Dr. Moatasim Siddiq
Dr. Mohammed al-Sayyad
In contemporary Iran, critical scrutiny is increasingly directed toward the competence and coherence of the state’s administrative, political and ideological structures, particularly in light of the mounting crises that have recently undermined the broader objectives of the “Islamic Republic.” Externally, Iran-aligned groups have suffered substantial setbacks in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, leading to a marked decline in their influence and operational resilience. Internally, the ruling establishment faces pronounced failures across key domains — economic management, public security and social cohesion — which have severely undermined the legitimacy of the foundational governance doctrine of the post-1979 order: Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist).
This model of clerical rule, once central to Iran’s ideological project, has faced increasing disrepute among significant segments of the population, particularly the youth, women and the broader public. It is now often associated with governmental inefficacy, authoritarianism, and, at times, reckless policies that have not only disrupted domestic stability but also drained national resources in pursuit of external ambitions. As a result, discourse within intellectual and religious circles is shifting from defending the functionality of Wilayat al-Faqih to investigating plausible alternatives to clerical governance.
Prominent among these alternatives is the doctrine of intizār (messianic waiting), which is accompanied by the principle of political inzawā’ (withdrawal or passivity), advocating that the religious establishment — particularly marajiʿ (senior jurists) — should retreat from direct involvement in state governance and confine their activities to traditional seminary functions. This approach envisions the formation of a civil and constitutional political system governed by technocrats and administrators, one that upholds the rights and dignity of citizens while fostering constructive, non-sectarian engagement with regional states.
One of the influential movements still adhering to and promoting the theology of intizar is the Hojjatieh Society. Despite its contentious history, this group remains one of the most prominent religious and cultural networks in Iran, particularly in its advocacy of a depoliticized clerical role and a return to a messianic posture of restraint until the advent of the Mahdi.
The Hojjatieh Society originally emerged as a counter-response to the expansion of the Bahá’í faith in Iran. Over time, however, the group has undergone notable intellectual and organizational transformations, evolving into a significant cultural and religious force within the country. The society has succeeded in cultivating deep connections with the traditional religious seminary establishment, while simultaneously maintaining a deliberate distance from formal political engagement. Despite its avoidance of overt political activity, the group poses a substantial theological challenge to the ruling establishment in Tehran. It stands as the most prominent religious network in Iran that actively embraces and propagates the doctrine of intizār, particularly among the youth and cultural elites, thereby presenting an implicit but potent contestation of the ideological foundation of Wilayat al-Faqih.
This doctrinal divergence places the clerical leadership in a complex and precarious position. While the governing theocracy presents Wilayat al-Faqih as a doctrine firmly rooted in Shiite jurisprudential tradition, the Hojjatieh Society and its adherents cast it as an alien or peripheral theory — one that lacks centrality in the historical corpus of Twelver Shiite thought.
Accordingly, this study aims to provide a systematic examination of the Hojjatieh Society’s political and religious worldview. It analyzes the group’s core principles, its intricate relationship with the Shiite seminary and its unequivocal rejection of the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih. Furthermore, the study situates the society within both the internal dynamics of Iran and the broader Shiite religious landscape. Finally, it addresses critical questions regarding the society’s current status under the prevailing religious system and its potential trajectory in a contemporary context.
While numerous scholars have examined the Hojjatieh Society, their analysis have predominantly concentrated on its religious and doctrinal dimensions, often overlooking its political outlook, intellectual evolution and the complex interplay with the country’s intellectual elites, state institutions and the religious seminary establishment. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the broader implications of the society’s political stance and its potential consequences for Iran’s sociopolitical landscape. This study distinguishes itself by addressing these overlooked dimensions, and it does so through the following key areas of inquiry.
Iran’s Political Structure
The Hojjatieh Society holds political views and a conceptualization of the state and governance that are fundamentally at odds with those of Iran’s ruling elite. Since its official dissolution in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, the group has made efforts to reassure the establishment of its non-confrontational posture and to secure limited operational space for its religious and cultural activities. However, these conciliatory gestures have consistently avoided engaging with the society’s core religious and political doctrines.
At the heart of the ideological divergence lies the society’s firm opposition to the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih. The group calls for a critical reexamination of this doctrine and maintains that no form of absolute or general guardianship is valid for the jurist during the ghaybah (occultation) of the Twelfth Imam. As a result, the political rift between the Hojjatieh Society and the ruling establishment remains profound and continues to widen.
Anti-government: Separating Religion From Politics
The Hojjatieh Society has historically rejected the necessity of establishing an Islamic government during the ghaybahof the Twelfth Imam, maintaining that the rightful authority to govern belongs exclusively to the Infallible Imam. From the society’s perspective, any attempt to establish a political order in the absence of Imam al-Mahdi is theologically impermissible. They argue that political legitimacy is inherently tied to infallibility, and thus no fallible human being — however just — should be entrusted with the lives, property and dignity of the people. In this regard, the society’s founder stated, “A just individual is still prone to error. The people’s blood, wealth, honor, and dignity cannot be entrusted to someone subject to mistakes or the influence of personal desires. These must be safeguarded by one who is sinless and free from error — that is, the awaited Mahdi.”[1]
Accordingly, the society advocated a de facto separation between religion and politics during the ghaybah, affirming that any political activity by individual members was to be regarded as personal and not representative of the group’s official stance. Following the revolution, the society adopted a posture of taqiyya (dissimulation) in the political sphere — primarily as a protective measure to avoid repression. However, this did not reflect a genuine shift in its doctrinal opposition to the fusion of religious authority and political rule. Rather, it was a tactical move intended to preserve the society’s ability to engage in religious and proselytizing work under the new political order.
This stance on the religion-politics nexus became a source of contention, with revolutionary loyalists viewing the society as a subversive force capable of diverting public sentiment away from the revolutionary ideology. Over time, however, the ruling establishment’s perception evolved. While the state remained cautious of the society’s ideological divergence, it came to view the group as a non-threatening entity that could potentially be co-opted or instrumentalized in service of certain political objectives — albeit with continued vigilance regarding its influence.
Elevating the Status of the Marja Over the Guardian Jurist
Given the Hojjatieh Society’s doctrinal rejection of political legitimacy during the ghaybah, its opposition to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih is a logical corollary. From the society’s perspective, this doctrine constitutes an encroachment upon the exclusive prerogatives of the Infallible Imam. According to their theological reasoning, legitimate political authority must be vested in an individual who possesses ‘iṣmah (infallibility) and comprehensive competence in the implementation of divine law — criteria that, in their view, are fulfilled solely by the awaited Mahdi.
Originally established with the endorsement of leading maraji’ al-taqlid (sources of emulation) to counter the spread of the Baha’i faith, the Hojjatieh Society found itself in a complex and constrained position following the 1979 “Islamic Revolution.” The post-revolutionary ascendancy of a new interpretation of Wilayat al-Faqih left the society with two options: direct confrontation with the newly established political order — which would likely result in suppression — or a strategic retreat from political engagement in favor of a focus on religious activities. The society opted for the latter path.
Nonetheless, its eschatological commitment to the eventual appearance of the Hidden Imam and the consequent establishment of a just Islamic order remains a fundamental component of its ideological framework. This messianic expectation, while seemingly apolitical, holds inherent political implications. In this context, the society advocated an alternative doctrinal framework known as Wilayat al-Marjaʿ al-Taqlid — a model that privileges the collective authority of the religious references over the singular political supremacy of the supreme leader.[2]
This proposal aimed to elevate the broader clerical establishment as a counterbalance to the centralization of authority in the Office of the Supreme Leader, especially among the loyalist clerical class that upholds the singularity of Wilayat al-Faqih. The Hojjatieh’s framework suggests that in cases of discord between the views of the supreme leader and those of senior maraji’, the latter’s positions should prevail — an idea fundamentally at odds with the vision articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini and later upheld by Ayatollah Khamenei, wherein the ruling of the Guardian Jurist supersedes all other clerical opinions in times of conflict.
Through this alternative model, the Hojjatieh attempted to recalibrate the balance of authority between political leadership and religious scholarship. At the very least, in non-political realms — such as matters relating to acts of worship — it sought to delimit the authority of the supreme leader. Effectively, this approach conceptually redefined the supreme leader’s role to resemble that of a head of state, thereby stripping the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih of its comprehensive religious and political meaning, particularly its claim to override even aḥkām al-awwaliyya (primary religious rulings) with aḥkām ḥukūmiyya (governmental decrees).
The conceptual framework advanced by the Hojjatieh bears notable resemblance to Muhammad Mahdi al-Shirazi’s theory of Consultative System of Leadership, though with key distinctions. Shirazi’s proposal envisions a collective leadership model wherein jurists and sources of emulation engage in consultative decision-making across all domains, including political governance.[3] However, this model has failed to gain traction within the contemporary Iranian system due to the entrenched nature of Wilayat al-Faqih as both a theological doctrine and a mechanism of political control.
The ruling theocracy’s model of Wilayat al-Faqih, particularly in its absolutist interpretation, is resistant to any framework that might dilute the authority or centrality of the Guardian Jurist. This resistance is rooted in the establishment’s self-conception: its political legitimacy and religious sanctity are perceived as inseparable. The supreme leader’s dual function — as both political sovereign and religious guide — grants the system a theological veneer that legitimizes its actions in the eyes of its adherents. Consequently, any attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of the Wali al-Faqih, whether in political or religious affairs, threatens to unravel the system’s ideological foundations. The regime’s authority is thus maintained through the instrumentalization of religion and the politicization of Shiite sectarian identity, rendering alternative models like Shirazi’s or the Hojjatieh’s fundamentally incompatible with the existing political-theological order.
The Society’s Position Toward the Revolution
The Hojjatieh Society’s opposition to revolutionary activism is rooted in a traditionalist Shiite paradigm, one that prioritizes waiting for the appearance of the Infallible Imam and maintains allegiance to the classical seminary ethos that discourages revolutionary engagement. This anti-revolutionary posture is not novel, but rather echoes early Twelver Shiite political theology, including positions articulated during the era of the imamate. Prominent seminaries, even in the contemporary period, maintain a consistent aversion to insurrection, irrespective of the perceived illegitimacy or injustice of ruling regimes.
This foundational conservatism shaped the Hojjatieh’s posture under the Pahlavi monarchy. The group neither supported nor condemned the shah, abstaining from overt political criticism or engagement and refraining from participation in the 1979 revolution. Consequently, in the immediate post-revolutionary period, Khomeini and his followers viewed the group with suspicion, associating its silence with counter-revolutionary tendencies. However, once revolutionary fervor had subsided, the new regime reassessed its stance, recognizing that the Hojjatieh posed no immediate political threat. Its passive and apolitical nature made it a potential instrument for containment rather than confrontation.
The group’s ideological detachment was exemplified by its recirculation of the traditional precept: “Every banner raised before the banner of the Mahdi is a banner of misguidance, and its bearer a tyrant.” This narration encapsulates its theological rejection of premature political activism. As a result, while the Hojjatieh may represent a challenge on the theoretical and religious level, it does not constitute a revolutionary threat in practical terms.
Mahmoud al-Halabi, the group’s founder, came to recognize the altered post-revolutionary landscape. Unlike the Pahlavi regime — which, although secular, allowed room for religious activism — the new republic fused political power with a theologically driven agenda. This transformation rendered political neutrality untenable. In an effort to secure space for the group’s continued existence, Halabi extended a congratulatory message to Khomeini following the revolution, referring to him as the “Deputy of the Imam” rather than “Imam” himself —preserving the group’s doctrinal insistence on reserving such titles exclusively for the Infallible, Hidden Imam.
This gesture was widely interpreted not as a genuine ideological shift, but as a tactical maneuver meant to avert state repression during a period of intense purges against ideological dissenters. Despite this, Khomeini eventually ordered the dissolution of the Hojjatieh, and tensions between the group and the regime persisted. Subsequent developments confirmed the group’s consistent doctrinal stance: after reorganizing following Halabi’s death, the group reiterated its rejection of Wilayat al-Faqih and affirmed that it had no political agenda.
This raises the critical question: could the Hojjatieh, in the event of mass uprisings, participate in a broad-based insurrection? Theoretically, such engagement runs counter to the group’s foundational principles. However, practically, its members — being embedded in the broader Iranian society — are not immune to social, economic or political discontent. Individual participation, independent of organizational endorsement, cannot be ruled out.
Indeed, there have been rumors of Hojjatieh involvement in the 2009 Green Movement protests. As with many ideological groups, the Hojjatieh should not be viewed as a monolithic entity. Its internal diversity — spanning across attitudes, interests, and interpretations — becomes particularly evident in times of upheaval and leadership fragmentation. While it is unlikely that the group would initiate a revolutionary act on its own — due to the risk of annihilation — it may well become entangled in mass mobilizations spearheaded by other actors, if only as part of the general population.
Religious Theses and the Relations With Shiite Actors
The Hojjatieh Society’s principal political and religious tenets revolve around a distinct blend of theological conservatism and sociopolitical restraint. Among its defining features are its advocacy for a separation between religion and state, a preference for cultural secularism, pronounced hostility toward Sufism and Islamic philosophy, strict limitations on Sunni participation in religious affairs, rejection of pan-Islamism, and a clear inclination toward free-market economics coupled with resistance to leftist ideologies. In terms of structure and doctrinal temperament, it bears notable resemblance to the Turkish Gülen movement, particularly in its emphasis on apolitical religious activism and societal engagement.[4]
The Hojjatieh’s abstention from political confrontation — both during the Pahlavi era and under the current republican system — stems from its eschatological worldview, which prohibits political or revolutionary activism in the period of ghaybah.[5] From its perspective, any effort to establish a government in the absence of the Hidden Imam is religiously impermissible. Accordingly, the group calls for silence, patience, and non-engagement with political structures, regardless of their nature or ideological orientation.
This theological stance has yielded a consistent political posture across radically different regimes: the monarchy of the shah and the current theocratic system of the Iranian republic.
Far from being a peripheral or recent innovation, this position is deeply entrenched in Shiite tradition. Historically, a considerable portion of Shiite jurisprudence and clerical authority adhered to similar quietist interpretations, particularly in the pre-revolutionary period. In this light, the Hojjatieh’s ideological orientation can be seen as an extension of longstanding currents within the Shiite scholarly milieu.
This continuity invites further exploration of the group’s relationship with other Shiite centers of authority, notably the seminaries of Najaf and Qom. Despite their divergent political trajectories, there remain undercurrents of doctrinal alignment between the Hojjatieh and elements within these centers, particularly those that continue to uphold quietist, non-revolutionary traditions. Similar affinities may also be found with certain philosophical circles that resist the politicization of religion, thus reinforcing the notion that the Hojjatieh’s vision — though often marginalized in the post-revolutionary Iranian landscape — remains rooted in a broader Shiite intellectual tradition.
Relations With Najaf
As tensions between Khomeini and the Hojjatieh group intensified, the Hojjatieh strategically aligned itself with the religious authority of Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, recognizing the deep-seated animosity between Khoei and Khomeini. This animosity stemmed not only from personal and institutional rivalry, but also from fundamental differences in political orientation. Methodologically, the Hojjatieh’s approach to political jurisprudence was more closely aligned with that of Khoei,[6] whose traditionalist, non-political stance offered a natural refuge for the group amid its growing alienation from Khomeini’s revolutionary vision.
Khoei perceived Khomeini as a disruptive figure who had deviated from the established principles of the Shiite scholarly tradition, advancing a novel theory of political governance — Wilayat al-Faqih — that he believed lacked grounding in the foundational teachings of the Shiite seminary. Conversely, Khomeini regarded Khoei as an obstacle to his broader ambition of asserting religious and political authority not only in Qom and Iran, but also in Najaf, thereby consolidating his claim to global Shiite leadership. Khomeini expected Khoei to acknowledge his supremacy, an expectation that went unfulfilled. This unresolved tension contributed to violent confrontations between their respective followers at various points.[7]
The Hojjatieh’s pivot toward Khoei’s camp was thus not only born of ideological affinity, but also a reaction to Khomeini’s dismissal of Halabi, the group’s founder. Khoei’s theological and jurisprudential outlook — marked by a rejection of direct political engagement and an emphasis on the anticipated return of the Infallible Imam — resonated deeply with the Hojjatieh’s core convictions. Even today, the group remains intellectually and institutionally tied to Najaf and its religious authority, maintaining a critical stance toward the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, which it views as incompatible with traditional Shiite doctrine.
Notably, the historical rivalries among Shiite religious authorities in the 1970s and 1980s—particularly those involving Khomeini — have had a lasting impact on contemporary Shiite groups and alignments. The rift between the Hojjatieh and Iran’s ruling elite became evident shortly after the revolution and has endured due to the persistence of the same theological and political disagreements.
A key question arises from this historical narrative: why did the Hojjatieh align itself specifically with Khoei, rather than with other prominent Qom-based clerics such as Ayatollahs Shariatmadari, Golpayegani, Shahab ad-Din Mar’ashi Najafi or Khwansari — all of whom held reservations about Khomeini’s political theory? The most plausible explanation lies in the congruence between Khoei’s quietist political theology and the Hojjatieh’s ideological framework. Both upheld the centrality of the awaited Mahdi, rejected the legitimacy of clerical guardianship in his absence, and were committed to preserving the doctrinal heritage of Shiism.
While Tehran has extended its influence beyond Iran’s borders — sometimes even co-opting clerical circles close to Najaf that endorse Wilayat al-Faqih — Najaf continues to possess symbolic authority due to its custodianship of Shiite tradition. As such, it retains the loyalty of clerical networks and seminaries within Iran and Qom that remain committed to the doctrine of awaiting the Mahdi. Therefore, the conflict between the two sides is central and rooted in divergent interpretations of Shiite theology itself. This deep and multi-layered dispute — entwining doctrinal differences with political interests — remains unresolved and is unlikely to be settled in the foreseeable future.
Relations With Qom and the Guardian Jurist
In its early years, Khomeini supported the Hojjatieh Society and even allowed its founder, Halabi, to collect funds from followers on his behalf. At that time, the Hojjatieh positioned itself as a staunch defender of Shiite teachings and the core principles of the faith, particularly in opposition to the Baha’i influence. Although the group held a negative stance toward political participation, this view was shared by most seminaries in Qom and Najaf during that period. Khomeini did not see the Hojjatieh as a threat to his political ambitions, especially since it played a significant role in combating the Baha’i faith, which was seen as a challenge to the religious seminaries’ influence and authority in the 1950s, notably among younger followers.
At that stage, Khomeini’s political theory was still evolving, going through several phases before reaching his ultimate doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.[8] Some scholars argue that within a single year, Khomeini’s attitude toward the Hojjatieh shifted dramatically from acceptance to criticism, suggesting that he may have politically exploited the group as part of his broader strategy.
A report in Khomeini’s newspaper recounted a question posed by some of his followers regarding the permissibility of giving religious dues to Halabi, the Hojjatieh’s founder.[9] Khomeini’s initial response was supportive: he praised the Hojjatieh’s efforts as pleasing to God and compatible with awaiting the reappearance of the Mahdi. He permitted believers to give zakat and other religious dues to the group, even allowing up to a third of the Imam’s share, provided these funds were managed under the supervision of qualified religious authorities. He even expressed a wish for Halabi to oversee this process.[10]
However, shortly thereafter, Khomeini withdrew this fatwa. Concerned about the Hojjatieh’s negative political stance, he retracted his support, revoked Halabi’s authorization, and publicly criticized the group and its ideology in his teachings and speeches. In 1971, Khomeini explicitly distanced himself from Halabi, saying, “Regarding the person you are asking about (meaning Halabi), his meetings seem harmful. Since I learned of this, I have not supported him, and I will not do so in the future.”[11] Halabi’s status fell from being “His Excellency the Respected Hojjat al-Islam” to simply “the person you are asking about.”
Hashemi Rafsanjani later explained Khomeini’s withdrawal by suggesting that the Hojjatieh was aligned with the shah’s regime. However, Rafsanjani highlighted two key points: first, the group forbade its followers from engaging in politics or launching jihad against the shah; and second, it attracted some mujahideen (fighters) to its religious lessons. Khomeini and his followers thus saw the group as pacifying the youth rather than mobilizing them, making it difficult for the revolutionary current to utilize the Hojjatieh’s influence. Instead, they felt the Hojjatieh had undermined their support base by spreading teachings that discouraged political activism.
As a result, Khomeini and his allies launched a major campaign against the group and officially withdrew their endorsement of Halabi.[12]
It is important to note that Qom’s religious establishment is more diverse than just those supporting Wilayat al-Faqih. Many jurists in Qom do not accept the ideology, and the Hojjatieh built strong ties with these figures —relations that occasionally caused discomfort for the establishment.
Relations With the Deconstructionist School
The founder of the Hojjatieh, Sheikh Mahmoud Zakerzadeh, known as Mahmoud al-Halabi (1917–1997), was a student of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, the founder of the Iranian deconstructionist school.[13] He established the Hojjatieh Society, Anjuman Hojjatieh, in Mashhad during the 1950s[14] — a city recognized as the main hub for the deconstructionist school. Due to this background, there are significant commonalities between the Hojjatieh and the deconstructionist schools, to the extent that some scholars have linked the Hojjatieh’s approach to that of deconstructionism, particularly regarding the relationship between philosophy and religion. Both schools share similar views on the interplay between philosophy, mysticism, and religious texts.
However, the deconstructionist school has generally avoided the question of religious governance during the ghayba. It has not made political rule a central concern of its thought, except in isolated cases where some members have engaged with the issue. The leader of the deconstructionist movement, Mohammad Reza Hakimi, was a devoted student of Ali Shariati — who faced hostility from the authorities both publicly and through covert distortion.
Deconstructionism is primarily a textual approach to doctrine and interpretation, differing from the more mystical or philosophical approaches to religious texts.[15] The close relationship between the deconstructionist and Hojjatieh Society is evidenced by Halabi’s direct tutelage under Mirza Mahdi Isfahani. Unlike Khomeini, Halabi opposed integrating Sufism and philosophy into Islamic jurisprudence.[16]
The Hojjatieh was initially founded as a response to the growing influence of the Baha’i faith.[17] In the 1950s and 1960s, many educated elites and youth were attracted to the modernist ideas promoted by the Baha’is, such as women’s rights and social equality. The Hojjatieh perceived the Baha’i faith as a serious threat to traditional Shiite values and dedicated itself to refuting Baha’i teachings,[18] branding the faith’s followers as apostates. This stance gained the Hojjatieh widespread support and acceptance among traditional clerics of the time.
However, this changed after the revolution when Khomeini began to caution against the Hojjatieh. Meanwhile, the deconstructionist school did not involve itself in combatting the Baha’i faith; it remained a largely elitist philosophical movement, lacking the populist appeal or outreach efforts that the Hojjatieh employed through its religious lessons and guidance to the broader Shiite community and youth.
Hojjatieh Revivalists and the Safe Alternative
The Hojjatieh Society remains active in the Iranian religious and cultural scene, making it important to anticipate its future trajectory, intellectual impact, and readiness to position its religious interpretation as an alternative to the current ruling elite’s model. Its future unfolds across several possible scenarios: it may become more active in the religious, cultural, and political arenas than it is today; it may maintain its current status, conscious of its size and cautious about its relationship with the establishment — fearing overexpansion and therefore vulnerable to setbacks that could weaken its structure; or it may enter a period of dormancy following the deaths of its founding leaders, facing fundamental ideological transformations influenced by modernity, younger generations and the social and political constraints of authoritarianism as elucidated below.
State Civility and Social Development
Supporters of this view argue that the Hojjatieh Society acts as an obstacle to the revival of Iranian society. They see it, alongside its historical rival — the Baha’i faith — as a significant barrier to societal progress and true renaissance. According to this perspective, these two religious groups, rather than the regime’s political and economic policies, are the main hindrances to social development. However, a more fundamental question arises: what criteria should be used to evaluate religious groups as either catalysts for renaissance or as obstacles? Both the Hojjatieh and the Baha’i faith advocate for a clear separation between religion and politics, or more precisely, between religion and the state. Consequently, they do not and cannot pose a political or social threat to Iranian society. They regard religion as a matter confined to the private sphere, while politics belongs to the public domain, with no overlap. Regardless of their theological views, neither group constitutes a real impediment to political development or the emergence of civil society in Iran, since both consistently emphasize the autonomy of religion from political authority. The way these groups interpret Islam has little bearing on the future trajectory of Iranian civil society. By contrast, other religious groups, from the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) to the reformists, highlight Shiism’s inherently political character. For those who support the establishment of civil society in Iran, it is vital that an interpretation of Shiism that separates religion from politics becomes widespread. Beyond that, it remains a matter of personal choice for Iranians whether they accept the Baha’i interpretation, which claims to have fulfilled the mission of the Mahdi while incorporating Iranian Shiite culture, or the Hojjatieh interpretation, which awaits the future appearance of the Mahdi. Meanwhile, many Iranians may choose different, not necessarily religious, paths.[19]
Ideological Shifts and Internal Differences
When Halabi congratulated Khomeini on the revolution and pledged to dissolve the Hojjatieh Society — which had members in the army and various government departments—another faction within the Hojjatieh rejected this move, seeing it as a betrayal of the society’s founding principles. This opposing faction believed that establishing the theocratic republic before the appearance of the Mahdi violated the duties of the Infallible Imam and viewed the Iranian republic as an obstacle to the Mahdi’s return. Halabi’s faction, which urged dissolution, also considered Khomeini’s interpretation of Wilayat al-Faqih as an encroachment on the Mahdi’s role, as evidenced by Khomeini’s lifelong suspicions toward them. Nevertheless, Halabi’s faction adopted a pragmatic approach, understanding that Khomeini would not tolerate opposition and would suppress dissent. Consequently, they chose to dissolve the group.[20] This decision proved correct, as the opposing faction, which refused to disband and resorted to violence, was eliminated. This opposition faction was reportedly linked to the Furqan Organization, which was responsible for assassinations of revolutionary figures such as General Gharani and Morteza Motahhari.
Meanwhile, Halabi’s faction managed to preserve at least the organizational framework of Hojjatieh, despite persecution and marginalization. After Khomeini’s death, this faction repositioned itself and restructured its affairs. Today, the Hojjatieh is one of Iran’s most influential religious societies, albeit limited mainly to cultural activities. Halabi’s faction used taqiyya to adapt to the evolving political climate, adopting the slogan “My God, my God, preserve Khomeini for us until the appearance of the Mahdi,” which was recited after prayers and at public gatherings. Particularly in the revolution’s first year, they focused on celebrating the Mahdi’s birth each year in mid-Sha’ban (the eighth month in the Islamic calendar) with grand events, street and mosque decorations, and sweets distribution. They insisted on referring to Khomeini as the “Deputy of the Imam,” not the “Imam.”[21]
The Hojjatieh expressed its new stance through an amended charter, now endorsing the theocratic republic: “The society supports the continuation of the Islamic Republic until the appearance of the awaited Mahdi, and we consider it our duty to serve in political and social spheres, in accordance with the directives of the supreme leader (Khomeini). Members may participate in media, political, or military activities under the supervision or approval of the great Shiite religious authorities.”[22] A close reading of the charter reveals no acceptance of Wilayat al-Faqih as the exclusive Shiite political theory, nor does it show enthusiasm for the widespread adoption of this concept within the society. The use of taqiyya is clear in this pragmatic language, indicating the shift was tactical rather than a fundamental change in principles or ideology. The Hojjatieh did not accept Wilayat al-Faqih as an absolute, nor did it require political activism from its members. Rather, the charter reflects an attempt to accommodate the revolutionary wave and the ruling elite’s force.
The charter also stipulated that members’ participation in military or media activities required the approval of Shiite religious authorities, not solely tied to the Wilayat al-Faqih ideology. Following this logic of social change, members gradually moved toward political participation in official government roles after the revolution, especially during the period when the group froze its public activities due to fear of repression by the new regime.
During this time, the dissolved Halabi faction concentrated on strengthening the bond between the people and the Hidden Imam through sermons, annual celebrations, doctrinal and guidance lessons for youth, and closer ties with the seminary and society. After the death of the society’s founder in 1997 and the succession of leadership by Eftekharzadeh, a “new Hojjatieh” began to emerge. This group has been active in preaching and doctrinal work while being accused by the regime of growing political activism. In reality, however, the society remains engaged mainly in religious and cultural fields and has deepened its connection with the seminary. Moreover, as a result of the ruling establishment’s failures, the society has been able to subtly reaffirm the idea of waiting and the separation of religion and state without openly confronting the governing elite.
The establishment has sought to discredit the Hojjatieh by accusing it of involvement in the 2009 and 2017 demonstrations and other protests. Yet, no concrete evidence has been presented proving the Hojjatieh’s official or hierarchical participation in these events. Most likely, the establishment fears the society’s growth, its soft power and its strong Shiite religious and traditional foundations, leading it to suppress the society through intimidation and baseless allegations.
Prominent Hojjatieh Theorists and Figures
The Hojjatieh Society’s founder Halabi (d. 1997) served as its primary theorist and disciple. He was also closely associated with Mirza Isfahani, known as the founder of Iranian deconstructionism. The society’s teachings adhered closely to core early Shiite principles, particularly the doctrine of awaiting the Infallible Imam and maintaining a negative stance toward active political engagement — eschewing participation, candidacy, or direct political conflict.
Following Halabi’s death, leadership passed to Hassan Eftekharzadeh, who led the society until his recent death in early 2025. Eftekharzadeh’s passing was marked by widespread condolences from prominent religious figures in Iran, signaling the strengthened influence of the Hojjatieh Society within religious circles in recent years.[23]
Under Eftekharzadeh’s leadership, the society notably abandoned the controversial notion that spreading injustice could hasten the Mahdi’s emergence. In his work Essays on the Imam of the Age, Eftekharzadeh dedicated an entire chapter to refuting this theory, vehemently denouncing the idea. The consistent presence of this theme across the Hojjatieh’s publications reflects an ongoing effort to defend itself and clarify its position against accusations.
The Hojjatieh Society is also known for its opposition to Shiite philosophy and prominent philosophers such as Khomeini, Tabatabai and Mulla Sadra. Ironically, Eftekharzadeh himself was a member of the Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy. The society’s political quietism and focus on doctrinal fundamentals have served to strengthen its base, which includes significant youth engagement and strong ties within the religious seminary.
Importantly, the society does not lack theorists even though it does not propose a novel theory of governance or statehood. Instead, it relies on established Shiite heritage and authoritative religious teachings — both ancient and contemporary — that discourage political activism and advocate distancing from public affairs as they have evolved since 1979. This stance aligns with the dominant Shiite authorities who promoted political loyalty and restraint as core principles post-revolution.
Consequently, the death of Halabi had little lasting impact on the society, and Eftekharzadeh’s recent death is also unlikely to significantly affect it. The Hojjatieh Society’s identity is deeply rooted in Shiite doctrine and the seminary tradition, presenting itself as a guardian of Shiite orthodoxy without deviation from traditional jurisprudential and theological terminology. This consistency has helped preserve its standing within religious seminaries. Furthermore, the society benefits from the support of some religious authorities and wealthy merchants, who provide necessary funding and resources.[24]
Conclusion: Potential Scenarios Regarding the Society’s Future
Today, the Hojjatieh Society appears as a deeply rooted institution within Iran’s intellectual, cultural and religious landscape. It refrains from political interference and focuses primarily on cultural and doctrinal activities. Although the society was originally founded to oppose the Baha’i faith, its current existence is no longer connected to that opposition. Instead, it offers a doctrinal framework that attracts many young Shiites and Iranians.
Through its religious interpretation, the society has become a refuge for those who reject the Wilayat al-Faqih and are disillusioned with the failures of the Iranian regime. The greater the regime’s shortcomings, the more the society appeals to individuals resentful of the politicization of religion and opposed to the Wilayat al-Faqih system.
Perhaps these very failures and setbacks caused by the Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran’s political and cultural spheres have helped secure the Hojjatieh Society’s sustained influence as a doctrinal, waiting movement. It seeks to restore Shi’ism to its original foundations, consciously distancing itself from politics. Many thus regard the society as a viable alternative to the ongoing politicization of religion that has dominated since 1979.
Accordingly, the society is likely to remain active culturally, with its size and role potentially expanding as Wilayat al-Faqih continues to falter. As a Mahdist-in-waiting movement, it sees political involvement as a violation of Shiite principles, considering full political participation a sin against the sect.
Although this stance contradicts the ideology of Tehran’s current rulers, it also functions as a protective shield for the society. Because it poses no strategic political threat — being passive in politics and neither seeking power nor leadership — it largely avoids government persecution. Its continued adherence to political quietism allows it to operate openly, frustrating the establishment’s attempts to undermine it.
The regime tolerates the society with threats and intimidation to prevent it from becoming a popular or religious embarrassment within the seminary but stops short of outright repression. Nonetheless, the society’s political stance does not exclude future possibilities: it could, if circumstances change, participate alongside the public or within a broad coalition from the seminary and society in protests, revolts, or efforts to reform the ruling structure.
Meanwhile, the society has strengthened its standing within the religious seminaries and deepened its relations with leading jurists. It is reported that some jurists support the society or even authorize it to manage portions of khoms (religious tax) funds on their behalf. Its connections with merchants and businessmen have also grown stronger.
Notably, unlike many religious and cultural institutions, the Hojjatieh Society does not rely on official government funding. This financial independence may cause discomfort among authorities, especially as there is no clear political or legal justification to persecute or restrict the society. Any repression would not resemble the regime’s treatment of opposition or so-called terrorist groups but would instead appear as targeting a doctrinal advocacy body that rejects political activity and follows the traditional seminary teachings of Qom and Najaf.
Such persecution would risk alienating the broader community of traditional clerics. Thus, a combination of seminary influence, economic backing, and political factors has enabled the society to remain resilient and influential in the public arena. It is likely to maintain this status as long as these conditions persist, unless significant transformations occur in Iran’s overall political and social landscape — changes that go beyond the society itself to affect the state, government and its current structure.
[1] “What Beliefs Does the Hojjatieh Society Hold? If Possible, Can You Name a Few Members of the Hojjatieh Society in Mashhad? What Is the Hojjatieh Society? And What Is Ayatollah Khamenei’s Opinion About These Individuals?” Pasokhgoo, March 23, 2011, accessed May 21, 2025, http://www.pasokhgoo.ir/node/29111. [Persian].
[2] Ibid.
[3] Mohammed al-Sayyad, “The Iranian Regime and the Shirazi Religious Authority,” International Institute for Iranian Studies, March 10, 2018 accessed May 20, 2025, https://bit.ly/3Z1m69U. [Arabic].
[4] “The Hojjatieh Society,” Zad Iran, January 25, 2025, accessed May 18, 2025, https://zadiran.com/جماعة–الحجتية/. [Arabic].
[5] Ahmad al-Katib, “The Shi’a From Hojjatieh to Khomeinism,” YouTube, April 6, 2021, accessed April 21, 2025, https://bit.ly/4jH5UlO. [Arabic].
[6] “Meethaq al-‘Isr, The Sistani Version of the Guardianship of the Jurist Between Appointment and Election,” Al-Mutakaffif, no. 3547 (2016).
[7] Badr al-Ibrahim and Mohammed al-Sadiq, The Shiite Movement in Saudi Arabia: Politicizing the Sect and Sectarianizing Politics, (Beirut: Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 2013), 147. [Arabic].
[8] For more on Khomeini’s transformations and his innovation of the absolute Guardianship of the Jurist, see: Mohsen Kadivar, “Guardianship of the Jurist: A Critique of the Theory of Governance in Shiite Political Thought,” translated by Hassan al-Sarraf (Doha: Arab Forum for Relations and International Dialogue, 2021), 184. [Arabic].
[9] Al-Imam Newspaper 2, 282. [Arabic].
[10] The fatwa was concluded on 5 Sha’ban 1390 AH. See: “Hojjatieh Society: Authorization to Utilize Legal Rights to Combat the Baha’i Faith,” Islamic Knowledge Network, http://cutt.us/4Trxv. [Arabic]. Also see: Ahmad al-Katib, “The Shi‘a from Hojjatieh to Khomeinism.” It is notable here that Khomeini authorized Halabi to oversee the legal rights, and that Halabi did not request this authorization from Khomeini.
[11] Mohammed al-Sayyad, Shia jurisprudence of Mahdism: Iranian Religious Currents Against the Supreme Leader’s Thought (Riyadh: Rasanah, International Institute for Iranian Studies, 2018), 106-111. [Arabic].
[12] Ibid.
[13] For more on the Iranian deconstructionist school, see: Mohammed al-Sayyad, “Mysticism and the Revolution in the Course of the Hawza in Qom,” Journal for Iranian Studies 2, no. 5 (2017). Also see: Haidar Hubballah, “The Deconstructionist School and the Question of Method: Do Iranian Sufis Revolt Against Transcendent Wisdom and Illuminative Mysticism?” Nosos, May 2, 2014, https://bit.ly/44u5LxW. [Arabic].
[14] Tawfiq al-Saif, Limits of Religious Democracy (Beirut: Dar Al Saqi, 2008), 262. [Arabic].
[15] Al-Sayyad, Shia jurisprudence of Mahdism, 106.
[16] Zad Iran, “The Hojjatieh Society.”
[17] Fatima al-Samadi, Political Currents in Iran (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2019), 296. [Arabic].
[18] Katajun Amirpur, “Baha’i in Iran: A Life of Repression,” translated by Raed al-Bash, Qantara, November 23, 2009, accessed April 20, 2025, https://bit.ly/4cJxDjN. [Arabic].
[19] “Guardianship Government, Reformists, and the Dilemma of the Hojjatieh Society,” Iran Chapar, August 24, 2009, accessed April 26, 2025, https://bit.ly/4jdKWKL. [Persian].
[20] Some researchers affiliated with the Iranian state argue that the regime did not officially dissolve the society; rather, the society dissolved itself tactically while the organization remained intact as it was.
[21] Al-Katib, “The Shi’a from Hojjatieh to Khomeinism.”
[22] Ibid.
[23] “Al-Hojjatieh: The Secret History of a Controversial Religious Society,” Zad Iran, March 28, 2025, accessed May 21, 2025, https://bit.ly/43i5KvQ. [Arabic].
[24] Ibid.
