{"id":8364,"date":"2020-10-07T16:52:36","date_gmt":"2020-10-07T13:52:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=8364"},"modified":"2020-10-08T15:00:21","modified_gmt":"2020-10-08T12:00:21","slug":"the-us-threat-to-shut-down-its-diplomatic-mission-in-iraq","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/position-estimate\/the-us-threat-to-shut-down-its-diplomatic-mission-in-iraq\/","title":{"rendered":"The US Threat to Shut Down Its Diplomatic Mission in Iraq: Motives, Ramifications and Scenarios"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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The developments in the Iraqi arena have taken a new turn as the United States threatened the Iraqi government in September 2020 with the closure  of its embassy if the Iraqi government failed to stop  Iran-aligned armed militias attacking  US and foreign diplomatic missions, the logistical teams supportive of the missions, the Global Coalition Against ISIS in Iraq and petroleum companies in the country\u2019s oil-rich provinces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the significance of Iraq to  the US strategy, owing to political, economic and geographical considerations, raises questions such as: What are the motives of the United States and how serious is it in moving ahead with  its threat to shut down  its embassy in Baghdad? What are the potential ramifications of carrying out this  threat on the security, economic and political circumstances in Iraq? Which of the parties to the conflict will be the biggest winner, or loser, in case the US embassy is closed in Iraq? What can  be expected to happen in the Iraqi arena in the coming period? And what are the foreseeable scenarios for the US position?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I- Motives Behind the US Threat to Shut Down  Its Embassy <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some motives behind the US threat to close one of  its biggest embassies in the world are overt and others are covert. The overt motives are connected  to the  ongoing rise in the rate and scope of the attacks carried out by armed militias aligned with Iran since early 2020. The attacks targeted  US forces, convoys and missions  as well as the forces, convoys and installations of the Global Coalition Against ISIS. In addition,  Arab and European foreign missions, convoys and facilities, the offices of the United Nations and the World Food Program as well as  the convoys of oil companies in multiple geographic locations across Iraq were all targeted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The number of attacks using Katyusha rockets and unmanned aircraft in the first quarter of 2020 against US, foreign and UN targets reached 11. The attacks during the second quarter of 2020 nearly doubled, specifically reaching 19 attacks. In the third quarter of 2020, the attacks surged to 27.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, the attacks using IEDs on US and UN convoys and trucks rose from 14 attacks in the first quarter of the year to nearly 27 attacks in the second quarter of 2020. In August and September 2020 alone \u2013 only two months \u2013 the attacks rose to 49 (24 attacks in August and 25 attacks in September 2020), according to a report by the Washington Institute<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the  covert motives, they are connected  to the views of experts in the Trump administration. They fear a Benghazi type scenario repeating itself, when the US consulate was attacked in 2012.  This is in addition to the famous 1980s hostage  crisis situation repeating itself, which was among the reasons behind Jimmy Carter\u2019s failure to win a second presidential term, which was won  by his rival Ronald Reagan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran could incite its proxies in Iraq to seize the US embassy and take hostages to diminish Trump\u2019s chances in the coming elections and boost the chances of the Democratic candidate Joe Biden. Iran hopes to return to the nuclear deal and find a solution to the tough sanctions imposed on it  which have caused Iran to lose, according to the remarks of President Hassan Rouhani, nearly $150 billion. <\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, it seems that the Trump administration wanted to act proactively to thwart any scheme against the US mission in Iraq and to protect it by threatening to shut down the embassy.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, several Iranian columnists believe that, to the contrary, Iran is not interested in  provoking  the US administration on the Iraqi scene. It does not want the  US administration to have an excuse to carry out  military strikes against Tehran and its proxies, giving Trump an electoral triumph over his Democratic rival Joe Biden in the coming presidential elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

II- Iraqi Efforts to Manage the Crisis<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kazemi\u2019s government undertook several actions  to prevent Iraq transforming  into an arena of  direct conflict between the United States and Iran and to prevent the Iraqi scene from returning to  square one. He held a quartet meeting with the president of the republic, the Parliament speaker and the Supreme Judiciary Council, the outcome of which reiterated the necessity of moving ahead on the path of transitioning towards the phase where weapons would be limited to the state, and the presence of  armed militias  in  key locations  in Iraq would be reduced. He called for  the government\u2019s efforts to safeguard Iraqi security and stability and statehood to be supported.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among the most notable security initiatives  was  the order to close down the offices of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) at Baghdad International Airport. Kazemi also dismissed two heavyweight PMU commanders affiliated with Al-Khorasani Brigades: Hamed al-Jazaeri and Wa\u2019ad al-Qado. They were accused of killing dozens of protesters, and the latter was placed on the US terrorism blacklist. This removal was  an attempt to change the despised PMU figures, and to  ease tensions with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kazemi also issued orders to the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) to carry out inspections across the capital Baghdad to arrest those firing rockets towards the Green Zone. The move aimed to prevent armed attacks and to provide a security umbrella to foreign missions.  Kazemi also intensified  security measures in the Green Zone and instructed Iraq\u2019s   security agencies to   tackle armed militias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kazemi did not limit  himself to these domestic actions to prevent the escalation of militia attacks targeting US interests.  Moreover, he dispatched Iraqi Foreign Minister Fouad Hossein on September 26, 2020 to Iran. The visit, according to observers, was conducted to convince Iran to pressure  its armed militias to stop the attacks  targeting foreign diplomatic missions, as Iran is the number one financier and sponsor of the armed militias targeting US interests.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, Iraqi President Barham Salih held a meeting<\/a> with the leaders of the Shiite blocs and parties to inform them of the US threats. They include: First: the closure  of the US embassy in case US targets come under armed attack. This could turn Iraq into a country that is hostile to the United States. Also  12 other embassies decided to shut down their headquarters in solidarity with the United States.  This could lead to Iraq\u2019s  total international isolation, according to the remarks of Salih.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second: to  assassinate  Shiite leaders and commanders of Shiite factions, as was the case with Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third: to carry out  airstrikes on the positions of armed militias until they are destroyed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, some media sources revealed that Washington informed Baghdad that it would attack 120 positions<\/a> in case  US targets come under further armed attack and  US nationals are killed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fourth: to end  the revenue streams  of some politicians engaged or involved in the attacks undertaken by  armed militias targeting  US interests  and to sue  them abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the aftermath of Salih\u2019s meeting and his warning of  US threats, including a military response, some sudden changes were made within the ranks of the Iran-aligned militias and alliances in Iraq. They did not wait too long to announce that they reject any attacks on  diplomatic missions, fearing for their political future in Iraq. Hadi al-Amiri, Nouri al-Maliki and Falih al-Fayyadh, in a joint press conference<\/a>, condemned the attacks on foreign missions using  unprecedented rhetoric for the Iraqi street. This was a surprising move as experts and specialists had concluded  that the Iraqi public would  only hear hostile language  against the United States from  Iran-backed militia leaders, with  mounting accusations levelled against Washington  on the Iraqi scene.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, the Hezbollah Brigades and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, working under the umbrella of the PMU, once glamorized armed attacks against US targets in Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the changes mentioned in the ranks of the militias and alliances  aligned with Iran did not happen independently of Iraq\u2019s eastern neighbor. Tehran controls  the positions and movements of  militias and their commanders in Iraq, asking them to move or freeze whenever it wants. No position can be announced without coordinating with the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards.  The militias are  ideologically linked and aligned  with the Qom seminary. The IRGC has condemned the attacks on diplomatic missions<\/a> in Iraq and called on the Kazemi government to intensify measures to prevent such attacks being repeated.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

III- The Potential Consequences for Iraq in Case the US Embassy is  Shut Down<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the benefits of the US threat in terms of pressuring the Iraqi government to step up measures to limit  weapons to the state, it poses several disastrous dangers and challenges for the Iraqi government as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 1- Instigating conflict: the US threat  to close the embassy poses a huge challenge to Kazemi. He wants to limit  arms to the state  and curb  armed militias without a military operation which could trigger street and sectarian conflict   which could destroy Iraq. If Kazemi undertook  the military option to curb the militias, they  would likely  respond harshly to the operation on Iranian orders. This could be detrimental to Iraq\u2019s security  and lead to the collapse of the Kazemi government, which took bold and unprecedented steps in this respect. Also, time is not  Kazemi\u2019s side as there are calls from political activists to take  to the streets again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thwarting attempts to transition toward statehood: when the US embassy is shut down, Iran and its regional proxies, via their media platforms, will proclaim that it has achieved a huge political and propaganda victory by forcing the United States to shut down its diplomatic headquarters in Iraq. This shall undermine the efforts undertaken by Kazemi to tighten the noose around  armed militias, transition towards statehood and end the stateless phase.   The might, clout and control of  armed militias would become stronger   over  state apparatuses,  steering the government\u2019s decision-making at home and abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the  US embassy closes,  it will be a disastrous decision for Iraq, the scope and impact will be greater  than Barack Obama\u2019s decision in 2011 to withdraw troops from Iraq.  That decision led to the rise of  ISIS, the resurgence of several other terrorist organizations and operations, and the creation of more pro-Iran armed militias on the Iraqi scene. The militias took control of large swathes of Iraq, which  strengthened Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, this threat will also make Kazemi feel that the United States has not recognized the achievements of the Iraqi government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government has taken a number of strong and unprecedented measures since it took office against  Iran\u2019s proxies in Iraq, such as arresting Hezbollah affiliates,  sacking Falih al-Fayyadh as a national security adviser, tightening control over the Iraqi-Iranian borders and issuing orders obliging  all foreign military officials and diplomats to enter Iraq with visas, a decision which mainly targeted Iranian military officials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2- Isolating Iraq internationally: the closure of the US embassy will not be limited to  US diplomatic and military operations ending in Iraq. But several countries are likely  to take similar steps. This was plainly stated<\/a> by Kazemi in a cabinet meeting on September 29, 2020, saying that ongoing  attacks  targeting foreign diplomatic missions prompted them  to consider closing their offices,  on top of them comes the United States and the European Union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On September 18, 2020, 18 European and Western countries expressed concern about the series of attacks waged by militias  targeting foreign interests and targets in Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is also expected that all the operations of the international coalition would stop and  several foreign powers would take steps similar to the United States  in case it happens, as these powers centrally depend on the US presence in Iraq, except Russia and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This would impact the security and economic situation in Iraq as it would end the economic cooperation between Iraq and these countries considering the delicate circumstances which the country  is facing as it needs foreign support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the US does close its embassy, this move  will reduce the chances of ensuring Iraq reaches a safe position,  and  will  not help the United States at the strategic or the tactical level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3- The possibility of triggering conflict  between the United States and Iraq on Iraqi soil: the US threat makes Iraq susceptible to facing a potentially  disastrous scenario if the move is a prelude to a series of intensified US airstrikes targeting the positions of armed militias in the country. This could turn Iraq into a genuine battleground to settle  scores between the United States and Iran since the United States could seize the opportunity to secure sweeping victories against Iran before  the coming elections to make up for the setbacks it has suffered in  other files such as  managing the coronavirus crisis, racism  and the standoff with China. However, Iran is aware of this and wants to deprive the US administration of this opportunity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IV-Evolving Developments in the Iraqi Arena<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The foregoing paints a clear picture about the level and gravity of the threats posed by  Iran-backed militias to US targets. This comes at an extremely sensitive time for the US administration ahead of the presidential elections, where the US administration does not want Iran to repeat the scenario of  besieging the US embassy in Baghdad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are two possible scenarios that could evolve  on the Iraqi scene in the coming period which will see the US presidential elections being held in November 2020 and Iraqi movements to hold early polls in 2021:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first scenario: moving ahead with the threat to close  the US embassy  to avoid a hostage situation being repeated.  This scenario is unlikely because the decision to close down the US embassy could mark, after the decision to reduce  the number of US troops in Iraq from 5,500 to 3,000, the start of a disastrous scenario and lead to the US settling  scores with Iran on the Iraqi scene.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But both Washington and Tehran understand a war in Iraq will not be a picnic. They cannot determine which party will benefit,  nor can they determine its timeframe. A war will also be costly for all parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, the US embassy in Iraq is considered to be a massive military base which includes thousands of marines, hosts many Patriot batteries, an airport and radars covering not only Baghdad but also large parts of the Iraqi state. Hence, there is no US benefit to close  the embassy given the fact that Iran will be the winner as it knows well how to take control of empty spaces where there is no influence. Therefore, the US threat could be a maneuver to test the seriousness of Iraq when it comes to the issue of driving out US troops as well as limiting weapons to  the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, the firing of six rockets at Erbil Airport on September 30 by armed militias aligned with Iran sends a message to Washington that the Katyusha rockets can hit US targets anywhere on Iraqi soil. This prompted the US administration to back down from the idea of moving the US embassy to another location on Iraqi soil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second scenario: keeping the US embassy open or closing its doors temporarily until security measures in the Green Zone and its vicinity are strengthened to repel any future attacks.  This is in addition to carrying out limited-scale strikes targeting  pro-Iran armed militias. This is  a likely scenario as the United States administration is aware of the dangers of leaving a vacuum  for its arch-foe and does not want to give a strong lever to the Democrats. This is because it is likely that the Democrats will promote the move as a US failure under the Trump administration to curb Iran,  possibly throwing their country into a war in which it will not make any strategic gains. This has resulted in the US  administration strongly  supporting  the government of Kazemi in order to counter the out-of-control militias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the end, it seems that for Iraq the dangers posed by the threat surpass the benefits as the country shall be the biggest loser if this move happens. With all its capabilities and opportunities available, the Kazemi government has been endeavoring to restore Iraq\u2019s sovereign statehood.  Though the Kazemi government has not achieved much in curbing Iran-backed militias in Iraq,     Washington should reconsider the threat to shut down the embassy and   stand by Iraq to render the efforts of Kazemi successful, especially since Washington possesses a protection umbrella capable of protecting its embassy, as was the case when the embassy was besieged by pro-Iran elements in September 2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, we believe that the US decision to close  its embassy in Baghdad will not bring any benefit to Iraq. But the Iraqi government should seize the opportunity and swiftly move to display its seriousness when it comes to limiting arms to the state and curbing the militias that are undermining the security and sovereignty of Iraq. At the same time, it is not easy to expect good results to be achieved in relation to these issues  in the foreseeable future due to Iran\u2019s considerable influence within Iraq.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The US Threat to Shut Down Its Diplomatic Mission in Iraq Motives, Ramifications and Scenarios<\/a>Download<\/a><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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The developments in the Iraqi arena have taken a new turn as the United States threatened the Iraqi government in September 2020 with the closure  of its embassy if the Iraqi government failed to stop  Iran-aligned armed militias attacking  US and foreign diplomatic missions, the logistical teams supportive of the missions, the Global Coalition Against […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":8366,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1402],"tags":[351,3270,237],"class_list":["post-8364","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-position-estimate","tag-iraq","tag-pmu","tag-us"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8364","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8364"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8364\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8377,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8364\/revisions\/8377"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8366"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8364"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8364"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8364"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}