{"id":7182,"date":"2019-12-07T12:09:28","date_gmt":"2019-12-07T09:09:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=7182"},"modified":"2019-12-07T19:01:53","modified_gmt":"2019-12-07T16:01:53","slug":"what-lies-beneath-shifting-the-irins-headquarters-to-bandar-abbas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/what-lies-beneath-shifting-the-irins-headquarters-to-bandar-abbas\/","title":{"rendered":"What Lies Beneath Shifting the IRIN\u2019s Headquarters to Bandar Abbas"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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ground truths olutions<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The Iranian Army\u2019s Navy Rear\nAdmiral Hossein Khanzadi inaugurated<\/a>\nthe navy\u2019s  new headquarters in the\nsouthern Iranian city of Bandar Abbas on November 21. Though the construction\nwork continues, the navy will continue to relocate from Tehran in phases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Admiral Khanzadi said<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Admiral Khanzadi said, \u201cA\nsignificant part of Navy HQ elements will be transferred [to Bandar Abbas] and\nthe naval forces will be led with an increased focus.\u201d The Iranian media\nreported that three campuses spread over 26,432 square meters will house the\nheadquarters of the navy. The Bandar Abbas naval facility on the Persian Gulf\nalong the Strait of Hormuz was constructed during  the 1970s as the headquarters of the Imperial\nIranian Navy and was shifted there in 1977 from Khorramshahr.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tehran eyes strategic and\ntactical dividends by placing  both its\nnavies \u2013 the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary\nGuard Corps Navy (IRGCN) \u2013 in close contact \nwith each other at the strategically located military city. While the\nIRIN is a strategic force, the IRGCN is a tactical one. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why should a country have two\nparallel naval forces? The answer lies in the revolutionary leadership\u2019s lack\nof trust in Iran\u2019s traditional armed forces called Artesh.  Khomeini \napproved the establishment of a multi-pronged force on the lines of the\nRepublican Guards. The pre-revolutionary military establishments were largely\nignored despite their valiant battles against their Iraqi foes.  Articles 143 and 150 of the Constitution<\/a> remain intact, albeit the former was amended in 1989.\nArticle 143 holds the regular army \u2013 Artesh \u2013 \u2018responsible for protecting the\nindependence and territorial integrity of the country and the order of the\nIslamic Republic.\u2019  Article 150 assigns\nthe IRGC \u2018the role of protecting the Revolution and its achievements\u2019 but\nstresses institutional harmony among the various branches of the armed\nforces.   The IRIN\u2019s  mission is to defend Iran\u2019s territorial\nwaters, ports, and islands as well as  to\nsecure  Iran\u2019s exclusive economic\nzones  for resource exploitation while\nthe IRGCN and the Coast Guard deal with subversive and criminal threats from\nadversaries as well as smugglers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The shifting of the naval\nheadquarters, induction of newer and larger vessels, and expeditions  in the Atlantic Ocean are sufficient\nindicators of Iran\u2019s leadership reposing greater confidence in the otherwise\nneglected arm  of its military. For over\nthree decades, in particular, the IRIN has been a green-water navy operating to\nfight in regional waters. The recently organized annual naval exhibition<\/a> at Bandar Abbas boasted the IRIN\u2019s indigenously-improvised weapons systems\nas well as forthcoming heavy naval vessels. The IRIN\u2019s submarine fleet is dated\ndespite various upgrades while its destroyers, which are mostly of western origin, are rusted due to lack of overhaul\nfacilities.  Iran\u2019s navy, like its air\nforce, could have received a significant\nupgrade<\/a> had the Islamic\nrevolution not interrupted the plans of the Shah\u2019s government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nhttps:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=pSuBVVqd0-4\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Tehran shifting its  naval resources to  Bandar Abbas will help address the\noperational challenges of interoperability between the IRIN and the IRGCN. With\nits aspirations to project power by building a blue-water  navy, \nIran intends to adopt a more assertive posture vis-\u00e0-vis its\nchallengers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Being the first line of\ndefense , Tehran positioning  its naval\nheadquarters  closer to various\noperational bases will help it save  logistical\ntime in organizing joint meetings and joint training missions as well as\npotentially help in launching better-coordinated  operations in Iran\u2019s territorial waters. No\ndoubt the bifurcation of command and control between the IRIN and the IRGCN\nwill remain an irritant in the strategically significant and crowded waters of\nthe Gulf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Also, the two navies will be able to practice\nacting in unison during ongoing tensions and \nhostilities. The shifting of headquarters to Bandar Abbas provides  Iran\u2019s top military commanders an opportunity\nto more frequently supervise overseas simulationsincluding joint training missions as well as the sharing of assets\nand troops.  <\/strong> Over the past forty years, the IRGC<\/a> has\ntrained Iranian army officers to be \nideologically at par with it. \nThus, the differences or irritants between mid-level or junior-level\nofficers won\u2019t find a conducive atmosphere to balloon and disrupt operability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Despite the positives of\nshifting naval headquarters to Bandar Abbas,  \nthis naval facility becomes ever more\nvulnerable to  enemy attacks due to the\npresence of the twin headquarters of the IRIN and the IRGCN. In addition, submarines,\naircraft, and helicopter pads are located there as well as the Shahid Darvishi defense complex, a subsidiary of the\nMaritime Industries Group of Defense Industries Organization. Though heavily\nguarded with air-defense  batteries, the\nGulf states and their western allies have the capacity to confuse, jam and\nannihilate Iran\u2019s defensive measures at Bandar Abbas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Relocation of  naval headquarters  can ensure better preparation for the\nbattlefield and the more effective management of   military assets during a standoff or all-out\nattack. <\/strong>Even within  Gulf waters, safety in numbers isn\u2019t\nguaranteed for Iran. There is no such thing in the open seas. The IRGCN has\nmany speed-boats and drones that can start a conflict but they won\u2019t be able to\nsustain one. The responsibility will automatically be handed to the navy, which\nremains miserably short of deadly destroyers or frigates. The gamble Iran\u2019s\nstrategic planners are playing is based on two premises: a). There won\u2019t be an\nall-out conflict and neither of  its\nfoes, from near or afar, would launch punitive attacks on its strategic assets.\nIf at all, the response will be symbolic and for news headlines; b). The\nconsolidation of Iran\u2019s air and naval assets as well as its  decision-making structure will deter  foreign forces from meddling in  Gulf affairs.  Iran has tested  its adversaries\u2019 resolve to fight a war by\nnot only shooting down a CIA drone but also by launching devastating attacks on\nAramco\u2019s oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran is gradually moving to \nadvance its naval diplomacy.<\/strong>\nHolding joint naval exercises with its allies and working under multilateral\narrangements against terrorism, piracy, as well as participating in environmental\nmonitoring, will bring Iran some much-needed goodwill and clout. Iran, after\nall, does not want to be confined to the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf. If the\nJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) stays intact, the country will gain\nsome space in 2020<\/a> to\nacquire tactical military weapons besides reducing the hesitancy  amongst its reluctant friends such as  India to hold joint military  drills, especially\nwith its navy. The scope of Iran\u2019s naval diplomacy and strategic messaging has\nbeen limited not only due to the UNSC and American sanctions but also due to the revolutionary\nleadership\u2019s indifferent attitude towards the navy. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nshifting of the IRIN\u2019s headquarters and the induction of newer domestically\nproduced vessels and weapons systems indicate the beginning of a costly and\ncomplex transformation for the IRIN to fill a wide technological and numerical\ngap.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Iranian Army\u2019s Navy Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi inaugurated the navy\u2019s  new headquarters in the southern Iranian city of Bandar Abbas on November 21. Though the construction work continues, the navy will continue to relocate from Tehran in phases. Admiral Khanzadi said, \u201cA significant part of Navy HQ elements will be transferred [to Bandar Abbas] […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":7192,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[1987,2151,3503,12,3505,3502,430,3504,2466,2731],"class_list":["post-7182","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-bandar-abbas","tag-hassan-rouhani","tag-hossein-khanzadi","tag-iran","tag-irgcn","tag-irin","tag-jcpoa","tag-khanzadi-said","tag-rasanah","tag-rasanah-issues"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7182","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7182"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7182\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7191,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7182\/revisions\/7191"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7192"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7182"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7182"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7182"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}