India and China have initiated a thaw in relations marked by the first in-person meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia after five years of escalated border tensions. Following this, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the recent G20 Summit in Brazil and discussed the developments on the border. The de-escalation initiative includes a new border patrolling agreement at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Despite the recent attempts to reduce border tensions, the mistrust between both countries is expected to prevail, especially as the divergences are rooted in historic territorial disputes. The infrastructure build-ups along border areas by both countries and intense geopolitical rivalries in recent years paved the way for violent escalations like the 2020 Galwan Valley clash and continued standoffs. Recent developments suggest that both India and China are making efforts to de-escalate tensions despite their long-standing disputes and disagreements.
The border tensions between India and China had reached a stalemate, with both countries unwilling to resolve the disputes. Some diplomats and scholars in India believe that New Delhi misjudged the situation regarding China’s actions in 2020, particularly its incursions at multiple points along the LAC. The unpredictability of China’s behavior has complicated the situation and has often made it difficult for India to accurately assess and respond to China’s military maneuvers. India’s Chief of Army Staff, General Upendra Dwivedi said that India is working to restore trust between both sides and the trust will be rebuilt as both countries engage with each other, ensure adherence to buffer zones, and provide mutual reassurances. As per reports, India and China have agreed to conduct coordinated patrols in Eastern Ladakh and each army will conduct one patrol per week.
Over the years, multiple agreements and measures have been implemented to manage India-China border tensions and prevent escalations. The 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles aimed to establish a framework for peaceful boundary resolution, while the 2013 Border Defense Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) introduced confidence-building measures like hotlines and disengagement protocols. Post-Galwan clashes in 2020, military talks facilitated phased disengagement at critical points such as Pangong Tso and Galwan Valley, including the creation of buffer zones. Despite these efforts, unresolved areas and distrust continued to challenge de-escalation and long-term stability along the LAC. Both sides refrained from using firearms during the Galwan Valley clash, adhering to the 1996 agreement, but the confrontation and skirmishes that followed caused severe injuries and fatalities.
Resolving the border situation requires a lengthy process of de-escalation, disengagement, and de-induction. There is limited information on the latest agreement and several parts remain ambiguous. The unresolved issues in Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, Gogra, and Hotsprings, where buffer zones restrict patrolling, prevent a full return to the pre-2020 status quo. These areas remain key points of contention in ongoing negotiations. New patrolling restrictions limit the number and size of patrols by Indian and Chinese forces in disputed areas like Depsang and Demchok, with mutual concessions and access to certain locations like Yangtse in the state of Arunachal Pradesh which China claims in its entirety referring to it as “South Tibet.”
The lack of a clear border demarcation between India and China remains a central issue. India views China’s broader strategy as a gradual, incremental approach to territorial expansion, often referred to as “salami slicing”. This strategy avoids direct military conflict while continuing to assert dominance over contested regions. India grapples with China’s encirclement strategy and assertive military presence in the Indian Ocean Region. China, on the other hand, asserts that its actions in contested regions are aligned with historical claims and strategic necessities while viewing India’s engagements with Quad and the United States as part of a containment strategy aimed at undermining its regional interests.
Economic factors have also likely played a crucial role in recent engagements. India’s ongoing trade imbalance with China, coupled with its dependency on Chinese products, limits India’s leverage. Meanwhile, China is facing challenges in its manufacturing sector and its economy is under pressure due to the collapse of its real estate sector, which accounts for about 30% of its GDP. The victory of Donald Trump, coupled with his threat to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese goods will only add pressure on China. These factors make continued confrontation less advantageous for both countries. Moreover, India’s rapidly growing economy is increasingly seen as an attractive destination amidst China’s slowing growth and strained relations with the West.
Indian trade leaders have called for policies to improve the ease of doing business, boost service sector exports, and address issues like China’s product dumping by reviewing tariffs. Both countries have witnessed significant growth in bilateral trade, with China emerging as India’s largest trading partner. As per India’s Commerce and Industry Ministry, India’s goods trade deficit with China expanded to $57.83 billion during April-October, up from $51.12 billion in the same period last year. This strengthens Beijing’s position in negotiations and bilateral dealings. India has also in recent months eased restrictions on Chinese investment in non-sensitive sectors, such as solar panels and battery manufacturing, to address gaps in domestic expertise and manufacturing. Moreover, there have also been demands from Indian businesses, particularly in the electronics manufacturing sector, to ease trade restrictions with China owing to domestic industry demands.
The mistrust and polarized public opinion surrounding India-China relations pose significant challenges. India believes that the 2020 border clashes with China were not an unexpected escalation but rather the result of deliberate actions likely directed by the Chinese government. This perspective implies that the confrontation may have been part of a larger strategy, rather than a sudden breakdown in the status quo. From China’s perspective, India’s regional diplomacy is constrained by a “China-centric mindset” and Beijing remains wary about India’s military ties with the United States.
In international relations, it is common for neighboring countries to experience a security dilemma when one nation grows significantly in economic and military power. This is particularly evident in the case of India and China, two nuclear powers that have not only fought a war but have also faced enduring conflicts and tensions. As China’s military capabilities continue to grow, India’s security concerns intensify, creating a complex dynamic in which both countries strive to adjust to each other’s military capabilities and strategic intentions.
