In October 2024, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi embarked on a significant diplomatic tour across the Middle East, with key stops in countries such as Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Oman, and Jordan. This tour occurred in the context of heightened regional tensions, particularly related to the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran-backed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has been engaging in diplomatic efforts to de-escalate rising tensions following Israel’s targeted strikes on October 26, 2024, which were aimed at Iranian military infrastructure. This recent incident escalates a year of hostilities that has seen missile exchanges and Israeli strikes on Iranian assets in Syria and Lebanon. Iranian diplomatic activities have focused on appealing to international bodies and securing support from regional allies to prevent a broader conflict and contain Israel’s possible future military operations against Iranian territory.
Iran has sought to frame its actions as self-defense, particularly following its own missile strikes on Israel earlier in October, and has called on allies such as Russia and China to play a role in restraining Israel. The United States and the UN have called for de-escalation, reflecting concerns that this cycle of retaliatory violence could pull more regional actors into direct confrontation. However, diplomatic solutions remain fragile due to the complexity of the conflict, as Iran and Israel both maintain that they are unwilling to back down from what they perceive as existential security needs. Consequently, the success of Iran’s diplomatic activism is uncertain, as the United States continues to support Israel’s security responses, while Iran remains aligned with groups in Syria, Palestine, Yemen and Lebanon that are also confronting Israeli forces.
The first objective of the Iranian diplomatic apparatus is to blame Israel for regional military tensions and to avoid any regional support for future Israeli air strikes against Iran’s military infrastructure. There is also an Iranian strategy of pushing neighbors to play an active diplomatic role in restraining Israeli military objectives and to prevent Israel from targeting Iranian energy and nuclear infrastructure in future strikes. Efforts to rally regional support against Israel have yielded mixed results so far. On the one hand, Israel did not use regional countries’ airspace during its military operation except for Iraq’s airspace following the greenlight from the United States. On the other hand, Iran’s objective of gathering regional political support for its stance on Palestine has also not been a complete success because of the diverging views between Tehran and its neighbors on the definition of what is the best diplomatic avenue to reach a political solution for the Palestinian people in the long term.
Moreover, Iran aimed to open diplomatic channels to prevent further escalation. Despite its firm stance against Israel, Iran positioned itself as not seeking an all-out war, expressing a desire for de-escalation in discussions with neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. By reinforcing ties with the Gulf nations and other regional players, Iran also aimed to reduce US influence in the region. This Iranian attempt to break its diplomatic isolation is limited given the strong foothold of the US military in the region.
During the Iranian foreign minister’s tour, he faced challenges in gaining full support for Iran’s stance against Israel. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states emphasized a policy focusing on regional de-escalation, avoiding direct involvement in the Iran-Israel military conflict. This policy reflects a focus on regional stability and economic interests, which are priorities for many Gulf nations. The diplomatic tour also saw the suspension of indirect talks on the nuclear issue between Iran and the United States through Oman, reflecting the worsening regional crisis, and further complicating diplomatic efforts between Tehran and Washington. This announcement was mitigated by the confirmation of a continuing Swiss role in maintaining another channel of communication between Iran and the United States. Another objective of this Iranian diplomatic activism was to strengthen ties with its non-state allies in Lebanon and the official authorities in Syria at a time when its network of influence is considerably weakened militarily. Iran reaffirmed its alliances with Lebanon and Syria, as Araghchi met with leaders in Beirut and Damascus. These countries are key members of Iran’s regional coalition, which supports groups like Hezbollah and stands against Israeli military operations.
Overall, while Iran’s tour succeeded in bolstering ties with its closest non-state allies within its network of influence, its broader goal of rallying regional support against Israel faced significant limitations, especially given the neutral or cautious stance of influential regional states. On October 27 2024, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that Israel’s attack on the “Islamic Republic should neither be exaggerated nor minimized.” The Israeli operation killed four or five members of Iran’s military. The latest Israeli attack will provoke a “destructive” Iranian military response according to Keyhan newspaper. Moreover, in an interview on October 26 2024, Araghchi also outlined that during his visits to regional countries he “conveyed to them that the Islamic Republic of Iran is both a warrior [for its enemies] and a man of peace toward its neighbors. We do not seek to escalate tensions. We pose no threat to our neighbors in the Gulf and beyond. […] Iran has no limits when it comes to defending its territorial integrity. We have witnessed examples of this in the True Promise 1 and 2 operations. These operations demonstrated the full strength of the IRI in terms of self-defense, which I believe is a driving force behind our foreign policy.” This ambivalent statement was a message to the region that an immediate Iranian military response to Israeli’s attack was not the priority of the Iranian authorities as Tehran’s air defense suffered a setback and its regional proxies must implement a new strategy to confront Israeli military operations. Nevertheless, in the longer term, revenge statements from the most conservative factions in the Iranian republic mean that there is internal support for a future military response to the most important military attack against Iranian territory since the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988.
