On February 29, the\nUnited States concluded a peace deal with the Taliban. The deal provides\nlegitimacy to a movement known for its hostility towards the United States and\nsuggests that Washington could be open to negotiating peace deals with other\nadversaries including Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is no secret\nthat US President Donald J. Trump wants to negotiate a deal with Iran. In\nmid-2019, the US president said he could talk with Iran<\/a>, and ease sanctions against the country. But he has sent out mixed\nsignals. On the one hand, the Trump administration has reached out to exiled<\/a> Iranian opposition<\/a> groups while on the other hand,\nTrump has said that the objective of Washington\u2019s maximum pressure strategy is\nnot regime<\/a> change in Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n President Trump has\nsaid that he is willing to negotiate with Iran without preconditions<\/a>. But earlier, he had presented a long\nlist of pre-negotiation conditions. When an exchange of prisoners<\/a> between the United States and Iran was made, Trump\nexpressed hope that Iran would be a fair negotiator. His statement came two\nweeks after deadly protests in Iran which led to the deaths of 1,260 people by\nthe Iranian government\u2019s security apparatuses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran is unclear about how seriously it should take US offers to negotiate, and it fears that the United States seeks war. Tensions between Washington and Tehran have increased since the US killing of Iranian Commander Qassim Soleimani in Iraq on January 3, 2020. Since then, Iran\u2019s \u201chardliners\u201d such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei<\/a> have dismissed negotiations with the United States. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This is despite\nefforts by President Hassan Rouhani to leave the door open with Washington for\nfuture negotiations by insisting that the Trump administration does not seek war<\/a> with Iran. President Trump says he wanted peace<\/a> with an Iran that seems to be \u201cstanding down\u201d rather than escalating\nconflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If Iran and the\nUnited States negotiate, it goes without saying that they must agree on a set\nof principles<\/a>. The United States should decide if\nits maximum pressure strategy<\/a> against Tehran will convince Iran\u2019s leaders to end\ntheir expansionist regional agenda in the Middle East. To date, Iran has been\nputting up maximum resistance<\/a> to the policy by insisting on its regional\ninfluence, despite assertions by State Department official Brian Hook<\/a> that pressures work. But according to President Rouhani, Iran cannot negotiate<\/a> with the United States under maximum pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Without agreement\non the aforementioned, it is hard to explain what a peace deal with Iran would\nlook like. The United States and Iran seem stuck over the issue. Iran insists\non the withdrawal<\/a> of US forces in the region, according to Iranian\nMajor General Yahya Rahim Safavi. Across the board, both democrats<\/a> in Washington and the Republican President Trump\nsay they want to either pull out US troops or avoid fighting battles<\/a>, but also demand to see Iran roll back its regional influence. This\npresents a conundrum to both parties to decide how this goal is to be achieved\nwithout sufficient US presence in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For now, what is\namply clear is that a military conflict<\/a> between Iran and the United States is unlikely to\nhappen given President Trump\u2019s preference not to engage in a war. But the\nUnited States might make the mistake of disregarding Iran\u2019s interference in the\nregion to broker a deal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The US-Taliban deal\nwill give the movement a bigger role in Afghanistan<\/a>, provided that it fights terrorists<\/a> that target US interests. In\nexchange, the United States will ask the United Nations (UN) to lift sanctions<\/a> imposed on Taliban leaders. The\nUnited States could offer Iran\u2019s sanctioned leaders the same relief, in\nexchange for their agreement not to attack US targets in the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran is trying to\nasses if making a deal with the United States is worthwhile by looking at the\nUS-Taliban peace deal for clues. So far, Iran-based analysts have dismissed the\nUS-Taliban deal as a tactical<\/a> instead of a strategic move that on the surface\npromises to serve President Trump\u2019s election promise of pulling US forces out\nof the region. But Iran\u2019s Foreign Ministry insists the deal helps the United\nStates to \u201clegitimize<\/a> its troops\u2019 presence in Afghanistan.\u201d The United\nStates will reduce its forces<\/a> from 13,000 to 8,600 soldiers\nonly. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran happens to\nthink that there is no guarantee that the peace<\/a> will even last, and its officials have been quick to dismiss it. Iran\u2019s\nForeign Ministry says the United States had \u201cno legal<\/a> standing to sign a peace agreement or to determine the future of\nAfghanistan.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n Tensions between\nthe United States and the Taliban, rampant before the deal, have actually\npersisted even after the deal, one reason why Iran wants US forces<\/a> out of Afghanistan according to Iran\u2019s envoy to the UN Majid Takht Ravanchi<\/a>. On March 4, US forces led a defensive strike against Taliban fighters<\/a> in southern Afghanistan. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Taliban could\nalso decide at any time to work against US interests despite a peace deal.\nMaking peace with the Taliban does not mean that the movement has America\u2019s\nbest interests at heart or that it will protect American interests on a\npermanent basis. The peace deal accepts Taliban control over Afghan territories<\/a> that are contested simultaneously by the US-backed\ngovernment in Kabul. Future territorial disagreements between Washington and\nmultiple Afghan stakeholders, including the Taliban and the government in\nKabul, could lead to the peace deal collapsing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n From Tehran\u2019s\nstandpoint, the peace deal has also led to disagreements and divisions between\nPresident Ashraf Ghani<\/a> who is largely against it and his rival Chief Executive Abdullah\nAbdullah who approves it. Importantly, divisions<\/a> within Kabul could further destabilize\nAfghanistan. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Moving forward,\nIran will continue to question the merits of holding peace talks of its own\nwith the United States. Iran also wants US forces out of Afghanistan,\nespecially after Soleimani\u2019s killing. Its ambassador<\/a> to Kabul, Bahador Aminian recently threatened that Tehran would decide\nif it needs to attack US bases in Afghanistan, although it will not carry\nattacks against the Afghan government. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Since then, Kabul and Tehran have been entangled in diplomatic<\/a> rows over the issue, with reports emerging that both countries have\neven expelled diplomats from their respective capitals. Iran also refused to\ntake part in the swearing-in ceremony of President Ghani on March 9. Iran is\neager to assert its own influence<\/a> over Kabul and the Taliban post-deal, however, the\nUnited States is fully aware of Iran\u2019s intentions and is likely to resist\nTehran\u2019s moves to sabotage the peace deal. On February 29, the United States concluded a peace deal with the Taliban. The deal provides legitimacy to a movement known for its hostility towards the United States and suggests that Washington could be open to negotiating peace deals with other adversaries including Iran. It is no secret that US President Donald J. Trump wants […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":7749,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[164,4582,4581,634,4579,4580,237],"class_list":["post-7748","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-afghanistan","tag-iran-in-afghanistan","tag-peace-deal","tag-taliban","tag-the-us","tag-the-us-taliban-peace-deal","tag-us"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7748","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7748"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7748\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9213,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7748\/revisions\/9213"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7749"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7748"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7748"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7748"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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