{"id":7658,"date":"2020-02-23T16:07:39","date_gmt":"2020-02-23T13:07:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=7658"},"modified":"2020-02-23T16:08:17","modified_gmt":"2020-02-23T13:08:17","slug":"the-shiite-house-the-position-of-religious-elite-on-the-iraqi-and-lebanese-protests","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/centre-for-researches-and-studies\/the-shiite-house-the-position-of-religious-elite-on-the-iraqi-and-lebanese-protests\/","title":{"rendered":"The Shiite House: The Position of Religious Elite on the Iraqi and Lebanese Protests"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>The Iraqi and Lebanese uprisings reflected the\ninherent philosophical and juristic dispute between the Shiite religious\nMarjayas. These disputes are&nbsp; between the\ntaqlidians&nbsp; and the reformists, as well\nas Najaf and Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The reformists whose\nroots can be traced back to Ayatollah Naini, the theorist of constitutionalism,\naspire for&nbsp; a civil state with&nbsp; genuine&nbsp;\nfreedoms and popular sovereignty; They deal with the actual homeland and its&nbsp; borders. In contrast, the fundamentalists of\nthe Iranian religious elite view&nbsp; the\nconstitutional approachwith suspicion. They\nfavor the anti-constitutional&nbsp; <em>Almostabedah<\/em>&nbsp; current led by Fazlollah Nouri. However, they are pragmatic in what they favour. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The disputes between the\ntwo currents are\nhistorical at the&nbsp; philosophical and juristic levels. There\nare disputes regarding the role of governance in\njurisprudence as well as disputes regarding various\nother political issues. One current seeks to establish a\nmodern civil state that governs on the basis of laws stipulated in the\nconstitution and through the use of institutions. The\nother&nbsp; believes that it is necessary\nto&nbsp; establish a religious state\nacting&nbsp; on behalf of the Infallible Imam\nuntil he appears.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There is another&nbsp; serious&nbsp;\ndispute between the fundamentalist activists and the&nbsp; reformists&nbsp;\n(i.e. between&nbsp; the Taqlids&nbsp;\nthemselves). The Taqlid&nbsp;\nactivists&nbsp; who are Iranian\nreligious loyalists&nbsp; view the Najafi\nTaqlids with suspicion. They consider them as a negative element that\nopposes the\nsincere expression of the Husseiniya revolution.\nThis dispute can be traced back&nbsp; to\nAyatollah Muhsin al-Hakim and Khomeini while he was in Najaf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the\nrelationship between all of these currents&nbsp;\nis not only limited&nbsp; to doctrinal\nthought and convictions, but there are also&nbsp;\nnetworks of political and economic interests and influence that have\nbeen established. These interests have become an influential determinant of the\nrelationship between these currents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If the Najaf supreme\nauthority does not believe in the Guardianship of the Jurist, nor political\naction in the absence of the Infallible Imam, it does&nbsp; express its opinion on pivotal events in Iraq. It is not usually&nbsp; concerned about issuing statements on <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/what%27s+happening+outside\">what&#8217;s\nhappening outside<\/a> Iraq. This however&nbsp; contradicts the Iranian religious elite that\nbelieves in the Guardianship of the Jurist and its centrality&nbsp; since it is perceived as an integral part\nof&nbsp; the Shiite doctrine. Iran\u2019s supreme leader\ndominates&nbsp; all other jurists. The Najaf\nMarjaya&nbsp; also does not believe in&nbsp; the Guardianship of the Jurist, the Shura\nCouncil of Jurists, or in any theory that\ndefines its powers or divides it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This firm belief of the\nreligious elite\u2019s <em>loyalists<\/em> [who believe in the Velayat-e Faqih, i.e. the Jurist\nGuardianship] has motivated them to view &nbsp;Iraqi Shiites, the Lebanese, and local Shiite\ngroups as subjects of the supreme leader. It deals with them in the same manner\nthat it does with Iranian society&nbsp; in the framework of&nbsp; guardianship.&nbsp;\nRevolution, hegemony, expansion and\nsectarianism&nbsp; are<strong>&nbsp; <\/strong>priorities for the\nloyalists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Therefore, we found\ndeep&nbsp; divergence&nbsp; between the Shiite religious elites\nregarding&nbsp; the October uprisings or&nbsp; revolutions in Iraq and Lebanon. The Iranians\ndid not pay attention to the suffering of the people; therefore, as usual,&nbsp; they attributed the whole matter to\nconspiracy theories and external elements&nbsp;\nresponsible for fueling all the demonstrations that threaten their\ninterests, security and borders. However,&nbsp;\nlocal jurists from among the reformists and taqlidis supported these demonstrations\nbecause they were <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/spontaneous\">spontaneous<\/a>. These demonstrations were triggered&nbsp; by elite corruption, and Iranian domination in these two countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this study, we seek\nto clarify&nbsp; the positions of the clergy\nas well as the scholars of&nbsp; the seminaries on&nbsp; the October uprisings in Iraq and Lebanon,\nand the impact of these positions on the relationship between the Shiite sect and\nthe Iranian religious elite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Introduction: The Roots\nof the Uprisings<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On\nOctober&nbsp; 1,\n2019, the uprising in Iraq, which&nbsp; was\nconsidered the biggest since the US invasion of 2003, erupted against\ncorruption, unemployment, and Iranian hegemony. They&nbsp; were concentrated in Baghdad and&nbsp;&nbsp; the central and southern&nbsp; cities of Iraq with&nbsp; a high Shiite <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/density\">density<\/a>. The demonstrators chanted slogans against Iran\nand the supreme leader, such as:\n&#8220;Iran out out.&#8221; They also burned pictures of Khomeini and Khamenei\nand some pro-Iranian leaders.<a href=\"#_edn1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The demonstrations extended to central Shiite capitals such as\nNajaf and Karbala, and agitated the public against Iran and the supreme leader.\nOn October 28, security forces broke up a sit-in&nbsp; protest in&nbsp;\nKarbala, one of the central Shiite capitals, killing at least 14, and\nwounding more than 100 protestors.<a href=\"#_edn2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a>&nbsp; On November 3, Shiite&nbsp; demonstrators attempted to storm the Iranian\nconsulate in Karbala. They burnt the Iranian flag and&nbsp; images of the supreme leader and chanted\nslogans against Iranian hegemony.<a href=\"#_edn3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The crisis dates back before October 2019. In September 2018, for\nexample, large demonstrations erupted in Basra city against water pollution and\ncorruption, and the lack of&nbsp; water in the\ncity due to the Iranian policy towards Iraq&nbsp;\nof building dams and thus preventing&nbsp;\nthe flow of water to Iraqi lands. The demonstrators burned the Iranian\nconsulate in Basra, and raised slogans denouncing Iran.<a href=\"#_edn4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> In\naddition, protests were&nbsp; held in June 2019.<a href=\"#_edn5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a>\nIn August and September 2019, hundreds of Master\u2019s degree and PhD graduates\nprotested in front of the Iraqi government\nin the center of Baghdad. The security forces\nsuppressed them and broke up their sit-in by force, and the Supreme Marjaya\ncondemned the use of force against the protesters at the time. A fact-finding\ncommittee was formed to investigate the reasons and dimensions of the use of\nforce against the protesters.<a href=\"#_edn6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At that time, the protesters nor their demands were seriously dealt with since the government bet\non the factor of time and the demonstrations fading away. Remarkably, chants\nagainst Iran were reiterated&nbsp; in most of\nthese waves of protest that erupted&nbsp;\nmainly in Shiite cities, or in areas of high Shiite density. However,\ndemonstrations held in 2013 in cities with a high concentration of Sunnis did\nnot include chants against Iran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the Lebanese level, another significant uprising erupted on\nThursday evening, October 17, 2019, against the government, corruption and the\nintroduction of new taxes. Just two days after the outbreak of the\ndemonstrations, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech on\nSaturday October 19. Nasrallah\u2019s speech&nbsp;\nrejected all the demands of the demonstrators, particularly: the\nformation of a technocratic government, or the holding of new parliamentary\nelections. Hassan Nasrallah clearly threatened to mobilise his supporters\nagainst the protesters. He said:\n\u201cYou will find us all on the streets and changing all the equations.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a>\nThe Lebanese army issued an official statement after Nasrallah&#8217;s speech, siding\nwith the demonstrators, and confirming its solidarity with their demands.<a href=\"#_edn8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In response to Nasrallah&#8217;s threats, thousands&nbsp; of protesters took to the streets in defiance. They&nbsp; chanted against him, condemning him as one of&nbsp; the corrupt figures.<a href=\"#_edn9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> It is noteworthy that the city of Nabatieh in southern Lebanon, which has a large Shiite population&nbsp; and is affiliated with Hezbollah, witnessed massive demonstrations. This indicates the fragility of the popular incubators of Hezbollah, which it has sought to increase in recent years.<a href=\"#_edn10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n<p><span style=\"color: #333399;\"><strong data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">I-The Position of the Iranian Religious Elites Towards the Iraqi and Lebanese Uprisings<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n<p>Initially, the Iranian\nposition regarding the Iraqi and Lebanese demonstrations diverged. On the one\nhand, it adopted&nbsp; a hostile and &nbsp;firm position against the Iraqi demonstrations, and&nbsp; a calmer disposition towards the Lebanese demonstrations on the other hand. As\nboth uprisings continued, the Iranian official\nposition, represented by the highest religious and political authority Ali\nKhamenei, was sharper and more negative, as the uprisings threatened to\nlimit&nbsp; Iranian sectarian and political\ninfluence in the region, particularly if the main goals of the two uprisings- rejecting&nbsp;\nsectarianism and quotas, and building a modern civil state- succeeded.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><strong><em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">1.The Position of the Supreme Leader: Jurisprudence of Blood<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<p>In the beginning of the first wave of the Iraqi demonstrations on\nOctober 1<sup>, <\/sup>2019, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in an official tweet,\nsaid: \u201cThe enemies are seeking to drive a wedge between Iraq and Iran, to no avail.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a>\nHe completely disregarded the more than 100 martyrs who died during the first wave of demonstrations. This&nbsp; raises deep questions about the jurisprudence\nof blood of&nbsp; the ruling religious elite.\nIf we review the religious and juristic sayings of these elites, we will find\nthat bloodshed is justified and legitimized in the framework of preserving the Islamic state and the Guardianship of the\nJurist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi<a href=\"#_edn12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a>\nbelieves that the use of force is mandatory to maintain the Islamic government,\neven if it has been rejected by more than half of the people. He said :&nbsp; \u201cA\nnumber is not a standard for maintaining&nbsp; the\ngovernment. Rather, the standard is when a number of followers of the Imam,\npeace be upon him, or the legitimate state of the jurist provide support for\nmaintaining the government. Sometimes the percentages of these groups constitute 90 percent, 50\npercent, or 40 percent of the people. He is the guardian jurist, who is\ncommanded to maintain the Islamic government. As&nbsp; long as there is a person who&nbsp; can&nbsp; maintain the Islamic government, he is\nobligated to maintain it. A number has no\nvalue any more.<a href=\"#_edn13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a>\nThe government must remain, even if it has only 10 percent of supporters, in any form and by any means.<a href=\"#_edn14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a>\nIf the Islamic goals can be achieved only through violence, then it&nbsp; becomes necessary.<a href=\"#_edn15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In addition, extrajudicial killings must be implemented&nbsp; without&nbsp;\nreference to the court,<a href=\"#_edn16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a>\nin order to protect the Islamic values of the state.<a href=\"#_edn17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a>\nThis can enable the guardian jurist to take over the state. He therefore has\nthe power to choose who\nhas the right&nbsp; to live in the land\nor&nbsp; otherwise. Every Iranian living on\nIranian territory must believe&nbsp; in the\nGuardianship of the Islamic Jurist. According to Yazdi, \u201cIf you want to live in\nthis country, you must accept the Islamic state even if it uses power against\nyou . Whoever opposes the Islamic state is condemned\nand should be fought, even if only one person is left in this country.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If this reflects the\nideology of the Iranian ruling religious elite towards the sanctity of the\npeople inside Iran, it is clear that this\nposition is even more brutal against\nprotesters who threaten the influence of the\nGuardianship&nbsp; of the Jurist in the\nregion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After the second wave of protests on October 25 which left over 60\npeople dead and more than 2,000 wounded, on Wednesday October 30, 2019, the\nIranian supreme leader&nbsp; commented on the\ndemonstrations in Iraq and Lebanon during the graduation ceremony of cadets\nheld at Khatam al-Anbia Air Defense University. He said, \u201cThe rightful demands\nof the people can be met through the\nlegal channels in their countries.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a>\nHe added, \u201cThe biggest blow that enemies can strike\nagainst any&nbsp; country is to take away\nits&nbsp; security, which they started&nbsp; in some countries of the region. I recommend\nthose who care about Iraq and Lebanon to address the riots and insecurity&nbsp; inflicted&nbsp;\nby America, the Zionist entity and some Western countries via the money\nof some reactionary countries.\u201d <a href=\"#_edn20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Despite the Iranian supreme leader\u2019s use of the word \u201criots\u201d in his recorded\nspeech which is available&nbsp; on his\nofficial website, and after the outrage expressed by Iraqis over the use of\nthis word, a member of the Assembly of Experts\nSheikh Abbas al Kaabi denied the supreme leader&#8217;s use of this word: \u201cHis\nEminence did not use the word (riots) in describing peaceful demonstrations and\nprotests in Lebanon and Iraq. He even stated that people&#8217;s demands are\nrightful. Improving living conditions,\nfighting corruption, and ensuring justice are\namong the most important duties of the state and one of the most important rights of the people. His Eminence also indicated that public\ndemands can be met through existing legal frameworks.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the words of the supreme leader were clear and&nbsp; <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/is+unequivocal\">unequivocal<\/a>. To further&nbsp;\nunderstand the dimensions of his speech\nand his intent, all his statements need to be\ncomprehended as well as those of the Iranian\nreligious, political and military elites related to the Iraqi and Lebanese\nuprisings.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><strong>2.<em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">The Position of the Head of the Judiciary<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<p>Commenting on the first wave of the Iraqi\nuprising, Hojjat al-Islam<a href=\"#_edn22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a>Ibrahim\nRaisi, head of the judiciary and the most prominent candidate to succeed\nKhamenei, said that these demonstrations were an American-Saudi sedition, to\ncause chaos and prevent Iraqis from participating in the Arbaeen pilgrimage. The same speech&nbsp;\nwas repeated&nbsp; by Yahya Rahim\nSafavi, the supreme leader\u2019s military adviser, and a number of Iranian\nofficials.<a href=\"#_edn23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To discuss the Arbaeen pilgrimage within the context of the protests is an\nattempt to sectarianize the issue,provoke sectarianism, and remind protesters in\nShiite majority communities of their sect, as well as to&nbsp;\nhighlight&nbsp; the risks threatening\nthe Shiite sect and community, because of these demonstrations!<\/p>\n\n\n<p><strong><em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">3.The Position of the Friday Imam of Tehran<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<p>On October 4, 2019 \u2013 the first Friday following&nbsp; the first wave of Iraqi protests \u2013 Ayatollah\nEmami-Kashan, Friday Imam of Tehran, commenting on the demonstrations, stated:\n\u201cThe enemy pays attention to the Arbaeen pilgrimage&nbsp; and Iraq\nand creates trouble because the issue of Arbaeen\nis tough on them. What is tough on&nbsp; the enemy is that&nbsp; more or less than 20 million people head to\nKarbala. The reason for&nbsp; this opposition\nis that Hussein\u2019s banner calls for&nbsp;\nmartyrdom and steadfastness. This banner awakens nations to stand against\noppression. It includes \u2018we will never&nbsp;accept,&nbsp;humiliation.\u2019\nAll the groups that participate in the Arbaeen pilgrimage&nbsp; embody those\nthat will never&nbsp;accept&nbsp;humiliation, and the enemy does not want to\nsee that. With the help of God, the issues and problems that have emerged&nbsp; will be resolved, and the masses will\nparticipate in the 40<sup>th<\/sup> march.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There&nbsp; are important nuances that must be comprehended in this sermon, most importantly: the Friday Imam of Tehran drew a link between the demonstrations of Iraq and espionage for a foreign country, as if the Iraqi people were not protesting against living conditions and political corruption. He also drew a link between the demonstrations and the Arbaeen pilgrimage, provoking sectarian sentiments.<br> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The most significant contradiction in the Imam of Tehran\u2019s Friday\nsermon was his talk of martyrdom and steadfastness, and the Shiite slogan of \u201cwe will\nnever&nbsp;accept&nbsp;humiliation\u201d in the\ncontext of the Iraqi demonstrations.&nbsp; He\nused the Shiite slogan to describe Iranians who will not accept humiliation\nfrom Iraqi protesters by accusing the Iraqis of working as agents of world\noppressors. <a href=\"#_edn25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a>\n&nbsp;Apparently,&nbsp; this slogan is used by the Iranian religious\nelite against its sectarian and political opponents only. Ironically,&nbsp; if this slogan is&nbsp; used against&nbsp;\nit, the religious elite would never accept this, as it is only used in\naccordance with the &nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/exigencies\">exigencies<\/a>&nbsp; of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist based on its Khomeinist style!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Kashani believes that martyrs\nwho follow the way of God have the true life. He said, \u201cThose who&nbsp; follow the path\nof the martyrs and confront problems and enemies&nbsp; have a true\nlife.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a>\nHowever, the Iraqi revolutionaries do not deserve this real life! Despite this contradiction, it represents the doctrine of\nthe Iranian religious elite, which monopolizes religion, doctrine and the 1979\nrevolution. It is the only one that can&nbsp;\ndecide which regime&nbsp; can be\nopposed, or not, because it speaks on behalf\nof the Infallible Imam. Through this way the Iranian religious elite entrenched\nthe principle of infallibility of the deputy of the&nbsp; Infallible Imam, even though it is not\npermitted <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/juristically\">juristically<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On Friday, October 11, 2019, the Friday Imam of Tehran, Ahmad\nKhatami, delivered a speech during the Friday sermon, saying, \u201cThe enemies of\nthe Iranian people took advantage&nbsp;\nof&nbsp; the wave of protests in Iraq.\nThe enemies of the Iranian people aimed to achieve four goals through these\ndemonstrations: The first goal&nbsp; was to makethe Arbaeen\npilgrimage irrelevant, through the spread of\nfear and terror among the people to stop them\ngoing to this pilgrimage, but they failed to\nachieve this. The second was to\ndisunite the Iranian and Iraqi people. The third goal\nwas to target&nbsp;\nthe axis of the resistance.The\nfourth&nbsp; was to take revenge against&nbsp; some\nIraqi officials who stood&nbsp; against\nthe&nbsp; illegal demands of the Zionist\nentity and America.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Khatami attributed these demonstrations to three sides. The first side is represented by\nAmerica, Britain and Israel. He said that the Zionist entity described the\nIraqi demonstrators as Iraqi <em>revolutionaries<\/em>.\nAccording to Khatami, this description of the demonstrators would distort their\nimage and &nbsp;undermine their demands. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The second side is represented&nbsp;\nby some Arab countries, according to Khatami\u2019s speech; these protests\nare&nbsp; the result&nbsp; of&nbsp; the\nchaos caused by some reactionary Arab countries. These countries seek&nbsp; to spread unrest and chaos in the world!&nbsp; Some\nelements of the Baathists are the third side responsible for&nbsp; wreaking havoc&nbsp; in Iraq.<a href=\"#_edn28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After the second wave of Iraqi protests on October 25, 2019, Ayatollah\nMovahedi-Kermani delivered a Friday sermon in Tehran<a href=\"#_edn29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> on\nNovember 1, saying: \u201cThe point that I should clarify about&nbsp; the Iraqi protests is the influence of some\nof the <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/aberrant\">aberrant<\/a> marjas&nbsp;\nas&nbsp; we call them English Shi\u2019a .\nEspecially, they committed crimes in Karbala, Basra and Amarah. The Iraqi people must keep&nbsp; themselves&nbsp;\naway from them.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a>\nThese attempts&nbsp;\naimed to sectarianize the conflict again by accusing the Shirazis of\nbeing behind the uprising. However, he never acknowledged the thousands of\nmartyrs and the&nbsp; injured demonstrators!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Movahedi-Kermani\nconcluded his sermon with prayers: \u201cWe&nbsp;\nask&nbsp; The Mighty and Majestic&nbsp; to end this strife&nbsp; quickly and for the Lebanese and Iraqi people\nto taste unity quickly. \u201d<a href=\"#_edn31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a>\nWe note here the use of the word \u2018sedition\u2019 used by the Iranian religious\nestablishment to&nbsp; describe everything\nthat threatens their interests, while using the words \u2018revolution\u2019 and\n\u2018uprising\u2019 to describe movements that serve their strategic goals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The common <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/common+denominator\">denominator<\/a>s in all&nbsp;\nthe Tehran Friday sermons regarding the Iraqi and Lebanese\ndemonstrations&nbsp; throughout the months\nof&nbsp; October and November can be\nsummarized as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>1-The demonstrations are\ncaused by the West, America, and Arab countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>2-They lead to chaos and sedition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>3- They are agitated by some elements of the Baathists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>4-They target the\nresistant axis.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>5-They are stirred by the English Shiite.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finally, the position of the clergy does not\ndiffer significantly from the Iranian diplomatic line adopted by the Ministry\nof Foreign Affairs in its official statements,<a href=\"#_edn32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> and\nin the&nbsp; statements of&nbsp; security officials. According to one of the\ncommanders of the special units of the Iranian police, these demonstrations are\ndesigned to weaken&nbsp; the resistance front\nin the region, which is the greatest achievement of the Islamic Republic.<a href=\"#_edn33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n<p><span style=\"color: #333399;\"><strong>II-The Iranian Ways of Dealing&nbsp; With the Two Uprisings<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n<p>After Khamenei&#8217;s speech and the negative responses from the&nbsp; political and religious elites regarding the\nIraq demonstrations, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also got\ninvolved in this matter. According to a Reuters report, senior IRGC officers\nwith experience in containing civil unrest met during the protests with Iraqi\nsecurity officials, and Iranian advisers warned that&nbsp; if the demonstrations continued, they would&nbsp; undermine&nbsp;\nthe government.<a href=\"#_edn34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a>\nTherefore, there was a <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/deliberate+intention\">deliberate\nintention<\/a>&nbsp; to kill the\ndemonstrators as was stated by Haider al-Abadi, the former Iraqi Prime\nMinister, who is&nbsp; undoubtedly familiar\nwith what is going on inside&nbsp; the Iraqi\nstate.<a href=\"#_edn35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a>\nApparently, Iranian experts made their recommendations early on from the first\nday of the Iraqi uprising. Therefore, the demonstrations were&nbsp; dealt with using several means which were\nused previously&nbsp; in response to the\nDecember 2017 protests in Iran. These included the following:<\/p>\n\n\n<p><strong>1.<em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">Sniping and Direct Killing<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<p>The&nbsp; death toll in the first\nwave of demonstrations in Iraq at the beginning of October was&nbsp; over 100 with nearly 4,000 demonstrators&nbsp; wounded, some of whom were in critical\ncondition.<a href=\"#_edn36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a>\nIn the second wave of Iraqi demonstrations that erupted on&nbsp; October 25, more than 60 protesters were\nkilled and over&nbsp; 2,000 were injured.<a href=\"#_edn37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a>\nIn addition, dozens were killed and injured in between the two waves, and after\nthe second wave, in Karbala, Najaf, Baghdad, and the central cities.<a href=\"#_edn38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Iraqi government has officially denied that its security\nforces faced&nbsp; the protesters with live\nbullets, and stated\nthat it will launch&nbsp; a full&nbsp; investigation into the killing of the demonstrators.\nThis supports&nbsp;\nthe Reuters report that the snipers who participated in the killing of\nthe protesters are affiliated to militias under the umbrella of the guardian\njurist&nbsp; rather than&nbsp; the regular security forces,<a href=\"#_edn39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a>\nparticularly in the massacre witnessed during the first wave of the uprising.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><strong>2.<em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">Preventing Access to the Internet and Curfews<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<p>The Iraqi government blocked internet access across the country\nand imposed a curfew&nbsp; on Thursday,\nOctober 3, 2019, in fear of further demonstrations on Friday, October 4.<a href=\"#_edn40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a>\nHowever, thousands of demonstrators broke the curfew and took to the squares\nwhere they demonstrate,\nthereby rendering the government\u2019s measures ineffective.<a href=\"#_edn41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a>\nCurfews were imposed&nbsp; repeatedly\nthroughout the uprising but the government\u2019s efforts to&nbsp; prevent the demonstrations&nbsp; failed again. None of these measures were effective in&nbsp;\npreventing&nbsp; the revolutionaries\nfrom demonstrating in almost all Iraqi cities. The voices of the demonstrators\nresonated across the country. <\/p>\n\n\n<p><em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">&nbsp;<strong>2.Bloodbaths<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n<p>The demonstrations in Iraq turned into bloodbaths, according to\nAmnesty International reports. The demonstrators were intimidated and\nthreatened, both physically and psychologically, with prosecution, arrest,\ndismissal from government jobs, kidnapping, and other extrajudicial acts.<a href=\"#_edn42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n<p><strong><em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">3.With Regard to the Lebanese Uprising<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;Hezbollah\u2019s militias assaulted the\ndemonstrators. In addition,&nbsp;&nbsp; the\ndemonstrators were accused of espionage and\ntreason&nbsp; by the media and those&nbsp; loyal to Hezbollah.<a href=\"#_edn43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This treatment&nbsp; toward the\nIraqi and Lebanonese uprisings, especially the Iraqi demonstrations, by the\nIran-backed militias and Iranian military advisers, according to Reuters, is in\ncomplete alignment with the religious and ideological rhetoric of the ruling\nelite in Iran, and its vision of the position of the guardian of the jurist,elections and popular sovereignty.\nThis is illustrated above in the words of Mesbah Yazdi and others, which&nbsp; describe the position\ntaken towards&nbsp;\nthe demonstrators, despite their affiliation with&nbsp; the Shiite sect.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><span style=\"color: #333399;\"><strong data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">III-The Position of the Religious Marjaya in Najaf<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n<p>The position of Najaf diverged from that of\nTehran increasingly. However, it is noticed&nbsp;\nthat the strongest&nbsp; statement was\nissued&nbsp; by&nbsp; Najaf after the demonstrators were accused of\nespionage&nbsp; by the Iranian leader Ali\nKhamenei. Ayatollah Sistani \u2013 in what was considered a response to Iranian\ninterference \u2013 said: \u201cNo party or regional or international actor has\nthe right to confiscate the will of the Iraqis,\u201d<a href=\"#_edn44\"><sup>[44]<\/sup><\/a> in\nreference to Khamenei&#8217;s accusations of espionage.&nbsp; and the need for legal methods to be\npursued. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the same day that\nSistani said these words which warned of external interference leading to the\nwill of the Iraqis being usurped,\nthe Friday Imam of Tehran said that Iraq was exposed to&nbsp; a conspiracy!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If we consider the\nsequence of events, we find that the position of the Supreme Marjaya in Najaf\nis firm and clear towards supporting the demonstrations. At the same time, the\nmarjaya in Najaf is not a solid institution, and it cannot&nbsp; engage with the Iranians in an open clash\nthat could lead&nbsp; to consequences, such as\nconfrontation with militias on the\nground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On Friday, October 4, after the events witnessed in the first wave of protests, it\nwas stated in the Friday sermon of the Supreme Marjaya: &#8220;Things must be\nrectified before it is too late.&#8221; Regarding the violence, it mentioned:\n\u201cThere are unacceptable and condemned attacks against\npeaceful demonstrators and the security forces. The government must change its\napproach when&nbsp; dealing with the country&#8217;s\nproblems. The government should fulfill its duties, do its best&nbsp; to improve public services, provide job\nopportunities for the unemployed, end&nbsp;\nfavoritism in public jobs, and complete the cases of&nbsp;&nbsp;those who are charged with\ncorruption and bring them to justice.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn45\"><sup>[45]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On Friday, October 11, Sheikh Abdul-Mahdi Al-Karbalai, the\nrepresentative of Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, said during the Friday\nsermon in Karbala that \u201cthe government and its security services are\nresponsible for the great bloodshed that was spilt in the demonstrations in the\npast days,\u201d He&nbsp; set a two-week deadline\nfor the authorities to announce the results of their investigations.<a href=\"#_edn46\"><sup>[46]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the Friday sermon&nbsp; on\nOctober 25, when the second wave of the uprising broke out, the Marjaya stated:\n\u201cThe real reform, and the desired change for the management of the country,\nshould be demanded&nbsp; through&nbsp; peaceful means. Corruption should be fought,\nand the privileges of senior officials should be abolished. The report of the\ninvestigation committee regarding the previous demonstrations did not achieve\nthe expected goal, nor did it reveal the facts. Accordingly, we call for\nforming an independent judicial body to follow up the demonstrations, limit\narms to the state, enact a\nnew electoral law, and challenge external interference in the affairs of the\ncountry vigorously.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn47\"><sup>[47]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Although the Marjaya called for a resolute approach to address\nexternal interference, the Iranian supreme leader spoke on Iraqi affairs in a\nspeech on Wednesday, October 30. According to his official website, he\n\u201crecommended those who are keen on the two countries to address the riots run\nby America and the Zionist entity.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn48\"><sup>[48]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the first Friday sermon of November, the Supreme Marjaya reiterated its advice to the\nstate not to use violence against the\ndemonstrators, and not to send its security\nforces to confront the young. Also, the\nSupreme Marjaya implicitly denounced Iranian interference \u2013 especially the statements\nof the supreme leader who described the events in Iraq as riots. The\nMarjaya&nbsp; stated: \u201cThe religious marjaya\nreiterates&nbsp; its well-known position on\ncondemning ill-treatment against&nbsp;&nbsp;\npeaceful demonstrators and all kinds of unjustified violence, and&nbsp; holding necessarily&nbsp; those responsible to account. It also&nbsp; calls upon&nbsp;\nthe relevant authorities on not involving any combat forces in dealing\nwith sit-ins and peaceful demonstrations, for fear of further violence.\nRespecting the will of Iraqis to define the political and administrative regime\nof their country by conducting a public referendum on the Constitution and\nperiodic elections to the House of Representatives is the principle that the\nreligious marjaya committed to and reiterated since the regime changed over.\nToday, it affirms that reform is an imperative necessity \u2013 as has been\ndiscussed more than one time.&nbsp; However,\nnecessary reform in this regard is also mandated to the Iraqi people\u2019s choice\nwith all its communities throughout the country. No person, group or party with\na specific orientation or any regional or international party&nbsp; has the right to confiscate the will of the\nIraqis and impose his opinion on them.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn49\"><sup>[49]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The position of the other marjayas did not differ from Sistani\u2019s.\nThe&nbsp; representative of Ayatollah Najafi\nsaid: \u201cOur position with regard to the demonstrations in Iraq and the Iraqi\ngovernment and the challenges facing Iraq is similar to what was presented\nthrough the Friday sermons held at the Imam Husayn Shrine. Najaf has always\nidentified the mistakes in the Iraqi state, drew the attention of its officials\nto these mistakes and revealed the need to find appropriate solutions to them.\nIt is imperative to find appropriate solutions to these problems and provide a\ndecent life for Iraqi citizens.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn50\"><sup>[50]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A statement from the Iraqi religious authority on Saturday,\nNovember 9, 2019 denied what was reported in the media about an agreement\nbetween the marjaya and political forces to keep the government of Abdul-Mahdi\nin power and end the ongoing protests. The statement stressed that the position\nof the religious marjaya towards the popular protests, as well as its\nrelationship and dealings with them was what was announced clearly in the\nFriday sermons. \u201cI have informed all of those that contacted me in this regard.\nAll of what has been associated with\nour position otherwise is for political exploitation\nby some parties and is baseless.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn51\"><sup>[51]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A statement of the marjaya&nbsp;\nwas issued on Monday, November 11, 2019 after Ayatollah Sistani received\nMrs. Jenin Hennes Blachart, Head of the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI).\nIt included the marjaya\u2019s\nreiteration of the people&#8217;s right to protest,\nand that the protesters will not return to\ntheir homes until their demands are met. In\naddition, it called for an end to external\ninterference. Ayatollah Sistani concluded: \u201cThe situation cannot remain as it\nwas before the recent protests.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn52\"><sup>[52]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We note that the marjaya\nreiterated its rejection\nof external interference and the right of the people to demonstrate peacefully.\nThis was because the marjaya felt embarrassed in\nfront of the people as the dead and injured\nwere very large in number. This put the marjaya in confrontation with the\ndemonstrators who called for a fatwa from the marjaya to protect them from the\noppression of the security forces and the pro-Iranian militias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The most important\npoints that the Supreme Marjaya focused on in all Friday sermons:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Preventing foreign parties from interfering in Iraqi affairs.<\/li><li>Forming independent judicial committees to investigate the\nprotests.<\/li><li>Rejecting violence against\nprotesters, and vice versa.<\/li><li>Limiting\nthe bearing of weapons to the state. <\/li><li>Fulfilling\nthe legitimate demands of the protestors.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>We did not find any\nterms related to conspiracy, espionage, riots, British Shiism, and\nZionist-American plots as\ncited in the speeches and statements of Iranian religious elites. However, the\nposition of the Najaf Supreme Marjaya is not expected to go further than&nbsp; denunciations and the issuance of statements,\nas was the case in previous events such as the demonstrations in Basra that\nwere met with live bullets<a href=\"#_edn53\"><sup>[53]<\/sup><\/a>\nand other demonstrations in which the marjaya resorted only to statements and\ndenunciations. This is because Iraq\u2019s religious marjaya has spiritual authority\nover the Iraqi political arena, i.e., it does not have power over Iraqi public\naffairs like that of the Velayat-e Faqih in\nIran. It is not one of the solid state institutions that can challenge some of\nthe armed militias affiliated with Iran. Therefore, the marjaya always calls\nfor restricting arms to the state. In addition, there is also the intermingling\nof some interests and influence of the clergy, which threatens the networks of\neconomic and political interests as a whole if there are fundamental changes in\nthe core of the Iraqi constitution and patterns of the relationship between\njurists and politicians that have been established in the period from 2003\nonwards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this context, the\nIranian government\u2019s decision to stop religious trips to Shiite religious\nshrines in Iraq appeared to be a disciplinary action against Najaf for its\nsupportive position of the demonstrators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Iranian television quoted from a source in the Iranian Supreme\nLeader Ali Khamenei\u2019s office ,\nsaying that \u201csecurity is not available at the present time for Iranian visitors\nto come over.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn54\"><sup>[54]<\/sup><\/a>\nThis may be part of a message to the supreme marjaya that ongoing\ndemonstrations will decrease the income of religious sites in Najaf and\nKarbala. The economic situation of the Iraqi religious marjaya was also\naffected, because the financial resources of&nbsp;\nthe Shiite shrines in Najaf and Karbala depend mainly on the numbers of\nIranian tourists. This event had happened before when Raza Khan (1878-1944)\ncame to power in Iran in 1925 and prevented Iranians from visiting Najaf and\nKarbala. He therefore stopped financial support for the Najaf Hawza, which\ncaused great suffering to religious scholars and made it difficult to fund\nHawza schools and students as well as existing projects belonging to the\nmarjaya. The Shah set conditions to agree to reimbursing the money, including the identity of the people on who the\nmoney would be spent. Isfahani and Mirza Al-Naini complained about not\nreceiving funds and legal entitlements from\nIran. They stated that what they received in funds was from Afghanistan and Zanzibar. There was a clear\ndestabilization in the financial situationthat&nbsp; resulted in a significant number of Hawza students leaving the seminary.When Nasir al-Din Shah (1831-1896)\nvisited Najaf, Mirza Al-Shirazi refused to meet him. The rest of the Najaf scholars\nwelcomed him, and their relationship withAl-Shirazi became strained because of his\ntough position on the Shah. The Najaf scholars were afraid to tackle&nbsp;&nbsp; the economic\nconsequences stemming from the Shah\u2019s policies\nbecause of Al-Shirazi&#8217;s position.<a href=\"#_edn55\"><sup>[55]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to one Shiite thinker: \u201cThe economy of Najaf and its\ncentral image in Iraq and Iran, and its distinction from other cities under the\nOttoman authority, were largely the outcome of such visits carried out by\nprominent leaders and people. A quick reading of the history of the holy cities\nis enough to discover that important urban projects were established there as a\nresult of the visits of leaders of this type, especially from the kings and\nprinces of Iran.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn56\"><sup>[56]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In any case, the Iranian\ndecision to prevent Iranian visitors from traveling to Iraq\u2019s Shiite shrines&nbsp; sends a message to the Supreme Marjaya in\nNajaf, and to dignitaries, merchants and officials in Najaf and Karbala. It\nreflects <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/implicit+recognition\">implicit\nrecognition<\/a> of the demonstrations\nand their effectiveness, as well as how far they spread. It includes\nrecognition that Iranian presence and influence are being targeted even in the\nheart of Shiite capitals.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><span style=\"color: #333399;\"><strong>IV-Independent and Reformist Clergy<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n<p>There are a large number of clerics who are neither affiliated\nwith the Najaf Marjaya nor are they totally affiliated with the Iranian state.\nThey supported the demonstrations, and some of them participated in them.<br>\n<br>\nThe Lebanese cleric Sheikh Yasser Auda, one of the reformist clerics and students of Hussein\nFadlallah, announced his solidarity from the first day of the Lebanese and\nIraqi demonstrations and participated himself in the Lebanese uprising on\nOctober 17, 2019.<a href=\"#_edn57\"><sup>[57]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the first uprising of Iraqis on October 1, 2019, Sheikh Yasser\nAuda said: \u201cDoes the Hussein government loot? Is the Hussein government a\nthief? Does the Hussein government&nbsp;\nkill&nbsp; people in cold blood?\u201d<a href=\"#_edn58\"><sup>[58]<\/sup><\/a>\nHis statement was a reference to the widespread corruption of&nbsp; the Iraqi government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After a number of demonstrators were subjected to harassment and\nviolence in Lebanon, Auda said: Peace to all young people rising up, they are\nfree men of Lebanon. I tell them: Keep going, no matter how great the pressure\nis &#8211; and the threat is great &#8211; so that at least your children do not curse you\nas our children did because we were followers of our communities\u2019 leaders. I\nstand by the youth even if they are secular, Christian, Druze, Alevi, or Sunni,\nand no matter what they are I will stay with them because every human has his\nown rights even if he is an infidel. This is what we have learned from Imam\nAli.<a href=\"#_edn59\"><sup>[59]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Sheikh Yasir Auda responded to one of the jurists of Velayat-e\nFaqih who forbade &#8220;the burial of the uprising\u2019s martyrs who were killed by\nthe security forces in Muslim graves because they are apostates of the Islamic\nstate.&#8221;<a href=\"#_edn60\"><sup>[60]<\/sup><\/a>\nThe intended Islamic state here&nbsp; &#8211;\naccording to the loyalists &#8211; is Iran. He also denounced&nbsp; the image distortion and the religious devaluation\nto which protesters were subjected to by saying, \u201cI am an agent for the poor and I\nam an agent for <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/vulnerable+persons\">vulnerable\npersons<\/a>.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn61\"><sup>[61]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Religious marja Sheikh Mohammad al-Yaqoobi, leader of the Fadhila\nParty, announced his support for the demonstrations in a statement and said: \u201cI\nbelieve that one of the most valuable outcomes achieved by the rising of the\nconscious youth, of the liberation uprising, is the restoration of the national\nidentity that sectarians had corrupted and their agents had taken away until\nthey wasted our&nbsp; hope to revive it and\nforced many of the sons of the nations to emigrate, leaving their families,\nmemories and eyes focused on those behind them.\u201d He rejected the use of&nbsp; violence against the demonstrators by saying:\n\u201cInsisting on the policy of repression and the use of violence does not help,\nbut it will lead&nbsp; the country and people\nover the edge and you cannot defeat young people who look for death and take\nbullets with bare breasts.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn62\"><sup>[62]<\/sup><\/a>\nAlthough al-Yaqoobi is affiliated with the elite of the Iraqi government, his\nstatement confirms that the demonstrators forced the Iraqi religious\nestablishment to announce their support. This confirms that the demonstrations\nare of a national consensus, and the religious marjaya within Iraq,&nbsp; did not accuse the demonstrators of\nespionage. They were accused by marjayas outside of Iraq. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>One of the reformist Iraqi clerics who supported the\ndemonstrations was Sheikh Meethaq al-Aeser, who stood for the rights of the protesters and criticized the\nIranian handling of the Iraqi uprising. He\nargued with them depending on the statements of Khomeini and his companions\nof&nbsp; the revolution, and listed some of\nKhomeini\u2019s texts that he was delivering to his followers during the Iranian\nrevolution calling on them to strike and demonstrate and halt public life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Kamal al-Haydari&nbsp;is a marja who supported the demonstrations\nand demanded the dismissal of the government. In one of his lessons, he said :\n\u201cIt is with great regret that the Iraqi people experienced another ordeal\nequally serious to the previous one. A corrupt class dominated political,\neconomic and social conditions, leading the nation to a state of&nbsp; despair and frustration in the homeland. I\nhave repeatedly warned in the past years of the widespread corruption in the\nruling class with all its branches, communities, currents and parties.\nCorruption has become a phenomena in the public life of the country facing no\nreligious or legal deterrence. The demonstrations that erupted and that will\nbreak out are only a natural reaction to this corruption. We declare our\ncomplete support of&nbsp; the demands of the\nprotesters in eliminating this ruling class. We call upon the Iraqi people to restrain any corrupt party that\nhas participated in the corruption -of&nbsp;\nall its communities&nbsp; and marjayas-\nand to participate in the wave of&nbsp; demonstrations and not to waste the rightful demands of the protesters.\u201d <a href=\"#_edn63\"><sup>[63]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Another supporter is the cleric Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin, who has\nsupported the demonstrations in Lebanon and Iraq. He also declared that a civil state has become a popular\ndemand for all.<a href=\"#_edn64\"><sup>[64]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Among those who attacked the Iranian leader and accused him of\nbeing behind the suppression of the Iraqi and Lebanese people is Sheikh Subhi\nal-Tufayli,<a href=\"#_edn65\"><sup>[65]<\/sup><\/a>\nwho accused Iran of sabotaging Iraq and Lebanon.<a href=\"#_edn66\"><sup>[66]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Taqi al-Modarresi is another supporter of the demonstrations since\nday one.<a href=\"#_edn67\"><sup>[67]<\/sup><\/a>\nHe called upon the clergy to advise the government and stand by the people.<a href=\"#_edn68\"><sup>[68]<\/sup><\/a>\nHe reiterated his support for the demonstrations following the recent violent\nevents.<a href=\"#_edn69\"><sup>[69]<\/sup><\/a>\nThere were dozens of Shiite imams and clerics who participated in the\ndemonstrations in Lebanon and Iraq and against the Iranian hegemony and the\nruling elites.<a href=\"#_edn70\"><sup>[70]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There are broad Shiite currents that supported the demonstrators\nand criticized Iranian intervention, such as the Shirazi movement. The\nreligious marjaya of Sadiq Al-Shirazi, the leader of the Shirazis, issued a\nstatement saying, \u201cIt is unfortunate that this Iraq has become a grave &nbsp;of\nthe dead and wounded. In this ongoing and painful tragedy, I am recommending\neveryone to strive to end these massacres which are a shameful incident in\nhistory. I also recommend the government, the army, the police and the security\nforces to make room for peaceful demonstrations of any kind, and to speed up\nthe process of fulfilling the\ndemands of the honorable demonstrators and not to harass them, as what Amir\nal-Mu&#8217;minin, peace be upon him, used to do during his great, fair and virtuous\ngovernment. I also recommend the proud, oppressed, and persistent Iraqi people\n&#8211; who have suffered for the last several decades through unjust governments and\nfrom injustice and tyranny &#8211; to commit themselves to peaceful demonstrations and certainly not to allow those who\ndiscredit them to infiltrate their ranks.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn71\"><sup>[71]<\/sup><\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We conclude that the ruling Iranian religious elite is the only one who looks at&nbsp; the\ndemonstrations as a conspiracy and espionage. The Iranian elite also believes\nthat the demonstrations are funded by international and regional powers. But\nmost of the traditional and reformist local religious elites are aware of the demands\nof the youth and the new generation particularly for\ndemocracy, a civil state, and social justice. Iran, however, has the power on\nthe ground which significantly outweighs&nbsp;\nthat of the religious elites and local hawza that oppose Iranian\nhegemony.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><strong><span style=\"color: #333399;\">V- Implications and Dimensions<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n<p>There are several\nindications that can be gleaned from the Iraqi and Lebanese uprisings, the most\nimportant of which are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>1. The <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/incubators\">Incubators<\/a>&nbsp; of Taqlid&nbsp; and Rebellion Against the Guardian Jurist <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Velayat-e Faqih has\nfaced deep rebellions within the structure of Shiite societies in recent years,\nindicating that there are fundamental changes evolving in the structure of the\nShiite fabric, collective mind, and historical memory towards the Iranian\nreligious elite and its underlying thesis. The transformations in the Iranian\nreligious arena \u2014 led by all Iranians;&nbsp;\nwomen and men, the young and old following the 1979 revolution \u2014&nbsp; have become quite noticeable. They were not\nconfined to one place so that one could claim that the problem is spatial or\ntemporal, but rather the scope of these transformations expanded to include\nthose in positions of influence and the Iranian homeland itself. Those\nrebellions began from inside Iran as individual or factional opposition\nmovements, until they were established as public\ndemands that have clear, political, economic and\nsocial features.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The structure of the collapsing Taqlid&nbsp; can be reviewed internally and externally as\nfollows.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><span data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">A.<\/span><em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">The Collapse of the Taqlid Structure Internally: <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n<p>The Iranian religious elite has been facing massive waves of protest inside Iran which have been going on for years, the last of which took place last year. In January 2018, protesters burned Hawzas and attacked homes of clerics. In reference to the public anger regarding the repression, corruption and theft, Ayatollah Ghiyasuddin Taha Mohammadi said, \u201cDuring the uprising, 60 offices belonging to Friday imams were attacked in most Iranian cities.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn72\"><sup>[72]<\/sup><\/a> In another wave of protests in August 2018, the homes of the clergy were attacked, stones were thrown at some Hawza , and the demonstrators tried to break down their doors and chanted \u201cDeath to the Dictator,\u201d<a href=\"#_edn73\"><sup>[73]<\/sup><\/a> in reference to the supreme leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These internal rebellions and the disrespect of the supreme leader and the religious elite were a violation of the religious\nholiness and the aura that surrounded this elite and the supreme leader., They are in fact rebellions against Taqlid and the\nguardianship of the jurist.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><span data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">B-<\/span><em data-rich-text-format-boundary=\"true\">The Collapse of the Taqlid Structure Externally:<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n<p>Only one year had passed\nsince these internal rebellions erupted when the Iranian religious elite faced\nexternal rebellions at the core of its Shiite crescent in Iraq and Lebanon, its\nhistorical and sectarian spheres of influence, and the central capitals of\nShi&#8217;ism.&nbsp; The Iraqis and the Lebanese,\nincluding a majority of Shiites, rose up against the Iranian supreme leader, the Iranian elite and their local religious and\nmilitia arms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em><strong>2.The Emergence of the Iranian-Najaf Dispute<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The positions of the Hawza and the Shiite religious elites\nregarding the two uprisings that broke out in Iraq and Lebanon in October 2019\ndiverged. In fact,\nthe positions of the Shiite religious elites towards these demonstrations have\nprofound indications in context of the\nhistorical dispute between Najaf and Qom, and between the reformists and the\nTaqlidis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Historically, Najaf does not believe that jurisprudence has a\nmandate over political and civil affairs, except in matters of Ijtihad. Whereas\naccording to the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist with its Khomeinist\nstyle, the mandate of the Iranian supreme leader&nbsp; is not confined within the Iranian borders\nbut extends to all Muslims with all their doctrines and communities and not to\nthe Shiites only. Therefore, the supreme leader is usually called in Iranian official media \u201cthe\nguardian of the Muslims.\u201d According to&nbsp;\nHojjat \u200b\u200bal-Islam Mohsen Kadivar, the geographical boundaries of the Velayat-e Faqih government should\nbe beyond its current borders; however, the current conditions have\nconfined it within&nbsp;\nspecific borders. <a href=\"#_edn74\"><sup>[74]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to the approved approach of the Iranian religious elite and the theorists of the loyalist current, the position of the supreme leader is one of inauguration rather than selection. The role of the Assembly of Experts <strong>is to rubber stamp not select the supreme leader.<\/strong> The Guardianship of the Jurist has an absolute mandate that includes all religious and earthly matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These three dimensions (the mandate of the supreme leader outside\nIran\u2019s borders, the comprehensiveness of the mandate covering religious and earthly\nmatters, and appointment by&nbsp;&nbsp; inauguration rather than selection) are the\nones that govern the philosophy of the religious elite andtheir relationship with&nbsp; the\ndoctrine internally and&nbsp; externally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This philosophy, adopted by the loyalists, is confronted with\ngreat resentment and dissatisfaction from both Najaf and Qom alike. There are\ndeep differences between the two schools &#8211; loyalists and Taqalids &#8211; regarding\nthis political theory and its implications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Iranians loyalists\nhave tried to control Najaf since the success of the revolution in 1979, &nbsp;as the Shah did not pursue this control before because he was\nsecular and did not adopt a dynamic religious movement. He also aimed to transfer\nthe Shiite weight to Najaf away from Qom in order to avoid the ongoing conflict\nwith the clergy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The post-1979 ruling\nsystem is purely religious;&nbsp; it fights\nwith the Najaf Marjaya&nbsp; for control over\nthe Shiite doctrine internally and struggles with religious institutions such\nas Al-Azhar, as well as central Sunni capitals such as Mecca, Medina, Damascus,\nIstanbul, and Cairo, over religion externally. According to the Iranian ruling\nsystem,&nbsp; the main conflict is over&nbsp; competition for the leadership of &nbsp;Islam, its\nrepresentation, and winning loyalty of all Muslims.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Iranians adopted a\npragmatic strategy in this conflict to dominate religion and doctrine, which\nconsisted of two tracks. The first track included the creation of pockets and\nsolid arms similar to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard&#8217;s model, such as the\n\u201cPopular Mobilization Forces\u201d in Iraq, \u201cHezbollah\u201d in Lebanon, and\n\u201cAnsar-allah\u201d in Yemen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The second track involved\nthe creation of a religious environment loyal to\nTehran, parallel to Najaf and a rival to it at the same time, in order to\nweaken Najaf which could be controlled over\ntime and especially after the death&nbsp; of\nthe current Supreme Marjaya&nbsp; represented\nby Ayatollah Sistani. This Marjaya is aware of the complexitiesof the conflict Shiites are going\nthrough and the extent of Iranian pressure. The investment in creating a Shiite crescent was not a coincidence but rather the\nresult of strategic planning worked on by the ruling religious elite since the\nsuccess of the revolution until the present day. One of those close to Khomeini\ncalled it the \u201cShiite sea that extends from the borders of Pakistan to the\nMediterranean.\u201d<a href=\"#_edn75\"><sup>[75]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, this Shiite\nCrescent faces a\nvulnerability that has disturbed Iranians. It has become fragile because of\nIranian foreign policies towards other&nbsp; states and non-state actors, especially in\nregard to political and socio-economic realities in the region,&nbsp; as well as\nsectarianism &#8211; in addition to Iranian national arrogance towards these\nsocieties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This fragility was evident\nin the massive uprising of the Shiite regions of Iraq and Lebanon, the slogans\nused against Iran and the destruction of&nbsp;\nthe images of the Iranian supreme leader. It was also noticeable in the\nattempts to storm Iranian diplomatic headquarters in historic Shiite capitals,\nsuch as what&nbsp; occurred in Najaf and\nKarbala.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The historic dispute\nbetween Najaf and the Khomeinist thesis came to the surface. This dispute has\nbeen ongoing since the time of Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, who differed\nsignificantly with Khomeini when he was in Najaf, then his successor, Ayatollah\nKhoei, who also disagreed&nbsp; with Khomeini\nbut with a deeper confrontation and more intense competition. Today, the\ncurrent dispute is between\nAyatollah Sistani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran has never\nsubmitted to the Najaf Marjaya since the advent of Khomeini, who went to Najaf\nas a dynamic marjaya looking for followers and\ninfluence, not as a taqlidi and a follower of the Najafis. On the other side,\nNajaf also did not submit to the will of the Iranians or their philosophy, and\nlooks upon them with suspicion and doubt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/One+of+the+most+striking+features\">One of\nthe most striking features<\/a>&nbsp;is\nthe people&#8217;s uprising in the central capitals of Shiism against Iranian\nhegemony and its local arms. This Shiite movement is considered the first broad\nrebellion against subordination by the Iranian guardian jurist in the middle of\ncapitals that Iran once considered part of its dynamic and solid spheres.\nHowever, this movement indicates that there was deliberate exaggeration from\nthe Iranian side of Iranian power in the region, as well as in the strength of\nthe Shiite crescent and Iranian military arms in the region. There is sectarian, political,\nand economic fragility within&nbsp; the\nstructure of this crescent; fragility, which led to uprisings.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In fact, we witnessed\ninternal rebellions against the Guardianship of the Jurist in Iran in 2009 and\n2017-2018 strongly and intensively. They spread all over Iran\u2019s cities. A large\nsector of those who participated in them are still under arrest or suffered\nenforced disappearance. These rebellions are increasing and their effectiveness\nand scope are spreading during this crisis. The regime is well aware of this\nand always tries to create enemies, incite\na sense of injustice<strong>,<\/strong> and a sense of danger within the Iranian nation to ensure&nbsp; the cohesion of Iranians against external\ndanger and the enemies surrounding Iran who seek to eliminate it. Therefore,\nthe Turkish, Saudi, the American enemies and so forth were created. Observers of the Iranian daily press and the speeches of the\nreligious and political elites are aware of the creation of enemies and the\nincreased&nbsp; frequency of warning&nbsp;against dangers surrounding the Iranian nation\nand civilization. However, as the&nbsp; levels\nof poverty, corruption, and tyranny increased internally,\nthis rhetoric no longer affects the people who have been harmed by the ruling\nelite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After the Iraqis\ndefeated the Islamic State (ISIS) and liberated the cities occupied by ISIS,\npeople began to call for a decent life, and\nrights.&nbsp; <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Najaf is fed up with\nIranian influence in Iraq, its attempts to curb Najaf, and the creation of a\nmarjaya loyal to Iran contrary to Hawza traditions and the historical\njurisprudential lessons adopted by Najaf and Shiites. Najaf believes that it is\nthe origin of Shiism and is the natural extension of the infallible imams and\ntheir successor.&nbsp; At the same time, the\nGuardian Jurist believes that his mandate includes even the jurists of Najaf\nand beyond. Hence, Iranian influence in Iraq at the doctrinal and political\nlevel is not complete and there is no certainty that it can last in the\nlong-term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So, we have a Shiite-Iranian confrontation\nbefore us. The Shiite sect is facing Iran at home and abroad. The language of\nthe revolution no longer seduces Shiites because\nIran raises the slogan of the revolution but suppresses their revolution at the\nsame time. Iran raises the slogan of \u201cwe will never accept humiliation\u201d but it\ngives them the taste of persecution, detention centers, <a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/dictatorship\">dictatorship<\/a> and corruption. People realized the duplicity\nof Iranian discourse, its use of religion, and exploitation of doctrine.\nTherefore, Iran, with the perpetuation of its policy, is destroying itself.\nThere is a day coming when Iran will face the entire Shiite population. The\nbest strategy to confront Iran is to clear the stage for it to continue its\nprovocative acts against the members of its sect who are now well aware of\ntheir true enemy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>When the Iraqis and the\nLebanese wanted to unite under one national banner and reject sectarianism and\nquotas, they were surprised that their leaders refused to abandon the quota\nsystem and that the Iranians and their local arms used sectarianism so that the\ndemonstrations and popular uprisings turned into sectarian strife and clashes. Iran\nthen emerges as a champion and guardian of its sect, as it always does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finally, regardless of the outcomes of&nbsp; the Iraq and Lebanon uprisings, the Iranians\nhave lost a large part of their sectarian status. The Shiite sect did not\nexpect that the Iranians would point weapons at their heads one day, and the\nfragility of the Shiite crescent is inevitably expanding due to the new\ngenerations being averse to the discourse of ideology and political Islam. They basically\nwant a decent life. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-file\"><a href=\"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2020\/02\/The-Shiite-House-The-Position-of-Religious-Elite-on-the-Iraqi-and-Lebanese-Protests-1.pdf\">The-Shiite-House-The-Position-of-Religious-Elite-on-the-Iraqi-and-Lebanese-Protests-1<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2020\/02\/The-Shiite-House-The-Position-of-Religious-Elite-on-the-Iraqi-and-Lebanese-Protests-1.pdf\" class=\"wp-block-file__button\" download>Download<\/a><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-left\"><strong>Endnotes <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> Jibril Al-Ubaidi, \u201cIraq\nDemonstrations: &nbsp;A Revolution Against\nIranian Infiltration,\u201d <em>Asharq al-Awsat<\/em>, October 6, 2019, <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nyw\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nyw<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;\u201cIraq: &nbsp;Dead and wounded, and the imposition of\nemergency and chants against Iran,\u201d Al-Arabiya Net, 3 October 2019, <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nyx-\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nyx-<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq: Horrific Scenes,\nDue to Security Forces Use of Lethal Force to Disperse the Karbala Protests<em>,\u201d\nAmnesty International<\/em>, October 29, 2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq demonstrations:\nDemonstrators in Karbala Trying to Storm the Iranian Consulate,\u201d <em>BBC, <\/em>November 4, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/not\n&amp; \u201cA New Night of Terror: &nbsp;Exciting\nMysteries About What is Going on in Karbala,\u201d <em>Al-Jazeera Net,<\/em> November 4, 2019 CE. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nou &amp; \u201cThe\nAnger of Iraqi Demonstrators Extends to the Iranian Consulate in Karbala,\u201d <em>Al-Jazeera Net,<\/em> November 4, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nov<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIranians Comment on Burning Their Country&#8217;s\nConsulate in Basra,\u201d <em>Al-Hurra,<\/em>\nSeptember 7, 2018. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nyy<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIn Pictures, the Basra\nDemonstrations are Back Again,\u201d <em>Al-<\/em><em>Jazeera\nNet<\/em>, June 29, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nyz<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq: Postgraduate\nStudents Challenge Oppression and Renew their Demonstrations to Call for&nbsp; Job Opportunities,\u201d <em>Al-Quds Al-Arabi,<\/em>&nbsp; September\n26, 2019 <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnn\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnn<\/a>. &nbsp;\u201cImam\nHusayn Shrine: Learn About the Position of the Supreme Religious Authority on Holders\nof Higher Degrees and&nbsp; Its&nbsp; Statement&nbsp;\nto the Government and Parliamentary Bodies,\u201d <em>Al-Quds Al-Arabi<\/em> &nbsp;September\n26, 2019 CE. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nno<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cLebanon\nDemonstrations: The Army Solidarity With the Protesters and Nasrallah Warns \u2018We\nWill Take the Street and Change the Equations,\u2019\u201d <em>BBC,<\/em> October 19, 2019, <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nz1\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nz1<\/a>. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cA Statement on the\nDemanding&nbsp; Protest Movements of\nDemonstrators,\u201d the official website of the Lebanese Army, October&nbsp; 19, 2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cProtesters Respond to\nthe Speech of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah : Video Clip\nFeatured on Twitter,\u201d <em>CNN Arabic,<\/em>\nOctober 20, 2019, <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nz8\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nz8<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a>\n\u201c\u2019Revolution\u2026Revolution\u2019 From Beirut to \u2018Hezbollah Areas\u2019 \u2026and Security in the\nStreet,\u201d <em>Al-Hurra,<\/em> October 18, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nz9<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> Khamenei, Twitter post, October 6, 2019, 10:06\nam, &nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/ar_khamenei\/status\/1180922270535032833\">https:\/\/twitter.com\/ar_khamenei\/status\/1180922270535032833<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> He is one of the\ngovernment&#8217;s philosophers and contemporary theorists, born in 1934, taken from\nTabatabaei and Khomeini. He is one of the extremist&nbsp; hawks of&nbsp;\nthe government&nbsp; of Guardianship of\nthe Jurist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> Mohammed Taqqi Alyazdi, <em>This\nIs What Religious Thinkers Claim<\/em>,&nbsp; Iran\nNewspaper, December 1, 2000. And Sadiq Haqeqat, <em>Distribution of Power of&nbsp;\nShi\u2019te&nbsp; Political Thought,<\/em>\ntrans.&nbsp; Hussein Safi ( Beirut: Center of\nCivilization 2014), 658.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> Haqeqat, <em>Distribution of Power of&nbsp; Shi\u2019te&nbsp;\nPolitical Thought,<\/em> 294.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a> Muhammad Taqi Misbah\nAl-Yazdi, \u201cKhordadNewspaper,\u201d <em>Aftab\nYazd Newspaper,<\/em> May 26, 2001 AD, <em>Nashat\nNewspaper<\/em> June 7, 1999<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> Haqeqat, <em>Distribution\nof Power of&nbsp; Shi\u2019te&nbsp; Political Thought,<\/em> 295.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> Tawfiq Al-Saif, <em>The Limits of Religious Democracy,<\/em>&nbsp; 137<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> Muhammad Taqi Misbah\nAl-Yazdi, <em>Aftab-e Yazd<\/em> <em>Newspaper<\/em>&nbsp; May 26, 2001. Quoted from Haqeqat<em>, Distribution of Power,<\/em> 305.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cImam Khamenei: The Fulfillment of the People&#8217;s\nDemands in Iraq and Lebanon is Rightful&nbsp;\nExclusively Within the Legal Frameworks,\u201d The official website of the\nIranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, October 30, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/arabic.khamenei.ir\/news\/4806<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThe Analysis Carried\nout by Sheikh Abbas Al-Kaabi: Imam Khamenei did not Describe Peaceful\nDemonstrations and Protests as&nbsp; the\nRiots,\u201d <em>Al-Hawza News Agency<\/em>,\nNovember 3, 2019. <a href=\"https:\/\/cutt.us\/oHBTl\">https:\/\/cutt.us\/oHBTl<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> Ebrahim Raisi&nbsp;\nstill&nbsp; holds&nbsp; the rank of Hojjat-al Islam, and he has not\nyet reached the rank of ayatollah, however, since he took over the judiciary,\nthe Iranian official media has described him as &#8220;the ayatollah.&#8221; See:\n\u201cAyatollah Raisi: The Saudi-American Sedition in Iraq Targets The Arbaeen\nPilgrimage,\u201d <em>Fars News Agency,<\/em>\nOctober 7, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/o0r and review: A group of news in&nbsp; Tehran Radio describing him as&nbsp; the ayatollah:\nhttp:\/\/arabicradio.net\/tag\/23491<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThe Iraqi\nDemonstrations Disturb Iran: \u2018American-Saudi Sedition\u2019 and \u2018<a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/has+sleeper+agents\">&nbsp;sleeper agents<\/a>,\u2019\u201d <em>Al-Arabi\nAl-Jadeed,<\/em> October 7, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzh<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cFour Million People in\nthe Arabaeen March Annoy the Enemy,\u201d <em>Fars News Agency<\/em> accessed November\n3, 2019,&nbsp; &nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bit.ly\/31PS3lK\">https:\/\/bit.ly\/31PS3lK<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> Sheikh Yasser Awda, a\nLebanese cleric, born in 1969, is one of the most famous contemporary Shiite\nreformers, who received education&nbsp; Sheikh\nHussein Fadlallah. See: Yasser Odeh: &nbsp;\u201cThe\nSheikh who generated&nbsp; controversy,\u201d &nbsp;Report: Yamanah Fawaz, published on YouTube on\nOctober 29, 2015 CE. https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=F8B9BryjCts<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a> &nbsp;\u201cKhatami: The Arabaeen\nMarch Frustrated the Islamic World, <em>Tansim News Agency<\/em>, accessed October\n11, 2019, <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nmm\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nmm<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> He is an Iranian cleric and politician, born in\n1931, appointed as a temporary imam in Tehran, and among the positions which he\nheld: Secretary General of the Mujahideen Association of Religious Scholars,\nmember of the Assembly of Experts, member of the Expediency Council, and\nappointed as a temporary president after Rafsanjani\u2019s death. Review: \u201cKermani\nAli Throne of Rafsanjani at Expediency Council,\u201d&nbsp; <em>International\nInstitute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah),<\/em> February 3, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nta<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> Friday sermon in Tehran, November 1, 2019. The\nPersian text of the sermon Persian,&nbsp; and\nits translation into Arabic by Sheikh Meethaq Al-Asr &#8211; a reformer&nbsp; Iraqi cleric &#8211; on his official Facebook page.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzo<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cImam of Friday Prayer, Tehran: Some Deviant\nGroups Penetrated the Iraqi People,\u201d <em>Tasnim\nNews Agency,<\/em>&nbsp; November 1, 2019. <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nm\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nm<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThe Iranian Foreign\nMinistry Deeply Regrets the Recent Events in Iraq,\u201d&nbsp; <em>Tasnim\nNews Agency,<\/em> October&nbsp; 26, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/o0s<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cDespite the Public\nOutrage of the Interference: &nbsp;An Iranian\nOfficial: \u2018The Unrest in Iraq and Lebanon Aims to&nbsp; Weaken&nbsp;\nthe Resistance Front,\u2019\u201d&nbsp; <em>Amad, November, <\/em>4 \/ 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzq<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cExclusively -Iranian-backed Factions Deployed\nSnipers at&nbsp; the Iraq Protests,\u201d <em>Reuters, <\/em>October 17, 2019. <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzr\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzr<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> Haider al-Abadi said,\n\u201cThe official number of martyrs since the beginning of the October uprising\nannounced in the report of the Ministerial Commission of Inquiry, is 149, but\nthe number of peaceful demonstrators who had&nbsp;\ninjuries but did not die is more than 400 protesters meaning that&nbsp; the shooting was intended to kill, not to\npush the protesters to disperse and flee. Review: Haider al-Abadi at hand, <em>Al-Sharqiah TV<\/em>, an episode posted on\nYouTube on October 22, 2019. https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=S2mU6tcC3G4 BBC:\nNo restrictions with former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, an episode\nposted on YouTube on October 20, 2019 CE. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=pBcY7pOdkqk\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=pBcY7pOdkqk<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq: The Latest Death\nToll From the Demonstrations Reached 100 Dead and 4,000 Wounded,\u201d <em>DW<\/em>,\nOctober 5, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzs<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThousands of dead and\nWounded is&nbsp; Iraq Death Toll During Two\nDays,\u201d <em>DW<\/em>, &nbsp;October 26, 2019,\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzt<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq: Deadly Attacks\nby Snipers, Intimidation of Protesters and Intense Campaign of Repression\nAgainst Them,\u201d <em>Amnesty International,<\/em>\nOctober. 9, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/noz<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThe Iraqi Government\nDenies the Killing of&nbsp; Protesters &#8230; And\nTalks About a Third Party,\u201d <em>Sky News,<\/em>&nbsp; October 26, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzu<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq: Protesters\nChallenge&nbsp; Curfew and Death Toll Rising,\u201d\nOctober 3, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzv BBC: \u201cIraq Demonstrations: Authorities Block\nOut&nbsp; Internet, Social Media and Spread of\nthe Hashtag&nbsp;&nbsp; # Iraq_ rising,\u201d <em>DW,<\/em>&nbsp;\nOctober 3, 2019 CE. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzw<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq Demonstrations:\nThousands Break Curfew in the Capital, Baghdad, and Hundreds of Wounded and\nDeaths of the&nbsp; Clashes in Karbala,\u201d <em>BBC,<\/em> October 29, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nzx<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq: A Number&nbsp; of Casualties Horrendous and Fatal\nInjuries Incurred Due to the Penetration of New Tear Gas Canisters Into the\nSkulls of Protesters,\u201d <em>Amnesty\nInternational,<\/em>&nbsp; October 31, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/noy<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cHezbollah and \u2018Amal\u2019\nSupporters Attack Protesters in Beirut (Shahid),\u201d <em>Arabi&nbsp; 21,<\/em>&nbsp; October 29, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/np6 and\n\u201cHezbollah \u2018trouble makers\u2019&nbsp; Assaulted\nProtesters in Southern Lebanon,\u201d <em>Al-Hurra,<\/em>&nbsp; October 23, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/np7 and \u201cWith\nKnives and Sticks, Members of Hezbollah Assault Lebanese Demonstrators,\u201d <em>Orient News<\/em>&nbsp; (video), October 29, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/np8<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref44\"><sup>[44]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cHis Eminence, Mr.\nSistani: No Regional or International Party has the Right to Confiscate the\nWill of Iraqis,\u201d <em>Shafaqna,<\/em> November\n1, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nmn<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref45\"><sup>[45]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIraq: The Supreme Shi&#8217;a\nMarjaya&nbsp; Calls on the Government to\nChange its Approach in Dealing With the Country&#8217;s Problems,\u201d <em>Monte Carlo<\/em>,\n&nbsp;October 4, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nng \u201cThe\nPosition of His Eminence Sayyid al-Sistani on the Current Events in Iraq,\u201d <em>Shafaqna<\/em>, October 4, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnh<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref46\"><sup>[46]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cAl-Sistani: The\nGovernment \u201cHolds Responsibility for the Heavy Blood\u201d in the Iraq Protests,\u201d <em>Sistani\nOrg<\/em>., &nbsp;October 11, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nni Check Al-Sistani&#8217;s website at this link:\nhttps:\/\/www.sistani.org\/arabic\/archive\/26350\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref47\"><sup>[47]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cAfter the Killing of Two Protesters, Sistani\nCalls on Iraqi Security Forces to Exercise Restraint,\u201d <em>Elephant News,<\/em>&nbsp; October 25,\n2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnl and review Sistani&#8217;s sermon on his official site:\nhttps:\/\/www.sistani.org\/arabic\/archive\/26351\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref48\"><sup>[48]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cImam Khamenei\nDuring&nbsp; the Graduation Ceremonies of\nOfficers&nbsp; From Universities of&nbsp; the Army: The Fulfillment of People&#8217;s Demands\nin Iraq and Lebanon is Available Exclusively Within the Legal Frameworks,\u201d <em>Khamenei<\/em>,&nbsp; http:\/\/ksa.pm\/np9<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref49\"><sup>[49]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cHis Eminence, Mr. Sistani:&nbsp; The Fighting Forces Must not be Involved\nAgainst&nbsp; Peaceful Demonstrations. No Party or Regional or\nInternational Party has Right&nbsp; to\nConfiscate the Will of Iraqis,\u201d <em>Shafaqna<\/em>, November 1, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnj Representative of Ayatollah \u201cNajafi: Our Position on&nbsp; the Iraqi Demonstrations Is Identical to What\nIt Was Presented Through Friday Sermons in Imam Husayn Shrine,\u201d <em>Al-Hawza News Agency,<\/em> October&nbsp;&nbsp; 26, 2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref50\"><sup>[50]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cA Statement by an Official\nSource in the Office of His Eminence Regarding Some of What Was published in\nthe Media,\u201d <em>Shafaqana,<\/em>&nbsp; November 9, 2019, &nbsp;http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnk<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref51\"><sup>[51]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cHis Eminence Received\nthe Head of the United Nations Mission in Iraq,\u201d <em>Ayatollah Al-Sistani<\/em> ,&nbsp; November 11, 2019, http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nte<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref52\"><sup>[52]<\/sup><\/a> Imam Hussain, \u201cThe\nSupreme Marjaya Announces Its Deep Concern Over the Situation in Basra and\nRefuses to Shoot Civilians,\u201d September 7, 2018. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnp<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref53\"><sup>[53]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cBecause of&nbsp; the Protests Iran Stops Religious Trips to\nIraq,\u201d <em>Al-Jazeera Net,<\/em>&nbsp; November 3, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/npl<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref54\"><sup>[54]<\/sup><\/a> Mohammed al-Sulami, and Muhammad al-Sayyad, &nbsp;<em>Iran\u2019s\nSupreme Leadership Usurped Power: Shite Political Controversy Between Arab and\nIranian Religious Authorities <\/em>(Riyadh<em>: <\/em>The Arabian Gulf Center for Iranian\nStudies 2017), 21-22.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref55\"><sup>[55]<\/sup><\/a> Tawfiq Al-Saif, <em>Against Tyranny: Shiite Political\nJurisprudence during&nbsp; the Age of\nOccultation<\/em> (Beirut: The Arab Cultural Center 1999), &nbsp;17.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref56\"><sup>[56]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cMessage to the Lebanese\nRevolutionaries,\u201d <em>YouTube<\/em>, October\n21, 2019. https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=Zl1vJwZR6j0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref57\"><sup>[57]<\/sup><\/a> Sheikh Yasser Auda &#8216;s\nofficial page on Facebook, video, &nbsp;October 17, 2019, &nbsp;http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nti<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref58\"><sup>[58]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cIn the video, Sheikh\nAuda rejects the use of treason: Peace be upon the protesters,\u201d <em>Janobiah<\/em>,\nNovember 10, 2019, <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/ntc\/\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/ntc\/<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref59\"><sup>[59]<\/sup><\/a> Yasser Auda, \u201cWhy do you\nCreate Sedition Among the Sons&nbsp; of\nSingle&nbsp; People?\u201d&nbsp; posted on his official page on Facebook, http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nth<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref60\"><sup>[60]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref61\"><sup>[61]<\/sup><\/a> Al-Badeel al-Iraqi\nalternative, a statement by Sheikh al-Yaqoubi, the leader of the Fadhila party,\nwho flatters&nbsp; the courageous October\nuprising, October 31, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnm<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref62\"><sup>[62]<\/sup><\/a> Kamal al-Haydari calls\nto&nbsp; overthrow the ruling class in Iraq\nand shows his solidarity with the demonstrators, posted on YouTube, October 23,\n2019, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=ksHxylhjzQY<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref63\"><sup>[63]<\/sup><\/a> Muhammad Hassan al-Amin\nYahya, \u201cThe White Uprising,\u201d <em>Janobia, <\/em>&nbsp;&nbsp;November 4, 2019. <a href=\"http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnr\">http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnr<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref64\"><sup>[64]<\/sup><\/a> He is a Lebanese cleric,\nborn in 1948, and he was the first Secretary-General of Hezbollah, before his\ndefection, and he adopted. positions against the interference of Iran and\nHezbollah in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. He has significant commentary on the\npolitical work of Hezbollah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref65\"><sup>[65]<\/sup><\/a> Friday sermon, November\n1, 2019, \u201cAnd we Were an Opponent Against&nbsp;\nthe Oppressor, and we Were Assistant to the Oppressed,\u201d <em>YouTube,<\/em> November 1, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/ntf&nbsp; Regarding his old\npositions on Iran, see: <em>Beirut Observer<\/em>,\nSubhi al-TufaylI, &nbsp;\u201cThree Countries Ruled\nby Shiites,\u201d &nbsp;August 25, 2018,\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/ntg<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref66\"><sup>[66]<\/sup><\/a> He is an Iraqi religious\nmarja , born in Karbala in the year 1945. He was a theorist of the Shirazi\nmovement, before the fragmentation of the current&nbsp; and his &nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/context.reverso.net\/translation\/english-arabic\/defections+from\">defection<\/a> from it after the death of Muhammad Mahdi\nAl-Shirazi. Refer to the CV on the official website of Mr. Muhammad Taqi\nAl-Madrasi, at this link: http:\/\/ksa.pm\/ntb and review some of his ideas in:\nBadr Al-Ibrahim and Muhammad Al-Sadiq, <em>The\nShiite Movement in Saudi Arabia<\/em>, i 1 \/ The Arabic Network for Research and\nPublishing 2013 Pp. 86 and onwards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref67\"><sup>[67]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cAyatollah Almodarresi\nIdentifies the Most Prominent Causes of the Demonstrations and Calls on\nScholars&nbsp; to Advise the Government and\nStand With People,\u201d <em>Al-Hawza News Agency<\/em>,&nbsp; October 13, 2019 http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnv <em>Al-Hawza News Agency<\/em>, \u201cAyatollah\nAlmodarresi: The Need for&nbsp; Pressuring\nForces to put the State on the Right&nbsp; and\nOrganize the Masses,\u201d October 26, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnw and \u201cAlmodarresi:\nPiling up&nbsp; Money and Denying&nbsp; People Rights Were the Causes&nbsp; of the Country&#8217;s Destruction,\u201d October 13,\n2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnx<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref68\"><sup>[68]<\/sup><\/a>, \u201cAyatollah Almodarresi\nReiterates His Support for Peaceful Demonstrations and Warns of Being\nInfluenced by Media of Sedition,\u201d <em>Al-Hawza\nNews Agency,<\/em> November 10, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/npa<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref69\"><sup>[69]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cDespite the Oppression of Shi&#8217;a Clerics who\nParticipate in the Movement,\u201d <em>Janobiah<\/em>,\n,November 10, 2019. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnt Review:<em>,<\/em> \u201cSheikh Kazem Yassin to the Shiites: It is Forbidden to Hit With\na Stick,\u201d <em>Janobiah,<\/em> October 31, 2019.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnu<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref70\"><sup>[70]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cA Statement of His\nEminence of Al-Shirazi Marajia on the Recent Demonstrations in Iraq and the\nTragic Events That Followed,\u201d&nbsp; <em>Al-Shirazi Net<\/em>, 30 Safar 1441 AH.\nhttp:\/\/ksa.pm\/nnq<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref71\"><sup>[71]<\/sup><\/a>: \u201cIranians Demonstrate\nin Front of the Clergy\u2019s Hawza: &nbsp;Read in\nContexts and Implications,\u201d <em>International Institute for Iranian Studies\n(Rasanah)<\/em>, August 7, 2018. http:\/\/ksa.pm\/o0o<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref72\"><sup>[72]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref73\"><sup>[73]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref74\"><sup>[74]<\/sup><\/a> Mohsen Kadivar, <em>The\nLoyalist Government<\/em>, translated by Mr. Mahdi Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin\n(Beirut: Intishar al-Arabi Foundation 2015), 11.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref75\"><sup>[75]<\/sup><\/a> Mohamed Hassanein\nHeikal, <em>The Cannon of the Ayatollah\u2019s <\/em>Defender (Cairo: Dar Al-Shorouk, 2009), 265.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Iraqi and Lebanese uprisings reflected the inherent philosophical and juristic dispute between the Shiite religious Marjayas. These disputes are&nbsp; between the taqlidians&nbsp; and the reformists, as well as Najaf and Iran. The reformists whose roots can be traced back to Ayatollah Naini, the theorist of constitutionalism, aspire for&nbsp; a civil state with&nbsp; genuine&nbsp; freedoms [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":32,"featured_media":7663,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7658","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-centre-for-researches-and-studies"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7658","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/32"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7658"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7658\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9280,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7658\/revisions\/9280"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7663"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7658"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7658"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7658"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}