{"id":8901,"date":"2021-03-18T10:50:06","date_gmt":"2021-03-18T07:50:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=8901"},"modified":"2021-05-31T10:53:50","modified_gmt":"2021-05-31T07:53:50","slug":"iran-and-the-challenges-to-reviving-the-nuclear-deal-options-and-potential-trajectories","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/centre-for-researches-and-studies\/iran-and-the-challenges-to-reviving-the-nuclear-deal-options-and-potential-trajectories\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran and the Challenges to Reviving the Nuclear Deal: Options and Potential Trajectories"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Diplomacy is viewed as the preferred \u00a0US option when it comes to dealing with \u00a0Iran\u2019s nuclear file since \u00a0President Joe Biden was inaugurated \u00a0in the United States. However, Iran must meet certain conditions set by Biden before returning to the nuclear deal, which are perhaps not so different from those set by former President Donald Trump. The difference is that Biden is seeking to use the diplomatic approach whereas Trump applied pressure.\u00a0Iran is hoping that the existing nuclear deal will be revived without any substantial amendments or with it having to pay a real price via making excessive concessions.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But all the remarks coming from  the Biden administration indicate that Washington\u2019s plan to return to the nuclear deal is premised on securing guarantees regarding Iran\u2019s missile program. This is in addition to including contentious issues in prospective nuclear talks, particularly Iran\u2019s regional behavior and ballistic missile program, as well as permitting other parties to participate in the talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hence, the United States reiterated that it will neither lift the sanctions nor return to the nuclear deal without setting the ground for  comprehensive talks with Iran. However, Iran insists the sanctions must be lifted before it considers any other step.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper addresses the gap and divergence in positions between the United States and Iran  despite the two sides agreeing on the importance of  diplomacy.  Hence,  before beginning nuclear talks,  whether directly or indirectly, there will be a tense phase. During this phase, Biden will use Trump\u2019s legacy  to reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other side, Iran will attempt to escalate pressure to speed up the course of talks and overcome\u00a0the suffocating \u00a0crisis which it is experiencing\u00a0due to the sanctions excessive pressure.\u00a0This will undoubtedly impact the options available to Iran and the chances to lift the sanctions as well as the possibility of reviving the nuclear deal. \u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I. Restoring the Prestige of Diplomacy and the Opportunities Available for Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is no doubt that there are good opportunities available for Iran to revive the  nuclear deal and lift the sanctions.  These opportunities include the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. The Preparation of the Parties to Engage and Reach an Understanding<\/em><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    The change in the White House has been critical in shifting the course of relations between the United States and Iran from a phase of confrontation to a phase of de-escalation. Biden is prioritizing the diplomatic approach.\u00a0His administration believes that talks are necessary to convince Iran to comply with its obligations under the nuclear deal and to address outstanding issues which are a source of concern for Tehran and to prove that \u00a0Washington is prepared to be part of the P5+1 group once again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    On the other side, Iran \u2013 especially the \u201creformists\u201d \u2013 believes that there is an opportunity to promote diplomacy despite the divergence in positions and differences particularly concerning \u00a0who should first pursue\u00a0 this approach and has urged \u00a0the European Union (EU) to pursue the same approach. According to \u00a0the EU\u2019s spokesman Peter Stano, diplomacy has a critical role in reviving \u00a0the nuclear deal. He said that the EU wants to make sure the US returns to the \u00a0nuclear deal and Iran returns\u00a0 to honoring its obligations under the nuclear deal.[1]<\/a> Stano said that Washington\u2019s return to the\u00a0 nuclear deal could be a starting point to expand\u00a0dialogue concerning security and stability in the region.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    2. The Priority of the Global Powers to Address  Iran\u2019s Nuclear File<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    There is a US\u00a0 priority to ensure Iran complies with its nuclear obligations.\u00a0This was mentioned by the US\u00a0 National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on January 29, 2021, when he said, \u201cFrom our perspective, a critical early priority has to be to deal with what is an escalating nuclear crisis as they (Iran) move closer and closer to having enough fissile material for a weapon.\u201d[3]<\/a> In fact, the nuclear file has influenced Iran\u2019s relations with the United States and the West and is an effective lever when attempting to set the framework for relations, to achieve some equilibrium, and to make some gains at the negotiating table.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Biden administration and the \u00a0global powers view the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to be the most comprehensive agreement ever \u00a0reached and includes the \u00a0most effective transparency and verification mechanisms in the history of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, let alone the highest level of commitments. The JCPOA \u00a0also obstructs Iran\u2019s potential methods to acquire a nuclear bomb or \u00a0start a clandestine military program. The collapse of the nuclear deal or its benefits ending could push Tehran to boost its nuclear capabilities, resulting in its nuclear program growing out of control, particular its plan to suspend inspections of its sites in\u00a0 case the current crisis continues and worsens.[4]<\/a> The nuclear powers consider the nuclear deal as an important means to curb\u00a0 international nuclear proliferation[5]<\/a> and have shown an eagerness to revive it.[6]<\/a> Iran is now aware of its importance to the global powers. Hence, it decided to reduce its commitments under the nuclear deal and to increase its enrichment levels and the number of active centrifuges as well as to undertake other moves. Tehran continued its escalation; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced\u00a0 on February 11, 2021, that 3.6 grams of uranium were present at the Esfahan nuclear site.[7]<\/a> This is in addition to Tehran announcing its plan to lower cooperation levels with the IAEA, particularly to suspend inspections of its sites beginning on February 23, 2021. This announcement had a significant impact on pressing forward on the path to reach an understanding between the parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    3. Relaxing the Excessive Pressure<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Since Biden entered the White House,  the maximum pressure campaign started  by the former US administration somewhat came to a halt.  The United States has not  imposed any new sanctions on Iran. Moreover, the US representative withdrew a request on February 18, 2021, to  implement the snapback mechanism which was activated by the former Trump administration. This move indicates the inclinations of the new US administration to prioritize a diplomatic path and to reach an understanding. The United States also permitted some countries to unblock some Iranian financial assets and oil sale revenues, such as South Korea and Japan. This move clearly indicated the inclination of the Biden administration. This US position is based on the belief that Trump\u2019s maximum pressure campaign  failed to curb Tehran\u2019s support for terrorism and  its other malicious activities, according to  Biden\u2019s National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.[8]<\/a> Keeping in place Trump\u2019s legacy provides grounds to reach a better settlement with Iran. These moves have coincided with  an upward trend in the export of Iranian oil and non-oil products  in recent months. [9]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Iran\u2019s oil exports increased in January, after recovering in the last quarter of 2020, three assessments showed.[10]<\/a> This means that there is an opportunity for Iran to reduce the impact of sanctions and isolation, hence limiting  the worsening crisis at home. This could lead to improving the legitimacy  of the government which declined to unprecedented levels during Trump\u2019s leadership.  Sources and reports indicate  that the Biden administration is considering to relax the restrictions on the supply of humanitarian aid  to Iran and to approve  Iran\u2019s request for  a $5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund to  fight the coronavirus pandemic. However, these moves will be conditioned on Iran halting steps to further reduce its  nuclear commitments. Although the mentioned moves are not fully compatible with Iranian demands, they could lead to a broader understanding and the eventual lifting of the sanctions. Biden will not face opposition in the Congress as it is controlled by the Democratic party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    4. Creating an Appropriate Atmosphere to Start  Diplomatic Mediation<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The current interactions concerning the\u00a0 nuclear deal have created an appropriate atmosphere for mediation which favors Iran, as there would be a shift away from the path of imposing sanctions and pressure on Tehran.\u00a0 Josep Borrell,\u00a0 the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his visit to Moscow on February 5, 2021, suggested that the parties to the crisis pursue a path of\u00a0\u201cdisciplined diplomacy\u201d instead of excessive pressure.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    On the same day, French President Emmanuel Macron indicated  his readiness to be an impartial mediator between Iran and the United States  to overcome the current deadlock. Spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova on February 5, 2021, announced Moscow\u2019s readiness to cooperate with the parties to the Iranian  nuclear deal, including the United States, to salvage the deal. However, Qatar and Oman expressed during the same month their readiness to play a mediating role  to bring closer the viewpoints of Iran and the United States. Although Iran has previously refused  several mediation offers during  Trump\u2019s tenure, it seems that during this phase European mediation is preferrable  for Tehran.  Zarif has  explicitly requested  European mediation and the United States has agreed to this. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    5. The Desire of Russia, China, and the EU  to Revive the  Nuclear Deal<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The three parties want to return to the nuclear deal and opposed Trump\u2019s withdrawal from it and undermined his efforts to forge an international consensus against Iran over the past three years. Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia\u2019s permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna, on February 9, 2021, floated the possibility of Moscow holding talks to revive the nuclear deal, and he indicated that it would be acceptable to hold an unofficial multilateral meeting under the JCPOA.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Yet, China is a significant Iranian ally and its vision on the nuclear deal agrees with Iran\u2019s. Iran is also taking advantage of the European position, which was expressed by Josep Borrell, the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cornelia Ernst, the head of the European Parliament\u2019s Delegation for Relations with Iran, who said on February 11, 2021 that, \u201cTehran didn\u2019t breach the \u00a0nuclear deal and the first step should be taken by Washington.\u201d[12]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This position represents an opportunity for Iran to coordinate with the Europeans as well as with the other parties to ensure its viewpoints are adopted at the negotiating table and to ensure it has allies that support its vision. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    II.  The Challenges and Problems Facing Iran  in Reviving the Nuclear Deal<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    There are a host of challenges the Iranian government is facing during the current transitional period, such as  the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    1. Internal Disagreements in Iran as the Presidential Election Approaches <\/em><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      The nuclear file is still a source of polarization at\u00a0 home among\u00a0Iran\u2019s political currents.\u00a0This was evident when Zarif asked the political currents\u00a0 not to make the nuclear file an electoral issue.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The \u201creformists\u201d want a return to the nuclear deal as this will boost their position which declined after Trump withdrew from the deal. This US move was exploited by the \u201cconservative\u201d current in the parliamentary elections held in\u00a0 February 2020. During the elections,\u00a0the \u201creformists\u201d were excluded from the political scene and could not prevent the \u201cconservatives\u201d from dominating the interactions regarding the nuclear deal. This mounting rivalry between the two currents is closely related to\u00a0 their respective preparations for the upcoming presidential election to be held in June 2021.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This dispute between the two current clearly impacted Iran\u2019s domestic policies. The Parliament preemptively acted before the inauguration of Biden, issuing a bill\u00a0 which was approved by the Guardian Council on February 21, 2021, which made its obligatory for the Iranian government to raise enrichment levels and to suspend\u00a0 the implementation of the Additional Protocol\u00a0 within a period of three months. The\u00a0 bill was opposed by Rouhani initially\u00a0 as it undermined the diplomatic path. \u00a0However, he was pressured to implement it, with plans to raise the percentage of enriched uranium to 20 percent purity after it was approved by the Guardian Council.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Rouhani reached an\u00a0agreement with the IAEA on February 21, 2021 to extend the inspections according to new understandings, such as surveillance cameras being kept in place for up to three months, with the Iranians hoping that this period would lead to sanctions relief via a new round of talks. Later, the Iranian Parliament unanimously voted to refer Rouhani to the judiciary because of his\u00a0recent agreement\u00a0with the IAEA. It cited breaches of the bill, such as suspending the implementation of the Additional Protocol completely. The supreme leader\u2019s positions\u00a0 \u2013 who has spoken of the need to lift the sanctions \u2013 are divergent from those of Rouhani and Zarif who support mutual understandings \u2013 though partial- according to the policy of \u201ccommitment for commitment.\u201d[16]<\/a> These divergences may impede the diplomatic path for a short while, even until after the presidential elections scheduled to be held in the middle of 2021.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      2. The Internal Pressure on Biden Not to Abandon the Maximum Pressure Campaign <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Differences exist in the Biden administration regarding how to handle the Iranian file.\u00a0This is in addition to\u00a0Republican members of Congress opposing any radical shifts pertaining to this file, especially the lifting of the sanctions on Iran. These members of Congress have the right to monitor the implementation of the sanctions on Iran which remain in place.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Several Republican congressmen have started to oppose Biden\u2019s inclinations by introducing a bill to the Senate which opposes the United States rejoining the nuclear deal. Some lawmakers, including Democratic ones,  oppose the lifting of the sanctions on Tehran without  actual and tangible pledges including Iran halting its  ballistic missile program and  destabilizing activities in the region.[18]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Moreover,\u00a0 some prominent political figures oppose Biden\u2019s policies, including former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger who advised Biden not to reverse Trump\u2019s decision to withdraw\u00a0from the nuclear deal, warning of a\u00a0 disastrous nuclear arms race in the Middle East.[19]<\/a>It must be pointed out here the pressure imposed on the Biden administration by lobbies affiliated to regional countries not to rejoin the nuclear deal. [20]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      3. The Pressure of Regional Powers to Influence the Course of Negotiations<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The regional powers are pressuring for the United States not to\u00a0rejoin the nuclear\u00a0deal without taking their interests into consideration. Hence, they want to be included in any nuclear talks.\u00a0They also want provisions to be added to the nuclear deal covering Iran\u2019s missile program and destabilizing regional behavior. The United States\u00a0 has succumbed to these pressures\u00a0 and called\u00a0 on some European countries to include other parties in the talks, such as the\u00a0 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration is well aware that bypassing the demands of regional parties will push them to boost their capabilities and cooperation levels to thwart US policies regarding Iran.[21]<\/a> Israel is\u00a0 exerting excessive pressure on the Biden administration to prevent it from rejoining the nuclear deal.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      4. The Shift in the Position of the European Troika and Coordination With Washington on Iran<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Biden \u00a0has started to re-establish Washington\u2019s relations with the European countries after the downturn in their mutual relations during Trump\u2019s term \u2014 resulting from their\u00a0disagreements on Iran.\u00a0Forming a unified front (between the United States and its European allies)\u00a0can possibly contribute to stronger levels of coordination between the two sides in relation to the Iranian file.\u00a0 The European Troika believe that reviving\u00a0 the nuclear deal with Iran is insufficient, and\u00a0 they are pushing for a new deal with additions including\u00a0Iran\u2019s ballistic missile program and\u00a0 its regional behavior, as they are key European interests. The office of the French president called on Iran to fully comply with \u00a0the nuclear deal before the United States rejoins it. [23]<\/a> On February 5, 2021, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan indicated that the Biden administration is actively engaged in discussions with its European partners. These discussions\u00a0 will lead to the\u00a0 establishment of a united US-European\u00a0 front regarding the strategy that will be implemented towards Iran.[24]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      5.  US Reactions to  Iran\u2019s  Ongoing Nuclear Breaches<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Some believe that the United States wants to keep the Iranian government at a certain level of strength\u00a0to serve its regional objectives and achieve a regional balance which preserves\u00a0its different interests.\u00a0The United States could pursue a harsher strategy towards Iran if it becomes apparent that Tehran is accelerating plans to develop a nuclear weapon or intends to change the regional balance of power.\u00a0Biden has an opportunity to use Trump\u2019s legacy while not abandoning his ambition to kick-start the diplomatic path. Before taking office, Biden\u00a0said, \u201cThe\u00a0 excessive pressures failed to contain Iran and they weren\u2019t effective. Hence, we should add smart sanctions.\u201d[25]<\/a> It is likely that the United States will not lift the sanctions without Iran making substantial concession \u2013\u00a0 the Iranian economy is suffering\u00a0 excessively due to the sanctions.[26]<\/a> There is no doubt that Iran violating its nuclear obligations has concerned the United States, however, it has the ability, whether directly or via its allies, to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      6. The Procedural Problems<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Despite restoring the prestige of diplomacy, reviving\u00a0 the nuclear deal faces a host of impediments, particularly regarding who will make the first move. Each party insists that the other should make the first move.\u00a0The second problem is related to the differences concerning\u00a0 the lifting of the sanctions. It is unlikely that the Biden administration will compromise on\u00a0 the most significant tool\u00a0 to pressure Iran.[27]<\/a> Finally, there are difficulties related to bridging the confidence gap, and stipulating guarantees to prevent going backward in the crisis. In case Biden returns to the nuclear deal, Iran and all the other parties to the deal will have a question regarding what guarantee can the US president provide that under his watch the United States will not withdraw from the deal? [28]<\/a> Especially any withdrawal which will lead to the United States having the right to activate the snapback mechanism. This mechanism included in the \u00a0nuclear deal allows the reimposition of the UN Security Council\u2019s sanctions in case Iran fails to comply with its obligations.[29]<\/a> The United States could also use this mechanism if the follow-up negotiations related to the non-nuclear contentious issues face an impasse. On the US part, \u00a0some members of Biden\u2019s administration do not \u00a0trust \u00a0Iran\u2019s behavior if \u00a0the nuclear deal is revived, especially as they experienced Iran\u2019s destabilizing behavior \u00a0after the signing of the 2015 nuclear deal. Iran also has hesitancies because of what happened under the Trump leadership, with his withdrawal from the deal. \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      III.  The  Options and Alternatives Available to Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      It seems that the Biden administration has put an end to the maximum pressure campaign and replaced\u00a0 confrontation \u00a0with Iran to pursue a \u00a0diplomatic path. Iran betting \u00a0on Trump\u2019s departure and a change in\u00a0US policy has yielded positive results. However, the Biden administration has considered important developments and factors, preventing the United States from\u00a0automatically returning to the nuclear deal or lifting the sanctions on Iran.\u00a0There is a US desire \u00a0that the existing deal will \u00a0be a base for a more comprehensive understanding addressing Iran\u2019s destabilizing activities. This had led to\u00a0divergent positions emerging\u00a0between the two sides. This divergence is not something that has occurred at \u00a0the current stage, but it existed even during the nuclear talks before 2015. Iran succeeded in preventing any other outstanding issue being included in the deal.\u00a0Iran is prepared to face condemnation for an extended period of time and pursues a policy to exert pressure on the US to hasten its return to the nuclear deal and to strengthen its position at the negotiating table. The Iranian moves include the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      1. Threatening to Continue Enrichment  and Develop Its Nuclear Program if the Sanctions Continue<\/em><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

        Uranium enrichment is one of Iran\u2019s important cards that it uses against the Biden administration and the international community to kick-start talks but without conceding ground and limiting talks to selective issues. On February 22, 2021, Khamenei expressed the centrality of uranium enrichment to Iran’s strategy, by announcing his country\u2019s readiness to raise enrichment levels to 60 percent if it needed to. Since the beginning of 2021, Iran has reduced its commitment by raising the enrichment rate to about 20 percent.[30]<\/a> Iran\u2019s representative to the IAEA , Kazem Gharibabadi, announced that his country has installed 348 new centrifuges at the Natanz facility, and that they are now operational. \u00a0They have been \u00a0\u00a0injected with uranium gas. Other devices were installed at the Fordow facility. Gharibabadi \u00a0added that the capacity of the new centrifuges is four times the capacity of the first-generation devices. Concerns regarding this development were \u00a0raised by the United States and Europeans, especially as they were confirmed by IAEA reports, in February 2021.[31]<\/a> Based on an agreement with the IAEA, Iran decided to suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol starting on February 23, 2021. However, the inspections remain in place. They will be carried out \u00a0under the Safeguards Agreement. The main inspections and cameras stipulated in \u00a0\u00a0this Safeguards Agreement will continue as usual.[32]<\/a> \u00a0The Iranian Minister of Security and Intelligence Mahmoud Alawi on February 9, 2021, indicated\u00a0 his country\u2019s intention to possess nuclear weapons if external pressure continue to be imposed on Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        2.The Push  for Mediation to Settle the Dispute<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        One of Iran\u2019s options so that is does not miss the opportunities offered by the diplomatic path is \u00a0to request the intervention of some parties to settle the dispute over the nuclear deal. Moscow was a key destination for Iranian officials. Mohammad Javad Zarif visited Moscow on January 25, 2021.[33]<\/a> The Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf visited Moscow as well on February 8, 2021 and met his Russian counterpart.\u00a0He\u00a0delivered a letter from Khamenei to Putin.[34]<\/a> Meanwhile, Zarif called for European mediation that could be carried out by Josep Borrell to determine \u201cthe actions\u00a0 that\u00a0 are to be taken\u00a0by the United States, and those that are needed to be taken by Iran,\u00a0and\u00a0 provide\u00a0 a \u201cmechanism\u201d\u00a0either\u00a0to \u201csynchronize\u201d the return of both countries to the nuclear agreement, or \u201ccoordinate what can be done.\u201d[35]<\/a> For its part, the United States announced that it had accepted European mediation to settle the disputes and expressed its readiness to participate once again in the nuclear deal talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        3.Reducing Missile Tests<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        Khamenei refused to give up his country\u2019s missile program, and indicated that this program \u201cforced Iran\u2019s enemies to reconsider their actions.\u201d[36]<\/a> At the same time, Iran has significantly reduced its launching operations recently, and it has carried out the same actions as it carried out during the first and second phase of the nuclear negotiations before the 2015 nuclear deal. Iran in its attempt to legitimize its missile program says it is for scientific and research purposes only. During the recent period it boosted its missile tests as well as satellite launches. The last satellite launch was on January 21, 2021. Iran is accused of abandoning the defensive nature of its missile program.\u00a0Iran\u2019s missile program has \u00a0become an effective tool in regional politics, after supplying its proxies with the technology needed to manufacture missiles. The United States is concerned that Iran will use\u00a0 long-range ballistic missile technology to\u00a0put satellites into orbit around the Earth, and to launch nuclear warheads. Iran denies this claim, stressing that\u00a0its satellite programs is it right and it is intended for only civilian and research purposes, hence \u00a0compatible with UN Security Council Resolutions.[37]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        4.  Starting Negotiations on Foreign Detainees<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \u00a0Foreign and dual national prisoners are a pressure card \u00a0Iran uses to bargain with the United States and Western powers. The importance of this card resulted in the United States including the human rights file in any prospective understanding with Iran. Blinken indicated on\u00a0\u00a0February 1, 2021 that Iran should release US detainees, irrespective of any deal. [38]<\/a> There is no doubt that Iran is skilled in using the foreigner card as it is politically inexpensive in talks and can be used to reduce concessions in other important files. Iran\u2019s ambassador to the United Nations, Majid Takht Ravanchi, indicated the use of prisoners in\u00a0 Iran\u2019s strategy. He said, \u201cWe are ready to engage in a comprehensive exchange of all prisoners and detainees with the United States, and this is a simple and a straightforward proposition.\u201d [39]<\/a>Indeed, the United States started \u201ccontacting Iran regarding the Americans detained there.\u201d The new US administration has prioritized this matter, according to\u00a0National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on February 21, 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        IV. The Future of Iran Returning to the Nuclear Deal <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The Biden administration has suspended the maximum pressure campaign to pursue diplomatic options. Iran betting \u00a0on Trump\u2019s departure and a change in US policy has yielded some positive results, most notably the relaxation of some restrictions and allowing some countries to unblock some of its financial assets held abroad. However, the Biden administration has taken \u00a0into account important developments and factors, hence it has not completely lifted the sanctions nor automatically rejoined the nuclear deal before settling other important files with Iran. It wants to take advantage of Iran\u2019s difficult economic conditions resulting from sanctions and excessive pressure. \u00a0Therefore, the United States plans to make its return to \u00a0the agreement a basis for comprehensively addressing\u00a0 \u00a0Iran\u2019s destabilizing activities. As a result, the divergence in positions between the two sides and\u00a0 key differences have arisen. \u00a0This divergence is not something new but has existed even before the 2015 nuclear deal. Iran succeeded previously in avoiding the inclusion of some other outstanding issues \u00a0in the previous deal, with the latter restricting its nuclear program in return for wide economic benefits. However, the Biden administration is more patient and determined to achieve greater gains at the negotiating table. This may complicate the course of diplomacy. The talks may take more time than expected. Therefore, it is most likely that the two parties will continue their policies and strengthen their negotiating cards to secure vital gains, to avoid making fundamental concessions, or to secure alternatives to\u00a0the lengthy course of\u00a0negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        In the light of this, the expected scenarios for Iran to lift the sanctions and return to the nuclear deal include the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        1.The Loss of Diplomatic Opportunities   and Adhering to  the Confrontation Option<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        This option means that the Biden administration will hold on to   its conditions to return to the agreement, which Iran will reject. Therefore, the Iranian government will resort to its traditional position of pursuing confrontation and resistance in response to external   pressures and refuse talks in accordance with Biden\u2019s conditions.  Resisting pressure over time has turned into a critical part of Iran\u2019s  strategy. The government believes that, for more than 40 years, it has been able to cope with various external pressures. Therefore, during this stage, it seeks to make clear that Biden imposing pressure and sanctions will not force it to concede ground.[40]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        This option is boosted by the fact that it is a  possible alternative that grants Iran power and a degree of balance when entering a possible confrontation phase with  the Biden administration. It also saves the government from making critical concessions that would impact its legitimacy and lower its popular support base. The government is used to this strategy and has the basic tools  to be successful. The decision to return to  the nuclear deal is still  in the hands of the hardliner \u201crevolutionary\u201d wing led by the supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guards. This faction opposes openness with the  United States and is unwilling to show flexibility in negotiations.  This faction also dominates the Parliament, and intends to prevent the \u201creformists\u201d from gaining the benefits that they did when they initially signed the nuclear deal. It is eager to do this prior to the presidential elections in June 2021, so that its interests are not risked. This concern is because the influence of the \u201creformists\u201d would increase in the political system if the deal was revived and their popularity would grow if living conditions improved. The nuclear bill was introduced to thwart negotiations, which Rouhani opposed initially. However, the Iranian Parliament passed the bill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The Biden administration may continue to build on Trump’s legacy and increase pressure on Iran, which will increase the possibility of a confrontation option because there are currents in the United States, which believe that it is difficult to tame Iran, arguing  that the Iranian political system had an aggressive nature and its behavior could not be modified. It also believed that changing the government was the only solution left and that continuous pressure  would eventually change the political system. The Biden administration has a greater opportunity to cooperate with the European parties to increase pressure on Iran, in light of the European Troika\u2019s position  that  seeks to fundamentally amend the nuclear deal and the position of regional powers to address all outstanding issues at once and not to repeat the Obama scenario. Finally, Russia and China may support Iran\u2019s approach within the framework of the   ongoing international competition, especially if their relationship with President Biden deteriorates. The Biden  administration seeks to assert the supremacy of the United States and its international leadership, by weakening Russia and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        2. The Inability to Withstand and Accept  US Conditions<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        This option means that Iran will agree to amend the nuclear agreement and include other issues such as its regional behavior, its ballistic missile program, and the human rights file in the talks in accordance with US demands. Although there are no clear indications regarding this option, it is a possibility, which could occur if Iran continues reducing its nuclear commitments and does not show flexibility. On the other hand, this option could materialize if  Biden abandons the diplomatic track, and  adopts Trump\u2019s policy, insisting on complete concessions from the Iranian side along with activating a regional deterrence strategy to counter Iran\u2019s regional influence. Perhaps Biden will carry out  directly or with Israeli coordination, military strikes targeting Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities, in addition to working to weaken the government, by supporting civilian actors, and agitating protests. In this case, the government will figure out that its survival is threatened, and then it will be forced  to \u201cdrink  poison,\u201d as before when  Khomeini was  forced to end the war with Iraq at the end of 1980s. Iran will accept the  US conditions and reach an understanding on all controversial issues, especially given the fact that no  global power,  including Russia and China,  will accept Iran crossing the  nuclear threshold barrier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        3 .Limited Concessions \u201cLess  for Less \u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        It may be an interim option, during which the two parties engage in limited understandings and actions to reduce escalation, rebuild confidence, and preserve the diplomatic path. Dennis Ross calls this path a \u201cless for less\u201d policy.[41]<\/a> The United States may grant Iran economic concessions, but they will be less than the sanctions relief stipulated in the 2015 nuclear deal.  Iran in turn will cease, or most likely give up its strategy of breaching its nuclear obligations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The indication of \u00a0this option is Rouhani\u2019s talk about a second and third nuclear agreement, meaning that if the first nuclear deal \u00a0succeeds, then the policy of settling outstanding differences can proceed albeit gradually. Washington also talks about allowing Iran\u00a0 some economic benefits, however, they will be no doubt less beneficial than the sanctions relief it received after its signed the 2015 nuclear deal.\u00a0The United States is likely to \u00a0approve Iran\u2019s request for a $ 5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund\u00a0 to confront the coronavirus pandemic,\u00a0in exchange for Tehran ending its nuclear obligation breaches. The Biden administration has withdrawn\u00a0a previous request made by the Trump administration to the UNSC to activate the snapback mechanism. Iran considers this to be a symbolic move to build confidence and push it to the negotiating table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        Likewise, there is talk about a US desire to address the concerns of the regional powers, by resolving the Yemeni crisis. \u00a0Extensive efforts have started\u00a0in this regard. The US State Department removed the Houthis from\u00a0its list of terrorist groups. This move may be part of a \u201cless for less\u201d policy; \u00a0considering that resolving the Yemeni crisis may limit the regional powers’ opposition against returning to the nuclear agreement without tackling all their concerns. The Houthis\u2019 escalation of attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at this stage may be part of Iran\u2019s plans to push forward the diplomatic path within the framework of partial understandings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        This choice of boosting diplomacy is strengthened \u00a0by the fact that the two sides are aware of the\u00a0difficulties and challenges facing Washington automatically returning to the nuclear deal. At the same time, they do not want confrontation, and display a definite desire to pursue the diplomatic path. Iran may realize that it has entered a new era of international politics that is different from\u00a0Obama\u2019s era,\u00a0and a return\u00a0to the pre-Trump stage is impossible. It may also realize\u00a0 that the nuclear deal\u00a0in light\u00a0of the new European positions may not survive, and the economic crisis that the government suffers from may worsen further. This crisis threatens the government\u2019s legitimacy, and it is likely to get even worse, if Iran does not display\u00a0flexibility in dealing with its challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        As for\u00a0the United States, waiting for a comprehensive settlement may take a long time, and this duration may be \u00a0used by Iran to\u00a0boost its nuclear capabilities. Therefore, invoking this option may be important in a phased manner because it would curb the danger of Iran stepping up violations, and address the concerns of regional powers, considering that these steps are preliminary, before starting a trajectory to tackle all the problems with Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        4. Flexibility and Mutual Benefits According to the \u201cWin-Win\u201d Principle<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        This option means that the two parties start negotiations, directly or through mediation, on all disputed issues, as was the case in the 2015 nuclear deal, and no party achieves full gains, according to the \u201cWin-Win\u201d principle. The most important gain for both sides is Iran complying with its nuclear obligations and  perhaps extending the nuclear deal\u2019s duration,  thus  calming   Israel\u2019s fears in exchange for the United States returning to the deal  and the lifting  the sanctions on Tehran. In regard to the rest of the files, they will be within the follow-up negotiations. One of the files that is likely to  be resolved is the Yemen file, and if done successfully, will contribute to mitigating the concerns  of the Gulf states. Meanwhile, Iran will maintain its missile program without making concessions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The indications of this option are President Rouhani\u2019s and Foreign Minister Zarif\u2019s remarks about \u00a0simultaneously returning to\u00a0their commitments, taking sequential steps to remove obstacles, and Zarif\u2019s request for European mediation to bring the\u00a0points of divergence closer together. On the other side, the United States is carrying out consultations with the European parties to build a reliable path for negotiations. The EU has already announced that it is in the process of holding talks with all concerned parties to build a path to return to the nuclear deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        This option is likely,\u00a0given the fact that the United States and Iran are aware of what cards they have and how effective they are to reap more gains. Otherwise, the alternative to negotiations and diplomacy is war. For its part, Iran is escalating its nuclear threats to the maximum level, and it cannot pursue this path to its full extent because it will face global rejection, and perhaps a military war. On the other side, the United States imposed maximum pressure on Iran, but it did not curb the government\u2019s inclinations \u00a0and policies, nor did it force it to surrender and accept \u00a0US conditions. The United States also does not want war and\u00a0 conflict in the region, and perhaps it does not have a desire to change the government, because Iran is an important balancing actor for the United States\u00a0 in an influential region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        This option is likely, given the fact that  the reality of  the crisis  means that  any mediation efforts are likely to be much more effective, than ever before. European-Russian collaboration might be important to restore the diplomatic approach, given the fact that all  parties realize that the nuclear deal is important to curb the international non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

        Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The path of diplomacy is the choice for both sides. There is a transitional period in which intentions will be tested, and confidence will be strengthened through some limited measures at the beginning. It is clear that the dialogue has already begun, even if it is conducted indirectly. It is likely that the option of \u201cless for less\u201d and making limited concessions is the path that will be tested in the short or medium term, due to the desire of both sides to push for a truce and to de-escalate,  so that the crisis does not slide toward confrontation once again. It may end with military action that none of the parties to the crisis favors. Some of the de-escalation steps  have already begun, in the hope that broader negotiations will take place indirectly or through mediation. At these talks,  each party will be obliged to make secondary concessions in exchange for vital gains. This could be a marathon in which each party uses its pressure cards  to achieve better gains. At the same time, regional and international parties seek to secure a future that limits the risks and threats posed by Iran. It is likely that there will be no major progress before the Iranian presidential elections, which are scheduled to take place in the middle of 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \n\n\n\n

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        [2]<\/a> \u201cTehran Confirms Its Seriousness in Adhering to the Nuclear Agreement and Asks the Europeans to Mediate With Washington to Save It,\u201d Al-Jazeera<\/em>, February 2, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3jCHf42<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [3]<\/a> \u201cBiden Priority Is Dealing With Iran\u2019s Growing Fissile Material Stockpile \u2013 Sullivan,\u201d Reuters,<\/em>  January 29, 2021, accessed February 10, 2021, http:\/\/reut.rs\/3qcyujK<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [4]<\/a>  Seyed Hossein Mousavian & Mohammad Mehdi Mousavian, \u201cBuilding on the Iran Nuclear Deal for International Peace and Security,\u201d Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament<\/em> 1, no. 1 (2018): 184-185.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [5]<\/a> Bryan Bender, \u201c\u2018This Is Going to Be Quite a Show:\u2019 Biden\u2019s Arms Control Team Eyes Nuclear Policy Overhaul,\u201d Politico,<\/em> January 27, 2021, accessed  February 11, 2021, http:\/\/politi.co\/3tPOQRt<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [6]<\/a> \u201cThe Iranian Nuclear Program. Washington Denies the Existence of Communications and Tehran Is Installing Hundreds of Centrifuges, and Israel Seeks to Prevent Return to the Agreement,\u201d Al-Jazeera,<\/em> February 3, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3aPkZ30<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [7]<\/a>  \u201cIran Produces Uranium Metal in New Violation of Nuclear Deal,\u201d BBC,<\/em>  February 11  2021, accessed  February 14, 2021, http:\/\/bbc.in\/2ZhFqAj<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [8]<\/a>  Jeff Seldin, \u201cBiden\u2019s National Security Approach Sees Merger of Foreign, Domestic Policy,\u201d Voice of America (VOA),<\/em>  January 29, 2021, accessed  February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3b9At2b<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [9]<\/a> \u201cZanganeh: The Enemies Failed to Cut Off the Sale of Iranian oil,\u201d IRNA<\/em> in an interview with the Yemeni network,  February 26, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/36qLMS3<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [10]<\/a> Alex Lawler, \u201cIran\u2019s Oil Exports Rise in January Despite Sanctions \u2013 Trackers,\u201d Reuters<\/em>, January 26, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/reut.rs\/3rFPxeo<\/a><\/em> .<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [11]<\/a> \u201cUlyanov: Russia Is Ready for Constructive Cooperation With the United States on the Nuclear Agreement With Iran,\u201d Sputnik Arabic,<\/em>  February 9, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/2Z42WR0<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [12]<\/a> \u201cWithout Boundaries Show, Without Boundaries – Interview With Cornelia Ernst, Head of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations With Iran,\u201d YouTube, Al-Jazeera News,<\/em>   48:21 minutes, February 11, 2021, accessed February 28, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly \/ 3bJzXIg. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [13]<\/a> \u201cZarif: I Will Not Run for the Presidency and Do Not Take Advantage of the Nuclear Agreement in the Elections … and 37 Human Rights Organizations Call on the International Community to Pay Attention,\u201d The International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah),<\/em>  February 6, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/ 3tMTtfe. [Arabic]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [14]<\/a> \u201cMember of Parliament:  Zarif Has Political and Electoral Goals From the Deal,\u201d IRNA,<\/em> in February 23, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3qH0dJ4<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [15]<\/a> \u201cThe Diplomatic Apparatus Should Provide the Ground for the Convergence of the Countries of the Region,\u201d Khaneh Mellat News Agency,<\/em>  February 28, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/2Ye73Kb<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [16]<\/a> \u201cRouhani, on the Day of \u2018The End of the Despot Trump,\u2019 Calls on Biden to Return to the Nuclear Deal,\u201d RT Arabic,<\/em>  January 21, 2021, accessed February 10, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3pDE2Ue<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [17]<\/a> Nahal Toosi, \u201cTrump Left Behind a Sanctions Minefield for Biden,\u201d Politico, <\/em>January 30, 2020, accessed  February 11, 2021, http:\/\/politi.co\/3aTerQP<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [18]<\/a> Rana Abtar, \u201cCongress Pressures the White House to Keep Sanctions on Tehran, the Middle East,\u201d Asharq al-Aawsat<\/em>, February 6, 2021 , accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/2Z5vbyT. [Arabic<\/a>].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [19]<\/a> \u201cHenry Kissinger\u2019s Wise Warning to Joe Biden on the Iran Nuke Deal,\u201d New York Post,<\/em> January 12, 2021, accessed  February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/39t8rxr<\/a><\/em> .<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [20]<\/a> \u201cIn an Interview With IRNA; Former Diplomat: Biden Should Return to the Nuke Deal in the First Week of His Presidency,\u201d IRNA<\/em>, December 13, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/2XzeJ9w<\/a>.  [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [21]<\/a>  Eric R. Mandel, \u201cA US-Israel Defense Treaty Has Benefits \u2014 and Perils,\u201d The Hill,<\/em> January 8, 2021, accessed  February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/2Z37vew<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [22]<\/a> \u201cReport: Mossad Chief to Meet Top US Officials During Upcoming Visit to Washington,\u201d Israel Hayom,<\/em>  January 31, 2021, accessed  February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3tNrk7W<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [23]<\/a> \u201cFrance Reiterates Position on the Nuke Deal,\u201d Khabar Online,<\/em> February 28, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3pmdjeN<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [24]<\/a> \u201cThe US National Security Council to Submit Recommendations to Biden on Iran,\u201d Asharq Al-Awsat, February 6, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3tPWLOE<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [25]<\/a> \u201cShariatmadari: Biden\u2019s View of Nuke Deal Is the Same as Trump\u2019s View, and It Is Even Harsher,\u201d ISNA,<\/em> February 26, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/39YJcn5<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [26]<\/a>Michael Rubin, \u201cCommentary: Trump Is Right on Iran,\u201d The Times and Democrat,<\/em> January 11, 2021, accessed February 28, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3sm4OC7<\/a><\/em> .<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [27]<\/a>  \u201cSeyed Hossein Mousavian, 9 Obstacles to the Revival of Nuke Deal,\u201d IRNA,<\/em>  December 20, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3sG9Jhy<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [28]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [29]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [30]<\/a>Hamd Ibrahim Targhinejad, Khatibzadeh:We will not allow ISIS to swell,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        IRNA news agency, (February 26, 2016), Accessed: February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/36btJPl<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [31]<\/a> \u201cThe Iranian Nuclear Program: Washington Denies any Contact.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [32]<\/a> Mehr’s news agency, Zarif upon arrival in Moscow: The formation of the Union of a 6-party organization is the most important goal of the trip to the Caucasus, (February 27, 2016), Accessed: February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3cdgwJB.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [33]<\/a> Raed Jabr, \u201cMoscow Calls on Washington to Return to the \u2018Nuclear Deal,\u2019 Lavrov and Zarif  Discussed  \u2018Confronting Provocations\u2019 Against Iran, the Middle East,\u201d January 27, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3jBmSo5<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [34]<\/a> \u201cQalibaf Explains the Outcomes  of His Visit to Moscow,\u201d al-Alam TV<\/em>,  February 10, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3jBCcRB<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [35]<\/a>  \u201cIran FM Asks Europe to Help Mediate US Return to Nuclear Deal,\u201d  France 24,<\/em>  January 29, 2021, accessed  February 12, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3qaC5i5<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [36]<\/a> \u201cKhamenei: We Are in No   Rush  on   the United States  Return to the Nuclear Agreement,\u201d BBC Arabic,<\/em> January 8, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bbc.in\/2L653Av<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [37]<\/a> \u201cIran Successfully Launches a New Satellite Carrying  Missile,\u201d al-Jazeera, <\/em>February 2, 2021, accessed  February 13, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/3jLmvXW<\/a>. [Arabic].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [38]<\/a> \u201cWashington Says That Iran Is Close to Possessing  a Nuclear Weapon, and Tehran Sets Conditions  to Return  to the Agreement,\u201d al-Jazeera,<\/em> February 1, 2021, accessed February 11, 2021, http:\/\/bit.ly\/2NjTFBH<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [39]<\/a> \u201cAn interview with NBC America: Takht Ravanchi: The ball is at the US court \/ We are not in a hurry to talk to Washington,\u201d IRNA<\/em>, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3oeAgip<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [40]<\/a>ISNA news agency, Rezaei: The last sanction of the Trump administration is to throw stones at the path of the next US president, February 25, 2016,  accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/3cacn9D<\/a>. [Persian].  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

        [41]<\/a> \u201cAn expert on international issues, said that the relationship between Europe and the United States in the Biden era is an opportunity and challenge for Iran,\u201d ISNA,  February 25, 2016, accessed February 11, 2021, https:\/\/bit.ly\/2MkkaXd<\/a>. [Persian].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Diplomacy is viewed as the preferred US option when it comes to dealing with Iran\u2019s nuclear file since President Joe Biden was inaugurated in the United States. However, Iran must meet certain conditions set by Biden before returning to the nuclear deal, which are perhaps not so different from those set by former President Donald Trump. The difference is that Biden is seeking to use the diplomatic approach whereas Trump applied pressure. Iran is hoping that the existing nuclear deal will be revived without any substantial amendments or with it having to pay a real price via making excessive concessions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":214,"featured_media":8903,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[3206,708,3161,5763],"class_list":["post-8901","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-centre-for-researches-and-studies","tag-challenges","tag-nuclear-deal","tag-the-nuclear-deal","tag-trajectories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8901","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/214"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8901"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8901\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9227,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8901\/revisions\/9227"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8903"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8901"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8901"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8901"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}