On August 28, 2025, the UK, France and Germany (the E3) triggered the snapback mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), citing Iran’s “significant non-performance.” Under the JCPOA, any participant can refer a case of Iranian non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The council then has 10 days to adopt a resolution maintaining sanctions relief, if this is unsuccessful, then all previous UN sanctions are automatically reimposed within 30 days.
A clear majority — eight of the 15 current members of the UNSC — are aligned against Russia’s resolution calling for an unconditional extension of the snapback mechanism. But even if this majority were to show indecisiveness, the outcome is virtually certain: a veto from the United States, France or the UK would still seal the resolution’s fate. This means the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran is now only weeks away, unless Tehran makes a decisive pivot toward transparency in its nuclear activities and accepts Washington’s central demand — zero enrichment on Iranian soil — as the price of reentering talks. This decision marks a decisive turning point in the international community’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program. It risks closing off the last remaining framework for dialogue between Iran and the West and could accelerate a chain of economic and military escalations across the region.
The timing of the E3’s decision reflects both urgency and frustration. With the snapback mechanism set to expire on October 18, 2025, Europe faces the prospect of losing one of its last legal instruments to contain Iran’s nuclear program. The E3 had tied the suspension of UN sanctions to clear Iranian concessions: renewed cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), credible transparency over the more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% and an unconditional commitment to reengage with the United States in nuclear talks. When Iranian negotiators met their European counterparts in Geneva on August 26, they offered little more than vague assurances. No concrete proposals were put forward and no clear roadmap was laid out. With the clock running down and Tehran clinging to a strategy of nuclear ambiguity, the Europeans concluded they had no real choice left but to pull the snapback trigger.
For the Europeans, the snapback mechanism serves as both a defensive measure and a warning shot. It demonstrates that Europe is unwilling to allow Iran to continue advancing without consequence and that it remains committed to the JCPOA’s non-proliferation goals. Yet the move also risks undermining Europe’s diplomatic credibility. Russia and China have opposed the activation of the snapback mechanism and are unlikely to comply with new UN sanctions, thus fracturing the great-power consensus that gave the JCPOA its initial legitimacy. In addition, the E3 risk being drawn into the United States’ broader strategy of maximum pressure against Iran, leaving them with little room for maneuver diplomatically. By acting before the expiration of the snapback clause, Europe may preserve leverage, but it also accelerates the confrontation that it sought for years to avoid.
Iran’s domestic reaction reveals the profound divisions impacting its nuclear policy. “Conservative” newspapers such as Kayhan and Javan argue that Europe’s decision proves diplomacy is futile. They call for Tehran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, restrict IAEA access and respond through coercive leverage, including threats to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. By contrast, the “reformist” daily Sharq describes the process as a “nuclear hourglass” and warns that the snapback mechanism could foreclose any realistic prospect of compromise. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has struggled to maintain a tenuous diplomatic channel, suggesting that Tehran could return to negotiations if Washington pledged not to strike again and offered compensation for the damage inflicted during the June attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet that diplomatic line runs hard against the realities of domestic politics. According to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Europe’s move proves that the West has already settled on confrontation, and they are pushing Tehran toward defiance, not compromise.
Ordinary Iranians, meanwhile, are wearily observing the drama. After years of broken promises, sanctions and inflation, fatigue and skepticism have replaced any real expectation that diplomacy can deliver. With inflation soaring above 50% and the rial at historic lows, many Iranians doubt their diplomats can strike a nuclear compromise that truly serves the nation’s economic interests. At the same time, economic pain is intensifying public demand for political change, leaving the government mired in a dilemma. Most Iranians want to avoid the return of UN sanctions, but within the establishment, “moderates” argue for restraint while “hardliners” push to resist pressure and escalate tensions — even as the hard facts of economic necessity point toward compromise.
The economic fallout of renewed sanctions promises to be severe. The Iran Chamber of Commerce forecasts catastrophic scenarios in which the dollar could rise from 1,150,000 rials to 1,650,000 rials, driving inflation to as high as 90% and pushing economic growth into negative territory. Oil exports, already constrained by US and EU sanctions, would face renewed global restrictions, further depriving Tehran of its main revenue stream. The reimposition of the UN arms embargo would halt Iran’s efforts to expand defense exports, particularly drones and missile systems, at a moment when such sales have become a vital source of revenue and geopolitical influence. Investment and industrial projects would stall, unemployment would rise and foreign exchange reserves would continue to dwindle. The resulting instability could strengthen “hardliner” factions who argue that Iran should abandon the diplomatic track altogether, while further weakening “reformists” who insist that engagement is the only way forward.
Against this backdrop, the risk of military escalation grows significantly. Israel has long warned that it will not allow Iran to cross the threshold of nuclear weapons capability. The collapse of the JCPOA framework and the reimposition of UN sanctions will reinforce arguments in Tel Aviv that only preemptive military action can halt Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran, for its part, may seek to retaliate asymmetrically by using proxy forces across the region or threatening freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Both moves risk miscalculation and escalation, raising the specter of a direct confrontation.
Yet diplomacy, while fragile, is not entirely dead. Iran has indicated a residual willingness to negotiate under specific conditions, notably security assurances and limited economic relief. The E3 and the United States, while determined to hold Iran accountable, remain wary of an uncontrolled escalation. The challenge lies in reconciling these positions within the narrow window that remains before sanctions formally return in late September. That effort requires urgent mediation by neutral actors such as some Gulf states or Switzerland, who retain channels of communication with both Tehran and Western capitals. Even limited agreements — for example, freezing enrichment in exchange for partial oil export waivers or enhanced humanitarian trade — could buy time and reduce the risk of immediate crisis.
For the E3, it is essential to signal that the snapback mechanism is not intended to permanently close the door on diplomacy. Europe must emphasize that sanctions could be suspended if Iran demonstrates verifiable compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. Iran, meanwhile, must recognize that provocations such as threatening maritime disruption or accelerating enrichment beyond 20% would only unify its adversaries and close off any chance of sanctions relief.
The activation of the snapback mechanism represents the most serious crisis in the JCPOA framework since the US withdrawal in 2018. It forces all parties to confront a stark choice. For Iran, the options are either to engage tactically to ease economic pressures or to escalate in ways that may provoke devastating retaliation. For the E3, the decision underscores both their determination to preserve the non-proliferation regime and their limited capacity to mediate between Washington and Tehran. For the broader international community, the coming weeks will determine whether the nuclear issue remains within the realm of diplomacy or slides inexorably toward confrontation.
The weeks leading up to September 27, when UN sanctions are likely to reenter into force, mark the last real chance for diplomacy. If sanctions return without a parallel push for dialogue, the Middle East could slip into a new cycle of confrontation, with grave consequences for regional stability and global security. The choice is not simply between sanctions and diplomacy, but between fragile negotiations and open conflict. Time is running out — and the cost of inaction could be catastrophic.
Opinions in this article reflect the writer’s point of view, not necessarily the view of Rasanah
