On January 14, the French, British,\nand German (EU3) ambassadors sent a letter to the United Nations\nSecretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres highlighting that Iran\u2019s development\nof nuclear-capable ballistic missiles violated UN Resolution 2231 (2015). The\nmove brings Iran closer to being referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC). <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Two days before the release of the letter, the EU3 foreign ministers<\/a> met following Washington\u2019s statement that it was “more likely than ever” that Iran would be referred to the UNSC. Iran could face crippling multilateral international sanctions if the UNSC votes that its actions are a threat to international peace. The US-led sanctions against Iran, put in motion since May 2018, have added pressure on Iran\u2019s economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, while it has\nthreatened under US pressure to continue nuclear enrichment\nwith full force<\/a>, which brings it a step\ncloser to building a nuclear bomb. This comes while the future of the Iranian\nnuclear deal is uncertain. The United States withdrew from the deal that was\nconcluded with Iran and other world powers in 2015, however, it offered\nsanctions waivers to countries such as China to help Iran develop its heavy\nwater reactor at Arak, the Fordow<\/a> nuclear facility, the\nBushehr nuclear power plant, and the Tehran research reactor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This leaves Tehran in a state of confusion regarding its options. President Hassan Rouhani\u2019s moderate camp wants to keep Iran committed to the deal until new developments lead to negotiations with the United States. But powerful \u201chardliners\u201d led by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are suspicious of any US-Iran talks. Last May, Tehran said its strategic<\/a> patience was over with the parties that did not fulfill their obligations under the nuclear deal, and gradually reduced its commitments to the deal in bi-monthly intervals. In June, it confirmed that it will breach<\/a> the nuclear deal by enriching uranium above the levels permitted under the deal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU3 possible referral of Iran to the UNSG is based\nmainly on violations of its commitment to UN Resolution 2231, which requires\nIran \u201cnot to undertake any activity related to ballistic<\/a> missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear\nweapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.\u201d On April 23, 2019, Iran tested the Shahab-3<\/a>\nmedium-range ballistic missile variant with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle.\nThe EU3 letter to the UN said the Shahab-3 booster is \u201ctechnically capable of delivering a nuclear weapon.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU3 referral also aims to\ntrigger the nuclear deal\u2019s dispute<\/a> resolution mechanism, in an\neffort to revive the faltering nuclear deal. But the hardline Tasnim News\nAgency insists that Iran is not obliged to comply with the UN Resolution 2231\nbut only to show good faith. Tehran has repeatedly said it would continue to\ndevelop its missile program but does not seek nuclear warheads<\/a>. Still, in January 2020,\nIran threatened to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)<\/a> which gives the International\nAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full authority to monitor its nuclear program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tehran blames the EU3 for the latest\ndevelopments. The EU3, China and Russia agreed to deliver humanitarian aid to\nIran under the nuclear deal, and set up financial mechanisms for future trade.\nBut the Instrument<\/a> in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX<\/a>) set up by Europe for this\npurpose is in disarray because of US sanctions despite efforts to implement<\/a> it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The United States could push for new\nUN sanctions against Iran. On December 5, 2019, President Donald Trump<\/a> asked the UNSC to take\nmeasures against Iran. The United States is also entertaining unilaterally\ntriggering the so-called snapback of UN sanctions on Iran. UN Resolution 2231\nencourages but does not require the resolution of disputes under the nuclear\ndeal\u2019s dispute resolution mechanism, and the United States could push the UNSC\nto enforce all UN sanctions on Iran while the EU3 and Iran work out the dispute\nmechanisms under the nuclear deal. A referral to the UNSC triggering the\nsnapbackof UN sanctions would\npermit any UNSC member, including the United States, to veto the lifting of\nsanctions on Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There will be a divisive outcome at\nthe UNSC if member states such as Russia and China decide to veto further\nsanctions against Iran or to ignore the sanctions altogether. The EU does not\nwant to refer Iran to the UNSC yet. A joint statement said it aimed to resolve\nthe impasse through diplomatic<\/a> dialogue. But the EU may\neventually comply with US<\/a> demands to exert pressure<\/a> on Iran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n If the UNSC remains divided in the\nfuture, Iran could be empowered to carry on with its nuclear plans. Russia<\/a> has warned against the\nEU3-led dispute resolution mechanism being triggered, saying the time frame for\na resolution should be extend<\/a>ed given the complexity of\nthe issues. In February, the joint commission under the nuclear deal will meet\nto coordinate technical<\/a> discussions to resolve concerns\nover Iran\u2019s nuclear program. In a new twist to this ongoing saga, the EU3 has\nnow said that it won\u2019t be referring<\/a> Iran to the UNSC at this\nmoment in time and wants to extend indefinitely the time frame for resolving\nthe dispute with Iran under the JCPOA. This EU3 position is likely to increase\ntensions with the US which continues with its maximum pressure strategy and\nescalation against Iran. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On January 14, the French, British, and German (EU3) ambassadors sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres highlighting that Iran\u2019s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles violated UN Resolution 2231 (2015). The move brings Iran closer to being referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Two days before the release of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":7502,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[4212,12,3146,2667,55,708,1257,1230],"class_list":["post-7501","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-countdown","tag-iran","tag-iranian-nuclear","tag-irannucleardeal","tag-nuclear","tag-nuclear-deal","tag-nuclear-program","tag-nuclear-weapons"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7501","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7501"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7501\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9250,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7501\/revisions\/9250"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7502"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7501"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7501"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7501"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}