{"id":9918,"date":"2021-11-28T16:42:08","date_gmt":"2021-11-28T13:42:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/?p=9918"},"modified":"2021-11-29T16:04:18","modified_gmt":"2021-11-29T13:04:18","slug":"iran-japan-relations-in-the-shadow-of-the-united-states","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/monitoring-and-translation\/reports\/iran-japan-relations-in-the-shadow-of-the-united-states\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran-Japan Relations in the Shadow of the United States"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Since Iran\u2019s 1979 revolution, Japan has always sought to  balance  its strategic alliance with the United States  and the promotion of its energy interests while dealing with Tehran. For instance, during the Iran hostage crisis from 1979 to 1981, Japan  never stopped buying Iranian oil on spot markets, despite  Washington\u2019s opposition<\/a>. Beyond securing  oil imports from the Gulf,  Japan\u2019s new strategy in the Middle  East is based on  transforming its  regional policy in the Indo-Pacific area into a global one. This new Japanese strategy  defines Gulf stability  as a core  interest and the need for Tokyo to actively engage in light of US plans to withdraw from the region<\/a>. In January 2021, Tokyo depended on the Gulf states for 90 percent of its crude oil imports  \u2013 46 percent from Saudi Arabia, 30 percent from the UAE, 8 percent from Qatar, and 6 percent from Kuwait. Japan also imported 5 percent of its crude oil from Iran before  the Trump administration-imposed sanctions on Tehran after its withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018. Japan imported  half a million barrels<\/a> of crude oil per day in 2006.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

From  Iran\u2019s point of view,  its Japanese policy is like its  European one.  Therefore, bilateral dialogue with Tokyo is  considered by Iranian decision-makers  as a diplomatic card to pressure the United States to lift the economic sanctions on  Iran<\/a>.  The US factor has played a critical role in Iran-Japan relations, and Tokyo has played an important role under different US administrations, although in accordance with somewhat different policies towards Tehran.During the Trump era,  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe\u2019s administration attempted  to mediate between the United States and Iran, but its efforts failed because both parties rejected its proposal to barter Iranian crude oil for US grain.   In  June 2019, during Abe\u2019s  meeting with the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in Tehran, an alleged Iranian drone  hit Japanese tankers, one of them was set ablaze and the sailors were evacuated from the vessel.    Abe was in Tehran to convey  a message from Washington about  President Donald Trump\u2019s readiness to  start direct talks with Iran<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to Iran\u2019s perspective, there was a new opportunity with the American administration changing in Washington. President Joe Biden during his electoral campaign had spoken about a new approach towards Iran and a shift away from Trump\u2019s confrontational approach. This new approach provides Iran with a widow of opportunity to overturn the sanctions and improve its internal economic situation.   Like during the Trump era, Japan has played an important role in conveying messages and bridging the gap between the two sides. In August 2021, the Japanese Foreign Minister  Toshimitsu Motegi\u2019s visit to Tehran stirred a debate  in Iran\u2019s media regarding its signification for Tehran\u2019s relationship with the United States. The Iranian  daily Aftab-e Yazd during his visit posed the question: \u201cIs the Japanese foreign minister<\/a> a US envoy?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Direct talks with the United States  are still a redline for  Iran\u2019s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Nevertheless, the Iranian government  is keen to take advantage of mediation efforts such as the European ones (the Swiss and French mediation attempts in particular) or the Japanese one  to limit the negative economic impact  of the US economic sanctions.  Japanese and European mediators are trying to create favorable conditions to start direct  talks between Iran and the United States. From the mediators\u2019 perspective,  this direct diplomatic channel could improve the  productivity of international talks  in regard to Iran\u2019s nuclear program and contribute to developing a positive framework to  restart trade exchange  between Japan and Iran on the one hand, and the European states and Iran on the other hand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Iranian \u201chardliners\u201d are promoting the idea that Tehran is not hopeful,  even if a new nuclear deal is reached, that the West will remove sanctions, reinvest in  Iranian markets and rekindle international financial links. This pessimism is  used by Iranian diplomats  to present  the West\u2019s diplomatic positions as the main obstacle to reaching a new nuclear deal.   Tehran welcomes the mediating efforts of middle powers such as Japan and France. Tehran presents Japanese and French diplomatic efforts as a sign indicating its significant nuclear developments and strong bargaining position.  One has to remember that in 2012, Iranian uranium enrichment to 60 percent purity was then considered  to be a redline by Western diplomats, provoking calls for military action to be taken against Iran\u2019s nuclear plants. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 The visit of the Japanese foreign minister this year appears to be much more successful than  Tokyo\u2019s  mediation efforts in 2019. This is because, today,  Iran needs to be much more flexible to tackle its  deteriorating economic  conditions. The Japanese foreign minister\u2019s mission was not only to mediate between  Washington and Tehran and to urge the latter  to deescalate geopolitical tensions but also to discuss with the Iranian government the volatile situation in  Afghanistan after the Taliban\u2019s capture of Kabul.  The E3 countries, Japan, and India  share similar concerns with Iran regarding the volatility in  Afghanistan.  Japan is one of the largest donors to the UNHCR to support Afghan refugees in Iran, in coordination with  the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants\u2019 Affairs which operates under the Iranian Interior Ministry<\/a>. Last but not least, as  part of its soft power strategy,  Japan provided Iran with grant aid of \u00a5695 million<\/a> (about $6.3 million) to strengthen its health and medical  capacities to fight the coronavirus pandemic.  Japan has also supported Iran by  dispatching about 3 million doses of Japanese-made AstraZeneca vaccines in July 2021 when the country was going through  its fifth wave of the pandemic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is significant that countries like Japan, a US ally,  continued to reach out to Iran to ensure that  diplomatic channels stayed open during the Trump  era. Japan, like a number of European countries,  provided financial and medical assistance to Iran during  the coronavirus pandemic. Japan and Europe have a strong interest to deescalate tensions in the Middle East and expand bilateral relations with Iran<\/a>, especially in the field of energy . Furthermore, Iran is keen to take advantage of Japan\u2019s mediation offers because although it is not a signatory to the  Iranian nuclear deal, it appears willing to  talk to all the parties involved in the  deal.  There is nevertheless one critical hurdle in the evolving bilateral relationship between Tehran and Tokyo, namely the frozen Iranian assets  held in Japanese banks due to the  US financial sanctions on Iran.  President Ebrahim Raisi has often called on Japan to  unfreeze Iranian assets held in Japanese banks<\/a>. Despite this hurdle,  Japanese aspirations  for economic rapprochement with Iran  can  be best explained by Tokyo\u2019s concerns regarding Chinese economic hegemony inside the Iranian market. As  Beijing\u2019s strategic competitor, Japan hopes that any future deal to resolve Iran\u2019s nuclear dilemma will pave  the way for it  to economically compete with China for lucrative contracts and access to Iranian energy resources.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Since Iran\u2019s 1979 revolution, Japan has always sought to balance its strategic alliance with the United States and the promotion of its energy interests while dealing with Tehran. For instance, during the Iran hostage crisis from 1979 to 1981, Japan never stopped buying Iranian oil on spot markets, despite Washington\u2019s opposition. Beyond securing oil imports from the Gulf, Japan\u2019s new strategy in the Middle East is based on transforming its regional policy in the Indo-Pacific area into a global one. This new Japanese strategy defines Gulf stability as a core interest and the need for Tokyo to actively engage in light of US plans to withdraw from the region. In January 2021, Tokyo depended on the Gulf states for 90 percent of its crude oil imports \u2013 46 percent from Saudi Arabia, 30 percent from the UAE, 8 percent from Qatar, and 6 percent from Kuwait. Japan also imported 5 percent of its crude oil from Iran before the Trump administration-imposed sanctions on Tehran after its withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018. Japan imported half a million barrels of crude oil per day in 2006.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":9919,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[12,5924,5925,186,5926,69],"class_list":["post-9918","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-reports","tag-iran","tag-iran-japan","tag-iran-japan-relations","tag-japan","tag-the-united-states","tag-united-states"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9918","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9918"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9918\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9938,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9918\/revisions\/9938"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9919"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9918"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9918"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rasanah-iiis.org\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9918"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}