{"id":8797,"date":"2021-02-16T13:38:27","date_gmt":"2021-02-16T10:38:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=8797"},"modified":"2021-02-23T13:41:57","modified_gmt":"2021-02-23T10:41:57","slug":"%c2%acirans-space-dreams-are-clear-and-dangerous","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/%c2%acirans-space-dreams-are-clear-and-dangerous\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00acIran\u2019s Space Dreams Are Clear and Dangerous"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Zuljanah, a satellite-carrying hybrid rocket  consisting of  two stages of solid fuel along with a supplementary liquid-fuel stage,  took to space on January 4. The new satellite launch vehicle (SLV) is claimed to be capable of shooting a 220-kilogram payload of one or more satellites at a maximum altitude of 500-kilometers. Since no new satellite was aboard the SLV, Iran called it a test run. Besides its timing, Tehran\u2019s decision to send the rocket into space manifests interesting technological aspects compared to its last successful satellite launch on April 22, 2020.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike the Qassed SLV, Zuljanah was not launched from the transporter-erector launcher (TEL) but from the fixed-structure launch pad in Iran\u2019s Semnan province, exhibiting Tehran\u2019s  confidence as well as showcasing its  technological leap<\/a> in comparison. Due to the two-stage solid-fuel rocket, the preparation time was short and kept prying foreign satellites from taking geospatial images, and averted any subversive attack from cyber or other domains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zuljanah\u2019s three state engine thrust is claimed to be 74 kilotons<\/a>, which is 16 kilotons less than  the United States\u2019 mainstay intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) LGM-30G Minuteman III. Iran\u2019s space program has  similarities with North Korea\u2019s.  The bilateral cooperation between the two countries reached a new peak<\/a> in the year 2020, as per news reports quoting a confidential UN report. The news reports  claimed that the UN report singled  out Iran\u2019s Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center for receiving \u201csupport and assistance\u201d for developing SLVs from North Korean missile specialists besides getting certain <\/strong>shipments<\/a><\/u><\/strong>. The degree and level of transfer of technological know-how and equipment have not been specified though. The independent panel that carried out the investigations leading to the UN report also  noted<\/a> Iran\u2019s denial, and Tehran responded to these allegations by saying that  a \u201cpreliminary review of the information provided to us by the panel indicates that false information and fabricated data may have been used in investigations and analyses of the panel.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prior to Qassed and Zuljanah, Iran  had made 12 attempts and sent four satellites into orbit with the first successful launch  in 2009.  Iran has been experimenting with launching a  liquid-fueled rocket as well as a hybrid (using both solid and liquid fuel) and a solid-fuel rocket. The IRGC launched a solid-fuel motor, large-diameter missile, Sejil, in 2008. However, its SLVs have been slimmer, posing  technological challenges, such as their inability to carry  larger engines to power the missile. <\/strong> Amongst others, China and Ukraine use liquid fuel to carry out  space launches as with more efficient motors, a country  does not necessarily need to use solid fuel. Iran\u2019s development of solid-fueled rockets and missiles resulted from frustration at a time when the supreme leader had imposed  a 2,000-kilometer range limit on the country\u2019s projectiles. <\/strong> It was revealed only after his death that the late Brigadier<\/a> General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, deputy commander of the IRGC\u2019s Aerospace Force and president of  the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), founded the IRGC missile force and led its development.  His affiliation with the IRGC and SSJO clearly suggest  that his intent was anything but the exploration of space for peaceful purposes. While Iran\u2019s liquid-fuel program received public attention,  Moghaddam worked silently on his more ambitious and strategic program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After Moghaddam\u2019s death, along with three dozen others, in 2011 during an explosion at the Bidganeh facility,  Iran\u2019s missile program went dormant for nearly five years, for both political and strategic reasons.  Since May 2016, the Bidganeh facility\u2019s testing range was revived and now it houses  five different test stands for motors. Iran has worked overtime to access the chemicals and technology needed for solid propellants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2017, IRGC Commander Hossein Salami and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh revealed<\/a> that the Salman rocket motor  would run on solid fuel. The IRGC  used carbon-fiber composites to reduce the motor\u2019s weight besides equipping it with a flexible nozzle for thrust vectoring, vital for solid-fueled missiles and rockets. The flexible nozzle performs far better than aerodynamic control surfaces and jet vanes for maneuvering. However, the IRGC  did not use the thrust-vectoring Salman motor for Zuljanah but opted for jet vanes. Since it was a test launch, Iran experimented with merging the country\u2019s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and SSJO resources. The two parallel programs have given Tehran technological and strategic flexibility. The motors that  Moghaddam\u2019s team manufactured  were used in the upper stages besides solid propellant and other systems it developed. If it was  not for political reasons i.e., talks with the White House regarding  the disputed Iranian nuclear deal and missile program, Iran would be preparing to launch  another SLV to carry  one or more satellites into  a lower orbit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The other crucial question concerns the conversion of  Zuljanah and Qassed-type SLVs into ICBMs.  The obvious answer is no, the  displayed technology falls short of ICBM capability. However,  no one can deny that acquiring or developing solid propellants, engines, and control systems  does provide vital knowledge  for ICBMs.  The crucial challenge in developing an ICBM is  its survival, command, and control in and after the re-entry phase. Iran has neither displayed  any technological capability to address  this substantial engineering challenge of an ICBM re-entering the atmosphere nor has any intelligence agency or open-source platform claimed the existence of such a technological feat  so far.  It is plausible that Tehran possesses the know-how but restrains itself from revealing it now because of the obvious  geopolitical repercussions. However, launching an ICBM towards an enemy without  testing  would be an unparalleled embarrassment for the Iranian political system and the IRGC as well as a  recipe for disaster.  <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Zuljanah, a satellite-carrying hybrid rocket consisting of two stages of solid fuel along with a supplementary liquid-fuel stage, took to space on January 4. The new satellite launch vehicle (SLV) is claimed to be capable of shooting a 220-kilogram payload of one or more satellites at a maximum altitude of 500-kilometers. Since no new satellite was aboard the SLV, Iran called it a test run. Besides its timing, Tehran\u2019s decision to send the rocket into space manifests interesting technological aspects compared to its last successful satellite launch on April 22, 2020.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":8798,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[5739,4848,4847],"class_list":["post-8797","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-dangerous","tag-irans-space","tag-irans-space-program"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8797","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8797"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8797\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8821,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8797\/revisions\/8821"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8798"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8797"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8797"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8797"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}