The Shiite Marjaya in Najaf has focused on the issue of\nintegrating all armed groups of the\nPopular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into Iraqi security institutions. The Marjaya has often reminded Iraqi officials of Iraq\u2019s \nsovereignty and the need to preserve it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, on both\nissues, the Marjaya could only offer an\nopinion, but it could not carry out any reform or policy decision. The Marjaya reiterated the same two issues following the\nrecent escalation that erupted between the Iranians and Americans on Iraqi soil\nthat led to the killing of the Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, and his\ncompanion Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Deputy Commander of the PMF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This escalation dates back to late 2019, specifically on December 27, when the Hezbollah Brigades targeted a US base in Kirkuk with a number of missiles. This rocket attack killed an American civilian contractor, and a number of American soldiers were seriously injured. On December 29, 2019, US forces in response bombed targets belonging to the Hezbollah Brigades in the city of Qaim. A spokesman for the US Ministry of Defense stated that the American strikes against the militia group was to hamper its ability to launch future attacks against the forces of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Sources from the Hezbollah Brigades said that the US strike killed 15 people, including leaders, and wounded several others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There are factions\nbelonging to the PMF which are loyal politically and doctrinally to the supreme\nleader in Iran. They are not traditionally subject to Najaf\u2019s Marjaya, nor to \nIraq\u2019s government. Among the\nlargest and most important pro-armed militias to Iran and the Quds Force are\nthe Hezbollah Brigades, which were the main instigators of the recent\nescalation, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2018, the Hezbollah\nBrigades targeted Iraqi security forces and refused to submit to Iraqi police\ncheckpoints. This resulted in a\nconfrontation between the two parties in which an Iraqi soldier was killed and\nseveral others were injured and led the\nsecurity forces to besiege one of the headquarters of the Hezbollah\nBrigades in east Baghdad. In July 2019,\nthe Hezbollah Brigades refused to respond to the decision of Iraqi Prime\nMinister Adel Abdul Mahdi to withdraw from the town of Nukhaib, along the Saudi\nborder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This proves that the Hezbollah Brigades are not\nloyal to the Iraqi state and the popularly elected government, and their\npolitical and doctrinal loyalty belongs\nto the supreme leader in Iran. This was\nconfirmed by an official in Baghdad, that the Hezbollah Brigades do not\nconsider themselves part of the PMF that fall under the Iraqi state\u2019s purview,\nbut is part of the axis of resistance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Hezbollah Brigades\nwere first established following the American invasion of Iraq with the help of\nthe Quds Force and the Lebanese Hezbollah. It was led by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.\nThe Hezbollah Brigades was designated as a terrorist group by the United States\nin 2009. The US Treasury then imposed severe sanctions on Muhandis. The Quds\nForce was also designated as a terrorist organization in 2007.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Furthermore, Asa’ib\nAhl al-Haq does not operate within the framework of the Iraqi state, and the\nUnited States included it on its list of\nterrorist organizations on January 3, 2020. \nAsa\u2019ib Ahl al-Haq is one of the largest pro-Iran militias loyal to the\nsupreme leader in Tehran. International human rights organizations have accused\nit of committing genocide, ethnic cleansing in Iraqi Sunni provinces such as\nDiyala and others, with direct support from the late Quds Force Commander\nQassem Soleimani, and committing the Barwana massacre in January 2016. Human\nRights Watch accused it of torturing civilians in Mosul. Indeed, the movement\nwas involved in the suppression of the Iraqi uprising on October 1, 2019. It\ncontributed to the killing of dozens and the wounding of thousands in Baghdad\nand the southern provinces with a Shiite\nmajority. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq also extended support to the Assad government in\nsuppressing the Syrian revolution and facilitated terrorist cells in the Gulf\ncountries. In addition, it offered\nlogistical assistance to Ansar Allah in Yemen. However, a remarkable statement\nwas made by Asa’ib leader Qais Khazali, saying that they will establish a\nShiite full moon not a Shiite crescent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The influence of these\nmilitias has reached the point where\nthey control the appointment of government officials and override the decisions\nof the Iraqi state. Iraq\u2019s former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi himself\ncriticized them, and accused these militias of political rivalry, and\ninterfering in the appointment of\nministers and the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At this time of crisis, we should pay attention to the position of the Shiite Marjaya in Najaf. It is always seen in Iraq as a factor contributing toward political and sectarian stability, and a buffer against the disintegration of the Iraqi state and a force preventing the country from sliding into civil war, or regional conflicts. It has repeatedly stressed the necessity for integrating these armed militias into state institutions, to preserve the sovereignty of Iraq from cross-border loyalties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On March 26, 2019, the\nNajaf Marjaya announced that the Friday sermon of December 27th would not be a\npolitical sermon. The purpose of this\nstatement was to ban any discussion of\npolitical affairs. The anger of the Marjaya was due to the delay by Iraqi politicians in forming a new government and meeting the demands of\nthe protesters, who were protesting in Iraq\u2019s streets and at Tahrir Square in\nBaghdad since the beginning of October 2019. Politicians were not responding to\nthe demands of the Marjaya , especially\nthose that were included in the December 20 sermon in which the Marjaya called for early elections, forming a new\nelection law, and denouncing torture and kidnappings. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, under the\nweight of political events, the Marjaya was obliged to talk politics again, after America targeted factions of the PMF. On December 29, 2019, the Shiite supreme\nauthority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, condemned the American attack\nagainst the Hezbollah Brigades in Qaim. According to the statement, \u201cThe Marjaya\n condemns this heinous attack<\/a> that targeted a group of fighters of the official Iraqi\nforces, killing and wounding a large\nnumber of them. The Marjaya stresses the need to respect Iraqi sovereignty and\nnot to violate it under the pretext of responding to unlawful practices by some\nparties. Iraqi authorities are entitled to deal with these practices and take\nnecessary measures to prevent them. They are called upon to do so and to ensure\nIraq does not become a field for settling regional and international scores and\nthat others do not interfere in its internal affairs.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n This statement\napparently calls on the Iranian Marjaya not to interfere in Iraqi affairs under the pretext of retaliation, because\nthis is the jurisdiction of the Iraqi official authorities alone, and not armed groups. It warned against settling regional scores on\nIraqi soil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On January 3, 2020,\nthe Marjaya said in the Friday sermon,\nin response to the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and\nhis companion Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis by the United States near Baghdad airport,\n\u201cEvents are accelerating, crises are worsening and the country is passing\nthrough critical junctures due to the\nattack that led to the killing and wounding of dozens of our fighters, the\nunfortunate incidents Baghdad witnessed during the past days, and the brutal attack near its international\nairport last night. This attack is an\ninsolent breach of Iraqi sovereignty and violation of international law. It\nled to the killing of a number of heroes who defeated Daesh terrorists.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n We note that the Marjaya\n focused in its statement on denouncing\nthe targeting of the PMF in Qaim and\ncalled for respecting Iraqi sovereignty. It apparently referred to the Americans and Iranians. With\nAmerican escalation following the targeting of Qassem Soleimani, the Marjaya,\nafter it denounced the targeting of\nSoleimani and his companions, called for restraint and to act wisely by saying,\n\u201cAs we call upon the parties concerned to exercise restraint and act wisely, we\npray to the Almighty, to keep Iraq and\nits people away from the evil of the\nwicked and the plot of the ungodly.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n When the Marjaya calls for self-restraint and underlines the\nneed to act wisely, it reinforces its previous stance on rejecting Iraq\u2019s entry\ninto an international conflict and settling regional scores. It reiterates the\nprinciple of Iraqi sovereignty, whether \nin regard to Americans or \nIranians violations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A similar stance was adopted\nby Sheikh Bashir Al-Najafi \u2013 who is one\nof the top four Marjas\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n in Najaf\nalong with Sistani, Saeed Al-Hakim, and Sheikh Al-Fayad. Sheikh Bashir\nAl-Najafi expressed his condolences on the death Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis by saying: \u201cIt is unfortunate that Iraq has\nbecome a battlefield for settling scores.\u201d However, Bashir Al-Najafi was more\nexplicit in his statement than Sistani. He led the congregation at the funeral\nprayer, while the other Marjas did not attend.\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n An important question\nis related to the purpose behind condolences offered by the Najafi Marjas on Soleimani\u2019s death, despite their disputes\nover some Iranian practices on Iraqi\nsoil. The answer relates firstly to understanding the nature of the dispute,\nbecause it is a dispute which emerged\nfrom within the sect itself over status, influence, and positions.\nHowever, it did not reach the level of\nestrangement or lead to a public rivalry between the sides. Secondly, it is\nrelated to the historical Shiite legitimacy, in which each Marjaya can draw and reinforce its legitimacy only\nthrough Iran, home to the largest Shiite community in the world. To reinforce the\nposition of the Marjaya among the \nmasses, there can be no confrontation with the supreme leader in Iran.\nThirdly, the most important answer is\nrelated to the issue of public Taqlid<\/em>; the Shiite public felt humiliated\nthat their sovereignty was violated when the assassination took place on their\nland. It is difficult in the wake of such violent events for the Marjaya to contradict the masses. Motahhari, Sorush,\nand other Shiite thinkers highlight that if the Marjaya confronts \nthe public it means that it has a serious weakness. If\nthe Marjaya contradicts the feelings of the masses and their deep\nquestions regarding the violation of Iraqi\nsovereignty by Soleimani and by the PMF\u2014 which ignored the advice issued by the Marjaya for the need \nto integrate within the\ninstitutions of the Iraqi state\u2014 it will face public outrage with the\noutpouring of angry and revolutionary sentiment after the violation of their sovereignty.\nMoreover, the Marjaya will have to face the\nsupreme leader of Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One important\nfactor in this context is that the assassination was committed by the Americans. Shiite groups, especially\nthose loyal to Iran, have been spreading news, day and night, that there are\nAmerican plans to eliminate them, and the state of the supreme leader. Those\nShiites groups absorbed the Shia\u2019s teachings: Anti- international oppression\nand anti-imperialism, and if the Marjaya confronts any of those prevailing teachings by opposing\nthe masses, it will lead to a decline inits authority. <\/p>\n\n\n\n All of these dimensions dominate the messages of the Marjaya, both inside and outside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n When looking at the\nthin thread of commonality between the condolence statements of the\nvarious Marjas, we find that they focused on the issue of martyrdom and\nsacrifice which represents the way of the imams. This indicates how marjas strengthen\nthe militant culture and create Shiite\njihadi enclaves, which the Iranian elite consider as a strategic choice that\nthey cannot give up both politically and ideologically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the statements\nof Kazem Al-Haeri, Al-Aarafi, Khamenei,\nRa\u2019aisi and others, they reiterate the\nissue of martyrdom and sacrifice. This philosophy is rooted in the beginnings\nof the Guardianship of Islamic Jurist. For instance, Khomeini believed that the Iran-Iraq war was an opportunity for\nIranian youths to ascended to God when\nthey were killed as martyrs!<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the grassroots\nlevel, the pro-Iranian media tried to stir up the sectarian dimension and\ncreate a sectarian context similar to\nthe killing of Al-Hussein in the Shiite memory. To this extent, images of\nHussein meeting Soleimani in Heaven, and other images of him being hugged by Hussein \nwent viral. There were narratives that began to appear involving \nconfrontation with the Umayyads\nand their mocking of Soleimani\u2019s killing, and other narratives related to this event to fuel the\nIranian imagination, according to some authors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran also worked to\nuse the killing of Soleimani and his companions to eliminate internal\nIranian demonstrations, known as the\ngasoline demonstrations, and externally to eliminate the Iraqi uprising that has been \nongoing since the beginning of\nOctober 2019. The protesters\u2019 demands have not been met yet, which was curbed basically by \nIranian interference. In the context of exacerbation<\/a>, the followers of the Guardianship of the Islamic\nJurist in some governorates of Iraq\nheld a symbolic funeral for Soleimani\nand Muhandis, while protesters in\nNasiriyah refused entry of the\nfuneral ceremony into the city, and\nthrew stones at the procession, and burned a number of vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are undoubtedly great gains that Iran will reap from the killing of Soleimani, related to restoring the cohesion of the Shiite house, and undermining political and sectarian opponents both internally and externally. The Iranian religious elite lost this cohesion after the burning of the images of the supreme leader by protesters since October 2019 in the central Shiite capitals of Karbala, Najaf, Basra, Beirut, and even one day before Soleimani was killed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Marjaya represented by Sistani and the three big\nMarjas in Najaf do not want Iraq to slide into an American-Iranian conflict,\nwhich may drain it. Therefore, the Marjaya\nrepeatedly called for the integration of all armed factions into the official\nstate security institutions, and demanded all parties concerned to respect\nIraqi sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, the Marjaya\n was unable to ignore the killing of\nSoleimani because it was considered a violation of Iraqi sovereignty\nby the Americans, and to save its face in front of the Shiites masses who are\nsympathetic to the killing of Soleimani, who is widely credited by Iraqis for\neliminating the Islamic State. In addition, the Marjaya could not ignore the\nkilling of the PMF leaders that \naccompanied Soleimani, like Muhandis and others who were recognized\nfor maintaining the cohesion of the\nIraqi state in the face of the expansion of the Islamic State. This brought popular sympathy for their killing,\neven from some of the protestors of Tahrir Square who called for the liberation of Iraq from Iranian and\nAmerican hegemony.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Given these\ninteractions, the Marjaya acted as a balance\nin light of these sharp regional fluctuations. It tried to satisfy the Shiite\nmasses. Meanwhile, it reminds Iraqi\npoliticians and officials of the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, and not to\nengage in regional conflicts that threaten the cohesion of the fragile Iraqi\nstate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the Marjaya in Najaf remains largely spiritual. It does\nnot have the ability to enforce \npolitical decisions on the ground by virtue of the presence of militias\naffiliated with the supreme leader in\nTehran which act under his command, and by virtue of the fact that the Najaf\nseminary does not adhere to the\nGuardianship of the Islamic Jurist.\nTherefore, its mandate is limited to\nmatters of daily life. Some of its followers are sympathetic to Iranian grievance<\/a>s, and influenced by the power of the Iranian media,\nwhich frequently speaks on behalf of all\nShiites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the Marjaya will retain its mentorship role, and remains\ngreatly blessed by politicians who show their affection and reverence to it. In\npolitical practice, the guidance of the Marjaya is overridden in favor of the\npolitical Marjaya represented by the supreme leader in Tehran.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Shiite Marjaya in Najaf has focused on the issue of integrating all armed groups of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into Iraqi security institutions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":7316,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[3864,3863,113,2151,503,12,263,351,3175,2466,2731],"class_list":["post-7315","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-abu-mahdi-al-muhandis","tag-adel-abdul-mahdi","tag-american","tag-hassan-rouhani","tag-hezbollah","tag-iran","tag-iranian","tag-iraq","tag-lebanese-hezbollah","tag-rasanah","tag-rasanah-issues"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7315","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7315"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7315\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7319,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7315\/revisions\/7319"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7316"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7315"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7315"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7315"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}