hakim to take a firm stand against the Shah in 1965, he reportedly responded, \u201cWhat could we do? Will it lead to change?\u201d
\nKhomeini answered, \u201cOf course. Through this uprising, we\u2019ll thwart the plots of the government. How then could it be of no effect?\u201d, adding, \u201cIf clerics unite [behind it], there will be a considerable effect.\u201d
\nHakim responded, \u201cIf there is a possibility for reason-based change, there will be no problem in taking \u2018reasonable steps\u2019.\u201d
\nKhomeini then recalled what happened with Imam Hussein, asking, \u201cDidn’t al-Hussein’s revolt offer a big favor to history?\u201d
\nTo this question, al-Hakim responded, \u201cWhat about al-Hassan? He did not rise up.\u201d
\nKhomeini countered Al-Hakim’s point by saying, “Al-Hassan did not find supporters,\u201d with al-Hakim replying, \u201cAnd I have no people who obey me.\u201d[19]
\nThis approach, which conflicts with Khomeinist interpretation of the Shiite doctrine in its entirety, continues to be the one favored at al-Najaf seminary till this very day. According to this doctrinal view, clerics have no capacity to govern and engage in politics, given the conflicts between clerics and the human and imperfect governing authorities. Thus, only the Mahdi is entitled to govern, enforcing Sharia and running the affairs of the state. This traditionalist doctrinal school\u2019s approach has remained unchanged, conflicting with the Khomeinist view which asserts that Jurists should take an interest in public affairs and governance and should assume responsibility for laying the groundwork to ensure the reappearance of the Mahdi and acting in the latter’s place in his absence.
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0\u2018Paving the way instead of waiting\u2019<\/span><\/strong>
\nThe Khomeinist\u2019 doctrinal coup against the traditionalist jurisprudential school of thought taught at Shiite seminaries since the foundation of Shiism had a massive impact on the course of Shiism as a whole. At the leading religious seminary in Qum,[20] Khomeini\u2019s theory of \u201cpreparation\u201d replaced the theory of \u201cwaiting\u201d, with clerics graduating in the post-revolutionary phase after 1979 disseminating this doctrinal theory rather than the traditionalist view. This happened in parallel with Khomeinist institutionalization of the state’s cultural and educational institutions, all of which now reflected the revolutionary \u201cpaving the way\u201d theory. This shift, or coup, in Shiite ideology, which had remained constant and stable for almost 1,000 years, was justified by Khomeini, who said, \u201cThe Mahdi has been absent for 1,000 years, and thousands of more years may pass before the time becomes ripe for the Imam to reappear. Over these long years, shall we leave the texts of Islam suspended, letting people do whatever they want? Should Islam lose everything after this minor disappearance? In my view, adopting this opinion is worse than claiming that Islam is distorted.\u201d[21]
\nKhomeini\u2019s views were a blatant attempt at finding a reasonable-sounding pretext for what was, in effect, a coup against millennia of Shiite heritage,[22] with his justifications based on very pragmatic and self-serving reasons rather than on religious texts. This enabled him to disregard the deep-seated principles of Shiism and the views of the early jurists who are the main pillars of Shiite thought.
\nWe note that Khomeini presented his interpretation of Shiism as though it were the sole \u2018true\u2019 Islam, reducing the religion to one sect in a cult-like fashion. With the dismissive phrase, \u201cShould Islam lose everything after the minor disappearance?\u201d, Khomeini justified this disastrous doctrinal transformation, disregarding the efforts of Twelver Shiite clerics who attempted to find solutions to the new doctrinal problems caused by his interpretation. The blame for the difficulties in this does not lie with them, however, since they dealt with the traditional interpretation of Shiism, which advocates yielding to sultans and exerting all one\u2019s efforts towards living peacefully in the state, refraining from disobeying the leaders by any means. They considered this stance to be of principle rather than strategy, since it is mandated within traditionalist Shiite doctrine, as explained above.[23] Khomeini and his followers, however, attempting to justify the Jurist Leadership [Wilayat-e Faqih], insisted that the traditionalists\u2019 stance was a tactical one rather than being born of principle.
\nSharif al-Murtaza,[24] one of the most renowned Shiite jurists who lived in the fifth Hijri century, said, \u201cWe are not entitled to appoint a ruler in case the Imam is powerless. Furthermore, we are not compelled to have this Imam altogether. Choosing an Imam is not obligatory on us, and we are not compelled to carry out Sharia-based punishments, and we are not in a position to censure others for leaving them unenforced.”[25] According to al- Murtaza’s statement, then, there is no obligation to choose a ruler since this mission lies with the infallible Imams, previously determined by the Shiite Twelver doctrine. Humans, according to this doctrine, are not in a position to interfere in such a pure and divine process, with God alone being the sole arbiter in the matter of selecting and appointing rulers.[26] In the case of the infallible Imam’s absence, it is clear that there is no choice but to wait for the Absent\u00a0Imam because he is, according to Twelver Shiite doctrine, the savior. This was the primary foundational principle of Shiism from its inception, right up until the dramatic transformation triggered by Khomeini. [27]
\nKhomeini had the possibility to integrate Shiites into Sunni countries, following in the footsteps of al- Murtaza, the Shiite jurists, and even the infallible Imams, who were integrated into the Umayyad and Abbasid empires, none of whom laid any foundation for a conflict between clerics and the state. Despite this, Khomeini preferred to turn his back on Shiite heritage as a prelude to enforcing the Jurist Leadership system. Without his wholesale dismissal of the traditionalist \u2018Waiting Theory\u2019, there would have been no possibility of implementing the Jurist Leadership doctrine.
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0The Mahdi and political rivalry<\/span><\/strong>
\nThis exploitation of the Mahdi has not only been seen in the Iranian regime\u2019s regional foreign policy; it is also a favorite strategy of politicians in Iran attempting to gain public support; thus, Mahdism has gone from being a revered religious belief to being a PR tool to achieve political objectives.
\nIn the 2017 Iranian elections, the Mahdi was a tool of political manipulation and even the subject of a standoff in the presidential elections, with several newspapers affiliated with the conservatives reporting that Hassan Rouhani’s election to the presidency had delayed the appearance of the Mahdi.[28] Former President Ahmadinejad also tried to manipulate the idea of the Mahdi in order to pressure his opponents, including pressure groups and even the seminary community, which bothered the clerics themselves. Indeed, Ahmadinejad held the first international conference on \u2018Mahdism,\u2019 following his notorious speech at the United Nations, during which he raised the idea of the Mahdi to a bemused audience.
\nSpeaking after the conference, Ahmadinejad said, \u201cI have no doubt that the people of the Islamic Republic are preparing for the return of the Absent\u00a0Imam, and if God wills, we will see his appearance soon.\u201d In another of his speeches, Ahmadinejad said, \u201cIt is our responsibility to establish in Iran a model society that is a prelude to that great event, the Imam\u2019s appearance.\u201d[29]
\nAccording to Samadi, the issue of Mahdism is now inseparable from political life and political rivalry in Iran, going far beyond any abstract doctrinal or theological debate to being a central issue in the struggle for power and influence.[30] Ahmadinejad\u2019s opponents have already accused him of promoting the idea of the Mahdi to achieve political objectives; amongst other things, he produced a film during his time in office about the Mahdi [reportedly funded by his supporters], which conveyed the message that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei are among the soldiers of the Mahdi, who will pass the baton to him. The film also projects Shiite narratives onto Khamenei, depicting him as Sayyed al-Khorasani, the legendary leader of a great army, who it is said will be the ruler preceding the Mahdi who will relinquish rule to him. The movie also portrayed Ahmadinejad as the venerated figure Shuaib Ibn Saleh, waging war against corruption and defeating the Sofayani army to pave the way for the emergence of the Imam of Time [Imam Zaman].[31] Nasser Makarem Shirazi and other clerics strongly condemned Ahmadinejad\u2019s movie, saying it was an insult to the people\u2019s Mahdism-related beliefs, and describing its content as ‘pure lies.'[32]
\nIn a recording attributed to Ahmadinejad, reportedly speaking to Javadi Amali, he said that he sensed the presence of the Mahdi and felt that an aura of light was surrounding him while he spoke at the United Nations.
\nThis claim was met with widespread criticism, [33] with many clerics accusing Ahmadinejad of exploiting the religious beliefs of the people for political purposes. Despite this condemnation, Ahmadinejad defended his political exploitation of the Mahdi.[34]
\nAhmadinejad is not alone in making implausible claims of this nature, with another senior regime official, Mohammad Hassan Rahimian, the representative of the Jurist Leader, director of the Jamkaran Mosque in Qum, and former head of the Iranian Martyrs\u2019 Organization, claiming that he witnessed secret meetings between the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Imam al-Mahdi, asserting that they met 13 times in a passageway in the aforementioned Jamkaran Mosque in Qum. Rahimian added that Khomeini gained more wisdom and insight through these meetings with the Absent\u00a0Imam, which reportedly took place during the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel; Rahimian said that Khamenei had asked the Mahdi to support Hassan Nasrallah in that conflict.[35]
\nAnother senior regime cleric, Makarem al-Shirazi, made similar claims, asserting that the secret behind successive political successes attained by the supreme leader is his close and continuous relationship with Imam al-Mahdi [36]. Al-Shirazi added that the Absent\u00a0Mahdi helps Khamenei to administer the affairs of the country.[37] Al-Shirazi made these claims despite vocally opposing Ahmadinejad’s exploitation of the Mahdi as a PR tool.
\nThe popularity of this exploitation of the Mahdi dates back to the Khomeini era, with much of the strong support for Khomeini springing from the belief that he is a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, who many believed might turn out to be the long-awaited Mahdi.[38]
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0Following in the Safavids\u2019 footsteps<\/span><\/strong>
\nThe aforementioned cynical tactics used by the current theocratic leadership in Tehran are not new, with the Safavid rulers in previous centuries using the exact same strategy.
\nShah Ismail al-Safavi claimed that he met with the Mahdi in a cave in Tabriz, telling him, \u201cIt is time to come forth. Go, I have given you the permission.\u201d Al-Safavi also claimed to have seen Imam Ali and to be acting in place of the Mahdi in his absence.[39]
\nIndeed, the Safavid State attempted to present itself as a theocratic state closely associated with the Twelve Imams, with the Shah revolutionizing Shiite political thought in his day, and also trying to circumvent the doctrines of “Taqiyya” and of waiting. Amongst his other implausible claims, the Shah asserted that he had received permission from the Mahdi to revolt against Turkmen rulers who governed Iran at the time. One day, whilst accompanying some of his Sufi companions in Tabriz, he reportedly ordered them to stop and crossed the river before entering a cave.[40] On emerging from the cave, he approached his colleagues wielding a knife, claiming that he had met in the cave with the Mahdi, who told him that it was time to revolt. He also claimed that the Mahdi grabbed his back and lifted him three times from the ground before placing a dagger in his belt and saying: \u201cGo. I have given you the permission.\u201d[41]
\nThese tactics are not simply whimsy, but are an effort by the Shah, Khomeini and Khamenei to lend legitimacy to their own regimes and their wars, conferring a divine rightfulness not only their rule but on any conflicts which they wage, and making them literally holy wars; if the people believe that these leaders are assigned by the Mahdi to protect their religion and to govern in his absence, this means that the leaders have divine endorsement and must be unquestioningly obeyed, with any objection or questioning of their authority being a challenge to the Mahdi himself, and thus a challenge to God. Convincing the people of the leaders\u2019 unquestionable, divinely sanctioned status is the point of these implausible stories of meetings with the Mahdi.
\nIn reality, these claims not only defy reason but also defy the core tenets of the Shiite doctrine itself, which flatly rejects any possibility of seeing Mahdi face-to-face during the period when he is supposedly absent, let alone spending time with or consulting him. This further demonstrates that these claims and the regime\u2019s wider exploitation of the Mahdi are distortions of Shiite doctrine, which is once again being cynically manipulated by the leaders to attain political benefits, just as it was by the Safavids and Qajaris.
\nThis exploitative approach is used by the Iranian clerics and politicians to justify their activities at home and abroad. According to regime doctrine, opposing a cleric is as grave as opposing the infallible Imam, with opposing the infallible Imam being akin to opposing God Himself; therefore, any political decisions, wars, and expansionist activities must stem from the will of the Absent\u00a0Imam as represented by the decisions of the Supreme Guide. By this logic, it is unthinkable to question Iran\u2019s involvement in the Syrian war and engagement in endless conflict across the Levant since these are expressions of the will of the Absent\u00a0Imam, taking place at his behest to pave the way for his reappearance; the deaths of at least 100,000 human beings in Damascus and the surrounding towns and villages are,[42] in this view, simply one of the indicators of his imminent reemergence. The war in Syria is, therefore, a wholly religious and sectarian one for Iran\u2019s regime, with the future of Shiism and of the Twelver doctrine hinging on this conflict.
\nThis was spelt out by a leading regime cleric, Sheikh Ali Saeedi, Khamenei\u2019s senior representative, who said during a meeting with senior commanders of the IRGC, \u201cThe Islamic revolution is preparing the international arena for the emergence of Imam Mahdi, and today we are standing on the threshold of this stage during which he will appear.\u201d[43]
\nSaeedi continued, \u201cToday there are two camps working hard to prevent the appearance of the Mahdi. The first is the American-led external camp. The second is the internal camp that is made up of liberals and secularists. The latter is very difficult to know because they are cloaked in hypocrisy.\u201d[44]
\nIt should be noted that as well as being used to justify expansionism in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, this regime narrative of war is paving the way for the Mahdi\u2019s reappearance, which depicts all opposition to Iran as stemming from an imperialist desire to impede the Mahdi\u2019s re-emergence or justify his arrest, is also being used to justify increasingly draconian suppression of domestic opposition in Iran under the pretext that dissidents are liberals or secularists who oppose the idea of the Mahdi’s reappearance.[45]
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0The aspects of the political manipulation of Mahdism can be summed up as follows:<\/strong>
\n– Brainwashing young people for forced conscription.
\n– Giving enthusiastic speeches to woo voters
\n– Putting a veneer of sanctity on the Supreme Leader\u2019s pronouncements in his speeches
\n– Waging regional wars in the Mahdi\u2019s name, under the guise of paving the way for him
\n– Distracting the attention of the masses using controversial issues, superstition, and evasion as a means of averting attention from urgent domestic crises.
\nFor the regime in Tehran, the primary objective is to indoctrinate the Iranian people and Shiites worldwide into absolute obedience through convincing them of the necessity of unquestioning patience and unthinking compliance with the regime\u2019s commands, primarily in participating in \u201cpaving the way\u201d for the Mahdi\u2019s reemergence.
\nIn a famous speech byKhomeini on 15 Sha’ban 1400 AH [September 28, 1980], he said, \u201cThe issue of the Imam’s absence is an important one, as it shows us that the Mahdi, peace be upon him, is the only one fit to achieve a sublime mission like this, which is enforcing justice in its true essence across the world and among all humans. All prophets came to this earth with the aim of achieving justice among all humans. However, they did not succeed.\u201d He continued, \u201cEven the seal of the prophets, Prophet Mohammed, was assigned to spread justice and reform the behaviors of humans, but he failed too. Moreover, the one who will succeed in the true sense of the word is the Mahdi, and we will be among his soldiers to achieve absolute justice.\u201d[46]
\nThe region and the world should pay attention to the underlying message conveyed by this mesmerizing speech, particularly in its conclusion, which expressed the Iranian regime\u2019s martial, expansionist objectives, then as now.
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0Preventing Assassination of Al-Mahdi<\/span><\/strong>
\nUnder the pretext of preventing the assassination of Al-Mahdi, Iranian politicians and clerics intend to implement certain plans and policies. This was evident when the Iranian state television accused the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of planning to assassinate Al-Mahdi by snipers positioned at the towers surrounding the Ka\u2019ba<\/em> in Makkah<\/em> as soon as he reappears, asking for Iranian action to prevent the assassination [47].
\nIran\u2019s former president, Ahmadinejad, also pointed to the Western nations and their attempts to assassinate Al-Mahdi saying, \u201cThe Iranian people have to put their hands in al-Mahdi’s hand. We are not the only people waiting for him; Europe and the United States are ahead of us in looking for his place and the time of his reappearance. Researches and studies produced by the US universities about Al-Mahdi are many times of what have been produced by Shiite Seminars [Hawzas] in Qum and Najaf.\u201d He added, \u201cWestern intelligence has met many Muslim figures who are in contact with Al-Mahdi and gathered all information to arrest the Imam.\u201d [48]. In order to gain public and hardliner support against his opponents in Iran, Nejad also used this issue, which is, in fact, a cover for aggressive Iranian policies to interfere in the affairs of other countries under the pretext of conspiring against Imam Al-Mahdi.
\nThe political use of Al-Mahdi\u2019s assassination was taken from inaccurate old stories. One historical tale talked about an attempt by ‘Almutadhid Ibn Abbass’ who sent three policemen to Imam ‘Al-Hassan Al-askari\u2019s’ house – al-Mahdi’s father- in Samara to arrest him. The story said, \u201cWhen the policemen arrived, they saw a sea and a man praying on a mat on the water. When they tried to approach him, they drowned and turned back after they apologized to him.\u201d [49].
\nIt seems that these superstitions have inspired the Iranian leaders to revive and use these false stories, not against Abbasids this time, but against the Arabs, Americans, and others.
\nShiite clerics regularly pretend they meet Imam al-Mahdi and take his advice and directives, which raises some controversial questions, even for Shiites themselves: why don\u2019t Shiites propose al-Mahdi’s death in his hiding place [50] just like his ancestors? Does infallibility mean immortality? Does hiding from authorities at that time when he was a little boy mean he is immortal? Why don\u2019t they propose that the imperialist powers they accuse of conspiring against Al-Mahdi, have really arrested and killed him? Isn\u2019t this quoted from their speeches and literature?
\nAssuming all superstitions about Al-Mahdi were real, why do Shiites always propose he would establish a state, rule, and dispense justice on earth despite all Shiite previous Imams – as quoted by Shiites themselves – had ignored politics and never participated in governments or established states? According to their legends, Shiites have always been concerned about concealing their faith; so, why are they focused on this issue and propose al-Mahdi’s reappearance would change the world?
\nIran claims it is following the directives of the absent Imam; however, its oppressive internal and external practices and the terrorism it spreads everywhere are all conclusive evidence on the falseness of the proposition of the State of Justice and the other superstitions Iran uses to excite people\u2019s feelings.
\nSuppose that Al-Mahdi disappeared fearing for his life when he was a little boy, why didn\u2019t he reappear when he had grown up? If his fear of killing continues, how can he guarantee not to be killed when he reappears? [51]. Can a coward Imam who has been hiding for hundreds of years, fearing for his life from ancient Abbasids and arrest by Americans in modern times, lead battles and risk his life? Do all the wars launched by Iran in modern times to make Al-Mahdi reappear justify all this bloodshed and destruction in the region? Is their goal only his reappearance or justice, freedom, and dignity? In fact, all these questions have no answers, even from Shiites themselves [52]. They only rely on inaccurate stories and superstitions to influence the public and excite their feelings, and which have inflamed the region and provoked sectarian wars and bloodshed for years.
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0Skipping of Historical Facts<\/span><\/strong>
\nIn essence, the Idea of Mahdism State contradicts the Shiite doctrinal laws and the infallible Twelver Shiite Imams. No Shiite historical narrative has supported the idea that the infallible Imam would engage in politics or establish the State of Justice. On the contrary, history has proved that the infallible Imams have dedicated themselves to their religious duties away from politics, which means, according to some Shiite thinkers, that those Imams were leaders in religion rather than in government and politics [53]. For example, the fourth Imam, Ali Zain Alabidin saw Yazid Ibn Muawiah and al-Hajjaj Ibn Yousuf; however, he never practiced politics or called people to rebel against the state; in contrast, he retreated from worldly matters to a modest living and was peaceful and close to the Umayyad Caliph, Abdulmalik Ibn Marwan [54]. Zain Alabidin was called Sajjad [The one who kneels down before Allah] for the long periods he spent kneeling down asking Allah for mercy and forgiveness, which made his followers collect his words in one book called the Sajjadi Manuscript [Alsahifah Alsajjadiah]. This path followed by Zain Alabidin is the path of Al-Hassan Ibn Ali, who favored Da’wah [Religious duties] over politics, which is evidence that the Imamate is only guidance rather than leadership and politics [55].
\nImam Sajjad had two sons, Mohammed who was called Baqir, and the younger Zaid. Zaid was a disciple of Wasil Ibn Ata, founder of Alaqlaniah Almu\u2019tazilah, and was influenced by his ideas. Zaid arrived at his theory on the Imamate in a realistic rational manner for Shiites in general, away from mythologies, as stated by Aljabiri [56]. However, the majority of Imamate Shiites decided Mohammed Baqir should succeed his father, which enraged Zaid so that he denied his brother\u2019s Imamate and called it for himself. Zaid rejected his brother\u2019s way of worship and retreat from politics saying, \u201cThe Imam is not the one who is sitting home, relaxing, and discouraging Jihad [holy war]; the imam is the one who secures his Hawzah, goes to Jihad, and defends his people\u201d [57]. Nevertheless, the Imamate Shiites declined Zaid’s proposition of involvement in politics and his call to rebel against the state.
\nCenturies later, Khomeini emerged and revolutionized the Twelver Shiite doctrine, unlike the majority of Twelver Shiites who had declined to politicize the Imamate before and during the times of the Imams themselves. In contrast, we find that the eighth Imam, Ali Ibn Mousa Alriza [153-203, Hijri date] swore allegiance to Abbasid Caliph, Al-Mamoun and became his crown prince [58]. Accordingly, we find that Khomeini\u2019s Shiism skipped historical facts and inferred from certain Imams\u2019 legacies without explaining whether their Imamates were only Da’wah [the call for religion] or State Imamate [the call for the establishment of a State]. In fact, Khomeini over- generalized the theory of the Imam\u2019s infallibility to include scholars, and decided – doctrinally and radically – to rule on behalf of the infallible Imam. In addition, Khomeini classified disobeying scholars the same as disobeying the infallible Imam and ultimately, disobeying Allah. Finally, Khomeini made preparation for the Mahdism State, a religious duty, which contradicts the Shiite classical doctrine – the foundation of the Imamate theory in terms of the decree and the infallibility of the Imam – and usurpation of the absent Imam\u2019s right [59].
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0Al-Mahdi in Narratives<\/span><\/strong>
\nThe Al-Mahdi theory emerged long time ago, during the time of Imam Ali [May Allah be pleased with him]. When Imam Ali died, some of his followers denied his death and said, \u201cAli did not die; he is immortal until he leads the Arabs with his stick and spreads justice and righteousness on earth after it has been filled with injustice and indignity\u201d [60].
\nMohammed Ibn Al-Hanafiah died in the year 81 Hijri date and Shiites were divided into two parties, one claiming that he did not die and that people, especially his nephew who buried him, imagined this. [61] While the other party said he died and claimed Mohammed al-Baqir as the fifth Imam.[62] Furthermore, Ibn Al-Hanafiah\u2019s son, Abu Hashem, led Shiites, after his father, against the Umayyad, but soon died and disappeared, which made his supporters claim he was Al-Mahdi Al-Muntazar [The expected one] and he was still alive. [63] Shiites also claimed that Mohammed Al-Nafs Al-zakiah [100-145 Hijri date] was Al-Mahdi Al-Muntazar because he looked like Prophet Mohammed [Peace be upon him] and was named after the prophet\u2019s first and second names. They also claimed that whenever he rode on his horse, people would scream, Al-Mahdi [64].
\nAfter the death of Ja\u2019far Al-Sadiq, Shiites differed over if he had recommended his youngest son, Mousa Al-Kazim, or his elder son, Ishmael, to succeed him. Some Shiites said he appointed Mousa Al-Kazim, while others said he had named his elder son, Ishmael for the Imamate. Later, this group was called the Ishmaelites, and claimed Ishmael as Al-Mahdi [65].
\nSome Shiites claimed that Mousa Ibn Ja\u2019far Al-Kazim was Al-Mahdi, while others argued Al-Kazim only meets Al-Mahdi and writes to him. However, Twelver Shiites rejected this theory, saying that Mousa Al-Kazim died in public and was buried about 150 years ago and the claim that he was still alive discredits reports that he was seen dead [66]. Mousa Al-Kazim visibly died in front of people, but the birth of Al-Mahdi Ibn Hassan Al-Askari was unknown to people at that time. If people had known about his birth, they would not have doubted him.
\nAl-Nobakhti inferred the possibility of al-Mahdi’s absence under the condition of not exceeding the logical and acceptable limit for all known absences – thirty years at that time. However, according to Shiite beliefs, al-Mahdi’s absence has lasted for hundreds of years after Al-Nobakhti\u2019s death [1178 years, until now], which exceeds the logical limit in their doctrine. This made some Shiite speakers to periodically create new evidence and use philosophical methods to overcome the significant gap in these beliefs. After the death of each Shiite Imam or scholar, new Shiite sects emerge and claim that he is Al-Mahdi. This was accompanied by groups of Hadeeth creators [fake stories] and immoderate writers with personal political and secular interests. For example, after the death of Mousa Al-Kazim [the seventh Imam], some of his companions said he was Al-Mahdi based on narratives presented by Hadeeth creators before them.
\nThis is evidence thatthe Al-Mahdi theory came from several resources, characterized by imprecision and methodological shortcoming. Its inclusion in the doctrinal rituals of Shiites is absolute extremism [67] for being adopted by a country that draws its policies based on such superstitions that were unclear even during the lifetime of the Imams themselves. Indeed, after the death of each Imam, Shiites differed on whom to succeed him, his eldest or youngest son, and were divided into many factions based on their differences on his successor. In certain cases, brother Imams differed and opposed each other on the same issue; for example, Mohammed Al-Baqir [the fifth Imam] and his brother Zaid [founder of Al-Zaidi sect] differed and each claimed the imamate for himself.
\nThis methodological flaw was observed by Shiite thinker, Ahmed Al-Katib when he said, \u201cThe presence of all these Shiite factions reveals the vagueness of the Imam Al-Mahdi theory, the possibility for him to be one of Al Al-Bait members, and that he rises with the sword to establish the state of justice.\u201d Al-Katib added, \u201cHad the personality of Al-Mahdi been identified during the time of the prophet [peace be upon him] or the time of the eleven Imams, then Shiites, Imamates, and the Shiites of Imam Al-Hassan Al-Askari wouldn\u2019t have differed on the identity of Imam Al-Mahdi.\u201d [68]Since the Shiite factions differed on who Al-Mahdi was with the absence of reliable narratives about his true identity, the belief in him as a doctrine is far from true religion, and is used for exciting and politicizing the whole Shiite sect. All in all, the Al-Mahdi theory does not have reliable sources, neither in the holy Quran nor the true narratives, and has never been unanimously agreed upon by Shiites themselves [69].
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0Mahdism Theory and Strengthening the State<\/strong><\/span>
\nThe Iranian regime believes that a constant link between Shiite people and rituals and occults [70] is the best way to keep them under the Mullahs control. [71] The ancient Safavid dynasty and modern Khomeini doctrine tended to excite people\u2019s feelings, and ignite their momentum over two months [Muharam and Safar] every year, if not over the whole year. Indeed, they had turned all days into Ashora and all lands into Karbala. They also highlighted Ali Ibn Abi Talib\u2019s characteristics and courage represented by revolution, Jihad, and the rejection of the unjust caliphate, and at the same time, they worked smartly on directing the Shiites feelings of vengeance against the Turks and the whole Muslim nation.[72] Based on that assumption, Safavids encouraged people to be patient and wait for Al-Mahdi, who would eliminate poverty and spread justice all over the world. In fact, this doctrine discourages and eliminates the people\u2019s will, their role in politics, and the deciding of their own destiny. In addition, it gives holiness to the regime\u2019s decisions – deputy of the infallible Imam – since they are made, as claimed, in cooperation between this regime and the absent Imam, who is satisfied with the regime\u2019s practices as long as he meets the president or the Jurist. This policy was followed precisely during the Safavid dynasty to distract people\u2019s attention from demanding their basic needs and submit them to occults and religious discouragement with promises to improve their living conditions after al-Mahdi’s reappearance. In fact, they adopted this policy to give a state of infallibility and holiness to the regime as deputy of Al-Mahdi.
\nThe Iranian leadership understands that the establishment of a universal Mahdist state is almost impossible. This project resulted from the theory of politicizing religion and contradicts facts and the international, regional, and local political standards. However, this belief is the normal domain of extremists who dream of building a huge empire, eliminating borders, and importing the old doctrine into modern times without differentiating between the changing and unchanging, and between the absolute and proposition. Nevertheless, the main goal of the Iranian government in using such literature is to involve its people in external conflicts under the Jihad concept, and impoverish them under the pretext of preparing for Al-Mahdi\u2019s reappearance, which reflects the danger of the Iranian project in the region.
\nAll in all, the Al-Mahdi theory is a vital intellectual and political modern Iranian affair. It is not only a classical doctrine that establishes the \u201cWaiting\u201d theory, but also has been taken beyond its historical context, Hawza, and doctrinal position in favor of the modern Khomeini revolution.
\n\u00bb<\/span>\u00a0Conclusion<\/span><\/strong>
\nThe Iranian Al-Mahdi-based literature revolutionizes not only Iran\u2019s Shiites but also Shiites in other countries outside Iran\u2019s borders to rebel against their home countries and prepare – as claimed – for Al-Mahdi\u2019s reappearance. Iran aimed at extending the revolution outside its borders, and work with other Islamic and public movements to establish one universal community and liberate all oppressed people in the world,[73] which was evident through the sabotage operations launched by Iran\u2019s proxies in the Gulf and other Arab countries with Tehran\u2019s political and logistic support.[74]
\nIran does not comply with international political standards, or even ethical and sectarian standards; rather, Tehran acts to preserve the future of its great national goal – the Universal State: The MahdisState of Justice or the world\u2019s leader, as stated by Shiites.[75] Accordingly, the Iranian Mahdism doctrine – emerging from Khomeini\u2019s ideas – threatened all the countries of the region, and aimed at subjugating the Middle East under control of the Jurist Leader to prepare for the return of the absent Imam. Through this doctrine, the Iranian regime also controlled the Iranian people and sold them the idea of submitting to the rule of Mullahs as representatives of Allah on earth. Thus obliging all people to obey them due to their divine right to rule. According to the Shiite thinker, Ahmed Al-Katib,[76] the belief in Al-Mahdi as the source of constitutional legitimacy to rule [based on Khomeini\u2019s ideas] drove the Iranian leaders to use religion as a cover for their political actions and ignore any public or democratic legitimacy, giving themselves absolute authority that threatened Shiite modern political experiments, and hindered any democratic development in the Shiite communities. As a result, negotiating with the Mullahs that control the Iranian decision-making process is impossible until they give up this proposition, and comply with ethical and international laws.
\nAll in all, we come up with the following conclusion:<\/strong>
\n1.<\/span><\/strong> The divergence of the Shiite views on Al-Mahdi theory. Some follow the traditional doctrinal view that prohibits practising politics until the return of Al-Mahdi, while the revolutionary views work on behalf of the absent Imam in politics to establish the State in preparation for al-Mahdi’s return through supporting militias and other groups in the region.
\n2.<\/span><\/strong> Al-Mahdi theory in the Shiite classical doctrine was a tool for inactivity and the inclusion of Shiites under the caliphate umbrella in the past and in modern times, which expresses the philosophy of the traditional \u201cWaiting\u201d theory. However, Khomeini rebelled against these traditions and revolutionized this theory that attracted many groups and networks to work undercover in countries having Shiite communities to destroy these countries and prepare for the return of Al-Mahdi. In fact, Khomeini succeeded in replacing the \u201cWaiting\u201d theory by the \u201cPreparation\u201d theory that could come about only by revolutionizing and politicizing the sect and its doctrine. On his side, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Ibn Salman criticized Khomeini\u2019s theory and the Iranian regime\u2019s acts that could ignite sectarian conflicts and set the whole region ablaze, unlike the traditional \u201cWaiting\u201d theory in the Shiite doctrine before the emergence of Khomeini.
\n3.<\/span><\/strong> The most dangerous translation of the Khomeini movement is the political use and explanation of the Al-Mahdi issue. Khomeini Shiism mobilized tens of thousands of Shiites to fight in Syria and Iraq to defend Al-Mahdi and prepare for his return. In addition, most Shiite communities outside Iran rebelled against their home countries and joined Iranian armed groups to be soldiers of the only representative of Al-Mahdi on earth, the Iranian Supreme Leader.
\n4.<\/span><\/strong> Khomeini Shiism used Al-Mahdi theory in the internal political conflicts between Conservatives and Reformers in Iran.
\n5.<\/span> <\/strong>In order to solve this problem, the righteous Shiite scholars should assume control over the Iranian and Shiite mentality and reshape the \u201cWaiting\u201d theory to replace the Khomeini \u201cPreparation\u201d theory and encourage Shiite minorities in other countries to engage in their communities. In this context, the Arab countries can encourage and invest in the traditional Shiite line as a historical and cultural heritage emerged in the Arab Sunni community before being involved in the Safavid political Shiism and later, in the Khomeini Shiism, which might change the balance of power in favor of today\u2019s Reformer Constitutional School headed by Soroush and Kadeifar in Iran and many other Scholars in Lebanon. The engagement of this school in politics against the Khomeini ideas can make it an alternative for the Khomeini Shiism and enable it to lead the State of Iran and jog things back in place, unlike the traditional school that was destroyed by the Iranian revolution.
\n6.<\/span><\/strong> Iran benefits from the \u201cPreparation\u201d theory by acting on behalf of Al-Mahdi: internally, by subjugating people to any political, economic, and social decisions; and externally, by provoking some Shiite minorities in other countries to rebel and establish Iranian proxy groups outside its borders as a form of political extortion of the regional countries, and geographic and demographic shields in favor of the Iranian project.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In an interview in early May 2017, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Ibn Salman said the Iranian regime has adopted an extremist ideology, adding that Tehran wants to take control of the Muslim world.[1] Ibn Salman said the Iranian regime wishes to ‘set the scene’ for the Mahdi to reappear.[2] These words are an extremely accurate […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":32,"featured_media":3459,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[770,52,42,1296,2059,2064,2055,12,2066,854,386,102,2053,1202,1919,2065,409,361,2063,2052,2060,73,2062,575,1040,1188,720,222,2054,2056,2061,28,2057,2058],"class_list":["post-3458","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-centre-for-researches-and-studies","tag-770","tag-52","tag-agcis","tag-arabian-gulf-center-for-iranian-studies","tag-hidden-imam","tag-hypocrisy","tag-imam-zaman","tag-iran","tag-irans-proxies","tag-jurist-leadership","tag-khamenei","tag-khomeini","tag-khomeinist","tag-mahdi","tag-mahdism","tag-mahdism-theory","tag-mashhad","tag-media","tag-missing-imam","tag-muslim-world","tag-political-rivalry","tag-press","tag-qajari","tag-qum","tag-religious","tag-safavid","tag-sectarianism","tag-shiite","tag-shiite-heritage","tag-shiite-theology","tag-taqiyya","tag-tehran","tag-twelver-shiism","tag-twelver-shiite-doctrine"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3458","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/32"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3458"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3458\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9233,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3458\/revisions\/9233"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3459"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3458"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3458"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3458"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}