{"id":4086,"date":"2017-12-18T13:57:56","date_gmt":"2017-12-18T10:57:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arabiangcis.org\/english\/?p=4086"},"modified":"2017-12-18T13:59:26","modified_gmt":"2017-12-18T10:59:26","slug":"what-is-the-basis-of-the-irgc-entering-tehrans-streets","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/articles\/what-is-the-basis-of-the-irgc-entering-tehrans-streets\/","title":{"rendered":"What is the basis of the IRGC entering Tehran\u2019s streets?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The parallel activities of the Basij with the law enforcement forces has set a precedent, and this has continued, with ups and downs, at different times. But it seemed that the IRGC patrolling the Iranian streets to confront \u2018social crimes\u2019 \u2013 and not \u2018security threats\u2019 \u2013 had stopped in 1991, following the establishment of law enforcement forces. <\/strong>
\nApart from the goals or the results of the new decision, naturally one of the most important questions is- what interpretation of existing Iranian laws are IRGC commanders going to use to explain the deployment of the IRGC on the capital\u2019s streets?
\nOn December 10, 2017, the Spokesperson for the Interior Ministry said considering Iran\u2019s laws and ratifications of the \u2018Social Council of the country\u2019, the law enforcement forces are in charge of confronting social insecurities and the IRGC has not been asked for help in this regard. The \u2018Social Council\u2019, headed by the Interior Minister, oversees policy making and generating coordination amongst different organizations to confront social problems, and representatives of different institutions of the regime \u2013from the Intelligence Ministry, law enforcement and Welfare Organization to the IRIB, the judiciary branch and the Basij \u2013 are present in this council.
\nThe Interior Ministry took this position one day after the comments made by Mohammad Reza Yazdi, the IRGC Commander in Greater Tehran were published. He said \u2018the IRGC of Greater Tehran, with police help, has formed patrols to prevent theft and to fight thugs and hooligans.\u2019
\n\u00bb<\/span> Ratification of the Supreme Council of National Security?<\/strong><\/span>
\nThe Iranian Criminal Procedure Code, ratified in 1998, listed the law enforcement forces that include the police, the Basij, and other armed forces, that require ratification by the Supreme Council of National Security.
\nAs a result, considering this 1998 law, the IRGC\u2019s, to play a domestic policing role in selective areas would require ratification by the Supreme Council of National Security.
\nBut in the new Criminal Procedure Code, ratified in 2013, law enforcement forces were placed in two categories of \u2018public law enforcers\u2019 \u2013 \u2018trained personnel\u2019\u2013 and \u2018special law enforcers\u2019 \u2013 the latter were officials and agents who \u2018according to special laws would be considered as law enforcers within the boundary of assigned duties.\u2019
\nAccording to this law, special law enforcers include- \u2018the agents of the Intelligence Ministry and resistance forces of the IRGC\u2019s Basij, as well as other armed forces in cases in which part or all of the duties of the law enforcers are assigned to them.\u2019
\nIn 2015, some amendments were made to the new law, according to which the \u2018IRGC intelligence organization\u2019 was clearly added to the list of special law enforcers. According to the new law and its amendments, apart from the trained personnel of the Iranian law enforcement forces \u2013 as the main law enforcers \u2013 the agents of the Intelligence Ministry, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, the Basij and \u2018other armed forces in cases in which part or all of the duties of the law enforcers are assigned to them\u2019 can be considered as law enforcers.
\nA significant difference within the new law compared with the one ratified in 1998 is that the role of the IRGC as an institute which can be a law enforcer in certain cases is not separately emphasized, even though two subdivision organizations of the IRGC \u2013 i.e. the Basij and the IRGC intelligence organization \u2013 are mentioned as law enforcers in special cases.
\nAnother part of the new law, of course, can include the IRGC indirectly- the part where a group of special law enforcers are considered as \u2018other armed forces, in cases in which part or all of the duties of law enforcers are assigned to them.\u2019 But this part of the new law, unlike the old law which made the IRGC\u2019s role as a law enforcer dependent on a case by case ratification by the Supreme Council of National Security, doesn\u2019t mention the role of the council, instead it merely says that the IRGC involvement must be \u2018according to law\u2019.
\nIn November 2014 and in continuation of the Criminal Procedure Code, the \u2018procedure code for dealing with crimes of armed forces\u2019 too was ratified, in which law enforcers of the armed forces (such as the IRGC) are defined as members of these forces who have been trained to have the \u2018necessary skills\u2019 for this duty and have obtained \u2018law enforcers\u2019 ID cards\u2019. Nevertheless, if such law enforcers are not present, other \u2018officers and ranks of armed forces\u2019 are allowed to confront \u2018flagrant crimes\u2019.
\nFlagrant crimes are those committed \u2018in front of the law enforcers\u2019; \u2018the abovementioned agents are present in the crime scene immediately or can see the remains of the crime immediately after it is committed\u2019; \u2019the suspect intends to escape, or is escaping, after committing the crime\u2019 or \u2018the suspect is a tramp with a bad reputation in that neighborhood.\u2019 According to Iran\u2019s new Criminal Procedure Code, law enforcers, when there are \u2018strong evidences\u2019 indicating commitment of a flagrant crime, can arrest the suspects.
\nGiven such definitions of flagrant crimes, a measure like confronting \u2018thugs and hooligans\u2019 \u2013according to the commander of the IRGC in Greater Tehran, is the reason for forming IRGC\u2019s patrols \u2013 and will probably be justified formally. However, if the IRGC starts patrolling the streets with the justification of confronting \u2018thugs and hooligans\u2019, it is likely that cases like \u2018bad hijab\u2019 \u2013 as a kind of flagrant crime \u2013 will later be put on the agenda of these patrols.
\n\u00bb\u00a0<\/span>Referring to IRGC\u2019s Constitution?<\/span><\/strong>
\nObviously, according to the current Criminal Procedure Code in Iran, it is not impossible to have IRGC forces in the streets as law enforcers, even though the conditions of such an involvement will be strongly interpretable. For example, as mentioned above, according to the 1998 law, the involvement of IRGC forces depends on the ratification of Supreme Council of National Security, but such a condition is no longer specified clearly.
\nOn the other hand, it is proved that whenever there are different interpretations about the IRGC\u2019s involvement in different non-military fields, defenders of such involvement refer to \u2018expanded\u2019 laws \u2013 which include the IRGC constitution \u2013 regarding this armed force.
\nThis constitution gives an open hand to the IRGC in taking a wide range of measures, and it is possible, with interpretation, to consider forming city patrols as one of them.
\nClearly, in a part of this constitution, one of the missions of the IRGC has been specified as \u2018cooperation with law enforcement in necessary cases to establish order, security, and the rule of law in the country\u2019. It is urged that the IRGC, in fulfilling this mission, \u2018acts as a law enforcer of the judiciary branch\u2019.
\nOf course, even based on this constitution, the IRGC measures in fields like law enforcement are in the form of \u2018cooperation\u2019 with police forces, and cannot be unilateral decisions of IRGC commanders.
\nMeanwhile, yesterday\u2019s announcement of Iran\u2019s Interior Ministry \u2013 according to which the police has not asked for IRGC\u2019s help to confront social threats \u2013 strengthens this speculation that the announcement of starting IRGC\u2019s patrols has not been coordinated between the law enforcement forces and the Interior Ministry.
\nGiven this lack of coordination, it is not clear if patrolling the capital of Iran by the IRGC is going to happen and the Iranian Interior Ministry\u2019s denial has cast further doubt on this, but eventually there is likely to be an agreement between this ministry and the IRGC in this regard.<\/p>\n

\n

Opinions in this article reflect the writer\u2019s point of view, not necessarily the view of The Arabain GCIS<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The parallel activities of the Basij with the law enforcement forces has set a precedent, and this has continued, with ups and downs, at different times. But it seemed that the IRGC patrolling the Iranian streets to confront \u2018social crimes\u2019 \u2013 and not \u2018security threats\u2019 \u2013 had stopped in 1991, following the establishment of law […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156,"featured_media":4089,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[52,42,1296,125,12,355,430,386,361,73,38,28,39],"class_list":["post-4086","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","tag-52","tag-agcis","tag-arabian-gulf-center-for-iranian-studies","tag-basij","tag-iran","tag-irgc","tag-jcpoa","tag-khamenei","tag-media","tag-press","tag-rouhani","tag-tehran","tag-zarif"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4086","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4086"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4086\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4090,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4086\/revisions\/4090"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4089"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4086"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4086"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4086"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}