{"id":9419,"date":"2021-06-29T12:13:43","date_gmt":"2021-06-29T09:13:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=9419"},"modified":"2021-06-29T15:48:25","modified_gmt":"2021-06-29T12:48:25","slug":"with-raisi-at-the-helm-nuclear-talks-and-sanctions-to-last-longer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/with-raisi-at-the-helm-nuclear-talks-and-sanctions-to-last-longer\/","title":{"rendered":"With Raisi at the Helm, Nuclear Talks and Sanctions to Last Longer"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

When Ebrahim Raisi takes oath on August 3 as Iran\u2019s 13th<\/sup> president, the country\u2019s unmonitored enrichment of uranium beyond 60 percent would have entered its seventh month. Since February 23, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has \u201cnot had access<\/a> to the data from Iran online enrichment monitors and electronic seals, or had access to the measurement recordings registered by its installed measurement devices.\u201d Rafael Grossi,  Director General of the IAEA, has already downplayed<\/a> any change in the status quo until the newly elected leader takes power.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Vienna talks (between Iran and the P5 + Germany) have adjourned indefinitely after six rounds of talks without any officially announced breakthroughs. The IAEA is not part of the talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n


After the last round of talks, Iran\u2019s deputy foreign minister and top negotiator Abbas Araghchi expressed<\/a> cautious optimism, \u201cWe are now closer to an agreement than any time before, but bridging the gap between us and an agreement is not an easy task and needs decisions, which must be mostly made by the other parties.\u201d Meanwhile, the IAEA  is continuing parallel talks with Iran for the extension of a temporary monitoring pact. Iran has been delaying  the provision of detailed replies to the IAEA\u2019s follow-up queries<\/a> regarding its suspicious nuclear activities. \u201cAfter many<\/a> many months, Iran has not provided the necessary explanation for the presence of the nuclear material particles at any of the three locations where the Agency has conducted complementary accesses (inspections).\u201d The IAEA<\/a> has confirmed that Iran has not responded to its call for extension of a preliminary monitoring pact which expired on June 24. Tasnim<\/a> News Agency quoted Iran\u2019s IAEA ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi saying, \u201cIran was not required to comply\u201d with the IAEA director general\u2019s request.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mossad\u2019s astounding operation at a Tehran warehouse storing nuclear archives in 2018 resulted in a plethora of questions regarding Iran\u2019s scientific program named \u201cProject AMAD.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Besides exposing Iran\u2019s plan and know-how for a \u201ccold test\u201d of key components for a nuclear bomb, the archives<\/a> also shed light on the authorized mandate for the \u201cdevelopment of a nuclear explosive device.\u201d When the Iranian nuclear deal was signed, the Obama administration had intelligence about  Iran\u2019s nuclear program but did not have access to the vast information that the Biden government has access to now. Also, Tehran has adopted a public and gradual approach in violating its obligations stipulated under the nuclear deal not only to expand its bargaining power but also to continuously  advance its nuclear proficiency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to producing uranium metal, Iran\u2019s other consequential violation of the  nuclear deal has been its installation of  dozens of more sophisticated centrifuges. This means that Iran is capable of enriching uranium 10 times faster than the permitted first-generation IR-1 centrifuges. Iran\u2019s leap in uranium enrichment is not just qualitative but also quantitative as the nuclear deal limited Iran to installing only 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran\u2019s Atomic Energy Organization (AEO), claims<\/a> that the country is working on developing centrifuges 50 times faster than the first-generation IR-1 centrifuges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By February when Tehran started enriching uranium beyond 60 percent, its stockpiles of HEU at 20 percent enrichment weighed around 3,000 kilograms against the permissible mass of 202.8 kilograms at 3.67 percent enrichment agreed under the nuclear deal.  It remains anybody\u2019s guess as to how much HEU Iran has stockpiled as of June at above 60 percent enrichment. In the shadows lurks the question of unknown-unknown nuclear sites Tehran might be operating.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It seems quite unlikely that the US administration  and  other world powers will change their approach toward reviving the nuclear deal after Raisi\u2019s inauguration. The general consensus remains that the nuclear talks, Iran\u2019s ballistic missile program and its activities and sponsorship of proxies across the  Middle East are in the purview of the supreme leader\u2019s office.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Frustration in the region  continues to mount against the likely revival of the nuclear deal  in its existing state. While the Arab states have been lobbying  global powers, Israel has been resorting to sabotage operations to obstruct Iran\u2019s quick pace towards nuclear capability by targeting its scientists as well as its nuclear sites. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The latest in Israel\u2019s string of operations appears to be a botched or failed attack<\/a> against a building belonging to Iran\u2019s AEO in Tehran. If Washington continues to press for the revival of the nuclear deal without taking a broader and closer view of the situation in Iran, multi-pronged Israeli sabotage attacks are likely to intensify<\/a>. On June 19, Bushehr nuclear power plant was temporarily shut down<\/a> for a \u201ctechnical overhaul.\u201d The IAEA-compliant 1,000-megawatt reactor went offline under mysterious circumstances and no date has been given for the overhaul to be completed and for the energy source to be  online again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The nuclear talks will resume at some point in August, but the pace will be lukewarm even though Abbas Araghchi might continue his role as Iran\u2019s  key negotiator.  Iran\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs  has, meanwhile, confirmed the formation of an \u201cadaptation committee<\/a>\u201d whose mandate is to review  the text of a possible nuclear deal for consideration by the supreme leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran desperately wants to return to the nuclear deal  and for the sanctions to be lifted  but Raisi  will not be offering concessions. Hence, the stalemate will continue against the will of the Biden administration. What has become more obvious now is Tehran\u2019s inflexibility regarding  its ballistic missile and space program.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

When Ebrahim Raisi takes oath on August 3 as Iran\u2019s 13th president, the country\u2019s unmonitored enrichment of uranium beyond 60 percent would have entered its seventh month. Since February 23, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has \u201cnot had access to the data from Iran online enrichment monitors and electronic seals, or had access to the measurement recordings registered by its installed measurement devices.\u201d Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, has already downplayed any change in the status quo until the newly elected leader takes power.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":9420,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[1837,708,1257,1758,5821],"class_list":["post-9419","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-ebrahem-raisi","tag-nuclear-deal","tag-nuclear-program","tag-raisi","tag-raisi-wins"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9419","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9419"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9419\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9427,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9419\/revisions\/9427"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9420"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9419"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9419"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9419"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}