The EU is concerned about the rising tensions in the north of Kosovo. In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, Brussels is considering the risk of potential Russian interference in the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia.[1] EU leverage is limited because of the lack of a credible path toward full membership to the European bloc for both states. Indeed, the states with more leverage on Serbia appear to be Germany (7.5 billion euros bilateral trade in 2022) and Italy (4.6 billion euros bilateral trade in 2022).
These economic ties appear more important than the EU prerequisites of implementing the agreement on the path to normalization signed in March 2023 to allow these two states to become full members of the EU. In the wake of heavy clashes between Kosovo police and armed Kosovo Serbs on September 24, 2023, followed by Serbian and NATO troop movements, the EU warned Kosovo and Serbia of repercussions if the normalization deal was not implemented.
One has to consider that the latest talks between Kosovo and Serbia are not progressing. Serbia was accepted as an EU candidate on March 1, 2012, and the first conference, between Brussels and Belgrade, at the government level, took place in January 2014. Nevertheless, today, Belgrade is not assessing that this process will eventually lead to a final accession in the short term despite the initial hope when the dialogue started almost 10 years ago. The accession stalemate is paradoxical considering the fact that the Russia-Ukraine war is still ongoing. As a consequence, the EU has a short-term interest to avoid the emergence of a new crisis in the Balkans.
This is why, despite the failure of the last European mediation efforts, the de-escalation and normalization of relations between the two states remains a top priority for Brussels. This was expressed in the statement published by EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrel after his meeting with Kosovan Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on September 14, 2023, “Today, we again urged both Parties to take immediate action in the north of Kosovo to de-escalate the situation, to avoid any further destabilization and to enable new early local elections to take place immediately. We cannot sit and wait for the next crisis. This has to take place immediately, in line with the requests made by the European Union and the broader international community.”
This sense of urgency is better understood in the context of the following diplomatic compromise: Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in exchange for the creation of a body to represent the interests of Serbs living inside Kosovo “without any further delay or pre-condition.”
The crisis in Kosovo is the consequence of the deadly conflicts resulting from the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. There is the memory of Serbian repression of Albanians in Kosovo including armed attacks and aggression. The 1999 NATO military intervention provoked the displacement of many Serbs to the north of Kosovo or their departure from the country. On the contrary, Kosovar Albanians living in the north decided to move to the south of Kosovo because of security concerns. This is why the north of Kosovo is mainly populated by Serbs. Finding a solution to the problems of the north of Kosovo will not only improve the governance of the state of Kosovo but also play a positive role in preserving regional security.
European efforts to resolve this crisis accelerated in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war which started in 2022. In September 2023, the failed mediation by Brussels put regional stability at risk. Even if it was formally Kosovo that turned down the latest EU proposal, European frustration with the failure to de-escalate tensions in the region could only be reversed with the prospect of full EU membership for both states. Another option could be for European member states in general and Germany and Italy in particular to use their economic leverage to influence the decision-making process in both states. This will pressure Kosovo and Serbia to choose the path of economic development rather than pursue a zero-sum security calculation.
[1] The EU can transform this dynamic by setting out clearer prospects for accession for both Kosovo and Serbia.
