Carrying Out a Military Response to Boost Credibility <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe leaders of the\nIranian ruling system realized that if they refrained from carrying out a military\nresponse, this would impact their credibility. The main message embedded in the\nremarks made by Iranian officials regardless of their military, religious and\npolitical rankings to the killing of Qassem Soleimani was they will\ndefinitely respond and take revenge. The\nIranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced on Sunday, January 3, 2020 a\nthree-day nationwide mourning, vowing, as he visited the family of Soleimani on\nJanuary 4, to revenge the killing of Qassem Soleimani when and where\nappropriate. The Iranian President Hassan\nRouhani, meanwhile, vowed to, during a visit to Soleimani\u2019s family, to carry\nout an act of harsh revenge for the killing of\nSoleimani, adding that everyone will seek revenge for Soleimani, in response to\na question from his daughter about those who will get revenge for her father. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Also, the Supreme National\nSecurity Council, as the highest security apparatus in the country, revealed,\nafter meetings held in the presence of Khamenei and Rouhani on Sunday, January\n3, 2020, that it had taken\nthe necessary decisions to respond to the US. This is\nconsistent with the remarks of the Commander\nin Chief of the IRGC, Major General Hossein\nSalami, on Wednesday, January 6, when he said orders had been given for\na response. He said:\u201d I declare it plainly and in an\nunambiguous way. Orders have been given. We are getting a powerful, decisive,\nfirm, regret-provoking and blowing revenge. The US has no place in the region\u201d. This is in addition to the army\u2019s Commander in Chief, Major\nGeneral Abdel-Rahim Mousavi, saying that the assassination of Soleimani will\nnever go unpunished. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
For his part, the Iranian\nForeign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif\ndescribed the US message telling Iran not to carry out a strong response to revenge the killing of Soleiman, delivered by the Swiss\nambassador to Tehran, who is the head of the US interest section, as rude. A special aide to the speaker of the Iranian parliament\nHossein Amir Abdullahian wrote in a post on Twitter that Soleimani is not the\nmartyr of 80 million Iranians, but of 1.5\nbillion Muslims worldwide. Such remarks, along\nwith the emotion expressed by leaders of the Iranian regime during the funeral\nprayers of Soleimani, as well as the shock on the faces of senior regime\nofficials and the millions who partook in bidding farewell to Soleimani, reveal\nthat the Iranian response was not surprising. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
III- The Motives Behind Iran Choosing Iraq as the Arena for Its Military Response<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\nIraq has been a top priority for Iran due to it being the closest defense line to where the\nUnited States targeted the mastermind\nand architect of Iran\u2019s regional\nproject; Soliemani. This is in addition to the vulnerability of US interests\nand bases spread across Iraq (See Table No 2.) whether due to geographic proximity\nto Iran or the wide-ranging deployment of\nIran-aligned armed militias across the country, which makes striking US targets\nwithin the realm of possibility. This is in addition to the importance of Iraq\nin the Iranian strategic mindset as a westward geographical extension for Iran,\nan arena for exercising influence, an economic artery and an outlet for\nreducing the pressures of economic sanctions.\nIn addition, Iraq\u2019s centrality to Iranian\nstrategy, its strategic sectarian makeup, and its security and military\nimportance for expanding Iranian influence westward (towards Arab countries),\nwhich in the end helps in creating the Iranian\ncorridor to the Mediterranean. This is in addition to Iraq being a\nperfect channel for smuggling and transferring\nweapons to Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned militias in Syria and other parts\nin the region. <\/p>\n\n\n
Table 2: US Military Bases<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n Source: \u00a9 2020 Rasanah IIIS. <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\nIV- Factors Influencing Iran\u2019s Choosing of a \u2018Small-Scale Response\u2019 Scenario <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n1- The Nature of the Regime\u2019s Elite and Priorities<\/em>:<\/strong> the ruling elite in Iran is rational and well-aware of the huge gap between the capabilities of both the US and Iran. It fears engaging in misadventures which could impact the regime which has been ruling the country for the past 40 years as maintaining the ruling regime is the topmost priority of the leadership of the regime despite the killing of a military commander, even if this commander is as heavyweight such as Soleimani. The elite has given priority to the regime\u2019s survival and longevity in order to implement Iranian schemes and projects at home and abroad. This has placed a curb on Iran\u2019s approach in choosing any uncalculated measure which it fears would impact the strength and position of the ruling regime. <\/p>\n\n\n\n2- A Tit-for-tat<\/em>: <\/strong> It seems that Iran assessed the US targeting of Soleimani as an escalation-for-escalation, not a shift in the US position towards curbing its regional clout. Therefore, it opted for a small-scale confrontation scenario, without killing or injuring US troops as it is aware of the US red lines. This is in addition to Iran\u2019s own complicated calculations which could arise if it engaged in an all-out confrontation with the US, such as risking the survival of the regime and its expanding regional clout, which has resulted in Iran incurring huge human and material losses. Iran is waiting to reap the benefits of its regional clout in light of its dire economic conditions. This is in addition to the high price that Iran will pay in case of engaging in an open-ended confrontation with a major world power, with which it is not on par militarily or economically in any part of the world. <\/p>\n\n\n\n3- The Massive Military Capabilities of the United States:<\/em><\/strong> <\/em>The Iranian leadership is well aware of US military capabilities in all the areas of contagion with Iran, which include dozens of US military airbases deployed around the borders of the Iranian state and the sweeping superiority of the US navy over the Iranian fleet, which makes several Iranian targets within the range of US fire. Also, Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf waters are an easy target for the US air force and the headquarters of the Shiite militias in Iraq stand uncovered in the face of US strikes. However, at the political level, Iran uses clever negotiating skills to maximize gains as Trump mentioned that \u201cIran never won a war, but never lost a negotiation.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n4- The Costly All-out Confrontation Scenario: <\/em><\/strong>This happens in light of the material and human costs required to engage in military confrontation which would catastrophic implications for all concerned parties in the region given that the Iranian economy is hit with economic sanctions and Iran’s prioritization of asymmetric warfare (fourth generation warfare) over conventional warfare (first generation warfare). This is in addition to Iran losing the support of European actors who could stand with it after defying the international community by announcing the fifth stage of reducing its nuclear obligations. Iran prefers to resort to limited confrontations so that it does not bear a direct cost based on past experiences.<\/p>\n\n\n\nV-Future Scenarios of the Iran-US Spat<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nIn light of the foregoing,\nand the nature of the US-Iranian statements after the Iranian missile attacks\non the US bases in Iraq and the positions of Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria,\nYemen, and Lebanon, the likeliest scenario revolves around stopping a direct\nUS-Iranian escalation, with the two sides ceasing strikes on each other\u2019s military targets. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Zarif swiftly announced\nthat Iran has conducted an appropriate\nresponse, in reference to efforts to de-escalate tensions and avoid war. Trump\nresponded by saying \u2018All is well\u201d and softened\nthe escalatory rhetoric during his speech at the White House. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is also likely that\nthe two sides may move to the pre-escalation period in the lead-up to the\nkilling of a US local contractor, with the US tightening its embargo against\nthe Iranian regime by imposing fresh sanctions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Trump also vowed to work\nto change the behavior of the Iranian regime particularly as Iran\nhas come to understand US redlines. The Iranian missile attacks on the US bases\ndid not kill a single US national and just caused limited material losses\naccording to the US narrative. Iran would also continue its proxy wars by pressuring its proxies in the region\nindirectly with the aim of getting US forces out of the Iraqi scene. It shall\nexploit the position of its proxies to get\nrevenge for the killing of Soleimani, given:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Position of the Houthis<\/strong>: <\/em>The Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi urged Iran to carry out a quick response by saying: \u201cThe swift and direct response by attacking the spreading bases is the option and solution.\u201d He here points to the US bases established in Iraq and the Arabian Gulf. The Houthi leader, who is sparing no efforts in displaying loyalty to the supreme leader in Iran, wants to tell Iran that he is ready to exercise pressure via levers available to threaten the security of maritime navigation at Bab al-Mandab, which would block the flow of oil and trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Position of the PMF<\/em>: <\/strong>the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq militias, Qais al-Khazali, who is placed by the US on its terror blacklist along with his militia, vowed to carry out a strike against US forces, which will be no less than the Iranian response to the assassination of the deputy head of the PMF Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who died in the US attacks which targeted Soleimani on January 3, 2020. He said:\u201d First, the Iranian response to the killing of Soleimani happened. Now it is time for the first Iraqi response to the assassination of Al Muhandis.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe position of Hezbollah:<\/em> <\/strong>the secretary-general of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah\u2019s speech on Wednesday, January 6, reflects the strong relations between Soleimani and Hezbollah and the role of the Iranian commander in developing the capabilities of Hezbollah militarily and on the battlefield. He said that the response will target US presence in the region, in reference to expelling US forces from Iraq, an issue which will be given top priority by Iranian proxies in the coming days. <\/p>\n\n\n\nIn an official, rare, extreme and\ndangerous admission that the militias are directly subordinate to Iran, the Commander of the Aerospace Force of the IRGC, Brigadier\nAmirali Hajizadeh, spoke in a press conference on Saturday, January 9, 2020, on\nthe Iranian strikes on the US bases in Iraq. This undoubtedly prompts us to\nstop considering the PMF as an Iraqi group,\nHezbollah as a Lebanese organization, the Houthis as a Yemeni entity and the\nSyrian militias as Syrian entities, as all of them, in these circumstances,\nhave become officially Iranian militias. He boasted of controlling these\nproxies as he was speaking while nine flags were put up behind him, six of\nwhich belong to armed militias and three belong to the Air Force, the Aerospace\nForce, and Iran. The flags were of the following militias: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
– Zainabiyoun Brigade, a Pakistani militia, in Syria. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
– Fatemiyoun Brigade, an Afghani militia, in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– Hamas movement in Palestine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– Houthis in Yemen. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
– The Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
– Hezbollah of Lebanon. <\/p>\n\n\n\nThis was the first\noccasion in which an IRGC commander gave a speech with the flags of\nthe so-called components of the Axis of Resistance in the background. In the\npast, IRGC commanders always spoke with the flags of the IRGC and Iran behind\nthem. This is an indication that these militias are Iranian ones, not Yemeni,\nSyrian, Lebanese or Iraqi ones. Therefore, how did the PMF become an affiliate\nof the Iraqi army and its political arm has lawmakers and ministers in the\nIraqi cabinet while it is an Iranian militia? Does it work for the sake of Iraq\nor Iran? How come Hezbollah has\nparliamentarians and cabinet members while it is working for the sake of Iran?\nWhat about the Hamas movement, which considers itself a resistance movement,\nnot an Iranian proxy? <\/p>\n\n\n\n
By doing so, Iran wants\nto send a message to both the domestic front and the outside world, reiterating\nits expansionist agenda and announcing that it is the main\npartner in taking and making decisions in these countries and that its role is\nfar beyond the reports of offering merely financial, political and military\nsupport. It revealed the true role of these militias as they work for Iran, not\nfor their homelands where they settle. From another perspective, such a move\nwill bring more harm to Iran than any benefit. Any act that will be carried out\nby these militias will be blamed directly on Iran as it has admitted these militias\nare its proxies. It is also expected that all these militias will be classified\nas terrorist organizations as they are Iranian militias who are carrying out\nacts beyond Iranian borders. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nAlthough Iranian and US\nremarks point to the fact that military escalation on the Iraqi scene is over\nand that the two parties do not have a desire to engage in armed\nconfrontation which would result in disastrous implications for all\nconcerned parties in the region and they intend to\nmove to the period before the killing of a US local contractor, and severe US sanctions shall\ncontinue to be in place despite the fact that\nIran continues to refuse to engage in negotiations without the lifting of the\nsanctions, the possibility of a renewed escalation between the US and Iran\nremains likely at any moment. This is because of not addressing the roots of\nthe US-Iranian conflict, which include amending the nuclear deal, curbing Iran\u2019s ballistic missiles program, reducing Iranian regional\nclout and the desire of Iranian militias to\nrespond by targeting US forces. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran here shall emerge as\na loser on all measures. Iran, represented by its regional proxies, did not make any\nstrategic gains by stepping up attacks on US forces in Iraq, except the strikes\nagainst Iraqi popular protests, which oppose Iranian influence in Iraq and\ndemand Iraq returns to the Arab sphere as Iran exceeded US redlines. This threw\nthe region into a limbo of whose disastrous implications regional\ncountries have long been warning of. An armed confrontation will not serve the interests of\nanybody while sitting down around the negotiating\ntable is the most favorable option in order to achieve Iranian strategic\nobjectives in a diplomatic way, which comes as President Donald Trump said that Iran\nwill never win a war, but it had never lost a negotiation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Even attempts\nto use the killing of Soleimani to win more\npopular support, public approval and public mobilization behind the regime have\nfailed. The regime lost the public sympathy it gained following the death of\nSoleimani after its admission that it was behind the downing of the Ukrainian\nplane which had 176 passengers onboard. The victims included 82 Iranians, 63\nCanadians, 11 Ukrainians, nine crewmembers, 10 Sweden nationals, 3 Afghans, 3\nBritons and 3 from Germany, according to the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym\nPrystaiko. The plane was hit by a missile\nminutes after taking off from Khomeini\nAirport. In the aftermath of the disaster, popular protests involving students, took to the streets and demanded the resignation\nof the supreme leader, and the IRGC\u2019s control over the country to end. They\nchanted the slogan \u2018Death to the Dictator\u2019 in\nreference to Khamenei and \u201cKhamenei is a killer [\u2026]His rule is null and void.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
In the midst of US-Iran military escalation on the Iraqi scene which some regional countries had always warned of particularly its disastrous impact on security and stability, the IRGC targeted on Wednesday at dawn, January 8, 2020, two US bases. The first target was Ain al-Asad airbase in the province of Anbar in western Iraq. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":7337,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1402],"tags":[12,351,3900,237],"class_list":["post-7336","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-position-estimate","tag-iran","tag-iraq","tag-rasanah-reports","tag-us"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7336","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7336"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7336\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7349,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7336\/revisions\/7349"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7337"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7336"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7336"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7336"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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