Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections unfolded at a moment of profound regional and domestic uncertainty, yet they also presented an unexpected possibility of the emergence of a third path; one that oscillates between the competing gravitational pulls of the United States and Iran. Early results indicated that Sudani’s coalition secured as many as 46 seats, placing it first in Baghdad and several Shiite-dominated provinces, and achieving strong second-place finishes in Sunni Arab regions. While such a performance marks an unprecedented consolidation of support across sectarian lines, the durability of this victory is conditioned on the loyalty of individuals who are on his electoral list — many of whom are vulnerable to cooptation by rival blocs in Iraq’s notoriously fluid political marketplace.
These elections took place against the backdrop of regional upheaval. The aftermath of the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the subsequent Gaza war, the weakening of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in 2024 have collectively reshaped the strategic environment surrounding Iraq. This evolving context heightens the importance of Iraq’s own balancing act between Washington and Tehran, rendering the November 2025 elections a test not only of domestic governance but of Iraq’s geopolitical orientation.
Since assuming office in 2022, Sudani has pursued a careful and at times astute strategy: preserving the consensus of the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework that brought him to power, while working methodically to expand his autonomy from Tehran and project an image of national stewardship. His insistence on keeping Iraq insulated from the regionalization of the Gaza conflict illustrates this approach. When Iran-backed militias contemplated escalatory actions in solidarity with Hamas, Sudani urged restraint. The militias understood, especially after the killing of Hezbollah’s leader in 2024, that any provocation risked overwhelming Israeli retaliation and their potential annihilation. Sudani’s capacity to prevent Iraq from sliding into another cycle of proxy warfare likely enhanced his credibility among voters weary of instability.
Voter turnout reached 56%, marking a significant increase from the historically low participation of 2021. This increase in turnout reflects a broader remobilization of political engagement, particularly among younger Iraqis who remain deeply disillusioned with the post-2003 political settlement yet increasingly acknowledge that abstention has produced limited political dividends. The elevated participation rate is notable given that several Iraqi political actors had expressed concern, in the days preceding the vote, about the prospect of persistently low turnout. In comparison, the 2021 parliamentary elections had an average participation rate of 43%.
Historically, higher turnout tends to advantage larger electoral blocs — such as Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition — whereas lower participation rates typically favor smaller parties with highly motivated bases. The fact that Sudani’s coalition secured a plurality of votes in eight provinces, including Baghdad, indicates a significant degree of political support. However, winning a plurality of votes does not automatically translate into a dominant share of parliamentary seats, given Iraq’s proportional representation system, which distributes seats according to vote share rather than through majoritarian allocation.
Throughout the electoral period, the United States exerted considerable diplomatic and economic pressure aimed at structuring the electoral process and the aftermath. Since the reduction of the United States’ troop presence after 2020, Washington has relied more heavily on political leverage and conditional financial support to shape Baghdad’s trajectory. Since 2023, Washington has increasingly tied substantial portions of its security and economic assistance to Iraq to benchmarks related to fiscal transparency, anti-corruption efforts and security-sector reform, including the role of the Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Recent US appropriations and draft legislation — notably the Liberate Iraq from Iranian Influence Act — seek to make future military assistance contingent on demonstrable steps by Baghdad to curb the autonomy of militias and strengthen civilian control over the security apparatus. US officials also promoted greater inclusion of Sunni and Kurdish actors, a priority reinforced by concerns about potential ISIS resurgence, Turkish incursions in the north and renewed Arab-Kurdish tensions.
The Trump team is seeking to consolidate its leverage in Iraq by further constraining Iranian influence. It has openly endorsed a second term for Sudani while setting explicit “red lines,” including the exclusion of politicians affiliated with Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) — one of the most influential and hardline Iran-aligned militias within the PMF — from the next cabinet. Trump’s appointment of Mark Savaya as special envoy, the first such move in two decades, signals an intent to shape government formation and to press Baghdad to curb or demobilize KH and similar groups that challenge state authority.
These policies, while aligned with the aspirations of segments of Iraqi society, also generated resentment among groups within the Coordination Framework. Pro-Iran factions accused Washington of meddling to weaken the “resistance,” framing US pressure as a form of neo-colonial intrusion. Al-Sudani navigated this pressure with a dual strategy: reaffirming Iraq’s sovereignty and rejecting overt interference in public statements, while privately reassuring US officials of his willingness to maintain a balanced relationship.
Iran, for its part, remains deeply entrenched in the Iraqi political landscape. Through decades of post-2003 engagement, Tehran has cultivated a dense network of political, economic and paramilitary ties. The Quds Force’s sustained ties with senior PMF commanders, coupled with high-level visits such as General Esmail Qaani’s mission to Baghdad on October 21, 2025, underscore Iran’s determination to safeguard its strategic depth in Iraq.
Economically, Iran leverages Iraq’s dependence on imported electricity and natural gas as well as its access to hard currency to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. Politically, Tehran exerts influence through aligned media outlets, campaign financing, and the mobilization of Shia constituencies in the south. Moreover, Iran relies on Iraq not only as a buffer against the United States but also as a conduit for circumventing sanctions and maintaining credibility within its networks of influence.
Overall, neither Tehran’s confidence in “deep bonds” nor Washington’s dependence on a “conditional partnership” offers Iraq any assurance of long-term stability. What Baghdad can plausibly pursue, however, is a form of managed equilibrium that transforms its structural vulnerabilities into a source of strategic leverage. Caught between these two sources of pressure, Iraq’s most effective defense may lie not in choosing one side over the other, but in carefully sequencing its commitments to keep both powers sufficiently engaged, contain their respective pressures, and gradually shift the prevailing narrative from political survival to effective governance.
Sudani’s political project appears aimed at rebalancing foreign influence by strengthening state institutions, improving service delivery and reducing reliance on paramilitary actors. His electoral performance suggests that many Iraqis support such an approach, even if the path to implementation remains fraught. Yet the 2025 elections mark an inflection point. If Sudani succeeds in transforming his electoral momentum into a coherent governing program independent of external influence, Iraq may inch closer to genuine sovereignty. His electoral success demonstrates that a segment of the Iraqi electorate yearns for economic stability and autonomy from Tehran’s ideological and security agenda. Whether this aspiration can translate into lasting political reality will become evident in the negotiations to form the next government. What is certain is that Iraq remains at the crossroads of regional rivalries, and its attempt to forge a third way — if sustained — could reshape its trajectory and recalibrate the balance of power in the Middle East.
