During his first foreign trip since taking office, the Pope visited Türkiye and Lebanon. The visit held both theological and political aims, especially since it was his first journey outside the Vatican. Its importance lay in the messages the Pope conveyed to the region and the broader international community.
The Pope began his trip in Türkiye on November 28, 2025, and then continued to Lebanon, where the bulk of the visit took place. In Beirut, he spoke about rejecting violence, promoting peace and addressing the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons. His visit came at a highly sensitive moment for the region — one that may represent a historic turning point. New actors are emerging, others are solidifying their power and some states that long tried to dominate regional decision-making are now in decline.
Lebanon and Türkiye stand at the center of these developments. The visit also reflected efforts to bridge Christian-Christian divides and respond to rising concerns about the future of Christian communities in the Levant — concerns that have grown following increased emigration among young Christians after the Beirut Port explosion and Hezbollah’s expanding influence in Lebanese politics. The Vatican’s strong interest in Lebanon, the most important Christian stronghold in the Middle East, stems from its commitment to offering support, guidance and reassurance during a time of deep uncertainty.
In this context, the new Pope, Leo XIV (Robert Francis), who succeeded Pope Francis in May 2025, brings with him a distinct set of priorities shaped by his strong ties to the Black community in the United States. He is an advocate for peace, nonviolence and the rights of workers and women. He continues his predecessor’s commitment to interfaith dialogue, building bridges between East and West, advancing Christian unity and narrowing theological divides among Christian denominations.
Pope Leo XIV also offers a doctrinal interpretation that departs from the populist Christian right in the United States. He supports immigrant rights, workers’ protections, fair wages and similar social-justice causes. These elements form an essential backdrop for understanding his mindset and approach to global engagement.
Accordingly, this report focuses on the broader political and theological conveyed during his first trip outside the Vatican — and on the significance of the political signals Hezbollah sought to send during the Pope’s visit.
Context and Significations of the Papal Visit
The Pope’s visit to Türkiye and then Lebanon occurred at a moment of intense global and regional tensions — religious, political and geopolitical. Although the trip coincided with the 1,700th anniversary of the Council of Nicaea, the Vatican’s objectives extended far beyond commemoration. The Pope sought to reinforce the Vatican’s religious and political presence in a region undergoing profound shifts.
For the new Pope, the visit also served as an opportunity to lay out and test the direction he intends to take during his papacy. He chose to begin by stressing unity among Christians, advocating political peace and calling for an end to conflicts between rival states. At the same time, he aimed to send a message to the East — and to the Islamic world in particular — by continuing the dialogue initiatives championed by his predecessor.
Hezbollah’s Message to the Pope
Hezbollah sought to set the tone ahead of the Pope’s arrival at Beirut’s airport by sending him a formal message and preparing the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts to take part in the reception. In its message, the party said, “We, in Hezbollah, seize the opportunity of your blessed visit to reiterate our commitment to shared coexistence, consensual democracy, internal security and stability, and the protection of national sovereignty. We stand alongside our army and our people in confronting any aggression or occupation targeting our land and our nation. If our religious conviction affirms that the followers of Jesus Christ — peace be upon him — are messengers of love, justice, and human dignity, then we rely on your principled stance in rejecting the oppression and aggression inflicted upon Lebanon by the Zionist invaders and their supporters.” The party also reiterated its opposition to foreign interference aimed at imposing any form of guardianship over Lebanon. Hezbollah went on to inform the Pope, “Lebanon — with its rich mosaic — represents a civilizational bridge between the followers of the two heavenly messages, Christianity and Islam, and among all religious, cultural, and secular traditions across the world. When human beings are placed at the center of concern for all faiths — and even for secular ideological systems — one can truly hope for the possibility of achieving lasting peace and security.” The statement also underscored “the suffering of the Lebanese people — caused by the Zionist occupation of parts of our land and its continuous aggressions and threats to our security and stability — reflects the enemy’s ambition to control our waters, land, and gas resources, and to impose political, security, and expansionist conditions without limit.”
This message carries several political and theological implications, the most significant being Hezbollah’s attempt to present itself as a party that respects the Lebanese national fabric and views sectarian and religious diversity as the foundation of Lebanon’s political and social stability and, by extension, its national security. From this perspective, any disruption to that religious makeup would threaten the Lebanese state or fundamentally destabilize a political structure that can be compared to a social contract.
At the same time, however, Hezbollah ignores its own record of hostility toward fellow Lebanese, its threats of violence and civil war against its opponents, its refusal to operate fully within the state’s legal and constitutional framework and its continued rejection of laws requiring it to surrender its weapons. In reality, the party continues to control national decision-making, behaving as an authority above the state, constitution and law. This includes maintaining relations with foreign actors and states, using these ties to consolidate its power while weakening state institutions and undermining its political rivals at home.
The party also draws on “modernity” as understood in the West — using terms such as “consensus” “democracy,”| “coexistence” and other related terms. Yet the real governing doctrine the party embraces, and repeatedly affirms, is the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih), not democracy. Its goal is to shape Lebanon into a state aligned with the supreme leader, with the party and all its members acting as “soldiers of the supreme leader.”
The invoking of modern democratic ideals and notions of pluralism is a pragmatic, tactical maneuver rather than a reflection of the party’s strategic worldview or founding ideology. Moreover, while the party tells the Pope that it stands with the army and the people, it simultaneously threatens both the army and the public should they attempt even to discuss the party’s disarmament. In reality, the party does not stand with the people or the army — politically, strategically or ideologically.
It is also important to remember that the Shiite community long predates the party; its historical roots in Lebanon run deep. Hezbollah emerged later, seeking first to assert authority over Shiite affairs and then gradually over Lebanese affairs as a whole — an ambition that the Lebanese public increasingly rejects today.
Chaos-Ridden Lebanon and the Pope’s Political Remedies
In a direct and unambiguous statement, the Pope urged Hezbollah to disarm and enter into dialogue, declaring that the Vatican calls on all warring parties to renounce weapons and violence and turn to the negotiating table. When asked specifically about Hezbollah’s prior message, he said, “I have reviewed Hezbollah’s message and prefer not to comment.” The Pope appeared largely indifferent to the party’s communication, neither responding to it substantively nor giving it significant attention. Instead, he emphasized the need for Hezbollah to relinquish arms and pursue dialogue rather than threaten allies or issue statements that mislead the international community.
In Lebanon, theological concerns took precedence in the Pope’s agenda. He focused on delivering messages to Christian communities in Lebanon and the broader East, with political considerations secondary. Among these, addressing conflicts between Christian denominations emerged as his primary concern. Promoting a safe and politically stable Lebanon aligns with the interests of Lebanese Christians, regional Christian communities and overall regional security — a key strategic priority.
For the Vatican, and for the Pope personally as a proponent of love and peace, affirming world peace and rejecting war remain central principles. By contrast, the Lebanese political elite expects the Pope to act on two fronts: first, to help curb Israeli raids on Lebanon and potentially mobilize international economic and political support to strengthen the Lebanese government and pressure Hezbollah; and second, to urge Hezbollah to disarm, thereby limiting Israel’s pretext for attacks. In this way, the Lebanese government seeks political signals from the Pope, but these objectives differ from, and at times may even conflict with, the messages Hezbollah sought to convey.
In the same context, the Pope called on the Lebanese youth to remain in their country despite the ongoing challenges and difficult circumstances. He also urged all religious communities in Lebanon to come together in the pursuit of peace. The continued presence of young Lebanese is a key concern for the Vatican, particularly given the surge in emigration following the Beirut Port explosion, Hezbollah’s dominance over national decision-making and the subsequent conflicts with Israel. The Vatican views this exodus as a serious threat to the survival of the region’s largest Christian community, as well as to religious and sectarian pluralism and Lebanon’s cultural diversity.
Türkiye’s Messages and Strategic Objectives
In Türkiye, Christians represent one of the smallest religious minorities in the world, with roughly 33,000 Catholics in a population of 88 million, while Orthodox Christians make up less than 1% of the total population. Yet the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople holds a prominent spiritual and historical role internationally, serving as the main rival to the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria. This status appears to concern the Turkish ruling elite. Last July (2025), Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that “the ecumenical title used by the Patriarchate has no legal or political meaning under Turkish or international law,” reflecting Ankara’s reservations about the political influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
In recent years, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has assumed a significant role in global Orthodox affairs, most notably granting independence to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Moscow’s authority — a move that angered Russia. Turkish concerns may also stem from domestic political tensions. Opposition parties argue that the Pope’s visit and official reception threaten the country’s secularism, with even religious opposition voices rejecting the trip.
Ahead of the Nicaea Council celebrations, the Turkish opposition party Renaissance Renewal, led by Fatih Erbakan — the son of the late Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, widely regarded as the architect of the Turkish Islamist movement — organized a protest march against the Pope’s visit and the planned Mass in Nicaea. Mehmet Kaygusuz, head of the party’s Bursa branch, criticized the visit as “a political move, not a religious one.” During the march, he warned the Turkish government that the Pope’s meeting with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew — the spiritual leader of some 260 million Orthodox Christians worldwide — represented “an attempt to target Türkiye’s sovereignty,” asserting that the visit was not “a pilgrimage or a tourist event,” but a politically motivated action orchestrated by the Vatican.
While the Turkish government expressed understandable reservations about the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s activities due to historical and geostrategic concerns, it simultaneously sought to capitalize on the Pope’s visit. Ankara aimed to present Türkiye as a leading Sunni Muslim state, a hub for interfaith dialogue and a bridge between East and West.
During a meeting with the Pope at the Vatican last July, Emine Erdoğan highlighted that “for centuries, Türkiye has been a land where religions and cultures have coexisted peacefully,” emphasizing that “Christian communities are an integral part of the Turkish cultural fabric.” She also referenced recent legal reforms that restored property rights to religious minorities.
Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between East and West, drawing on its Islamic heritage and Ottoman legacy, which historically bordered Europe for centuries. Ankara sought to convey to the new Pope that Türkiye could serve as a platform for interfaith dialogue and as a cultural and diplomatic link between civilizations.
This perspective was echoed by the Pope in his address at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, where he described Türkiye, with its geographical location and cultural and religious diversity, as “a natural bridge between East and West and a meeting point of civilizations.” He cautioned that the dominance of any single group within Turkish society could undermine its pluralism, asserting that “society can only thrive through diversity.” He also called for respect for the dignity of all residents, including women, foreigners and the poor.
Türkiye’s message to the Pope sought to strengthen its soft power and global influence as a center for intercultural dialogue, aiming to reshape its image in the West. The message also reflects Ankara’s desire to compete with other Islamic and Eastern powers that wield historical, cultural and religious influence in the Muslim world — such as Tehran, which regards itself as the “Mother of Cities” and has long aimed to dominate Islamic capitals; Cairo, whose interpretation of Islam, represented by Al-Azhar, is similar to that of the Turks, though political rivalry extends into the religious sphere; and Saudi Arabia, home to the Two Holy Mosques, the cradle of Islam and birthplace of revelation, which has asserted a strong leadership role over the past decade.
In this context, Türkiye sought to present itself to the Vatican as a dependable partner in building bridges between East and West and between Christianity and Islam.
The Visit’s Outcomes
Pope Leo began his visit to Türkiye in the town of İznik (formerly Nicaea) in Bursa Province, northwestern Türkiye, to mark the 1,700th anniversary of the First Council of Nicaea, which established the Nicene Creed followed by most Christians worldwide today. Speaking at an event with Christian leaders from across the Middle East, the Pope condemned violence motivated by religion and urged efforts to overcome centuries-old divisions. Addressing senior religious figures from countries including Türkiye, Egypt and Syria, he described the ongoing disunity among the world’s 2.6 billion Christians as a disgrace.
Why İznik/Nicaea?
Nicaea was the site of the first synod of bishops from around the world in 325 AD. This council was convened not at the request of the clergy but by Emperor Constantine, aiming to organize the church’s administrative structure and resolve a theological dispute, particularly between Arius of Alexandria and Pope Alexander I of Alexandria. The disagreement concerned the nature of Christ: whether he was of the same essence as God, as Alexander argued, or whether he did not possess God’s eternity and there was a time when Christ did not exist, meaning the Father alone existed initially before creating the Son, as Arius contended.
At the conclusion of the council, a decree condemned Arius’s teachings and exiled him along with his leading followers, following the emperor’s orders. Arius’s writings were to be burned, and anyone concealing them faced punishment. In this context, the Pope’s visit to Nicaea and his calls for unity and the end of schisms carry a clear message to all Christians — Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants — to overcome divisions, potentially under the Vatican’s leadership, the largest and most influential church in the Christian world. The Pope stated, “I am convinced that by returning to the Council of Nicaea and drawing together from this common source,” adding, “we will be able to see in a different light the points that still separate us,” and that “through theological dialogue and with God’s help, we will gain a better understanding of the mystery that unites us.”
Unity of the Christian World
During his visits to Türkiye and Lebanon, the Pope highlighted the issue of Christian unity, especially between the Orthodox (including Eastern churches) and the Catholics. This theme has been a persistent concern for him; he called for reconciliation with the Anglicans immediately after his election. Last October, he also met with King Charles of Britain for the first joint prayer service between the heads of the two churches in five hundred years. The ceremony began with a prayer recited in English in the Sistine Chapel, the largest chapel in the Papal Palace, symbolizing the rapprochement and unity between the Anglican and Catholic churches after centuries of division. A statement from King Charles’ office described the strengthened relationship between the two denominations as “bulwark against those promoting conflict, division and tyranny.” Clearly, fostering reconciliation has been a central focus for the Pope since he assumed office.
In Türkiye, he visited the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and received a warm welcome during the Divine Liturgy at the Patriarchal Church of St. George, held on the feast day of St. Andrew the Blessed, founder of the Church of Constantinople. The Mass, presided over by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew with participation from Theodore of Alexandria, was attended by bishops from both churches, representatives of other Christian denominations, diplomats and officials — including Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Loverdos — and a large crowd of believers.
During the celebration, Patriarch Bartholomew and Pope Leo XIV reaffirmed their commitment to making every effort to ensure harmony and unity between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. In his address following the Divine Liturgy, Patriarch Bartholomew referred to the Pope as “a beloved brother,” noting that the joint commemoration of the 1700th anniversary of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea had strengthened ecclesial unity. He also reiterated his proposal to celebrate Easter on a common date, indicating that Constantinople and Rome were exploring ways to achieve this.
The Ecumenical Patriarch emphasized that unity is a pressing need “especially in our times,” marked by wars and forms of discrimination stemming from the desire of some to dominate. He specifically mentioned the war in Ukraine, stating, “We cannot be complicit in the bloodshed taking place in Ukraine.”
For his part, Pope Leo XIV expressed his support for dialogue between the churches of Rome and Constantinople, acknowledging that there were “many misunderstandings and even conflicts” of the past and challenges of the present in “achieving full communion,” he said, we must continue to strive towards unity and “continue to consider each other as brothers and sisters in Christ and to love one another accordingly.” He emphasized his goal to protect society and unity and concluded that in these times of conflict and bloodshed, the Church must play the role of peacemaker.
Here we note that the literature of rapprochement did not originate solely from the Vatican but also came from Patriarch Bartholomew himself. The Egyptian “Alexandrian” Church was absent from the scene, suggesting that the Vatican may have recognized the significant obstacles to rapprochement with the Patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Alexandria. Consequently, it turned to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which may face fewer hardline factions internally and possess sufficient political space to move toward closer ties with the Vatican.
Opportunities and Challenges: Ending Political and Theological Divisions
Christian Divisions
The question of the division or unity of the Christian world and its three main churches is undoubtedly of paramount importance globally, and especially in the Middle East, the cradle of Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Conflicts continue today in Palestine and Lebanon, driven by both religious and political factors. Muslim-Christian relations remain crucial in the region and were a direct cause of colonial interventions in the 18th century.
The important question, however, is whether it is truly possible to end the religious divisions among Christian denominations today. Even if this historical, theological and political division were resolved, what impact would it have on the Middle East? Achieving church unity in the modern era appears not only extremely difficult but perhaps impossible, due to differing interpretations of Christ’s nature. Disagreements also persist within the same denomination, such as between the Greek Orthodox and Coptic Orthodox churches (the Coptic Orthodox Church is based in Alexandria, founded by Saint Mark, while the Greek Orthodox Church follows the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and is more widespread in Greece, the Levant and Russia).
The difference between the Coptic Orthodox and Greek Orthodox churches is not merely a historical theological divergence, but a fundamental doctrinal disagreement that led to the schism after the Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD. From the perspective of the Coptic Church, the belief in the “two separate natures” affirmed by Chalcedon represents a deviation from the true faith, considered heretical. Moreover, Pope Tawadros II of Alexandria and Patriarch of the See of St. Mark did not attend the celebrations marking the 1700th anniversary of the Council of Nicaea, and thus did not meet with the Pope of the Vatican, explaining his absence as due to unforeseen circumstances.
However, anyone following developments within the Alexandrian Church knows the pressure exerted by hardline factions on Pope Tawadros to halt his attempts at rapprochement with the Vatican. Some extremists within the Church even accused him of heresy, a charge comparable to apostasy in Islam, particularly after the 2017 agreement between Alexandria and the Vatican regarding the sacrament of baptism. Pope Tawadros described them as extremists or ignorant, yet he still yielded to their influential voices within the Egyptian Church and slowed the rapprochement process with the Vatican.
Politically, Türkiye’s national security requires that its church remains local and separate from any potential unity or strategic relationship with outside entities, including the Vatican, which could affect the government’s policies and its control over the public sphere. Likewise, Turkish secularists worry about protecting Türkiye’s secularism, while Islamists fear any return to the country’s Christian heritage.
In Egypt, home to the ancient Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria, Egyptians also fear major shifts in the relationship between the Egyptian Church and either the Vatican or Constantinople. The Egyptian Church today plays a prominent political role in matters that affect national security, particularly in Africa (Sudan and Ethiopia). Although small and decentralized globally compared to the wider Christian world, the Egyptian regime treats it as a soft power tool.
Regarding the Anglican Church, even a meeting between the British monarch and the Pope is insufficient to resolve a centuries-old issue deeply rooted in history. Furthermore, hardline and populist factions within the Catholic Church itself resist rapprochement with Eastern or other churches. Some even promote white supremacy, oppose immigration and regard labor rights and fair wages with suspicion. Thus, while Christian divisions are fundamentally theological, they are intertwined with political, religious, economic, personal and self-serving interests — all of which hinder resolution.
Opportunities to End Political Disputes
The Pope’s visit to Lebanon and Türkiye comes at a moment when local and regional issues intersect, and where the front lines in the south of Lebanon overlap with political and sectarian divisions. Therefore, assessing the Vatican’s potential to resolve political conflicts is a complex process, one that goes beyond the purely religious or protocol-driven nature of the visit. The very presence of the Pope in Beirut demonstrated that this is not a routine event, but a significant milestone with implications beyond mere symbolism. It represents a rare opportunity to revisit questions of statehood and coexistence amid escalating Israeli threats and clarion US messages warning of the possibility of a wider war in the south.
During the visit, there was a temporary respite from tensions. A noticeable decrease in Israeli strikes and drone attacks was recorded, and Lebanese state institutions appeared eager to project an image of unity, issuing statements reaffirming Lebanon as a country founded “for and by freedom,” not for the benefit of any particular group. While this visit confirmed that Lebanon still commands religious and international attention, it also highlighted internal divisions — particularly in light of Hezbollah’s open letter to the Vatican, which drew condemnation and appeared as an attempt to grant spiritual legitimacy to a force operating outside the state’s authority.
Although the papal address focused on peace, reconciliation and respect for sovereignty, and included appeals to Lebanese youth to persevere, the impact of this address remains largely symbolic. Major contentious issues — such as Hezbollah’s weapons, national sovereignty, state borders and decisions about war and peace — cannot be changed by the visit alone, given the prevailing imbalance of power, deep political divides and the direct regional influence of Iran and Israel on Lebanon’s internal dynamics. Field reports indicate that Israel continues its stated objectives of dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, and aerial escalation persists despite the temporary lull during the visit. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s internal dynamics — where Erdogan sought to use the visit to boost his international reputation and show support for religious diversity — still largely serve symbolic purposes and will not necessarily lead to major policy changes or influence the region’s intricate conflicts.
The visit serves as an important moment for reopening political debate and raising public awareness about existential threats facing Lebanon and the region. Yet, it does not, on its own, provide a path to ending conflicts. It can create a more conducive environment for dialogue and remind Lebanese factions that preserving the state requires internal consensus. It may also support certain international decisions, but it cannot impose solutions or shift the balance of power while regional forces — from Israeli escalation to Iranian support — continue to define Lebanon’s limits. In short, the event opens a significant symbolic window, but one that requires genuine internal will and regional and international support to transform it from a ceremonial occasion into a starting point for a new political path. In its current state, it offers Lebanon primarily a moment of moral support rather than viable political solutions.
Politically, for Türkiye, the Pope’s visit represents an opportunity to reinforce its role as a champion of dialogue and religious tolerance and to demonstrate its commitment to protecting the Christian community within its borders, thereby enhancing its international image. Türkiye’s motivations can be understood from several perspectives. It seeks to establish a regional and international foothold by presenting itself as a responsible state capable of conducting religious and political dialogue with the Vatican. This grants it additional influence over regional issues where religion and politics intersect, such as in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
Furthermore, Türkiye aims to achieve symbolic and diplomatic gains by showcasing its commitment to protecting religious diversity, strengthening its political and moral standing and enabling it to garner international support on regional matters such as refugee policy and cooperation with the European Union. Leveraging direct communication channels with the Vatican is also a strategic objective, providing Türkiye with diplomatic tools to influence regional affairs. The visit’s symbolic dimension allows Türkiye to reinforce its image as a mediator capable of reconciling religions and peoples, thereby enhancing its position on the international stage and giving it greater flexibility to steer regional conflicts in line with its interests.
However, this does not mean that the visit did not have political repercussions domestically. Some opposition parties or political actors who disagree with Erdogan’s policies view the visit as an attempt to exploit a religious event to strengthen his political and personal position. This could open debate within Türkiye about the state’s priorities and the use of religious symbolism in sensitive regional matters.
Conclusion
The papal tour, which included Türkiye and Lebanon, represents a clear effort by one of the world’s most influential religious authorities to encourage greater stability in the region. This is pursued through a discourse centered on dialogue, rejecting the use of weapons and emphasizing the protection of religious diversity. The Vatican aims to strengthen the Church’s role and restore the Catholic community’s influence over Christian discourse by advocating for the unification of centers of Christian religious activity. However, the visit’s capacity to resolve religious and political conflicts remains limited. During the Türkiye leg of the tour, the Vatican’s presence was approached with clear political sensitivity, as Ankara engaged with the Church within the framework of carefully considered sovereign considerations. Thus, the visit is not expected to produce a major religious or political breakthrough, but rather a symbolic event that signals a mutual desire to maintain open channels of communication without compromising the fundamental principles of the Turkish state.
The Pope’s ability to resolve political disputes in Lebanon is extremely limited. The primary obstacles to stability are not purely internal but are entwined with complex regional dynamics involving Iran, Israel, and the broader Middle Eastern context. Consequently, the Vatican’s initiative remains largely symbolic, offering moral support and stimulating public debate, yet lacking the leverage to directly shift the regional balance of power.
Therefore, while the visit carries significant political and spiritual weight, it falls short — under current circumstances — of achieving a meaningful breakthrough in Lebanon’s conflicts unless it is complemented by broader regional and international measures that address the root causes of instability.
