{"id":9399,"date":"2021-06-24T10:14:09","date_gmt":"2021-06-24T07:14:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=9399"},"modified":"2021-06-28T10:37:16","modified_gmt":"2021-06-28T07:37:16","slug":"irans-presidential-elections-results-and-implications","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/position-estimate\/irans-presidential-elections-results-and-implications\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Presidential Elections: Results and Implications"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Introduction:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under internal and external pressures, Iran\u2019s political system held its presidential elections on June 18, 2021. The seemingly already determined result showed that \u201chardline\u201d cleric Ebrahim Raisi won  the election.  This election  was of particular importance due to the developments taking place inside and outside Iran. Therefore, its  result will have an important impact on the overall situation whether on Iranians at home or on Iran\u2019s foreign relations. This report will highlight the most important developments regarding the election, its results and   its implications inside and outside Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I- Iran\u2019s Presidential Election and Crisis Dimensions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The presidential election took place under critical internal conditions as the country  continues to suffer from isolation and siege in the aftermath of US sanctions and the Rouhani government\u2019s failure to fulfill its promises. These critical conditions have led to competition intensifying  between the two political \u201ccurrents\u201d of Iran\u2019s political system:  the \u201chardliners\u201d and \u201creformists.\u201d The \u201chardliners\u201d sharply criticized President Hassan Rouhani and the \u201creformists\u201d and held them responsible for the negative impact of  the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal as well as for  the failure of the deal.  They also exploited the external pressure facing Iran to thwart his policies and his government\u2019s goals, notably his attempt to reduce the dominant role of Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC) in the country\u2019s economic sector.  However, the IRGC\u2019s role expanded in  managing the economic crisis after the reimposition of the sanctions on Iran. The country\u2019s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with parallel institutions used their authority to criticize Rouhani and his government, to force changes in the government\u2019s personnel,  to amend some \u201cresistance economy\u201d policies and to adopt a policy of confrontation and mutual escalation in dealing with external pressure. Examples of this policy of provocation include reducing Iran\u2019s nuclear commitments, enriching uranium to 60 percent purity and hindering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection missions.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201creformists\u201d on the other hand leveled  criticism at the \u201chardliner\u201d current, sometimes including  the supreme leader and parallel institutions, over policies that negatively impacted public expenditure, hence leading   to economic conditions deteriorating. This ultimately led to the weakening of Rouhani and the \u201creformists\u201d and the strengthening of the supreme leader and the IRGC.          <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The crisis culminated after the Rouhani government intensified its criticism  of the supreme leader and Iran\u2019s parallel institutions because they had prevented the government from implementing its programs and plans.  This was evident in Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif\u2019s leaked audio in which he criticized the IRGC  and the marginal role assigned to the  Foreign Ministry regarding  making decisions in relation to foreign issues.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cconservatives\u201d also blamed Rouhani and his government, attributing the home front\u2019s  deterioration in Iran to Rouhani\u2019s confidence in the West and his dependence on the nuclear  deal to address the country\u2019s crises. Iran\u2019s economic and social situation is worsening due to  the reimposition of US sanctions and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and the government\u2019s mismanagement of this health crisis.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Outside Iran, the sanctions on Iran have not been lifted,  however,  former US President Donald Trump\u2019s departure and President Joe Biden\u2019s arrival has provided an important opportunity for the  sanctions to be lifted on Iran. This is against the backdrop of  Russian and Chinese support for Tehran, and the European desire to revive the nuclear deal.  Furthermore, diplomacy is once again playing an important role. The Rouhani government has shown openness to indirect talks with Washington to return to the nuclear deal  and to save its face by improving its internal position against the \u201cconservatives.\u201d The latter has sought to derail the nuclear talks to deprive the \u201creformists\u201d of any popular benefits which  would boost  their position ahead of the presidential election.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The election took place amid  the Vienna negotiations but their  future is ambiguous.  The current talks are experiencing a gap between the two sides (Iran and the United States). Iran looks forward to  the US sanctions being lifted  before it returns to its nuclear obligations and wants guarantees that it will not be subject to sanctions once again; this is  unacceptable  for the United States. There was a desire to resolve the nuclear issue with Iran prior to the presidential election so that its outcome does not  impact the course of the negotiations, particularly as the Rouhani government was  flexible and open towards the negotiations. This, however, did not happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The election also took place during heightened tensions with neighboring countries, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. These tensions were very costly   for Iran as they led to  further deterioration on the home front in light of Iran\u2019s  regional interventions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the meantime, all countries  are hoping that Tehran genuinely reverses its policies to defuse tensions and restore regional stability, thereby benefiting  all regional countries and peoples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

II- Iran\u2019s Authoritarian \u201cEngineered\u201d Presidential Election and Priorities of Electoral Participation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The clerical political system in Iran concentrates power in the hands of the supreme leader and  its unelected institutions or the so-called parallel institutions. Iran\u2019s  Guardian Council is the supreme leader\u2019s effective tool to control the election and to ensure that its outcome does not change  his revolutionary aims and orientations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran’s \u201chardliners\u201d have recently dominated all decision-making institutions as all the \u201creformists\u201d were disqualified  from the parliamentary election in February 2020 by the Guardian Council, empowering the \u201cconservatives\u201d to take over the Parliament. The same scenario was repeated in the presidential election in which  most prominent \u201creformist\u201d figures were excluded. \u201cReformist\u201d candidate Eshaq Jahangiri along with eight other \u201creformists\u201d were disqualified from contesting the election. To ensure that the \u201chardliners\u2019\u201d preferred candidate would win the presidential race, two of the most prominent \u201chardliners\u201d were also disqualified;  former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the former Parliament speaker Ali Larijani.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This  paved the way for Khamenei\u2019s preferred candidate, Ebrahim Raisi, to run against unpopular candidates who do not have a substantial electoral base. Raisi\u2019s engineered victory aims to preserve the political and economic interests of the \u201chardliners,\u201d notably the supreme leader and the IRGC. It also  aims to uphold  the country\u2019s political system in the face of  internal and external pressure and to renew the revolutionary zeal which  has recently declined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other side, as the presidential elections were looming, the \u201creformists\u201d were unable  to agree on a  specific candidate perhaps because of their disappointment with Rouhani who failed to fulfill his reform promises, and their frustration with the Guardian Council\u2019s decision as it  disqualified the most prominent \u201creformist\u201d candidates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lack of a  specific candidate led to  divisions among the \u201creformists\u201d while the \u201cconservatives\u201d rallied round  Raisi. 210 Parliament members  in a statement called  on Alireza Zakani, Amir\u2011Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, Mohsen Rezaee and Saeed Jalili to quit the race in favor of Raisi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alireza Zakani and Saeed Jalili dropped out of the race while other figures called on voters to boycott the election and promoted the \u201cI will not vote\u201d slogan,  expressing their opposition to the election which they  described as a political charade which was neither free nor fair.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ahead of the election, Iran\u2019s political elite was more keen to ensure a high voter turnout than to hold an impartial and competitive election. This is because elections have been important to the ruling political system in Iran ever since the 1979 revolution. Elections are tools to strengthen political legitimacy for the ruling class and maintain its interests. Therefore, even though  the election was engineered for a particular candidate, all the disqualified candidates, whether by the Guardian Council or through other means,  called on the public to participate in the elections.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cDespite all the grievances, one should think about the future of Iran, the country and the system and go to the ballot boxes to protect the republic,\u201d said Eshaq Jahangiri in a tweet on June 16. Similarly, Larijani, Zarif and Rouhani encouraged voters to cast their votes. Rouhani  believes that participation in the election is a way to defend  the republic, the Constitution and  Khomeini\u2019s legacy. Former President Mohammad Khatami also called on the Iranian people to vote in the election. Even Mehdi Karroubi, who has been under house arrest since 2009, voted in favor of Abdolnasser Hemmati while only Ahmadinejad tweeted that he was boycotting the election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

III- The Results and Implications of the Election<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The results of the already-engineered uncompetitive election showed that Ebrahim Raisi won the presidential race with 17.9 million votes  equaling  61.95 percent of the votes. The votes indicated that Raisi was far ahead of his competitors. These results were largely expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Table 1: The Number of Votes Won  by Iran\u2019s  Presidential Candidates and the Invalid Blank Votes<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No<\/td>Candidates<\/td>Total number of votes<\/td>Percentage<\/td><\/tr>
1<\/td>Ebrahim Raisi<\/td>17926345<\/td>61,95%<\/td><\/tr>
2<\/td>Mohsen Rezaee<\/td>3412712<\/td>11,79%<\/td><\/tr>
3<\/td>Abdolnasser Hemmati<\/td>2427201<\/td>8,38%<\/td><\/tr>
4<\/td>Amir\u2011Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi<\/td>999718<\/td>3,45%<\/td><\/tr>
5<\/td>The invalid and blank votes<\/td>3726870<\/td>12,88%<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table>
Source: https:\/\/bit.ly\/3qfLc1O<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Voter turnout reached 48.8 percent. Of  59,310,307 eligible Iranian voters, only 28.8 million voters headed to the polls \u2014 the lowest turnout in the history of  Iran\u2019s presidential election since the 1979 revolution. The last lowest voter turnout was seen in the 1993 elections  when the turnout reached 50.6 percent. And if we compare the results with the previous presidential election held in 2017 \u2014 when Hassan Rouhani won\u2014with a voter turnout of over 73 percent, we find that  the voter turnout declined by  25 percent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, holding local elections to coincide with the presidential election was supposed to draw people to the ballot box, especially in the rural areas and regions that have overlapping ethnic and sectarian makeup. This was expected to significantly increase voter turnout. But the low voter turnout reveals the significant decline in the political system\u2019s legitimacy and the state of popular indifference \u2014 and perhaps the frustration with the political and economic circumstances \u2014 especially if we take into account that the political system in Iran considered this election to be a referendum regarding its popularity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the results  indicated an unprecedented surge in the number of blank votes, with voters leaving the ballot papers blank without voting for any of the designated candidates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the Ministry of Interior, the number of blank votes \u2014 let alone the invalid ballots \u2014 reached 3.7 million votes, making up about 13 percent of the total votes. This means that the total number of  blank votes surpassed the votes won by Mohsen Rezaei who came in second behind Ebrahim Raisi \u2014 which sparked irony across Iranian society as the blank and invalid votes were considered to have won second place  behind Raisi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What explains this phenomenon is that some voters decided to partake in the election, but favored none of the four candidates. So, they decided to leave the ballots blank in protest at the disqualification of their preferred  candidates. Some also said that voters cast blank  papers inside the ballot boxes \u2014 which means they  elected none of the candidates \u2014 to avoid a crackdown or face accusations of abstaining from voting or hostility towards the political system. Some institutions even forced their workers to cast their votes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some also feared that they would be dismissed, deprived of  privileges offered by their institutions of employment or deprived of job opportunities.  Finally, there is another factor behind the low voter turnout which is that Iran\u2019s presidential election coincided with the local elections. Some sources said that many  had no intention to cast their votes  in the presidential election, instead  they headed to the local polls  to cast their votes \u2014 on a totally local services-centered agenda.  However, the authorities forced them to vote in the presidential election as well. Therefore, many of them deliberately left the ballot papers blank in protest at the authorities forcing them to vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, deducting the percentage of these blank votes \u2014 which amounted to 13 percent of the total voter turnout of 48.8 percent \u2013 reveals the scope of dissatisfaction with the designated candidates  on the ballot paper and the dissatisfaction with the political system in its entirety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These blank votes also reveal the failure of the political system to rally and mobilize the Iranian people despite utilizing all its capacity and tools to push voters to partake in the election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given that elections in Iran are a popular referendum on the political system \u2014not a real competitive process\u2014and that Parliament is not effective in  policymaking, this voter turnout percentage  indicates that the political system\u2019s support base is declining.  It is the lowest turnout since the revolution broke out in 1979. This  low turnout is related to the preceding social mobilization and widespread protests \u2014 most recently the protests against fuel price hikes  in November 2019 and the protests that followed the downing of the Ukrainian commercial airliner in January 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IV-  The Consequences of Electing Raisi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is no doubt that one of the main functions of any election is to quell social tensions and contain the anger of the masses. But given the authoritarian engineering of the election  and its objective to empower  the ruling class in Iran, the political system\u2019s legitimacy will continue to be  questioned, especially since the president-elect represents the Iranian political system\u2019s repressive apparatuses which  continue to oppress and silence the  Iranian people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Raisi\u2019s human rights  record clearly indicates there will be no reforms at home, rather more crackdowns will be witnessed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He is accused of participating in the so-called \u201cDeath Committee\u201d which ordered the mass execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988. He was also among the supporters \u2014 during the 2009 disputed presidential election \u2014 of the brutal crackdowns following the election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His campaign managers suggested \u201climiting access to the internet.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He is also depended on to limit  the waves of change and Westernization, especially among young men \u2014 as the political system considers these two processes to be threatening to  the Iranian revolution\u2019s foundations and pillars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the economic level, it is  expected that Raisi  will not make substantial economic reforms. He reflects the viewpoint of Iran\u2019s dominating economic powers, especially the IRGC and parallel economic institutions. He was previously appointed by Khamenei to head Astan Quds Razavi \u2014 a charitable foundation with assets amounting to  billions of US dollars. From 2016, he held this position for three years. Raisi  believes that the home front\u2019s situation  has nothing to do with the sanctions but is related to domestic mismanagement.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Raisi is likely to adhere to the supreme leader\u2019s line and will be his shadow in the presidency, especially as he is considered as a potential successor to Khamenei. He has recently been  elevated to the rank of ayatollah, which means he will avoid  the crisis experienced by Khamenei when the political system\u2019s institutions selected him for the supreme leader\u2019s position even though his religious credentials were not suitable for this  position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hence, Raisi\u2019s efforts will be focused on making Iran  more \u201cIslamic\u201d and less \u201crepublican\u201d through solidifying Velayat-e Faqih and  following  in the footsteps  of the country\u2019s two supreme leaders to cement his  position. He will also be close to the \u201chardline\u201d factions such as the clerics and the IRGC, both of which have tremendous influence in selecting  Khamenei\u2019s successor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By selecting Raisi, the supreme leader has managed to avoid criticism such as the criticism  leveled at him by former presidents \u2014 whether \u201cconservatives\u201d or \u201creformists.\u201d Many former presidents had serious disagreements with him during their tenures in office. They protested against the interference of the supreme leader\u2019s foundation in their affairs. Others also complained \u2014 such as the outgoing President Hassan Rouhani \u2014 of the  little powers granted to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the outside world, Raisi will adhere to the well-established principles of the political system when it comes to foreign policy.  Perhaps he will take a hard line in relation to the negotiations and Iran\u2019s relationship with the United States as he embodies Iran\u2019s  revolutionary zeal and its uncompromising foreign policy stance.  This could prompt the United States and Europe to quicken the pace of the negotiations  to  craft a deal before Rouhani leaves office. This would surely be a reckless misadventure that will give Raisi and the \u201chardliners\u201d justification  to uphold their hostile positions  without making any substantial concessions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This scenario could see Raisi have a prepared agreement \u2014 for which he will bear no consequences but will reap the benefits \u2014 to improve the image of the conservative movement. But should the negotiations be postponed, Raisi might be compelled  to keep the door open for dialogue with the West as well as the negotiations over returning to the nuclear deal.  However, he will be more reserved than Rouhani and will \u2014 in the end \u2014 fulfill the desires of the supreme leader and the IRGC. Hence, his government will pursue a harsh  position regarding Iranian demands such as lifting  US sanctions first and verifying that sanctions will not be imposed again. This is added to asking for guarantees that the United States will not pull out of the nuclear deal again. These demands  are likely to  prolong the negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Raisi needs to urgently address the economic crisis to maintain the legitimacy of the religious ruling class. Hence, he may  display some degree of flexibility, especially since a return to  the nuclear deal will  boost his legitimacy and  allow the political system to regain  some of its  declining popularity \u2014 especially if the sanctions are lifted and there is an  inflow of tens of billions of dollars resulting from Iran\u2019s overseas assets being unblocked and the ability to resume the export of oil, petrochemicals, minerals and other Iranian items.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But there is a fear that his positions could be an obstacle to foreign investors flocking to Iran in case  the country returns to the nuclear deal as there is much uncertainty surrounding his foreign policy as he did not discuss his positions during  his electoral campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even with Iran returning to  the nuclear deal, there will be red lines imposed by the Raisi government that hinder the United States from making important economic gains. Iran under his government will depend more on  China and Russia and have less desire to be open to the West and the United States. This is in line with his ideological orientations which are sponsored by the supreme leader and the IRGC. His orientations  are driven by the principles of the revolution and he was  elected to  ensure  their continuity. Moreover, given the policy of \u201cturning towards the East\u201d  which the government has recently pursued, Raisi will continue Iran\u2019s movement towards Russia and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s position towards the regional powers will continue to hinge on developments related to the nuclear deal as well as international and regional pressure aimed at curbing its behavior. Without this pressure, Raisi will be inclined towards the IRGC and the \u201chardliners\u201d in  adopting a regional policy driven by sectarian tendencies to achieve Iran\u2019s ambition of becoming an influential regional power. This will be met with a harsher regional stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, the ball is now in the court of the \u201chardliners\u201d who are dominating the scene and upholding their control over the three branches of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The blame placed on Rouhani for his failed economic plans and his bad bet on the  nuclear deal is now thrown to the coffers of the \u201chardliners.\u201d Will their policy succeed in stopping the decline in the political system\u2019s legitimacy? Can they lay out an approach to counter external pressure and reconsider their regional policies and relationship with the United States, ridding Iran of the decline in the legitimacy which is an unprecedented threat to the political system? Or will they continue to adopt the ideological principles derived from Velayat-e Faqih?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction: Under internal and external pressures, Iran\u2019s political system held its presidential elections on June 18, 2021. The seemingly already determined result showed that \u201chardline\u201d cleric Ebrahim Raisi won  the election.  This election  was of particular importance due to the developments taking place inside and outside Iran. Therefore, its  result will have an important impact […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":9402,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1402],"tags":[1659,355,696],"class_list":["post-9399","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-position-estimate","tag-ebrahim-raisi","tag-irgc","tag-presidential-elections"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9399","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9399"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9399\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9415,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9399\/revisions\/9415"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9402"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}