Popular protests broke out in both Iraq and Lebanon this month (October 2019), due to deteriorating living conditions, rampant corruption, the failure of the political class and because of\u00a0 alliances forged along\u00a0 sectarian and militia lines, which have resulted in\u00a0 the state and its institutions being unable to shoulder their responsibilities and discharge\u00a0 their duties to\u00a0 benefit their citizens. Protesters directed some of their anger towards Iran, calling on it to stop meddling in their internal affairs\u00a0 and placed a great deal of blame on it for the deteriorating conditions in both countries. This blame is either direct as in the case of Iraq, or indirect as in the case of Lebanon. Anger is expected to mount in the capitals of both countries where Iran controls the political decision-making in the coming phase.
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These protests marked an\nopportunity to exercise more direct pressure on Iran and created appropriate\nconditions for exerting pressure on its expanding influence in Lebanon and\nIraq. But the\npolicies of the United States and its allies in recent years have demonstrated\nshortcomings and strategic weaknesses in confronting Iran\u2019s regional\nexpansionism. The limited pressure on the\ndirect presence of Iran beyond its borders contributed to enabling it to become\nthe most influential actor in these arenas. Perhaps its influence is surging in\nlight of the absence of an effective strategy to curb its expansionism,\nincluding the absence of the United States, which continues to pursue a policy\nof withdrawal and retreat from the region. \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These developments give\nrise to an important paradox when it comes to \nUS strategy to confront Iran\u2019s regional expansionism. On one hand, the\nUnited States betted on stirring up Iran\u2019s home front via a package of extreme sanctions as a tool\nto influence Iran\u2019s regional behavior.\nOn the other hand, it adopted a policy of withdrawal in the face of Iranian\nexpansionism. Also, the United States did not take into account the role of society within the countries subject to Iranian interference and\npaid no heed to popular discontent towards Iran\u2019s role in these countries.\n<\/strong>Despite the importance of these factors, they were not taken into consideration by the\nUnited States in its strategy, which\nultimately aims to curb Iran\u2019s regional clout.\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on the foregoing,\nthis article attempts from one angle to highlight the shortcomings in the US\nstrategy when it comes to affecting the regional clout of Iran, in particular,\nlooking at the impact of US economic sanctions on Iran\u2019s behavior.\nFrom another angle, the article aims to \nclarify how Washington\u2019s strategy has contributed to Iran possessing more levers to\nmaneuver, confronting its challenges and\nexercising further regional influence, all of\nwhich could hinder US efforts in their\nentirety. Finally, the article aims to discuss the chances of success for the\nUnited States in undermining Iran\u2019s\nregional clout based on the status quos in Arab countries facing anti-Iran\nprotests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The regional sphere has\nalways provided opportunities to impose more \npressure on Iranian regional clout. \nThe administration of US President Donald Trump, since withdrawing from the nuclear deal in May\n2018, has focused on changing the behavior of the Iranian government through\nadopting a maximum pressure strategy via imposing more economic sanctions on\nTehran. The Trump administration believes that the Iranian government will\nrespond to negotiations under pressure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The aim of the Trump administration is to trigger a popular uprising in Iran through economic pressure. This would, in turn, put the Iranian government in a difficult position and prompt it to acceptnegotiations based on a set of defined US conditions, including \u00a0discussions on Iran\u2019s regional role, its clout and ties with armed militias in some regional countries, hence negotiations will indirectly impact Iran\u2019s regional role.\u00a0 When the implementation\nof the US strategy of maximum pressure began, the Iranian street was brimming\nwith anger. Protests reached their peak. \nThe Iranian protesters demanded\nthat the Iranian government focus its efforts at home\nand cease its interventions overseas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, as time passed,\nthe government started to activate its strategy for confrontation. One year\nafter the US pullout from the nuclear deal and after sanctions reached an\nunprecedented level, it has been observed that \npopular pressure against the government has significantly declined. The\ngovernment managed in one way or another to control the manifestations of\nrebellion at home, whether by repression or through the introduction of\nmeasures granting temporary economic relief. Furthermore, the government\nmanaged to transform US pressure, which was directed towards stirring the Iranian\npeople, into an advantage via national propaganda, allowing it to mobilize the Iranian population\nagainst US behavior towards Iran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other hand, the\nTrump administration did not take advantage\nof the regional atmosphere within its strategy, as\nseveral countries in the region reject Iran\u2019s interventionist role. The US\nmaximum pressure strategy, which aims to counter Iran\u2019s regional clout, is less\nthan what was expected by several countries. There is also no direct mechanism\nwithin the strategy to achieve the aim of changing Iranian behavior in the\nregion in a direct and adequate way. Therefore, the countries of the region\nshouldered the burden of facing up to Iran\u2019s expansionism via several\ninitiatives where the role of the United States was less than adequate as was\nthe case with the Arab Nato and other initiatives, including a plan to form a\nsecurity force to protect the Gulf. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Coinciding with these\ninitiatives, the United States pulled out its troops from some strategic areas,\nleaving a vacuum that Iran was ready to fill. Its position is still ambiguous\ntowards some of the main areas of confrontation, which has given Iran a greater\nopportunity to expand its clout and influence and exercise pressure via direct\nor indirect attacks on the interests of the United States and its allies in the\nregion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran took advantage of\nthe US strategy\u2019s shortcomings related to curbing its regional role and benefited from\nthe US pulling out its troops from some countries\nsuch as Syria. It\nalso made great strides in its project to establish a corridor extending from\nTehran to the Mediterranean via Iraqi and Syrian territories, which is known as\nthe Shiite Crescent. Iran has enhanced its\ncontrol over the political, military and economic decision-making in Sanaa,\nDamascus, Baghdad and Beirut, while the United States has stood idle. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The US\nstrategy\u2019s tools such as pressuring the\nIranian government at home, military withdrawal, and ruling out confrontation\nagainst Iran have proved inadequate in meeting the\nregional objectives set by the Trump administration. US experts themselves\nbelieve that sanctions are only effective as long as they are used to meet certain political objectives but ineffective in changing a political system or achieving multiple and\nwide-ranging objectives. This is what is happening now. Sanctions have no\neffect whatsoever on the regional clout of Iran which is increasing day after\nday. And there are no alternatives to the continued US withdrawal from the\nareas of dispute which Iran continues to exploit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In reality, there were opportunities to support stability and strengthen societies in Iraq and Lebanon to enhance their independence from Iranian influence. This support would have hindered the Iranian presence in its entirety, but instead Iran has been allowed to hijack the decision-making of these countries, making them pawns to its own interests.\u00a0 The US strategy was not effective in\nthese countries and it withdrew its troops from the areas of conflict because\nthese countries (Iraq and Lebanon) are under Iranian influence and have helped\nin mitigating the impact of US sanctions imposed on Iran. The resources of these countries and some of their institutions\nare under the control of Iran and are working to serve the strategy of\nconfrontation that it is embracing. Both Iraq and Lebanon, via Hezbollah,\nspecifically, play a major role in helping Iran circumvent US sanctions. Iran\u2019s regional clout which mounts day by day across its borders is an important and critical\npart of its strategy to counter the challenges posed by the United States and\nit has prompted world\npowers to think carefully when it comes to dealing with Iran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This clout moves Iran\u2019s battle beyond its borders and reduces the chances of employing alternative strategies to deal with the Iranian threat. It also gives Iran an opportunity to expand the scope of confrontation in more than one country and target more than one foe, without being directly blamed. Yet, this clout also exposes it to the possibility of being isolated internationally or coming under a maritime siege. Iran has created a foothold for its forces at several ports on the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab as well as in South East Asia both on land and at sea. This is in addition to Iran\u2019s presence in the Arabian Gulf, which is an important lever in reducing the likelihood of it being targeted. The United States is\nstill relying on economic sanctions to intensify pressure on the government via\neroding its legitimacy at home to prompt Iran to change its behavior, in order to curb its regional clout, or address two more important issues from the US perspective: Iran\u2019s nuclear deal\nand its missiles program. However,\nIran\u2019s increasing regional influence and greater control over political,\nmilitary and economic decision-making in some Arab capitals, continue to\nprovide it with a challenge-free environment, which enables it to advance its\nstrategy for resistance and defiance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps when Iran\ninitially deployed its militias beyond its borders, its ambitions were not very\ngreat. However, the mistakes of the United States and regional conditions have allowed Iran to increase its ambitions and have also prompted it to revive its imperial dream,\nwhich had always been unimaginable before the collapse of the regional system\nand the United States lifting its security\numbrella from the region. <\/p>\n\n\n\n There is no doubt that popular protests in Lebanon\nand Iraq are transcending sectarianism and posing a real challenge to Iran\u2019s\nregional project. These protests could be the most\nimportant elements in confronting\nIran\u2019s regional threat. The goals and slogans of the protests were about the crises which the region is facing. Protesters in\ncountries like Iraq and Lebanon are the same as those protesters inside Iran,\nwho call for reducing Iran\u2019s interventionist role overseas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Had the United States\nbalanced its economic sanctions on the Iranian government, contributing to increasing popular discontent\nat home, with an alternative regional policy other than withdrawal such as\nsupporting regional countries and their societies to\nconfront Iranian occupation, its\nstrategy of maximum pressure perhaps would have been much more effective in\ncurbing Iran\u2019s clout in the region. But this did not happen. <\/p>\n\n\n\n On the ground, Iran did\nnot pay sufficient attention to the state of popular discontent against it in\nthe countries where it has influence. Even US pressure aimed at stirring up the Iranian people has declined as time has passed. It\nwas unclear whether the United States was exerting economic pressure on the\ngovernment for it to change its behavior or to change the government entirely.\nThe opposition\ninside Iran even lost its momentum due to\nfrustration over contradictions in US policy\nregarding the future of the Iranian\ngovernment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps it is not too\nlate, popular anger towards Iran\u2019s\nrole in some regional countries has provided an opportunity\nfor the United States to rectify the shortcomings\nin its strategy in order to confront the regional danger posed by Iran. Iran is no longer\nwelcome in any country where it exerts influence as it has been involved\nin sabotage and destruction in societies and has played a key role in promoting political and sectarian divisions. Iran\u2019s militias are involved in corruption\nas well as being responsible for squandering\nstate resources. In addition, these militias have implemented policies that have forcibly\ndisplaced citizens and repopulated Sunni areas with Shiites. Due to this Iranian clout, the\npolitical destinies and resources of regional countries\nhave been unlawfully seized by Iran for the\nbenefit of its militias. Protesters burning the pictures of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali\nKhamenei and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, is considered a timely\nopportunity for formulating an integrated strategy to counter the regional\nclout of Iran, whether by taking advantage of\nthe popular anger against Iran or countering the power of Iran and its proxies\nin Iraq and Lebanon, for example, with an effective equal force. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This integrated strategy\nrequires reviving the role of society within countries whose fates are\ncontrolled by Iran as society represents the genuine bulwark against the\nIranian project. Civil societies, fortified by their own nationalist\nideologies, can stand firmly in the face of the Iranian ideological project. This\nis due to the fact that political\nclasses in regional countries have not protected their countries from Iranian\nincursions. On the contrary, political elites in these countries have created a state of instability and disintegration\nwhich has enabled the Iranian project to advance on the ground. However, to continue imposing pressure on the Iranian\ngovernment through economic sanctions would help in creating complex realities for the Iranian government leadership. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Any\npossible US strategy of confrontation also\nrequires the fostering of stability in the countries where chaos abounds. It\nalso requires repairing the national fabric of societies by overcoming sectarian differences by adopting positions that take into account the interests of\na diverse spectrum of people. There is no doubt that the region needs a new\nproject to rehabilitate it through alleviating\nregional tensions and ending infighting and strife as well as adopting national\nprojects of popular credibility, which are based on a collective national\nconsensus. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps an important unanswered question is: Does the\nUnited States want to pursue a strategy of confrontation? US policy does not\nindicate a movement towards changing the\ndesperate situation in the Arab world. US policy in the region has contributed to spreading chaos and enhancing\ndivisions. Its regional withdrawal has opened the floodgates for regional and\ninternational powers to compete in order to\ntake advantage of ongoing conflicts, including Iran, which expanded its clout\nin an unprecedented way. <\/p>\n\n\n\n It seems that Trump\u2019s regressive policy towards the\nregion is not so different from that of Obama despite the uproar that Trump\ncaused regarding the issue of Iran. But as it\nstands, Trump\u2019s uproar against Iran has\nnot resulted in any real gains on the ground. All of Trump\u2019s regional plans for confronting Iran have shifted the\nburden of doing so onto the countries of the\nregion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps the United\nStates desires to advance its regional interests through this chaos and these\ncontests which exhaust the countries of the region and eat away at their\nefforts and resources, including Iran itself. If\nthe United States does not make substantial changes to its strategy, including\nexerting further pressure on Iran\u2019s regional clout and empowering societies\nwithin these countries as well as pushing them towards independence from\nIranian influence, Iran will continue to hold important levers and influential\nareas through which it will continue to \nhinder the US strategy of maximum pressure in its entirety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Opinions in this article reflect the writer\u2019s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Popular protests broke out in both Iraq and Lebanon this month (October 2019), due to deteriorating living conditions, rampant corruption, the failure of the political class and because of\u00a0 alliances forged along\u00a0 sectarian and militia lines, which have resulted in\u00a0 the state and its institutions being unable to shoulder their responsibilities and discharge\u00a0 their duties […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":214,"featured_media":7070,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[3342,3340,12,66,3341,1387,2926],"class_list":["post-7069","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","tag-alternative","tag-flawed-us","tag-iran","tag-protests","tag-regional-protests","tag-strategy","tag-us-strategy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7069","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/214"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7069"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7069\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7071,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7069\/revisions\/7071"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7070"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7069"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7069"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7069"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}} I- The Consequences of Insufficient Pressure on Iranian Regional Behavior <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n II- Iranian Gains and a Greater Ability to Maneuver Regionally <\/strong>
<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\nIII- Reassessment and Possible Effects on Iranian Influence <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n